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Foreword
Unemployment Insurance in the American Economy was published in
1966. Written by William Haber and Merrill Murray, this book remained the
definitive work on the unemployment insurance system for the next twentyfive years. By the 1960s, the Upjohn Institute had already staked out unem
ployment insurance as one of its primary fields of emphasis. Merrill Murray
was part-time on the staff of the Upjohn Institute, and Harold Taylor, then
Director of the Institute, encouraged the authors to pursue the book. The Insti
tute funded the effort and assisted with the publication of the book.
In 1980, Saul Blaustein discussed with Wilbur Cohen, a key figure in the
development of the federal-state UI system in the United States, the concept of
a new book that would update and expand upon the 1966 work. Merrill Mur
ray had passed away, but William Haber, nearing age 90, agreed to help. The
Institute enthusiastically agreed to support the effort, as it had the original.
During the 1980s both Cohen and Haber passed away. Meanwhile, the
scope of the new project had grown considerably from the original concept.
Blaustein, now working alone, decided to split the work into two parts, with
the first part covering the fifty-year history of the system from its inception in
1936 to 1990. This work, entitled Unemployment Insurance in the United
States: The First Half Century, was published by the Institute in 1993.
Chapters of the Haber and Murray book were divided into five parts. The
Blaustein book essentially followed the format of the first two parts, parallel
ing and expanding the discussions on the nature of the unemployment prob
lem, the objectives of unemployment insurance, and how unemployment
insurance developed abroad and in the United States. After a discussion of
unemployment insurance provisions in the Social Security Act of 1935 and the
beginnings of the system, Blaustein devoted almost two hundred pages to the
evolution and growth of the system over the next fifty years, while the original
work covered the growth of UI in only thirty-five pages of text. This difference
reflects both the need to cover an additional twenty-five to thirty years of
experience and the incorporation of new material on the older period. The
emphasis of the Blaustein book remained historical. Blaustein discussed how
the system and coverage expanded through the 1960s, were put under finan
cial strain by the recession of the 1970s, and evolved new approaches to
financing. A brief discussion in Haber and Murray on state legislation became
a major chapter in Blaustein, in which state laws and experiences were com
pared—with emphasis on events in three years, 1948, 1971 and 1990.
This current volume, Unemployment Insurance in the United States: Anal
ysis of Policy Issues, was intended to encompass and expand on the topics cov
ered in Part III of the Haber and Murray book, "Issues in Unemployment

Insurance." Blaustein produced early drafts of some of the chapters of this
book, and Murray Rubin, then a private consultant but for many years a senior
policy analyst in the Department of Labor, was commissioned to complete the
work. Rubin produced initial drafts of a few chapters, but sadly, passed away
before completion. Chris O'Leary, senior economist on the Institute staff and
specialist on unemployment insurance, took over the production of this vol
ume.
In 1995, with joint funding from the Upjohn Institute and the U.S. Depart
ment of Labor, a conference was held to help celebrate the fiftieth anniversary
of the Institute and to provide a forum for presentation of papers commissioned
by the Institute and slated to become chapters in the policy issue volume.
The issues of coverage, eligibility, adequacy of benefits, duration of bene
fits (including extended benefits), labor market attachment, benefit financing,
fraud and abuse, and federal-state relations, are all covered in this volume, as
they were in the original work. These are still the broad categories of issues
facing federal and state legislative bodies concerning unemployment insur
ance. Many specific concerns regarding UI have changed in response to
changing circumstances and attitudes. For example, Paul Decker's chapter,
"Work Incentives and Disincentives," summarizes what is known about the
issue of whether UI payments discourage job search and provides insight into
the even more recent concern with getting UI beneficiaries back to work more
quickly. The recessions of the 1970s and 1980s greatly strained the financial
integrity of the UI Trust Fund and gave rise to questions of trust fund ade
quacy. What was done about this problem is discussed in Mike Miller, Robert
Pavosevich and Wayne Vroman's chapter on "Trends in Unemployment Insur
ance Benefit Financing." The current congressional interest in devolution is
reflected in an excellent discussion provided by Tom West and Jerry Hildebrand in their chapter, "Federal-State Relations." Overall, this book should
become an essential reference for anyone interested in the state of knowledge
about the policy issues facing the UI system.
O'Leary was joined in this effort by Steve Wandner, who is a visiting senior
research associate at the Urban Institute on leave from the U.S. Department of
Labor. Together they guided this work to completion, including commission
ing papers, writing chapters, organizing the conference, editing the papers,
and generally preparing the manuscript for publication. O'Leary and Wandner
did an outstanding job in bringing this major work to fruition.
Robert G. Spiegelman
Executive Director Emeritus
W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research
December 1996

Preface
This book attempts to present an accessible survey of what is known about
how the federal-state system of unemployment insurance (UI) works in the
United States and to offer ideas for further improvement of the system. To
faithfully accomplish such a challenging project required the dedicated effort
of many experts on the UI program.
The chapters for this book were originally written for and presented at a
conference held in June 1995 at Kalamazoo, Michigan. The conference was
jointly sponsored by the U.S. Department of Labor and the W.E. Upjohn Insti
tute for Employment Research. It was a main event in the celebration of the
Institute's fiftieth anniversary.
At the conference, after each chapter was presented by the author, exten
sive oral and written comments were provided by a primary discussant who
suggested ways to improve the content and exposition. Other conference par
ticipants also offered comments on each chapter. Following the conference,
almost all chapters were extensively rewritten, based on input from discus
sants, conference attendees, and the editors.
The introductory and concluding chapters were written by the editors.
Strong contributions from the talented researchers who wrote the other chap
ters made this task a pleasure. The chapters are structured so as to naturally
form a comprehensive book on UI policy, yet at the same time remain inde
pendent self-contained tracts on each topic. While this dual aim resulted in a
small degree of overlap, we felt that the value of the book as a reference will
benefit significantly. For example, rather than listing all references together at
the back of the book, we place chapter-specific references at the end of each
separate chapter, thereby providing brief topic bibliographies.
Having completed our attempt at this substantial project, we now hold our
predecessors—William Haber, Merrill Murray, and Saul Blaustein—in even
greater esteem. We are indebted to them and also to Wilbur Cohen and Murray
Rubin for laying the foundation for the present volume. We also thank the
chapter authors, without whom this project would have been impossible. Brief
biographical sketches for them are provided in the section "about the authors,"
which appears near the back of the book. We also thank the conference chap
ter discussants, who are recognized individually in the notes to each chapter.
Many other friends of the Upjohn Institute and experts on UI who attended the
conference also contributed valuable and constructive guidance for the
project. These included the scholars who served as session chairs for the con
ference: Bob Spiegelman, Gary Burtless, Bob LaLonde, Carl Davidson, Frank
Brechling, Susan Houseman, and David Fretwell.

We offer special thanks to Janet Norwood for delivering the keynote
address at the conference in June of 1995. At that time Dr. Norwood was serv
ing as chair of the Advisory Council on Unemployment Compensation. Prior
to that she had a long tenure as commissioner of the U.S. Bureau of Labor Sta
tistics. From her unique perspective, she offered comments which both sharp
ened the focus of the conference and helped to celebrate the fiftieth
anniversary of the Upjohn Institute.
For special assistance with chapters 1, 5, 15, and the performance measure
ment section of chapter 13, the editors would like to thank Dr. Burman Skrable
of the UI Service in the U.S. Department of Labor, who also contributed chap
ter 10 to the book. Others in the UI Service whom we would like to thank are
Norman Harvey, who originally developed the historical analysis of UI perfor
mance measures presented in chapter 13, Tom Stengle, who provided graphics
and tables for chapters 13 and 15, Diana Runner, who provided tabulations of
UI state law data for chapter 15, John Palumbi, who provided special data tab
ulations and analysis that appear in several different chapters, Kurt Schlauch
and Wayne Gordon, who provided information on the UI experiments and
worker profiling, and Virginia Chupp, Jerry Hildebrand, Diana Runner, Jon
Messenger, and John Palumbi, who reviewed the text of several chapters.
We also acknowledge the special contributions of Saul Blaustein and Mur
ray Rubin, who worked on an earlier attempt at this book. While chapters 5
and 6 both contain new material, Murray Rubin is listed as a co-author for
each chapter because much of his earlier work was incorporated. Similarly,
Saul Blaustein's work was incorporated into chapter 1, for which he is listed as
co-author. We also benefited from the on-going input and encouragement
received from Saul Blaustein throughout the course of this project.
Finally, we thank the W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research for
supporting our effort in many ways. At the Institute, clerical assistance and
help in organizing the UI conference were provided by Claire Black, Ellen
Maloney, and Phyllis Molhoek; final copy editing was organized by Judy Gen
try; and management support was provided by Randall Eberts, Allan Hunt,
and Robert Spiegelman. In particular we thank Bob Spiegelman for helping to
initiate this project at a time when completion seemed a distant hope.
As editors of this volume, we are responsible for any errors and for policy
judgements. We and the chapter authors have been free to express our own
opinions. As a result, the text reflects the opinions of the authors and editors. It
does not necessarily represent the positions of the W.E. Upjohn Institute for
Employment Research, the United States Department of Labor, or other orga
nizations with which chapter authors are affiliated.
Christopher J. O'Leary
Stephen A. Wandner
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CHAPTER

1

Policy Issues
An Overview
Saul J. Blaustein
W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research, retired
Christopher J. O'Leary
W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research
Stephen A. Wandner
Urban Institute and UI Service, U.S. Department of Labor

The federal-state program of unemployment insurance (UI) is well
established among economic institutions in the United States. It has an
undeniable influence throughout the economy, affecting personal
incomes, employer taxes, federal-state relations, and interstate compe
tition for industrial production and employment.
The UI program serves a variety of functions that help frame
employment relations between Americans. Over the nearly sixty years
since the program's inception, these functions have come to be
accepted and relied upon by both workers and employers.
UI partially replaces lost income for individual workers who are
involuntarily unemployed, and, in the aggregate, it helps to maintain
purchasing power during economic downturns. It reduces the dispersal
of skilled workers when employers impose temporary layoffs and
helps prevent the breakdown of general labor standards during such
periods. Some features unique to the UI system in the United States are
designed to encourage employers to stabilize employment levels.
During the twentieth century, the existence of a reliable system of
unemployment compensation has become a hallmark of a developed,
modern industrial economy. Rapidly growing middle-income coun
tries, from central Europe and sub-Saharan Africa to southeastern Asia,
are experiencing urbanization of their peoples and are seeking systems
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for insuring incomes. There is a recognition that workers in an indus
trial economy are separated from the subsistence guaranteed by the
land in an agrarian society. When designing a safety net for workers,
these emerging nations are faced with two broadly differing strategies
concerning UI. 1
The UI approach popular in Europe emphasizes income replacement
without much attention to return to work or to stabilizing employment.
The American UI system presents a distinct alternative, which is cus
tom designed to operate in a competitive market economy. The system
in the United States emphasizes individual responsibility, while the
European system views unemployment compensation as a social obli
gation.
At the core of most contentious issues in the federal-state UI system
in the United States is the struggle between social generosity and indi
vidual responsibility. These competing interests must be weighed to
determine matters such as the scope of coverage, the requirements for
benefit eligibility, the appropriate level and duration of benefits, and
the distribution of the financing burden.
Social attitudes about the unemployed as workers and income pro
viders shape the public view of unemployment. Perceptions about
employers as business operators and job providers influence how the
public sees employer responsibilities for workers. Also critical to
resolving UI issues are public attitudes regarding the proper role of
government in dealing with the problem of unemployment.
The diverse issues generated by conflicting public opinions are diffi
cult to sort out neatly. Yet, this chapter attempts to make a brief exposi
tion of some of these attitudes and of the broader and more
fundamental controversies they engender so as to help illuminate the
later discussions of specific program issues. In the next section, the
genesis of the UI program and the controversies surrounding it are
examined. This analysis begins with a brief review of the historical
context of UI and is followed by a discussion of public attitudes toward
unemployment and about UI. The third section of this chapter, which
considers UI in the larger context of economic security, includes a dis
cussion of the distinctions between UI and welfare programs, UI as
part of the whole social safety net, and the role of UI in the overall
economy. Conflicting and shifting viewpoints about the causes of
unemployment and the character of the unemployed then lead to an
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overview of the basic controversy concerning the UI program's effects
on the incentive to work. Fifth, the subjective element of an individ
ual's unemployment is considered as the basis for questions about fair
ness and efficiency in administration and about possible fraud and
abuse of the system. The sixth section discusses the controversy arising
from employers and workers pressed to advance their particular eco
nomic interests in regard to issues of UI taxation and benefit levels.
The conflict inherent in the federal-state relationship on which the UI
system is built is subsequently reviewed as a source of dispute in the
program. The chapter concludes with reflection on whether and how
knowledge about the working of UI is used to improve the system.

Genesis of the Program and Controversy
Historical Context of Controversy

The federal government's adoption of a major, active role in social
planning during the Great Depression provoked widespread public
controversy because that move departed from the traditional laissezfaire approach of government. Prior to the 1930s, unemployment was
not regarded as much more than a temporary and occasional problem,
an inevitable seasonal or cyclical malady of industrial society. Once
business and employment recovered, public concern about unemploy
ment faded. Workers who experienced much unemployment were
often seen as responsible for their own predicament. They were viewed
as either not industrious enough to hold steady jobs or fundamentally
flawed in their character. In cases where job and wage loss produced
temporary family deprivation, local privately funded welfare agencies
were regarded as the appropriate sources of assistance. In some areas,
public unemployment relief was provided by local government. 2
Public UI proposals were advanced in a number of states before
1930, but these initiatives were not broadly accepted given prevailing
attitudes. The thought of federal government intervention to deal with
unemployment was an even more remote idea and viewed as probably
unconstitutional. Most employers did not see provision for the unem
ployed as a responsibility of business. The few who did thought that
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unemployment benefit plans should be provided by employers on a pri
vate, voluntary basis.
The reality of mass unemployment during the depression of the
1930s made clear that personal deficiency was not the only cause of the
problem. As joblessness reached into the homes of executives, whitecollar workers, and skilled mechanics—people who heretofore had
been untouched by unemployment—the realization grew that the
industrious and efficient worker as well as the marginal, unstable, lazy
worker could be affected. Moreover, the problem was not of brief dura
tion; unemployment persisted. Personal economic hardship among the
jobless became widespread. Efforts to ease these difficulties over
whelmed private welfare resources and local government relief. Resis
tance to large-scale government assistance for the unemployed could
not long withstand the pressures exerted by the massive needs of so
many over so many years.
Old attitudes began to give way, though not willingly or universally.
The exposure of millions of workers and their families to the indignity
of applying for and accepting relief shifted opinions sufficiently to
broaden the support for unemployment benefits provided on an orderly,
prefunded, social insurance basis. Employer organizations continued to
resist the coming of UI, but with the continuation of the depression, it
could no longer be denied.
The federal-state unemployment compensation program was autho
rized as part of the Social Security Act enacted August 14, 1935. As a
result of tax offset inducements contained in the companion Federal
Unemployment Tax Act, by July 1937, in all states plus Alaska,
Hawaii, and the District of Columbia, legislation had been passed to
create UI programs. "The constitutionality of the state and federal laws
was challenged in several states as soon as [UI] taxes became payable
on employment after January 1, 1936. The U.S. Supreme Court upheld
the constitutionality of the New York law in November 1936, and that
of the Social Security Act and the Alabama Unemployment Compensa
tion Act in May 1937" (Rosbrow 1986, p. 7). In writing the majority
opinion, Justice Benjamin Cardozo asserted that it was not a lack of
compassion for the unemployed, but rather a reluctance to competi
tively disadvantage native industries that discouraged states from inde
pendently establishing UI systems before 1935.
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While the depression altered general attitudes enough to make the
federal-state UI system possible, the opposing points of view did not
disappear. Today, UI is widely accepted as a permanent public pro
gram. Millions of Americans, however, still find it difficult to accom
modate themselves philosophically to the idea that unemployed
workers should be allowed to receive benefits as a matter of right even
if they do not appear to need them. Unemployment is recognized as a
continuing problem, although it is more acute during dips in the busi
ness cycle than at other times. Most unemployment is viewed as the
consequence of impersonal economic forces, but during nonrecession
periods, the belief that unemployment is the fault of the worker usually
resurfaces. Thus, this classical view of unemployment lives on within
the populace and forms a significant basis for continued controversy
about many UI aspects and for resistance to the program's expansion
and improvement.
In the 1980s and particularly in the 1990s, this perspective on unem
ployment has been partially offset by a growing public awareness of
the impact of permanent worker dislocation, which results from
increasingly competitive markets at home and abroad and from the
impacts of rapid technological change. The widespread potential for
worker dislocation has caused the public to be more concerned about
unemployment, even in nonrecessionary times. 3
Public Attitudes toward Unemployment in a Market Economy

As noted, the general view prior to the 1930s was that unemploy
ment was primarily the result of the individual's own deficiency. The
experience of the Great Depression shook this position, but its hold on
the public mind has remained a strong force, making difficult nearly
every effort to extend and improve the UI program.
One expression of this view appeared in the Wall Street Journal in
1914:
Let any man ask himself how often has he seen really industrious
workmen out of employment for any length of time, except by
their own choice in a labor dispute? The man who wants work can
get it, and can soon establish a character that will get him better
work (Wall Street Journal, March 5, 1914).
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In her classic 1930 analysis of case studies of unemployed persons,
Clinch Calkins summed up the earlier attitudes as follows:
There are several widely held ideas about unemployment... . One
of them is that unemployment comes only in hard times. ... A
second presumption is that under unemployment only those who
have been too thriftless to save suffer. And still a third, the most
pervasive of all, is that if a man really wants to find work, he can
find it (Calkins 1930, pp. 20-21).

A quarter of a century after the federal-state UI system had been
established, a sample survey of urban Ohio households gave evidence
that a large proportion of Americans still held to the idea that those
who truly want work can always find a job. When asked "whose fault is
it when people become unemployed?" 37 percent of employees, 38
percent of the self-employed, and 58 percent of employers interviewed
put the blame on the unemployed themselves (Ohio State University
Research Foundation 1963). Among employees, those in professional
occupations were most likely to respond this way (48 percent). Profes
sionals were also least likely to experience unemployment. Among
unskilled workers, the proportion blaming workers for their own unem
ployment was much less (23 percent). The higher respondents' educa
tional attainment, the more likely they were to blame a jobless worker
for being unemployed and, as noted by the survey report:
The people with the greater amounts of formal education, presum
ably the most informed people, are those who most likely have
been exposed to the ideas of economics, including the widely-held
notion of involuntary unemployment. Yet this seems to make little
difference regarding their beliefs about the reasons for unemploy
ment. It must be, therefore, that this attitude is the manifestation
of a more-or-less deeply held belief that is not susceptible to alter
ation or modification merely through exposure to the thinking and
opinions of those generally regarded as "experts" (Ohio State Uni
versity Research Foundation 1963, p. 33).

Adams (1971, p. 22) reviewed a 1965 Gallup Poll conducted for the
Washington Post in which 75 percent of a national sample responded
yes when asked, "Do you think many people collect unemployment
benefits even though they could find work?" (Washington Post, Sep
tember 16, 1965). Respondents were more likely to answer in the affir
mative if they had higher incomes and more education.
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Since the 1960s, there have not been any surveys specifically mea
suring the extent of public belief that unemployment is the fault of the
individual. Views expressed on occasion in the news media or by busi
ness and political leaders give evidence that this attitude still holds to a
significant and influential degree. These opinions may be heard as
complaints that positions go unfilled while jobless workers crowd the
UI rolls.4
Recognition that the unemployed may not always match the require
ments of the vacant jobs, or that their location may be wrong, or that
employers seeking workers may not always be willing to offer reason
able wages sometimes tempers such a blanket indictment. Citing case
studies of unemployed white collar workers, a March 1993 cover story
in Fortune magazine said that "while the economy is growing steadily
again, more than nine million Americans remain jobless, victims of
changes they cannot control" (Erdman 1993, pp. 40-49).
Regardless of who is to blame for unemployment, the American
public regards it as a serious national problem. When asked in 1994 by
Princeton Survey Research Associates for Newsweek magazine, "How
concerned are you about the effects of unemployment and a lack of
good-paying jobs?" 92 percent of the national sample of 742 adults
said that they were either somewhat or very concerned.
In a series of national surveys conducted between 1988 and 1995 by
the Hart and Teeter Research Companies for NEC News and the Wall
Street Journal, registered voters were asked, "Which of the following
list of economic issues facing the country do you feel is the most
important right now: inflation, unemployment, interest rates, the Fed
eral budget deficit, Federal taxes, or the U.S. trade deficit?"5 The sur
vey was conducted more than a dozen times, at approximately sixmonth intervals. Unemployment and the federal budget deficit always
topped the list of most important economic issues. In June 1988, unem
ployment was picked by 28 percent, while 34 percent said the deficit;
by January 1992, as unemployment had risen, 53 percent said unem
ployment, while 16 percent said the deficit; and by January 1995, as
unemployment fell, the responses were nearly identical to those in June
1988. Public sentiment expressed in these survey results clearly
reflects the competing pressures on UI policy makers. Notably, survey
respondents indicated the third most pressing economic issue to be fed
eral taxes.
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Public Attitudes toward Unemployment Insurance

Many Americans have viewed UI not as a social insurance program
but more like welfare and other public assistance programs. As such,
these individuals consider UI as running counter to such historic values
as individual and local self-reliance and a free market economy. Writ
ing in the mid-1950s, the historian Max Lerner noted in his study
America As Civilization that the process of social reform and increased
assumption by the state of responsibility for certain needs of the people
had been going on since the start of the century, and that the process
was opposed throughout by various interest groups, in part by invoking
those historic values. These public programs developed with great dif
ficulty, much reluctance, and almost grudgingly. Lerner wrote that
Americans
have responded piecemeal and in irregular fashion to the need for
workmen's compensation, unemployment benefits, old-age insur
ance, subsidized low-cost housing (etc.) . . . what has emerged in
each area of welfare is the acceptance of the principle of responsi
bility but with the least challenge to private enterprise, the least
burden on the tax structure, and the greatest reliance on the volun
tary principle. The broad formula has been for the government to
set a floor below which security and welfare cannot fall, to use
government funds for the more claimant forms of social insurance
but to let the others go, to give the states the widest possible dis
cretion, to steer away from centralized authority and administra
tion...to put the burden of expanding the programs upon continued
popular pressures (Lerner 1957, p. 131).

In this passage, Lerner identified the heart of much of the basic UI
controversy. The program was designed to minimize any disruption to
the private free market system. Political pressures work toward keeping
it contained. Employers have sought to keep their responsibility for
financing unemployment compensation narrow and limited. Through
its experience-rated UI tax structure, the program seeks to allocate
responsibility for benefit charges among those businesses giving rise to
those charges; this tax structure thereby also gives employers an incen
tive to avoid layoffs and to stabilize employment. 6 Experience rating
also results in constant pressure from employers to keep compensation
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levels at a low level of protection, so that benefit charges and UI taxes
can be held to a minimum.
From the beginning, the states have enjoyed wide discretion in set
ting specific benefit and tax provisions of their UI laws. Furthermore,
there has been resistance to any attempts to set federal minimum stan
dards or to any strengthening of federal authority in the program.
Expansion of the program has usually occurred only when organized
labor has been strong enough, or when unemployment has been wide
spread enough, to bring sufficient pressure on the state legislatures or
on Congress to act.
Despite resistance, government entitlement programs have multi
plied and expanded over the years. UI evolved into a broader program
than at first deemed appropriate or affordable when it was initiated dur
ing the Great Depression. The system now covers nearly all wage and
salary workers and provides much longer periods of protection than it
did originally.
Adams (1971) provided a comprehensive review of American senti
ments in Public Attitudes Toward Unemployment Insurance. In sum
marizing evidence of declining American support for UI from the
1930s through the 1960s, as preserved in the archives of the Social
Security Administration by the Roper Center, Adams wrote the follow
ing:
The Social Security Act programs were deeply rooted in the Great
Depression experience. The effects of that experience on public
attitudes have diminished as time has passed and memories have
dimmed. . . . Those people who were 10 years old or over in 1930
and therefore may be presumed to have personal memories of the
Great Depression years constituted 50 percent of the population
over 19 years of age in 1965 ... 38 percent by 1970 . . . and 22
percent by 1980. . . . The impact of the Great Depression on atti
tudes toward the unemployed and unemployment insurance will
be transmitted indirectly, if at all, to succeeding generations, and
this fact may be expected to have substantial influence on the pro
gram in the future (Adams 1971, pp. 17-18).

By the 1980s, for many Americans, the expansion of social pro
grams and government regulation of economic activity had gone too
far. This reaction lent support to attempts at limiting the scope of some
programs, to reducing their size, and to restoring the vigor of free mar-
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ket principles throughout the economy. 7 In the mid-1990s, the exigen
cies of persistent federal budget deficits further curtailed government
largess and involvement.
These trends have affected the UI program as well, influencing the
movement toward more restricted eligibility, more punitive disqualifi
cations among beneficiaries, and more limited levels and duration of
benefits.8 Nonetheless, nationwide surveys of public sentiment indicate
broad-based support for the present system of income security for
workers. When asked in 1987 by an ABC News/'Washington Post sur
vey if spending on UI should be increased, decreased, or kept about the
same, 86 percent of a national sample of 1,505 adults said that spend
ing should be increased or kept the same. When the National Opinion
Research Center asked the same question in 1990, 75 percent of 1,217
adult respondents in a national survey said that spending on UI should
be increased or kept the same. In January 1995, when the Los Angeles
Times asked a national sample of 1,353 adults, "Do you think govern
ment should cut back spending on unemployment insurance pro
grams?" only 30 percent answered yes.
In the 1990s, the reality of increased worker dislocation, greater
public awareness of this issue, and the need to provide early, system
atic reemployment assistance resulted in a policy response that began
directing the UI system more toward reemployment. The 1993 Worker
Profiling and Re-employment Services (WPRS) system mandates
nationwide an additional UI eligibility requirement of early active
reemployment efforts for beneficiaries who are identified as most
likely to exhaust their entitlement. The emphasis on reemployment—
and economic development—further resulted in legislation allowing
states the option of using UI trust fund money to help "profiled" bene
ficiaries become self employed; the enabling legislation was included
in the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which was
signed into law by President Clinton in November 1993. The UI pro
gram has also adopted an ongoing, active approach toward the preven
tion of unemployment; this strategy is based on state "work sharing"
programs. Work sharing schemes have been included in the UI provi
sions of 18 states since 1978, when California enacted the first work
sharing program in the U.S.9
The ebb and flow of prevalent views about the role of government in
the economy and society will no doubt continue indefinitely, influ-
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enced largely by how economic conditions affect public attitudes gen
erally. That ebb and flow will ensure the continuation of controversy
surrounding UI as it reflects the tensions between social equity and
economic efficiency.

Unemployment Insurance and Economic Security
The Welfare-Insurance Dichotomy

The widespread hardship endured in the 1930s made large public
relief programs politically acceptable. At that time, the typical worker
struggled alone to sustain a family, which tended to be larger than is
the average family late in the twentieth century. Multiple-earner house
holds were comparatively rare in the 1930s. Loss of work by the bread
winner put families into a crisis situation very quickly. The depression
spread penury like a plague among families that heretofore had
escaped serious unemployment. Needy individuals and families who
accepted relief suffered social indignity and loss of self-respect. Con
sequently, the concept of unemployment benefits provided on an insur
ance basis had considerable appeal. 10
The idea that contributions to a reserve fund, based on earnings,
could provide workers surety against the risk of total wage loss from
unemployment came to be regarded as far superior to reliance on char
ity or on relief, which required a painful public admission of poverty.
Rights to UI benefits were earned through working; the question of
demonstrated individual need was irrelevant. The insurance concept
became and remains important to workers.
UI is social insurance, not private insurance. The major differences
between the two are summarized in table 1.1. Indeed, many of the fea
tures of UI that make it social insurance also mean that its existence
would be impossible under private arrangements. Without government
mandate, nothing like UI as we know it would be available: because of
a type of market failure, private markets would not provide what soci
ety requires as generalized insurance against unemployment for work
ers. 11
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Table 1.1 Major Differences between Social and Private Insurance
Social insurance

Private insurance

1. Compulsory

Voluntary

2. Minimum floor of income
protection

Larger amounts available,
depending on individual desires and
ability to pay

3. Emphasis on social adequacy
(welfare element)

Emphasis on individual equity
(insurance element)

4. Benefits prescribed by law that can
be changed (statutory right)

Benefits established by legal
contract (contractual right)

5. Government monopoly

Competition

6. Costs difficult to predict

Costs more readily predictable

7. Full funding not needed because of
compulsory contributions from
new entrants and because program
is assumed to last indefinitely

Must operate on fully funded basis
without reliance on new entrants'
contributions

8. No underwriting

Individual or group underwriting

9. Widespread differences of opinion
regarding objectives and results

Opinions generally more uniform
regarding objectives and results

10. Investments generally in
obligations of federal government

Investments mainly in private
channels

11. Taxing power readily available to
combat erosion by inflation

Greater vulnerability to inflation

SOURCE- Rejda (1984, p 40)

The UI program aims to provide protection against a risk so wide
spread that it is social in scope. Without some organized system of
relief against unemployment, massive problems of social dependency
could result. UI benefits provide a minimum floor of protection that
prevents individuals from becoming a social burden and that collec
tively helps to minimize fluctuations in aggregate consumer spending.
This public good would not be available without government-man
dated participation in the system. If the UI program were voluntary, it
would collapse very quickly. Workers with a low risk of job separation
would realize that they could save money on premium payments by
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breaking away and forming their own low-risk pool. This would even
tually result in those with a high risk of unemployment facing premi
ums so large that they would go uninsured, leaving them with public or
private social assistance as their only means of income security. 12
Social insurance embodies both the incentive aspects found in pri
vate insurance contracts and the eligibility features required by consid
erations of social adequacy. Private insurance contracts provide
payment for losses due to occurrence of the insured risk, with the com
pensation amount dependent on premiums paid. Social insurance bases
amounts of payments on some estimation of presumed need, so that
compensation is not always directly related to contributions, and eligi
bility is not always based on the ability to avoid the risk. UI places a
ceiling on how far benefits can go in compensating for wage loss,
thereby reducing the fraction of earnings replaced for higher-wage
earners. Some state weekly benefit formulas weight the benefit-wage
replacement ratio to favor low-wage earners. Some states provide
allowances for dependents. These provisions reflect the social welfare
intent of the program to concentrate benefits more on those who are
presumed to need them more. Although its insurance character is well
established and supported, the extent to which the program should
reflect welfare objectives has been a source of some controversy.
There is a handful of features that objectively distinguish UI from
welfare. When characterizing social insurance, Rejda stated five clear
distinctions from social welfare, which apply to UI and can be summa
rized as follows.
1. UI benefit levels are predictable since they are based on explicit for
mulae that apply to applicants uniformly, while in relief programs
the benefit is dependent on the degree of need demonstrated.
2. Financing is done out of specifically earmarked taxes, while public
assistance is paid from general revenues.
3. All those covered by UI are participants in the program, with only a
fraction ever drawing benefits, while only those who apply for and
receive benefits are participants in social welfare programs.
4. No stigma attaches to the receipt of a UI payment, "which provides
compensation for wage loss as a matter of right with dignity and dis
patch." 13
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5. The UI program presumes need due to the economic loss resulting
from unemployment, while general relief requires demonstration of
need, often including the shedding of personal assets.
The last of the preceding differences probably has contributed most
to the UI controversy. The welfare aspects of UI have been drawn into
question because of the changing perception of the economic position
of American workers and their families. The circumstances of the aver
age worker today are far different from those of the average worker
more than a half century ago. By and large, the public in the 1990s is
less likely to regard unemployment with the same sense of urgency or
to see the unemployed so generally in such desperate straits as was the
case in the 1930s. Need is not so widely presumed to be as universal or
as evenly felt among various segments of the unemployed.
In the Great Depression, the real extent of the unemployment prob
lem was not precisely known. Estimates hovered in the range of 15 to
25 percent of the labor force being out of work (Levitan, Mangum and
Marshall 1981). Reliable national income accounting and labor force
estimation practices were undeveloped. 14 Since that time, information
about the operation of the economy has steadily improved, and, for bet
ter or worse, has guided national economic policy. The result of this
evolution, together with other institutional reforms in the social, legal,
banking, and trade sectors, has been that none of the ten economic
recessions since 1946 has even approached the widespread collapse of
economic activity suffered in the 1930s (Moore 1980; U.S. Department
of Commerce 1995).
This relatively stable labor market has greatly reduced the personal
fear of unemployment. For the large majority of Americans, the Great
Depression is an item in history rather than a personal memory. Most
have never known serious unemployment or felt its consequences close
at hand. Many do not identify with the unemployed. On the other hand,
increasing worker dislocation over the past twenty years has spread the
potential for permanent job loss, bringing the uncertainty of employ
ment to white-collar workers, where it previously belonged primarily
to blue-collar workers.
Workers today also enjoy a much improved standard of living. The
multiple-earner household is more the rule than the exception, giving
many families a broader income base and less vulnerability to the
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effects of job loss by one family member. Unemployment for any
lengthy period can still produce heavy financial strains, even disaster,
as many households have built their higher living standards on a base
of substantial indebtedness as well as on increased income.
There has been some pressure for better protection under the pro
gram for the unemployed who clearly are in need. Some UI critics see
the program largely as protection for the middle-class worker: many of
the poor, low-wage, or marginal workers who are unemployed are
either excluded or receive very inadequate benefits. It has been sug
gested that, to broaden access to the program, eligibility requirements
be relaxed so that marginally attached workers may qualify for some
UI benefits. Sharply increased minimum weekly benefit amounts could
be justified on the ground that existing low minimums inadequately
support even a subsistence standard of living. Others argue that benefit
levels are sufficient, but that benefit durations are inadequate. Many
industrialized nations supplement UI benefits with unemployment
assistance, which provides means tested income support for people
who have recently exhausted UI benefits. Unemployment assistance
usually is available for up to a year, with the idea that it will prevent
slippage into long-term dependence on social assistance by prolonging
the period of hope for reemployment. 15
The atmosphere of controversy surrounding specific UI issues has
been intensified due to the conflict between calls for expanded welfare
content in the UI program and calls for closer adherence to strict insur
ance principles in the face of a growing perception of general worker
affluence and of a narrowed presumption of need. However, by a large
margin, the public as of 1980 still regarded the payment of unemploy
ment benefits as earned insurance rights rather than as welfare assis
tance. A national survey conducted in 1980 by the Survey Research
Center of the University of Michigan found that almost twice as many
American families characterized unemployment compensation as
"earned insurance" than thought it was "part of our welfare system"
(59 percent to 32 percent). "Households in which one or more mem
bers were unemployed at some time during the two years prior to the
surveys more frequently viewed unemployment compensation as
earned insurance, especially if the unemployed household member
actually received unemployment compensation (78 percent) . . . [com
pared with] 56 percent of the households who had no unemployment
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experience during the prior two years" (Curtin, Gordon and Ponza
1981, p. 41).
Defenders of the program's insurance principle emphasize that UI is
not intended as a measure to overcome existing poverty but rather to
prevent descent into poverty. Although workers today are generally
better off than their counterparts of earlier times, they still face the real
risk of job loss with severe consequences. Relatively few wage or sala
ried workers could long withstand a total loss of their earnings before
their achieved standards of living were damaged badly. Even in multi
ple-earner families, where the loss of one income may be partially
cushioned by the remaining incomes of other household members, the
loss may be severely felt because of high customary expenditure and
consumer debt levels.
The lack of adequate welfare support for needy, involuntarily unem
ployed persons who can and want to work and who fall outside the
scope of UI is a problem that the system cannot effectively resolve in
its present form. Helping the poor unemployed to overcome their pov
erty through employment is a policy no one can oppose. Preventing
workers from slippage toward poverty because of prolonged temporary
job and wage loss is a more manageable task.
The values of the insurance approach go beyond that of using pre
sumed need instead of the individual needs test. Insuring against wage
loss due to involuntary unemployment makes at least as much sense as
insuring a home against fire damage or a car against theft, regardless of
the personal ability to absorb the financial loss. Wage loss is only par
tially insured, with limits applicable as to amounts and length of time.
Employer payments into public funds for unemployment benefits are
part of the cost of labor compensation, which includes wages and other
fringe benefits. Workers earn UI rights through their employment and
indirectly pay part of the premium by accepting wages that are some
what lower than they would be in the absence of UI (Anderson and
Meyer 1995). Regardless of personal financial circumstances, if their
employment terminates involuntarily, workers have the right to unem
ployment benefits until they either find other employment or exhaust
their entitlement. Unemployment benefits are not a charge on society
as a whole, financed out of general government revenues, as is the case
with welfare. Within the context of these UI characteristics, presumed
need remains valid regardless of individual variations in need. Loss of
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income can be damaging to the unemployed worker's household
finances if not limited to some reasonable degree.
Unlike private insurance payments, unemployment benefits reflect
certain overtones of welfare since some of the limits satisfy social pol
icy goals rather than purely actuarial considerations. Hence, UI is
social insurance. The implicit presumption of need also has socially
oriented limits. The controversy in applying limits focuses on the
weekly amount and on the duration of payments.
The Role of Unemployment Insurance in the Overall Economy

One of the main reasons UI is compulsory public social insurance as
opposed to private insurance is because it is the only way to achieve
nearly universal coverage in the population. In performing the central
income replacement function, with nearly all workers covered, the sys
tem works to arrest declining income of the unemployed, reduce the
potential increase in welfare dependency, and slow the decline in
aggregate spending when the economy moves into a recession. The
direct cost of UI is paid by employers through payroll taxes. It has been
argued that these costs affect the economy by influencing business
location decisions.
In the aggregate, UI benefits constitute a nonnegligible portion of
total spending in the economy. As summarized in table 1.2, between
1938 and 1995 UI benefits usually hovered in a range between onequarter and three-quarters of 1 percent of gross domestic product
(GDP). The annual figures in the table also make it clear that UI con
tributes a larger share of total spending in recession years than in
expansion years and that the boost in spending is appreciable and
rapid. For example, during the 1957-1958 recession, UI benefit pay
ments rose from 0.39 percent to 0.77 percent of GDP, and, during the
1974-1975 recession, payments rose from 0.41 percent to 0.74 percent
of GDP. Burtless (1991, p. 38) has argued that "changes in the system
over the past decade have eroded the value of unemployment insurance
both as income protection for the unemployed and as an automatic sta
bilizer." It is easy to see in table 1.2 that the spike in benefits as a per
centage of GDP was much smaller in the 1990-1991 recession than in
many previous postwar recessions. 16 This partly reflects the tighter eli
gibility conditions and diminished real benefit levels imposed by many
of the states in response to financial crises in the early 1980s.
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Table 1.2 UI Benefit Payments as Percentage of U.S. GDP, 1938-1995

Year
1938
1939
1940
1941
1942
1943
1944
1945
1946
1947
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967

UI benefits
(thousands)
393,783
429,298
518,700
344,324
344,083
79,644
62,384
445,867
1,094,845
775,142
789,931
1,735,991
1,373,113
840,411
998,238
962,219
2,026,868
1,350,264
1,380,728
1,733,876
3,512,732
2,279,018
2,726,849
3,422,558
2,675,565
2,775,222
2,521,575
2,166,011
1,771,292
2,092,364

UI as percentage
of GDP
0.46
0.47
0.52
0.28
0.22
0.04
0.03
0.21
0.52
0.33
0.30
0.67
0.48
0.25
0.29
0.26
0.55
0.33
0.32
0.39
0.77
0.46
0.53
0.64
0.47
0.46
0.39
0.31
0.23
0.26
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Year
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995

UI benefits
(thousands)
2,029,957
2,125,809
3,847,312
5,935,925
4,520,809
4,090,573
6,107,448
11,986,137
9,305,600
8,666,091
7,998,880
9,241,720
14,191,178
13,879,278
21,100,164
18,510,200
13,231,491
14,682,332
15,950,231
14,190,743
13,240,757
14,205,321
17,975,980
25,478,724
25,066,162
21,758,380
20,979,858
21,278,429

UI as percentage
ofGDP
0.23
0.22
0.38
0.45
0.37
0.30
0.41
0.74
0.51
0.42
0.35
0.36
0.51
0.44
0.65
0.52
0.33
0.35
0.36
0.30
0.26
0.26
0.31
0.43
0.40
0.34
0.30
0.29

SOURCE: U.S. Department of Labor (1996), U.S. Department of Commerce (various issues).
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When we look at the dollars of UI benefits as a share of GDP, we see
only the direct first-order effect of UI on aggregate spending. It should
be recognized that spending of UI benefits becomes money income to
others who again spend a part of it, and so on. The cumulative effect of
all the spending is called the multiplier. For the nation as a whole, Oaxaca and Taylor (1983, p. 6) estimated that "for each dollar of UI benefit
payments in 1975 .. . disposable income was increased by $1.02." Per
centage effects estimated by Oaxaca and Taylor (1986) of UI benefit
payments on local economies were even larger, at 3.18 percent of real
disposable income in Phoenix and 2.16 percent in Tucson for 1976. 17
UI is also considered to have an impact on the economy because of
the payroll tax charged to employers to finance the system. While
Anderson and Meyer (1995) estimate that this cost is partly shared by
workers who contribute to the system by accepting lower wages, it has
been argued widely that UI taxes are one of the factors figuring into
business decisions about where to locate or to expand operations. This
thesis was put forward more generally in terms of all area-specific tax
levies by Due:
On the basis of all available studies, it is obvious that relatively
high business tax levels do not have the disastrous effects claimed
for them. . . . However, without doubt, in some instances the tax
element plays the deciding role in determining the optimum loca
tion, since other factors balance (Due 1961, p. 171).

Interstate variation in business taxes was examined by Wheaton
(1983), who suggested that these differences may affect business loca
tion decisions within small geographic areas such as at interstate bor
ders. Among individual categories of taxes that vary across states,
Wheaton (1983, p. 85) estimated that property taxes constitute 42 per
cent of tax payments; UI taxes are tied for second with state corporate
income taxes, each of which receives 18 percent of total state tax pay
ments made by business. In a survey article, Newman and Sullivan
(1988, p. 232) conclude that "the most recent studies, employing more
detailed data sets and more refined econometric techniques, have gen
erated results which cast some doubt on the received conclusion that
tax effects are generally negligible." While the role of UI as a built-in
economic stabilizer is widely acknowledged as significant and useful,
interstate differences in the employer cost of the program remain an
area of constant controversy.
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Unemployment Insurance as Part of the Social Safety Net
The social safety net in the United States is an intertwined web of
public and private programs that naturally divide into two main catego
ries. One group of programs is for labor force members with a reason
able history of job attachment; eligibility for these programs is usually
independent of individual or household income levels. The other group
provides benefits without regard to attachment to the labor force and
generally requires a low-income test. UI may be viewed as a keystone
in the arch supporting that portion of the U.S. social safety net
designed for workers attached to the labor force.
In testimony before the Subcommittee on Department Operations,
Nutrition and Foreign Agriculture, Committee on Agriculture of the
U.S. House of Representatives, Jane L. Ross, Director for Income
Security Issues of the U.S. General Accounting Office, provided an
overview of means-tested programs:
In fiscal year 1992, the federal government provided about $208
billion in six areas of need for low-income people. When state
dollars are included, the total amount of spending reached $290
billion.
The welfare system comprises about 80 programs, representing
about 15 percent of total federal outlays in fiscal year 1992.
Included in the system are AFDC, Medicaid, SSI, and Food Stamp
programs. These four means-tested programs accounted for 20
percent of the $700 billion spent in fiscal year 1993 on the 10 larg
est entitlement and mandatory spending programs. [18] The sys
tem's nearly 80 programs target low-income individuals and
families to meet two broad objectives: (1) to provide basic support
and health care for those who are often unable to support them
selves—the aged, blind, disabled, and children—and (2) to pro
vide transitional assistance to able-bodied adults and their families
while promoting self-sufficiency, table 1 [1.3] highlights the fed
eral spending levels in some of the largest programs in each area
(Ross 1995, p. 2).
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Table 1.3 Selected Means-Tested Programs in Six Functional Areas
(Dollars in Billions)
Functional area/program

FY 1992 estimated
expenditures

Income support
Aid to Families with Dependent Children
Supplemental Security Income
Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC)

$13.6
18.7
9.6

Medical care
Medicaid
Medical Care for Certain Veterans

67.8
7.8

Food and nutrition
Food Stamps
School Lunch
Special Supplemental Food Program for Women,
Infants and Children (WIC)
School Breakfast

23.5
3.9
2.6
.8

Housing
Section 8 Housing Assistance
Low-Rent Public Housing
Education and training
Stafford Loans and Pell Grants
Job Training Partnership Act (JTPA)
Head Start
Job Opportunities and Basic Skills (JOBS)
Training Program

12.3
5.0
11.1
3.9
2.2
.6

Other services
Social Services Block Grant (SSBG)
Child Care and Development Block Grant (CCDBG)

2.8
.8

.8
Child Care—AFDC, Transitional, and At-Risk
Community Services Block Grant (CSBG)_____________A____
SOURCE Ross (1995, p. 3).
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Many industrialized nations bridge the gap between UI and welfare
with a program of unemployment assistance, which is a means-tested
benefit for people who have recently exhausted UI benefits. In the
United States, while the duration of UI benefit payments may be
extended depending on the condition of the economy, there is no stan
dard benefit program to help individual UI benefit exhaustees in the
absence of a widespread recession.
Apart from UI, the main body of public programs for people with
labor market attachment or aspirations consists of retraining programs.
In testimony before the U.S. Senate Committee on Labor and Human
Resources, Clarence C. Crawford, Associate Director of the U.S. Gen
eral Accounting Office for Education and Employment Issues, stated
that
. . . legislation enacted in the last Congress identified at least 163
programs administered by 15 different agencies that provide about
$20 billion in employment training assistance for adults and outof-school youths..."employment training programs" refers to pro
grams or funding streams that (1) help the unemployed find jobs,
(2) create job opportunities, and (3) enhance the skills of partici
pants to increase their employability (Crawford 1995, p. 1).

This list includes everything from the Food Stamp Employment and
Training program administered by the U.S. Department of Agriculture
to improve the ability of food stamp recipients to gain employment,
increase earnings, and reduce their dependency on public assistance, to
the All-Volunteer Force Educational Assistance program administered
by the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs, which aims to assist in
developing a more highly educated and productive workforce by help
ing service-persons readjust to civilian life through educational bene
fits. The complexity of eligibility conditions and benefits available
from the 163 different federal employment and training programs has
spurred efforts to establish a unified "one-stop-shopping" training sys
tem.
The reemployment system most closely linked to the UI system is
the state-operated Employment Service (ES). While there have been
calls for a new institution to act as a reemployment clearing house, the
ES has been touted by some as the natural point of entry for one-stop
shopping. The ES is an existing agency with a statutory funding stream
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authorized by the Wagner-Peyser Act, and it has strong state relation
ships with existing offices in 1,700 locations.
The widespread ES presence has also raised the issue of whether a
newly proposed one-stop reemployment services delivery system
needs another physical institution. Simultaneously, there is recognition
of the prospect that the new institution could be a virtual one-stopshopping place for reemployment services, operating in cyberspace as
an electronic network among existing physical locations. Eligibility for
various programs and options available to an individual could be deter
mined through the electronic information network. Under virtual onestop shopping, the system would be most encompassing if any existing
agency could serve as a port of entry, so that there would be one-stop
shopping with multiple points of entry.
The ES link with the UI system was forged through cooperation in
enforcing the work test for UI benefit eligibility. Further links have
been provided since 1982, as the ES has been involved in referring
beneficiaries who exhaust UI entitlement to retraining programs
administered under the Job Training Partnership Act (JTPA). The most
recent reemployment initiative in UI, the Worker Profiling and Reem
ployment Services (WPRS) system, has relied heavily on the ES to
provide early intervention reemployment services to UI claimants
identified as being most likely to exhaust benefits.
Historically, there has been a general reluctance to fund active labor
market programs other than the ES from the Unemployment Trust
Fund. Congress and the executive branch have faced strong opposition
from the employer community regarding possible funding of retraining
and other reemployment services from the Unemployment Trust Fund.
Employers believe that active labor market programs should be paid
for out of general revenue and question their responsibility for training
the potential workforce of competitors. Since the Unemployment Trust
Fund frequently contains a large reserve for recessionary periods, it has
often become the target for alternative uses when reserves increase
during periods of low unemployment. 19
With increased concern about maintaining employment and return
ing unemployed workers to productive jobs, the UI program has taken
a more active role in reemployment policy. UI funds are being used to
pay for two types of active employment efforts: work sharing, which is
a form of partial UI benefits, and self-employment allowances, which
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are UI benefits received while starting a new business. On the other
hand, there is no movement to allow the Unemployment Trust Fund to
pay for retraining or reemployment services such as job search assis
tance. Under the WPRS initiative, the UI program conducts profiling,
but the provision of reemployment services, such as testing, counsel
ing, job clubs, and job search workshops, cannot be funded by the UI
system. These services must be provided by the ES or the JTPA pro
gram. Together, these active labor market efforts are linking UI with
initiatives that strengthen the social safety net and help labor force
members from slipping toward public support.

Incentives for Job Search and Employment
Along with the view that the unemployed generally could find work
if they wanted to is a related belief that the payment of unemployment
benefits diminishes the recipient's incentive to work or to seek work.
The disincentive argument has been made against UI since the earliest
days of its consideration. It is part of the philosophy that social pro
grams weaken the work ethic, sap self-discipline, and create a growing
dependence on transfer payments that "have imposed a rising burden
of taxation on working families which has provoked a spirit of anger
and frustration with American democratic institutions" (Gilder 1981, p.
137). This threat of moral decline and malingering has been the prime
argument by opponents to broadening the UI system.
During the 1970s, when many states constrained weekly benefit
amounts and the duration of benefits they provided, even as unemploy
ment levels were rising, the disincentive case was pressed more force
fully. Higher unemployment rates were alleged to be due, at least in
part, to generous UI benefits. These charges relied on a body of
research that empirically tested for evidence of the effects of unem
ployment benefits on the level and duration of joblessness. Researchers
attempted to measure how changes in various parameters of the pro
gram, like the weekly benefit amount, the wage replacement rate, and
the entitled duration of benefits, influenced the duration of insured
unemployment. No two studies were exactly comparable. They dif
fered with respect to the types of data used, the specifications of the
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hypotheses to be tested, the definitions of the variables, the behavioral
assumptions adopted, and the kinds of analytical approaches applied. 20
Despite their noncomparabilities and varying results, the studies did
supply evidence in support of the effects hypothesized. For example,
after reviewing the methodology and findings of a dozen studies of the
effects of UI on the duration of unemployment, Hamermesh concluded
that
the best estimate—if one chooses a simple figure—is that a 10percentage point increase in the gross replacement rate leads to an
increase in the duration of insured unemployment of about half a
week when labor markets are tight. This is not an exact figure, but
it does appear that there is some effect, certainly above zero and
probably less than one week (Hamermesh 1977, p. 37).

The findings of these studies suggest that increased UI liberality
reduces the incentive to return to work. Research about the size and
significance of the work disincentive has continued. Some analysts
have advanced the countervailing thesis that, by allowing recipients to
search more extensively for suitable work, improved benefits enhance
the efficiency of the labor market. Thus, a rise in unemployment dura
tion could prove beneficial to the economy as well as to the recipient in
the longer run. Attempts to measure the favorable job search effects of
UI have been few and have not been regarded as satisfactory (Welch
1977). Overall, findings from research done in this period provided
some support for stricter benefit eligibility rules and less generous pay
ment levels so as to minimize work disincentives.
It was argued that the narrow gap between the net after-tax wage
workers might earn on a job and the weekly UI benefit amount was an
important element contributing to the disincentive effect of unemploy
ment benefits. Feldstein (1974) focused on this factor and showed how
taxes withheld from wages could severely limit the monetary advan
tage of working over drawing benefits. His analyses helped to support
the case for taxing unemployment benefits as income, a policy adopted
beginning in 1979 for recipients in households with incomes above
specified levels, and applied universally regardless of income levels
beginning in 1986. A study by Solon (1985), examining the experience
in Georgia during the first year the new tax policy took effect, provided
some evidence that benefit recipients at income levels subject to the tax
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had a significantly shorter duration of unemployment, on average, than
recipients at similar income levels the year before the tax applied.
Recipients at lower income levels showed no reduction in average
duration levels over these two years.
The work disincentive argument, fortified by the research findings,
was used by those who wished to curtail the liberality of the UI pro
gram. The taxation of benefits was a direct outcome of this movement.
As Vroman (1990) documents, the benefit funding crises experienced
by many states following the back-to-back recessions of 1980 and
1982 exerted further pressure on the states to restrict benefits and to
tighten eligibility rules.
More recent studies of UI work disincentive effects have used differ
ent or refined research methodologies.21 Katz and Meyer (1990) pro
duced some of the biggest disincentive effect estimates yet. They found
that a 10 percentage point rise in the UI wage replacement rate
increased the average duration of insured unemployment by 1.5 weeks.
Davidson and Woodbury (1996) have found estimates closer to results
from studies done in the 1970s. Using an equilibrium search and
matching model calibrated with data from several UI field experiments
conducted in the 1980s, they found that a "10 percentage point increase
in the UI wage replacement rate can be expected to increase the unem
ployment duration of UI claimants by between 0.3 and 1.1 weeks"
(Davidson and Woodbury 1996, p. 25).
Among both researchers and policy makers, there has recently been
great interest in positive reemployment incentives for UI beneficiaries.
While stricter eligibility rules with respect to job search requirements
may be considered something of a stick, the spur to reemployment
efforts is viewed more as a carrot. Positive reemployment incentives
have appeared as a natural alternative to further costly administrative
monitoring of compliance with work search requirements. The Office
of the Chief Economist of the U.S. Department of Labor summarized
research findings from a variety of experiments testing new reemploy
ment incentives for UI beneficiaries.22 Field experiments involving ran
domized trials of various positive reemployment incentives for UI
beneficiaries have been conducted in the states of Illinois, Massachu
setts, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Washington. These incentives
have included cash bonuses, self-employment allowances, referral to
retraining, and individually tailored job search assistance. The experi-
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ments have led the way to federal legislation permitting states to offer
self-employment allowances and requiring referral to job search assis
tance for some UI recipients.
The compulsory initiative to come out of the research on positive
reemployment incentives for UI claimants, the Worker Profiling and
Re-employment Services system, was required by legislation enacted
in 1993. This system has given a new, positive role to the cooperative
agreement between UI and reemployment service providers—the pub
lic employment service and the JTPA system. Previously, the only link
between the two organizations was that, in most states, the employ
ment service helped to enforce the UI work test, largely through regis
tration with the employment services as well as with some placement
efforts. For claimants identified as being most likely to exhaust UI ben
efits, participation in reemployment activities is an additional eligibil
ity requirement for continued benefit receipt.

Fraud and Abuse
To qualify for UI benefits, in addition to being involuntarily sepa
rated from work, the individual must want employment, be able to
work, be available and prepared to take a suitable job, and make appro
priate efforts to regain employment. These conditions are imposed in
an attempt to affirm that unemployment is an insurable risk, that is, to
reduce the moral hazard in UI, the risk of compensating malingering
rather than genuine unemployment. An individual's unemployment
following a job separation can be, to a greater or lesser degree, a func
tion of how much he or she truly wants to work. The worker files for UI
benefits for each week claimed as a week of unemployment. It is
administratively very difficult to monitor whether the worker is earnest
about actually becoming reemployed. This is a classic example of the
principal-agent problem, which is familiar in private insurance mar
kets. Unless the claimant admits a lack of interest in working, there is
no objective way of assessing the genuine desire for work, short of
being able to offer a suitable job opportunity. The UI system seeks evi
dence in other ways, mainly on the basis of the individual's pattern of
behavior or circumstances, which might indicate a weak interest in
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working. This largely subjective approach is a difficult one to adminis
ter. It is a process open to a wide range of judgment; it is fraught with
suspicion and uncertainty and is frequently contentious.
Historically, certain kinds of UI claimants have tended to arouse
more suspicion about their reemployment intentions than others. These
include spouses of fully employed workers, students and other teenag
ers living with their parents, workers between seasonal jobs, and pen
sioners. Since involuntary unemployment is difficult to prove in so
many situations, one school of thought holds that the provisions of UI
law should be strict enough to ensure that benefits go to only those who
are unquestionably and demonstrably involuntarily unemployed. The
other school of thought holds that the unemployed worker should be
given the benefit of the doubt and that the law should be liberal in test
ing the readiness of the worker to find employment. This philosophical
difference partly explains the variation in eligibility rules across
states.23 It also helps to explain the variation in the severity of the dis
qualifications imposed. For example, the first school of thought would
apply blanket disqualifications to all persons who quit their jobs to
relocate geographically with a moving spouse. Those holding to the
second school of thought would permit the payment of benefits to such
workers if they demonstrated that they were available and able to work
in the area of their new residence. In fact, there has been a gradual
tightening of eligibility conditions for a wide variety of causes, and
there has been a similar tightening of disqualifications from receiving
benefits from a fixed time period to the entire duration of the spell. This
has been a fight that benefit rights advocates have gradually but
steadily lost in the states.24
The subjective character of unemployment is an important factor
contributing to the differential treatment of claimants across jurisdic
tions. Apart from variations in statutory provisions that reflect oppos
ing schools of thought, there are differences among the states in
administrative policies and procedures as they are applied in determin
ing the validity of claims. The potential for abuse in this troublesome
area, both by the claimant and of the rights of the claimant, constitutes
another source of controversy for the program.
The perception of the extent to which beneficiaries abuse the UI pro
gram affects attitudes toward many of its provisions. Periodically, the
system has been subject to attacks in the news media, which attempt to
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prove, or at least to imply strongly, that benefits are being paid to large
numbers of "loafers, quitters, schemers and cheaters."25 The instances
of abuse described run the gamut of situations involving violations of
specific provisions in many of the state laws. Examples cited often
include students, pregnant women, women who have quit their jobs to
fulfill marital obligations, seasonal workers, and vacationers, all of
whom, in the opinion of the critic, are not very interested in taking
work and therefore abuse the system by drawing benefits. Disqualifica
tion provisions for voluntary quitting or discharge for misconduct are
attacked as being too lenient and leading to abuse of the system. The
cases are not always situations in which outright fraud is perpetrated
but include ones in which the worker is alleged to have taken advan
tage of some provision or interpretation of the law in a manner that
constitutes an abuse. The criticism is directed at the offending provi
sion as one allowing the payment of benefits when it should not. These
cases generally are not run-of-the-mill examples but are unusual ones
that, in most instances, have been the subject of review by appeals tri
bunals, even by the courts, and in which benefits have been awarded.
Such cases are usually on the borderline; otherwise, they would not
have reached the appeal stage. The U.S. Department of Labor has often
found that the facts cited by the critics are taken out of context and fail
to include the extenuating circumstances that led to the final award of
benefits (U.S. Department of Labor 1960). Occasionally, a presumably
fraudulent case is identified in the media with information not previ
ously available to the administrative agency. Given this information,
the agency would not pay the benefits. 26 The media criticisms often
select particular cases because they support an attack on the legal pro
visions that permit the payment of benefits in such instances.
Given the criticisms of the mid-1970s and the mounting pressures
exerted by the financial strains most state programs experienced, it is
not surprising that the trend turned strongly in the direction of stiffer
eligibility rules, more severe disqualifications, and tighter administra
tion. The first move was a broadened and strengthened application of
work search rules. Many states increased requirements for claimants to
furnish specific evidence of their job search, usually by indicating the
names of a minimum number of employers contacted each week.
In response to concern about the potential for fraud and abuse in the
UI system, Burgess and Kingston (1980) undertook a six-city study of
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the accuracy of benefit payments for the National Commission on
Unemployment Compensation. They estimated that 50 percent of ben
efit overpayments identified by intensive study, ex post, were due to
either the "failure of claimants to conduct active job searches or by
claimants' unavailability for work" (Burgess and Kingston 1980, p.
508). These findings led to more comprehensive research to develop
and test a method to intensively audit a random sample of claims paid.
Such a study was conducted in five states between April 1981 and
March 1982. The results from this more involved investigation indi
cated that about 14 percent of all benefits paid in these states during the
period were in excess of the entitled amount. Furthermore, the princi
pal reason for the overpayments, accounting for nearly half to fourfifths of the total amounts overpaid in each of the states, was inade
quate work search—failure to meet the work search requirement which
was not detected when the claim was filed and processed for payment.
Beginning in calendar year 1988 as the Benefits Quality Control
Program, the random sample audit procedure was introduced as a stan
dard operation throughout the nation. It has produced estimates of error
rates similar to those found in the pilot studies. In calendar year 1993,
for all states reporting, the estimated error rate was 8.8 percent of a
total of $21.05 billion in benefit payments. 27 This error rate is in line
with rates of the last few years, but lower than estimated in the first few
years that benefit payment accuracy was checked by random audit.
The trend among the states toward stiffer enforcement of the work
test was reversed following nationwide implementation of the Benefits
Quality Control Program. It may be the case that the relaxed stringency
of the work test is due to an effort on the part of the states to lower their
error rates, and to perform better on the quality control random audit,
since failure of the work test remains a prime reason for payment
errors.
Debate continues over whether an active weekly work search
requirement applied generally to claimants contributes much to speed
ier reemployment in many cases. Reasonable and useful job search
may call for different approaches, depending on a claimant's occupa
tion and experience, on the recruiting and hiring practices of potential
employers, and on the current condition of the labor market. Many
states provide for certain exemptions or departures from their active
search requirements to reflect these practical realities. This approach
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makes for even more complexity but attempts, at least, to minimize
fruitless efforts by claimants and annoyances to employers that serve
only to satisfy a bureaucratic rule but do not lead to reemployment. Is
the evidence of substantial overpayments of benefits an indication of
widespread abuse? Of a lack of interest in work? Would stricter
enforcement of the work search requirements eliminate many benefit
payments, or would it induce claimants to make more effort to meet the
requirements even if it served no other purpose?
Up until recently, the work test was generally a mechanical process:
if individuals indicated that they were able and available for work, and
if they listed three separate employer job search contacts or, in some
states, simply indicated that they searched for work, usually nothing
else was done by the state agency. Some states claim to check the
validity of listed work searches contacts; this is unlikely.
The decline in the UI work test is mostly in the elimination of the
certification of having searched for work with a given number of
employers in the previous week and naming those employers on the
continued claims form. These changes may partially reflect an effort to
reduce reported error rates under the Benefits Quality Control Pro
gram.
A field experiment conducted in Tacoma, Washington, investigated
whether the traditional work test of requiring three employer contacts
reduced UI benefit duration and payments relative to no work test or to
significantly more intensive work search requirements. Based on this
experiment, Johnson and Klepinger (1994) estimated that, if UI checks
continue with self-certification for continued receipt and no reporting
requirement, benefit duration will increase by 3.3 weeks relative to the
traditional work test. In addition, they found that significantly more
aggressive work search assistance is likely to shorten benefit duration
by about half a week as compared to the customary three contacts work
test. The evidence from Washington resulted in the U.S. Department of
Labor funding an additional alternative work search experiment in
Maryland.28
There is no doubt that there are cases in which claimants take advan
tage of provisions in state laws that permit some latitude in interpreta
tion. Recent trends have lowered that latitude and, thus, have reduced
opportunities for abuse. The tightening of eligibility rules and stiffened
enforcement have also eliminated some claims that were previously
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regarded as valid and free of any questions. To the extent that the pub
lic sees UI abuse as a serious problem, the program will be controver
sial in those areas suspected of vulnerability to such practices.
In evaluating the overpayments issue, Kingston, Burgess, and St.
Louis (1983), who pioneered the random audit procedure, noted cer
tain "features of the unemployment insurance program which contrib
uted significantly to the problem." Prominent among these were the
complexity of the program's eligibility provisions and policies, the
limitations in administrative resources that made it unlikely that
agency staff could monitor claimant compliance with the rules effec
tively and equitably, and the weaknesses in the program's incentives
for detecting and restraining improper payments. 29 Reflecting more
broadly on ways to reduce problems of fraud and abuse, Burgess and
Kingston identified six desirable features of a UI system:
(1) appropriate economic incentives for all system participants,
including strong incentives for claimant self-compliance; (2) to
the extent possible, simple rather than complex system features
and eligibility criteria; (3) to the extent possible, little emphasis on
intensive administrative scrutiny of claimant behavior and motives
in the routine operational system, with emphasis instead placed on
self-compliance with relatively objective and easily measurable
criteria; (4) minimizing the administrative discretion that makes
selective application and enforcement of eligibility criteria possi
ble; (5) horizontal equity for system participants; and (6) incen
tives for both administrative efficiency and smaller administrative
bureaucracies (Burgess and Kingston 1987, pp. 258-259).

Conflicting Employer and Labor Views of the System
Long before the establishment of the federal-state UI system in the
United States, both employers and labor opposed it as a compulsory
public program, although for different reasons. Labor's reservations
were founded in suspicions developed following many years of consis
tent hostility by government authorities toward worker efforts to orga
nize and to press demands for better wages and working conditions.
The principal union leadership stood against any governmental
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involvement in labor-management relations and preferred to deal
directly with management to resolve mutual problems. It was not until
1932 that the position of organized labor shifted to support for UI.
Employer opposition was also rooted in history as well as in classi
cal economic theory. Starting with the decline of feudalism and con
tinuing through the industrial revolution to the dominance of modern
corporate enterprise, the tradition of employer responsibility for the
personal welfare of employees weakened to the vanishing point. Indi
vidual employers could and did sympathize with individual workers
who suffered the hardships of unemployment, but this was usually sep
arated from any economic responsibility. 30 Applying classical eco
nomic theory, unemployment was viewed as the result of a temporary
imperfection, an imbalance in the market that was readily corrected as
wages adjusted to levels at which the demand for labor would absorb
the excess supply. Tampering with the operation of this mechanism,
such as by government intervention, was thought to endanger the cor
rective process and to possibly delay or prevent the restoration of equi
librium at full employment. In this context, UI was regarded as
interference in the market adjustment.
The massive and prolonged unemployment of the depression dam
aged the credibility of classical economic theory. The theory held that,
in the long run, prices would adjust so that markets would clear, mean
ing that unemployment would vanish. In response to this line of think
ing, John Maynard Keynes, who advocated government management
of aggregate spending in the economy and who changed the way econ
omists view severe economic recessions, wrote that "in the long run
we're all dead" (Heilbroner 1953, p. 251).
Although the momentum for UI began to build, employers generally
held to their opposition. Since the proposed plans placed most or all of
the UI financial burden on employers, their opposition focused on the
taxes to be levied on them. The UI taxes were viewed as a further
impediment to business, at a time when most were struggling to stay
afloat, and as a competitive disadvantage in interstate commerce
(Ewing 1933, p. 13). Moreover, the tax reversed historic trends by
compelling employers to assume some responsibility for the welfare of
their employees, representing another step back from free enterprise.
Opposition on these grounds was expressed by Noel Sargent of the
National Association of Manufacturers before a select committee of
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the United States Senate in 1931: "Penalization of employers because
of unemployment resulting from conditions over which the employer
has little control is both ethically and economically unjustified" (U.S.
Senate 1931).
The injection of experience rating into the UI system made the pro
gram more acceptable to employers. It was reasoned that, by allocating
benefit costs to those businesses giving rise to compensated unemploy
ment, experience rating helped to keep UI consistent with the free mar
ket system. The costs of the goods and services produced by insured
workers thus would also reflect the costs of benefits paid to them if
they experienced involuntary unemployment. Because of market com
petition, employers, seeking to minimize costs, are motivated to avoid
or minimize unemployment of their workers. In this way, it is argued,
experience rating serves the twin goals of appropriate economic cost
allocation and employment stability. Furthermore, the tax offset
scheme introduced by the Federal Unemployment Tax Act of 1935
allayed most fears about competitive disadvantage across states.
These theoretical concerns were prevalent before 1935, when the
Social Security Act required states to establish UI systems. After the
system was up and running, there was an added practical concern by
employers about experience rating. As noted earlier, UI costs at the
outset were on the whole less than they were expected to be and well
under the standard tax rates levied by the states. The only way allowed
under the system to reduce tax rates was through experience rating. As
experience rating spread and tax rates declined, many employers
became increasingly sensitive to benefit costs and to charges against
their accounts.
The concept took hold among employers that they should pay only
the cost of benefits related to their own layoffs of workers. This view is
a major reason for general employer advocacy of many restrictions on
benefit payments to workers whose unemployment is not attributable
to their employers. Labor has opposed experience rating, claiming that
it leads employers to be restrictive about their employees' benefit
rights and to challenge claims unjustifiably so as to keep down charges
and tax rates.
Labor and management have been natural antagonists with respect
to UI. Employers generally resist any expansion or liberalization that
would add to costs. Labor's interest is to press for generous levels of
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benefit support during unemployment, for as long a period as neces
sary, with relatively few restrictions on eligibility. The confrontation of
these diametrically opposed interests assures conflict on nearly every
aspect of the program.
Since specific UI elements are defined by law, the conflict usually
centers on the legislative process, mostly at the state level. The detailed
provisions of state law are of prime importance to employers, individu
ally and collectively, given their sensitivity to cost. Few sophisticated
employers feel that they can stress or even discuss candidly their con
cern over costs. Much of their discussion and debate deals with less
tangible matters such as "insurance principles," "equities," "abuses,"
and "work disincentives," arguments that play useful roles in legisla
tive maneuvering. On the other side, labor's efforts stress the hardships
endured by the unemployed and the inadequacy of UI benefits to alle
viate deprivation and suffering. Not all employer and labor representa
tives hold unreservedly to these positions. Many come to a responsible
conclusion with a balanced resolution of the conflict. At times, the two
sides may bring an agreed upon bill before the state legislature, the
result of concessions and compromises. This approach does not always
serve the public's best interest, however, if employers agree to a benefit
increase in return for labor's agreement not to oppose a tax reduction,
with the solvency of the fund weakened in the process.
Throughout much of the program's history, employer influence at
the state level in many parts of the country has been greater than that of
labor in shaping UI provisions. Where union strength has been more
concentrated, as in heavily industrialized states, the results have been
more balanced. Labor, however, has felt that its views have received a
better response at the federal level than in the states, at least until 1980.
Labor has favored more federal UI control, such as through the imposi
tion of minimum benefit standards, and even complete federalization
of the program, arguing that unemployed workers have been treated
inadequately and inequitably under widely disparate state laws.
Employers oppose increased federal control of the program, usually on
the basis of political philosophy, arguing the dangers and inefficiencies
of operation or dominance by a remote, cumbersome central govern
ment.
Beginning in the late 1970s and continuing into the 1990s, the fed
eral government has increased the number of federal compliance rules
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that affect the discretionary authority of states over their own UI laws.
However, these changes have not usually been supportive of organized
labor's goals for the program. Union membership in the United States
has declined dramatically in the past half century, falling from 35.5
percent of the work force in 1945 to 15.8 percent in 1995 (7995 World
Almanac and Book of Facts, p. 154). The influence of organized labor
has in advocating its UI objectives has accordingly diminished. The
financial difficulties encountered by many of the states in the 1970s,
1980s, and 1990s have pushed UI taxes higher despite the usual
employer resistance. It seems fair to say, however, that some of the past
extremes of the employer-labor UI controversy have eased somewhat.
Responsible leadership on both sides is usually able to reach some rea
sonable accommodation to protect the system's basic integrity. More
over, the narrower employer and labor concerns are giving way more
often to broader public considerations.

Federal-State Relationships and Conflicts
The decision at the outset to establish UI as a federal-state system
did not end striving for a wholly federal system after the program
began. Champions of the federal approach, some of whom held impor
tant staff positions at the Social Security Board, pressed their case
strongly during World War II, when the state employment services
were nationalized. As noted earlier, the Board itself recommended that
UI also be converted to a uniform federal program. The Truman admin
istration opposed the return of the employment service to the states
after a period of wartime federalization. State officials successfully
organized themselves to help defeat attempts to eliminate or to reduce
their role in the employment service at that time. As a result of these
early experiences and later because of a states' rights philosophy, state
employment security administrators generally looked upon nearly all
subsequent federal legislative proposals to broaden UI as efforts to
assert greater federal control over the system, even well after any active
hope for federalization had been abandoned. Opposition to these pro
posals frequently was ideological and did not address their intrinsic
merits.

38

Policy Issues

Throughout much of the first four decades of the UI program,
employer groups allied themselves with state administrators in oppos
ing liberal federal proposals, which labor tended to support. Not all
state officials lined up in the same way during this period, but the
majority of them did. On the whole, this combined opposition suc
ceeded in blocking, slowing, or limiting changes in the system through
federal laws. For example, federal minimum benefit standards have
been proposed repeatedly, often with broad support, as a means of
overcoming the persistent failure of the majority of states to provide
adequate benefit levels under their own provisions. On a few occasions,
one or more of the proposed standards came close to passage, but in the
end, none was ever adopted. Preference for retention of state control of
these matters was a major factor in the outcome, even in cases of
acknowledged program inadequacies.
The federal role in the UI system, nevertheless, did expand as the
result of two major developments beginning in the 1970s. One was the
permanent provision of extended benefits for the long-term unem
ployed during periods of high unemployment, as mandated by the per
manent federal-state shared program adopted by Congress in 1970.
The other development was the widespread insolvency of state UI
funds during the 1970s and 1980s, which called into play the provi
sions of the federal loan fund. Repeated use of federal-state shared
extended benefits plus wholly federal supplemental extensions during
the 1970s and 1980s gradually increased the number of federal rules
applicable to benefit entitlement provisions, which heretofore had been
exclusively state concerns. Although the federal rules applied only to
the extended and supplemental benefits, they could not help but influ
ence regular state benefits as well.
The financial problems of the period produced even more pervasive
federal influence over state programs. Blaustein (1993, chapter 9)
describes how the evolution of federal loan and repayment provisions
structured incentives and penalties that have induced states in debt to
restrict benefit eligibility and benefit levels and to increase tax levies in
order to overcome insolvency. During the 1980s, a number of federal
requirements were also enacted that had some direct impact on state
benefit provisions; in effect, these amounted to federal benefit stan
dards. In these cases, however, the requirements operated to make
states pay less rather than more in benefits. It is ironic that such federal
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provisions circumscribing state control should have been put through
by a Reagan administration that was publicly committed to reducing
the power and role of the federal government and to strengthening the
role of the states in the interest of a "new federalism." The basic pur
pose of these provisions, however, was to lower the costs of the UI pro
gram, and this could be done expeditiously only by amending federal
law with respect to the federal, rather than state, UI programs.
There has been an uneasy balance of power between the states and
the federal government over the administration of the UI program. Fed
eral law specifies broad administrative standards to which the states
must conform. States are free to structure and operate their UI pro
grams within these broad constraints. Over time, federal constraints
have declined. Highly detailed budgeting in the 1950s and 1960s—
when the purchase of individual capital equipment items had to be
approved by the U.S. Department of Labor—changed to broader cate
gorical grants in the 1970s. Finally, the states were given "bottom line"
authority between grant categories beginning in 1986. Despite this
gradual relaxation of administrative rules, over the years, this entire
area has been a source of friction between the two partners in the sys
tem. In the mid-1980s, the Reagan administration moved to alter that
arrangement by proposing "devolution." The federal government
would surrender many of its responsibilities for and power over state
program administration. It would also reduce the federal unemploy
ment tax by an amount equivalent to that portion going to support state
program administration. States would then be left free to determine
how they preferred to administer their own programs and how to
finance the costs involved. Despite years of federal-state controversy,
as of 1997, the system for financing state administration remains
unchanged. Many states have claimed that a fair share of administra
tive financing dollars has not been returned to them because of federal
efforts to reduce the persistent annual federal budget deficits. Mean
while, in the face of rapid improvements in information processing
capabilities, there has been no agreement on what constitutes efficient
administration of UI.
The nature of the federal-state system is such that some conflict
between the two partners is inevitable. Given the federal structure of
our governmental arrangements, it would appear that the particular UI
approach chosen offered a means of serving urgent national economic
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needs while preserving the state and local fabric that comprises the
web of our society. The balance is a delicate one, never perfect, and
often in flux. Some critics of the federal-state approach to UI see the
problem of unemployment as increasingly countrywide, requiring a
national remedy. Others see the problem as varied as the nation's geog
raphy and believe the solution cannot lie in application of broad uni
form standards; they favor more state control and experimentation, out
of which would emerge better solutions. Still others feel that the exist
ing system provides the framework for debate yielding the best balance
of federal and state ideas. 31
Despite conflicts between the states and the federal government, the
federal-state relationship in the UI system has retained support in the
1990s. While there is an active movement to return training programs
and even the public employment service to the states in the form of
block grants, the federal-state UI system looks quite secure. The
advantages of a highly decentralized UI system with a measure of fed
eral oversight are appealing from both policy and political perspectives
at a time when the twin missions of the UI program—providing indi
vidual income assistance and macroeconomic stabilization—continue
to have wide public backing. Although the balance of responsibilities
in the federal-state UI system is apt to fluctuate, the basic structure of
the system is likely to remain intact for the foreseeable future. The
same cannot be said for other employment and training initiatives. Part
of the explanation for this difference may be the strength of the federalstate nature of the UI program.

Judgment as a Source of Disagreement

Even if there were no conflicts of interest in UI, many issues would
be difficult to settle to everyone's satisfaction. Rarely are there matters
for which the facts available are completely adequate to answer all the
questions involved. Research and data analyses can go far to narrow
the areas of uncertainty and dispute that surround specific issues. Yet
the research results are not always altogether clear-cut and unqualified.
The data and their analyses are not always directly or perfectly relevant
to the issue at hand, and the conclusions inferred are not entirely
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unequivocal. As has been noted with regard to the work disincentive
studies of the 1970s, for example, researchers can differ in their meth
ods and in the types of data used, with varying results. These studies
have supplied an idea of the direction and general magnitude of some
disincentive effects, but the question remains unresolved as to whether
the effects measured are significant enough to warrant specific policy
action. The research even makes possible estimates of the conse
quences of such action through simulation techniques, but here, too,
there are limitations because not all the factors that can influence
events have been accounted for, or because some factors may change
and turn out to be more critical than expected, leading to unanticipated
results.
What remains, therefore, is the need to evaluate the implications of
the information provided and finally to exercise judgment about the
policy action proposed. In making such judgments, people will differ
because no one is free from predilections or biases or, stated more pos
itively, because individuals hold disparate values. For example, where
to set the weekly UI benefit amount is an issue that involves value
judgments. Given that a prime objective of the program is to alleviate
hardship during unemployment, the weekly amount should be ade
quate to satisfy that end. But what is adequate? How is hardship to be
measured? Benefit adequacy research has examined various measures
of expenditures of the unemployed as the levels to be sustained by the
benefit received. What should be included among those expenditures is
debatable. Furthermore, for a given definition of expenditures, what
proportion of beneficiaries should receive a benefit adequate to sustain
them—50 percent? 67 percent? 90 percent? How should the concern
about the effects of higher benefit amounts on recipient work incen
tives be weighed in considering a level to set? How should the effects
on costs and taxes be taken into account?
In short, a number of subjective judgments are called into play in
deciding weekly benefit amount policy and almost every UI provision.
For nearly every feature of the program, multiple choices exist con
cerning what the policy should be. Each provision adopted by a legisla
tive body usually represents a choice among alternatives, based on the
judgment of the majority of the legislators and often achieved through
compromise and trade-offs. Controversy need not be a bad or destruc
tive fate for UI as long as reasonable adversaries maintain mutual
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respect for their differing judgments. Many objective observers would
likely agree that the results can improve and strengthen the program, as
they have over the life of UI in the United States.
NOTES
1. See Wandner, Robinson, and Manheimer (1984) for a discussion of UI schemes in develop
ing countries.
2 See the discussion in Breul (1965).
3 Brechlmg and Laurence (1995) provide an extensive analysis of how experience-rated UI
tax systems might deal with the problem of financing permanent as opposed to temporary layoffs.
4. One of the most prominent of these expressions came from President Reagan at a press con
ference in January 1982, when, in response to a question about the gravity of the current unem
ployment problem, he noted having recently counted many pages of help-wanted advertisements
in the newspaper, implying that there were plenty of jobs available (New York Times, January 20,
1982, p. A-30) A later "explanation" of his comment acknowledged that some of the jobs listed
called for skills that many of the unemployed did not have
5. The surveys involved random samples of between 1,000 and 1,500 each time the question
was asked. Results of the surveys were provided by the Roper Center at the University of Con
necticut.
6 In chapter 8, evidence on the extent to which the experience-rated UI tax system acts to sta
bilize employment is reviewed.
7. Opposition to government transfer payments may be part of the reason that Blank and Card
(1991) found that only about 70 percent of those eligible for UI benefits actually draw them.
8. In February 1995, an attack on UI came from very high in the federal government. Within
weeks of being seated as Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives, Newt Gingnch said, "if
you're not at work, why are we paying you...[unemployment insurance] is not a vacation fund."
He cited UI as an example of a government program that discourages job creation by encouraging
out-of-work people to sit and collect money instead of learning new skills (Rice 1995).
9. Similar linkages between unemployment compensation and active employment measures
have been forged in other Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
countries See Brodsky (1994, pp. 58-59)
10 An excellent overview of the history and philosophy of the insurance concept is given in
Mahsoff(1961).
11. A similar argument about social security is made by Cohen and Beedon (1994).
12. While the weekly UI benefit is limited because of social adequacy considerations, private
supplementary unemployment insurance is available. Workers may purchase—in a fashion similar
to credit life and disability insurance on loans—unemployment insurance that guarantees periodic
consumer loan payments dunng unemployment up to a certain duration. This option may repre
sent a significant supplement in a consumer society where virtually everything from homes and
cars to groceries and air travel may be purchased on credit.
13. Blaustein (1993, p 47), from a statement of UI objectives issued by the U.S. Department
of Labor, Bureau of Employment Security, in 1955.
14. In the United States prior to the 1930s, the only reliable employment data came from the
decennial census. The census relied on the gainful worker concept, which excluded unemploy
ment since most of the unemployed held a job at one time or another during the interview year
(Levitan, Mangum, and Marshall 1981, p. 77).
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15. Blaustem (1981) proposed a type of unemployment assistance as part of a suggested threetier system of job and income security for workers.
16. Note that the benefits listed in table 1.2 do not include payments for extended or third-tier
programs.
17. A further stabilizing influence may be exerted by the UI benefit financing mechanisms
While UI benefit payments increase during recessions, tax payments by employers for those ben
efits occur gradually over a period ranging between 4 and 24 calendar quarters later. The full ben
efit repayment burden is not placed on employers during recessionary times.
18. The $700 billion figure for 1993 includes the largest entitlement program, social security
old age pensions, which does not means test payments
19. Sinner (1972), who advocated using the Unemployment Trust Fund for training, provides
an early comparative review of active labor programs and financing in Europe and the United
States. A more recent review is provided by Schmid, Reissert, and Bruche (1992).
20 See papers in the symposium edited by Arnold Katz (1977).
21 Atkmson and Micklewnght (1991) provide an excellent survey of the literature.
22. See section 5 of U S Department of Labor, Office of the Chief Economist (1995)
23 Part of the present variation in eligibility rules across states has resulted from changes over
time in response to the realities of the differing industrial mix of employment and unemployment
and the impact of these on benefit payments and UI tax levies.
24. The trends in statutes can be followed in the various revisions to U.S. Department of
Labor, Comparison of State Unemployment Insurance Laws
25 Examples are Gilmore (1960, 1964); and "Another RipofP" Sixty Minutes, April 25, 1976
26 A claimant for unemployment benefits interviewed on the CBS Sixty Minutes program of
Apnl 1976, who admitted that he did not seek or want work, a fact he concealed from the state
agency when he filed his claim, was disqualified from drawing benefits the morning after the pro
gram was shown.
27 See US. Department of Labor (1994)
28. Results from the Maryland experiment are to be available in late rrud-1997.
29. See Kingston, Burgess, and St Louis (1983).
30 Nelson (1969, p. 47) states that "at least twenty-three company unemployment-insurance
funds, covering approximately 60,000 workers, were in operation at one time or another between
1916 and 1934. There were never more than sixteen plans in effect at one time, and this peak was
reached only in 1931."
31. This is the view advanced by Rubm (1983) at the conclusion of his book
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CHAPTER

Coverage and Recipiency
Trends and Effects
Laurie J. Bassi
American Society for Training and Development

Daniel P. McMurrer
Urban Institute

Two key measures of the responsiveness of the unemployment
insurance (UI) system to the needs of the labor force are the percentage
of the labor force that is covered under the UI program and the percent
age of the unemployed who actually receive UI benefits. Although
these two indicators are inextricably linked, they have consistently
moved in different directions since the inception of the UI system (fig
ure 2.1).
With regard to coverage, the percentage of the labor force that is
covered under the system has been rising over time, generally as a
result of changes in federal law. By this measure, the system appears to
have become responsive to the needs of an increasing portion of the
labor force. Simultaneously, however, the percentage of the unem
ployed who actually receive UI benefits has been in decline since data
first became available in 1947. In part, this long-term decrease can be
attributed to broad external trends, including those in the demographic
and industrial composition of the labor force. In addition, there is some
evidence that changes in federal and state UI laws have made it more
difficult to qualify for benefits. Regardless of its exact causes, the
decline in recipiency suggests that the UI system has become less
responsive to the needs of workers. Thus, the two trends in system
responsiveness appear to have partially canceled out one another.
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Figure 2.1 Percentage of Workers Who Are Covered and Percentage of Unemployed Workers Who Receive UI
Benefits, 1950-1993

Percentage of labor
force covered

Percentage
of unemployed
receiving benefits

1950

SOURCE- U.S. Department of Labor.
NOTE: Shaded regions represent recessions from peak to trough.

1990

Unemployment Insurance in the United States

53

The percentage of the labor force that is covered under the UI sys
tem is defined as the percentage of jobs in which an employer pays UI
taxes on a portion of a worker's wages. An employer who is required to
pay UI taxes must pay taxes for all employees. Thus, whether or not a
worker is covered under the UI system is fully dependent on the partic
ular status of the worker's employer(s).
Over time, federal coverage requirements have been extended so
that the vast majority of employers are required to pay UI taxes, result
ing in coverage for the vast majority of employees. If a worker who is
covered becomes involuntarily unemployed, that worker can receive UI
benefits if all state monetary and nonmonetary eligibility requirements
are met. Coverage may thus be considered a precondition for eligibil
ity, as workers who are not covered cannot be eligible to receive bene
fits, even if they meet all eligibility requirements.
Eligibility among those unemployed workers who are covered under
state UI systems is based on a combination of factors. Monetary eligi
bility requirements are designed to ensure that those who receive UI
benefits had a substantial attachment to the labor force prior to their
unemployment. Only covered wages are considered in making a deter
mination of monetary eligibility. Thus, if an individual has two jobs,
and only one of the jobs is covered under UI, then only the wages from
the covered job are considered in determining eligibility (and in deter
mining benefit levels).
Nonmonetary requirements are designed generally to ensure that a
UI recipient (1) is involuntarily unemployed (i.e., was laid off from
work) or voluntarily left work for good cause, (2) is available for work,
and (3) is actively seeking work. The first of these conditions (along
with monetary eligibility requirements) determines whether an unem
ployed worker initially qualifies for benefits. The second and third of
these conditions must be satisfied on a continuing basis throughout an
unemployment spell. If they are not satisfied in any given week, the
worker is ineligible to receive benefits for that week. In this chapter,
eligibility is discussed primarily in regard to its effects on recipiency
among the unemployed.
The receipt of UI benefits by an unemployed worker (the percentage
of unemployed workers who receive benefits is often referred to as the
"recipiency" rate) requires that the worker be covered under the UI
system, make a claim for benefits, and be found to have met all eligibil-
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ity requirements. Thus, an individual's receipt of benefits is a function
of a combination of three general factors: coverage provisions, an indi
vidual's decision to apply for benefits, and state eligibility standards.
Similarly, the percentage of all unemployed individuals who actually
receive benefits is a function of these factors.

Coverage
Original Coverage Provisions

At the inception of the UI system in 1935, federal law required only
employers in industry or commerce to be subject to UI taxes, and then
only if they employed eight or more workers during at least 20 weeks
of the year. Among the effects of the initial federal provisions were the
exclusion from coverage of workers in small firms, workers in agricul
ture and the public sector, and seasonal workers. 1
Blaustein suggests that the decision to limit initial coverage was pri
marily a practical one, in that it would allow the administrative burden
to be lessened in the first years of the program, while still ensuring that
a significant percentage of workers would be covered. He suggests that
there was always an expectation that coverage would be extended—
ultimately to all workers who could be subject to involuntary unem
ployment (Blaustein 1985). Others, however, have provided different
reasons for some of the coverage exclusions; in particular, they argue
that the decision to exclude agricultural labor from coverage was
rooted in discrimination and racism (see Norton and Linder 1996).
Expansion of Coverage

Federal law has been amended on a number of occasions to extend
coverage to various groups that were excluded under the original law.
It should be noted that most expansions of coverage were preceded by
significant opposition and by dire predictions of the harmful effects
that would result. Rarely have these objections had substantial merit
(Blaustein 1985).
Coverage was first expanded in 1954, when federal law was
changed to extend coverage to all commercial or industrial employers
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with four or more workers. In 1970, the law was amended again,
requiring employers to pay UI taxes if they employ one or more work
ers during at least 20 weeks of the year or at a payroll of at least $1,500
in any calendar quarter.
The 1970 UI amendments also extended coverage to employees of
nonprofit organizations who employ four or more workers. 2 Through a
combination of the 1970 and 1976 UI amendments, coverage was fur
ther extended to all employees of state and local governments. 3 In addi
tion, the 1976 amendments included new coverage for some
agricultural workers. Employers with ten or more agricultural workers
in at least 20 weeks of the year or with a payroll of at least $20,000 in
any calendar quarter were required to pay UI taxes.4
A number of other smaller extensions in coverage have occurred
since the creation of the UI program. Federal civilian employees were
included in the system in 1954, when a separate program was created
to cover them. Former members of the military were added under vari
ous pieces of legislation in the 1950s, with a separate program also cre
ated for them.5 Puerto Rico entered the system as a "state" in 1960, and
the Virgin Islands were included under the 1976 amendments.
Overall, as a result of the extensions of coverage since the beginning
of the program, UI coverage today is nearly universal. It extends to
more than 90 percent of all civilian employment in the United States,
and almost all wage and salaried employees are covered. Only four sig
nificant coverage exceptions remain.
Remaining Exclusions from Coverage and Effects

First, agricultural workers who are employed on farms that are
defined as "small" are not covered in many states. Second, workers
who are classified as "self-employed" are also excluded from coverage.
Ambiguities in this definition, however, have caused certain workers—
who should be covered under some other coverage requirement—to be
excluded from coverage because they are classified as self-employed
independent contractors. Third, household workers of employers who
pay wages less than $1,000 per quarter are excluded from coverage,
and, fourth, employees of religious organizations are excluded. Each of
these four categories will be discussed briefly.
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Agricultural Workers
A large percentage of agricultural workers remain uncovered by the
UI system as a result of the "small farm" exclusion, which exempts
small farm employers from coverage requirements. This is the most
significant remaining gap in the coverage of wage or salaried workers.
The exemption of small farm employers from paying UI taxes can
affect even those migrant workers who do a significant amount of their
work on large farms. Because their wages from small farm work are
uncovered, it is possible that the inclusion of only their large farm
wages (i.e., the covered wages) in determining monetary eligibility
may result in the workers' failing to meet monetary requirements, even
if their total wages would have made them eligible. Reasons cited for
the small farm exclusion include the poor economic position of small
farmers, as well as practical problems related to difficulties in covering
workers who, by the nature of their work, are likely to have many dif
ferent employers or who include a relatively large percentage of
undocumented aliens.6
The problems associated with agricultural coverage have been exac
erbated by the inclusion of a special Federal Unemployment Tax Act
(FUTA) rule allowing agricultural workers who are supplied by a farm
labor contractor (or "crew leader") to be considered as employees of
the crew leader under certain circumstances. The practical effect of this
rule in many cases has been to assign UI reporting and taxpaying
responsibilities to crew leaders, among whom worker advocates report
widespread noncompliance. Thus, even among those agricultural
workers who should be covered under existing requirements, the crew
leader provision frequently creates problems for workers who attempt
to secure those benefits. Further exacerbating the extent of these prob
lems, the use of crew leaders has increased significantly in recent years
(Martin 1994).
Blaustein (1985, p. 22) notes that "the trend in the organization of
agricultural activity has continued in the direction of consolidation of
farms and large-scale commercial enterprises. This process both calls
for and makes possible investment in more productive methods and
equipment that raises output with less labor or with more efficient use
of labor. As farming increasingly resembles other business activities,
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the grounds for exclusion of farm employers from coverage grow nar
rower and weaker."
It should also be noted that eight states have expanded their agricul
tural coverage provisions beyond the federal requirements of the 1976
UI amendments. A large percentage of the nation's farm workers reside
in these eight states, which include the major farm labor states of Cali
fornia, Florida, and Texas. California covers agricultural workers on
the same basis as workers in all other industries, resulting in almost
universal coverage of farm workers in that state. In California, agricul
ture is a negative reserve industry, meaning that unemployed workers
in agriculture receive more in benefits than agricultural employers con
tribute to the system. Between 1983 and 1992, agricultural employers
paid an average of $114 million in UI taxes, while unemployed agricul
tural workers received an average of $259 million in benefits (Martin
1994).
Because a relatively large percentage of workers on small farms are
already covered under state law, the cost of a federal extension of cov
erage to agricultural workers on the same basis as other workers would
be relatively small. Rough approximations suggest that additional ben
efit costs could be between 1 and 2 percent of current total UI benefits
paid.7
Self-Employed Workers
Generally, considerations related to moral hazard are cited as the
primary explanation for the continuing exclusion of the self-employed
from UI coverage in most states. In particular, coverage is considered
to be infeasible because of difficulties in determining whether unem
ployment is involuntary, in identifying what income has been lost, and
in determining whether or not a self-employed worker is employed or
unemployed in a given week (U.S. Department of Labor 1995). Each
of these concerns reflects the moral hazard inherent in any effort to
provide insurance against unemployment to workers who control
whether or not they are employed in any given week and who also con
trol the documentation of this unemployment. Haber and Murray
(1966, p. 147) suggest that these difficulties make it "obvious" that the
self-employed cannot be covered in the UI program.
Indeed, only one state—California—allows self-employed workers
to apply for any sort of self-coverage under the UI program. Under this
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provision, self-employed workers who become unemployed can
receive UI benefits on a fully reimbursable basis, meaning that they
must pay back all benefits received, dollar for dollar, after returning to
employment status. Program administrators report that the use of the
program is extremely limited. 8 Thus, California, in effect, confronted
the moral hazard problem by ensuring that workers cannot profit by
manipulating the system. It is likely that a strict program such as Cali
fornia's is the only means through which coverage could be extended
to self-employed workers without significant moral hazard.
While the exclusion of truly self-employed workers from coverage
may appear to be reasonable—assuming the occurrence of the various
administrative difficulties that could develop as a result of their cover
age—there are a number of troubling issues that result from the exclu
sion of such workers. Most significantly, the actual classification of
workers as self-employed has created numerous problems. There are
incentives for employers to attempt to categorize workers as selfemployed independent contractors.
Indeed, a phenomenon has developed, relating to the emergence of
new groups of workers who are incorrectly excluded from UI coverage
by virtue of their classification as independent contractors. It should be
recognized that this phenomenon has been driven primarily by forces
external to UI; however, the development has had a direct impact on
the UI system, both by excluding workers who should be covered and
by denying the system revenues from UI taxes that should have been
paid but were not.
For federal tax purposes (including those of FUTA), employment
classification is based on a set of twenty common law factors. These
factors are determined by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and are
designed to determine "control" in a work relationship, which is criti
cal in differentiating between those who are employees and those who
are truly self-employed. For state tax purposes, many states use a
broader definition of employee than the federal common law test.
Under this system of classification, a significant number of workers
are misclassified under the IRS system as independent contractors,
which has important implications for the UI system. Estimates suggest
that over 4 million workers are misclassified annually, and this is pro
jected to increase to 5 million workers in the next ten years (Coopers
and Lybrand 1994). In 1984, the IRS estimated that one of seven
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employers misclassified workers as independent contractors (IRS
1989). Misclassification of workers appears to be more pronounced in
certain industries, including construction and finance, insurance, and
real estate. Firms with fewer than 100 workers were also more likely to
misclassify employees as independent contractors.
Some of this misclassification is certainly unintentional and may
result from the ambiguous system of defining employment relation
ships. Other misclassifications, however, are certainly intentional, as
employers can avoid payment of payroll taxes (employers avoid social
security taxes in addition to state and federal UI taxes), as well as some
employee benefits and other costs associated with compliance with the
law. Employers who misclassify employees are able to cut costs and to
gain a competitive edge over other firms that comply with classifica
tion laws. As a result, workers who should be included in the UI sys
tem are unable to draw benefits if they should become involuntarily
unemployed.
Household Workers
Household workers of employers who pay less than $1,000 per
quarter in wages are not covered under the UI program. Opposition to
the coverage of these workers centers on administrative obstacles. In
particular, difficulties in enforcing tax collection and wage reporting
requirements have been cited as arguments against the extension of
coverage (e.g., Haber and Murray 1966; Blaustein 1993). Recent pub
licity has highlighted similar problems in enforcing social security tax
provisions for household workers. Administrative difficulties in enforc
ing the work search requirement for unemployed household workers
have also been cited as an obstacle to providing full coverage to house
hold workers. The existing coverage of workers in households that pay
more than $1,000 per quarter, however, appears to nullify this concern.
More generally, the experience of some states that have provided
broader coverage for household workers for decades suggests that
administrative obstacles to coverage can be overcome (Blaustein
1985).
Employees of Religious Organizations
Workers who are employed by religious organizations are excluded
from coverage. In general, it appears that this exclusion reflects both
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the desire to maintain the general tax exemption for religious organiza
tions as well as concern about the constitutional mandate to separate
church and state.
Coverage Policy Issues

Overall, the extension of UI coverage to the vast majority of wage
and salaried workers represents a significant success for the UI pro
gram. Nevertheless, as Blaustein notes, "the coverage issue in unem
ployment insurance has dwindled to minor proportions overall.
Perhaps because that is so, it is difficult to overcome the tendency
toward indifference and neglect about closing the gaps further. For
those who are excluded, coverage is important. To provide more com
plete coverage does not appear to face any obstacles more serious than
apathy. It should be done" (Blaustein 1985, p. 30).
While most workers who face a risk of involuntary unemployment
are covered under the UI system, those workers who remain uncovered
are found disproportionately at the low end of the wage distribution
and often work in jobs for which there is a significant risk of unem
ployment. Many are workers who have a substantial attachment to the
labor force and are workers for whom UI benefits would represent a
critical component of income support when unemployed. As a result,
the arguments for continued exclusion of these workers from the sys
tem should be seriously examined.
Justifications for the continued exclusion of agricultural and house
hold workers, in particular, revolve primarily around practical consid
erations and cost and do not rest on more philosophical grounds. In
light of the program's history of demonstrating that many expected
administrative burdens related to coverage could actually be managed
quite effectively, strict scrutiny should be given to the validity of prac
tical arguments against the coverage of excluded groups.
For all groups of excluded wage and salaried workers, financial con
siderations—such as concerns about the additional benefit costs from
including currently uncovered workers—should be weighed against
the significant benefits that would accrue by covering those workers. In
addition, efforts should be made to minimize the effects on the UI sys
tem that result from the ambiguous external system for classifying
employees. Finally, additional attention should be paid to the system of
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optional, reimbursable UI coverage offered to self-employed individu
als in California, in order to determine the feasibility of extending cov
erage on a similarly limited basis to self-employed individuals.

Recipiency
Measurement

Two statistics have primarily been used to measure recipiency. The
first is the ratio of the Insured Unemployment Rate (IUR) to the Total
Unemployment Rate (TUR),9 and the second is the ratio of UI claim
ants (IU) to the total number of unemployed (TU). 10 The two ratios are
highly correlated (figure 2.2). The IUR/TUR is more difficult to inter
pret than the IU/TU because of various mathematical complications
related to the definitions of the populations being counted. Neverthe
less, the IUR/TUR ratio is widely reported, and the IUR itself is of par
ticular importance because it represents the primary trigger for the
federal-state Extended Benefits (EB) program. Both ratios are based on
a measure of the number of UI claimants, collected by state on a
weekly basis.
The total number of claimants, however, includes some individuals
who do not receive UI benefits but are counted among the insured
unemployed for any given week. Three primary groups of individuals
fall into this category: (1) individuals who are on a one-week waiting
period before the beginning of their benefit spell; (2) claimants who are
ultimately denied benefits for nonmonetary reasons; and (3) claimants
who are disqualified from collecting benefits in a given week for rea
sons that include the requirement that recipients be able and available
for work and that claimants who are working not exceed a given level
of income in a week. The inclusion of these groups has tended to
inflate the measure of UI recipiency by 10 to 15 percent per year (fig
ure 2.3). Thus, a third, less frequently used, measure of recipiency is
the number of actual weeks compensated, which excludes claimants
who do not receive benefits in any given week, as a percentage of total
unemployment.
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All three measures are correlated with one another, and because of
their varied use, all are cited at some point in this chapter when consid
ering research regarding recipiency. The IU/TU measure is encoun
tered most frequently in the research literature; thus, it is this measure
to which reference is most frequently made in the discussion contained
in this chapter.
Trends in Recipiency

Using any of the three measures discussed above, the percentage of
unemployed workers who receive UI benefits under regular state pro
grams has exhibited two significant trends: (1) a long-term trend, in
which the national recipiency percentage has declined slowly and con
sistently since the 1940s; and (2) a more recent trend, in which the
recipiency percentage dipped dramatically between 1980 and 1984 and
has remained near that low rate throughout the 1980s and early 1990s.
Recipiency measures vary considerably across states, with 1993
ratios of claimants to total unemployed ranging from a low of 15 per
cent in South Dakota to a high of 64 percent in Alaska (see table 2.1).
Over time, most state rankings (relative to other states) on recipiency
have fluctuated significantly. That is, most states have had relatively
higher recipiency rates in some years and relatively lower rates in other
years. (It is likely that much of this fluctuation is a result of variations
over time in state economic conditions.) Among those states that have
especially high or especially low recipiency rates, however, there is
less variation in their rankings relative to other states. For example,
since annual state recipiency data first became available in 1976, nei
ther of the two states with the lowest average rank—Virginia and
Texas—has ever ranked higher than 43rd among the fifty states. Simi
larly, neither of the two states with the highest average rank—Alaska
and Rhode Island—has ever ranked lower than 7th among the fifty
states.
In the long term, the IU/TU ratio has declined by approximately 40
percent since 1947, the first year for which data are available. The ratio
has consistently displayed (1) an overall downward trend and (2) some
cyclical variation during periods of recession, as job losers—who are
more likely to be eligible for benefits—represent a higher percentage
of the unemployed during these periods, when layoffs tend to increase.
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Figure 2.4 illustrates the relationship between the IU/TU and the
unemployment rate over time. The overall downward trend suggests
that the UI program has served an ever-decreasing percentage of the
unemployed.
Table 2.1 Ratio of Claimants to Total Unemployed, by State, 1993
State
Alaska
Hawaii
Vermont
District of Columbia
Connecticut
Washington
Oregon
Idaho
Pennsylvania
Wisconsin
Rhode Island
Montana
New Jersey
Arkansas
Massachusetts
Iowa
Nebraska
California
New York
Tennessee
Puerto Rico
Delaware
Nevada
Illinois
Kansas
Minnesota

IU/TU
63.6
53.1
53.1
45.3
45.0
44.4
43.3
40.5
39.9
39.8
39.7
38.9
38.7
37.6
36.5
36.4
35.8
34.6
34.5
33.7
33.0
32.1
32.0
31.8
31.8
31.6

State
Florida
North Dakota
Michigan
Missouri
Colorado
Wyoming
Arizona
Mississippi
Kentucky
Maryland
North Carolina
Utah
Maine
South Carolina
Ohio
West Virginia

Alabama
Louisiana
Texas
Georgia
Oklahoma
New Mexico
Indiana
New Hampshire
Virginia
South Dakota

SOURCE. U S Department of Labor
NOTE' Data for the Virgin Islands are not available

IU/TU
30.1
30.0
29.8
29.4
28.5
28.5
28.3
27.7
27.5
27.5
27.2
27.0
26.2
25.4
24.9
23.5
22.5
21.8
21.4
21.3
21.1
20.7
20.6
20.3
17.0
15.3

Figure 2.4 Recipiency Rate for Regular State UI Programs and Total Unemployment Rate, 1950-1993
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The long-term decline in UI recipiency was combined with a pro
nounced drop in both measures of recipiency during the early 1980s.
By 1984, the number of UI claimants as a percentage of total unem
ployment had dropped to 28.5 percent, the lowest recorded percentage
since data were first collected in 1947. The ratio increased slightly after
1984 but has remained lower than its historical average.
The period since 1980 is also the first one during which recipiency
measures did not increase significantly as the unemployment rate
peaked. 11 This represents a fundamental shift away from the dynamic
trends that had marked the UI program since its inception. 12 Burtless
and Saks (1984) also find a fundamental shift in dynamics, in that the
extremely strong statistical relationship that had existed between
insured unemployment and the number of job losers unemployed for
less than 26 weeks deteriorated significantly in the early 1980s.
Research on Trends in Recipiency

The long-term and recent declines likely were caused by a combina
tion of factors that tend to have similar effects upon the UI system. To
date, the long-term trend has generated relatively little research inter
est. The research that does exist, such as that by Burtless and Saks
(1984), suggests that the long-term decline is partially a result of broad
shifts in the demographics of the labor market, coupled with industrial
shifts. To the extent that the percentage of the unemployed receiving
UI benefits has decreased over the long-term, the UI program has
become unresponsive to the needs of a growing portion of the unem
ployed population.
A number of researchers have worked to identify the causes of the
recent decline in national UI recipiency. The federal government began
to support research efforts on this and related issues in the early 1980s,
and lingering questions about the primary causes of the decline have
fueled continuing research efforts since that time. In addition, two sets
of supplemental questions to the Current Population Survey were
funded that address the reasons why unemployed individuals do not
receive benefits.
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Causes of Long-Term Decline in Recipiency
Research suggests that the long-term decline in UI recipiency is pri
marily a result of broad changes in the demographics of the labor force
and in industrial composition. In addition, it is likely that evolution in
state policies has also contributed to the secular decline in the recipi
ency rate (see chapter 15 of this volume, as well as Blaustein 1993).
Burtless and Saks (1984) suggest that a primary cause of the decline
in the IU/TU ratio before 1980 was the changing demographic compo
sition of the jobless. Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, as many women
and young workers from the baby boom generation entered the labor
force, they also became a higher percentage of the unemployed. As a
result, men of prime working age, who are the most likely to receive UI
benefits, declined considerably as a percentage of the unemployed.
Burtless and Saks find that such demographic changes explain a large
percentage of the decline in the IU/TU ratio before 1980.
While the demographic changes described by Burtless and Saks
declined in their impact after 1980, other demographic changes have
continued or even accelerated in the 1980s and 1990s. Perhaps the
most significant change is the continuing rise in the number of twoearner families. It is likely that the increase in two-earner households
has reduced the need of some workers to apply for UI benefits upon
becoming unemployed. Thus, it is possible that various broad demo
graphic changes have continued to have a negative impact upon UI
recipiency. Factors that affect current receipt of benefits are discussed
in a later section.
The shift of workers from manufacturing and other industries with
high UI recipiency rates was also identified by Burtless and Saks as a
primary cause of the long-term decrease in recipiency, although they
report that it is quite difficult to estimate with precision the magnitude
of this effect. As will be discussed, the downtrend in manufacturing
also has been identified as a significant cause of the recipiency decline
during the 1980s.

Causes of the Recent Decline in Recipiency
Considerable inconsistency exists in the research examining the
decline in UI recipiency that occurred in the early 1980s. The variabil-
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ity of the results is an indication of the difficulty that researchers have
had in quantifying the impacts of various agents. Four primary factors
have emerged as the most common explanations of the short-term
decline in recipiency: (1) federal and state policy changes, (2) popula
tion shifts to states with traditionally low UI claims rates, (3) the
decline in the unionized percentage of the work force, and (4) the
decline in the manufacturing sector of the economy. It is likely that a
combination of some or all of these elements contributed significantly
to the short-term decline.
During the 1980s, several changes in federal and state law appear to
have contributed to the reduction in the percentage of the unemployed
who received unemployment benefits. Overall, the U.S. General
Accounting Office (GAO 1993) finds that policies designed to improve
the solvency of state trust funds had the effect of reducing UI recipi
ency among unemployed individuals. Most significantly, numerous
state laws were changed to restrict eligibility and to reduce benefit lev
els. In part, these state laws were in response to federal policies that
provided incentives to states to adopt more restrictive legislation for
regular state unemployment programs. A number of federal laws, most
notably the decision to tax UI benefits, also directly reduced the value
of unemployment benefit levels.
Federal Policy Changes. During the 1980s, a number of significant
changes were made in federal law governing state UI trust funds.
Beginning in 1982, states were required to repay federal loans to their
trust funds with interest (previously, the loans had been interest-free,
and there was some uncertainty whether repayment would be required
at all), and states with loans were induced to adopt other specific mea
sures to ensure solvency. Overall, these changes provided incentives to
states to avoid the need for future loans by reducing the scope of state
benefit programs. In addition, states were given other direct incentives,
linked to federal EB funds, to tighten UI eligibility requirements and to
reduce UI benefits. Taken as a whole, these federal policy changes
were reflected to some extent in state policy changes.
Federal laws also were changed in ways that directly and indirectly
affected the recipiency rate. In 1979, UI benefits were partially taxed
for the first time, and in 1986, all unemployment benefits became sub
ject to taxation. This change reduced the effective value of applying for
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benefits and would therefore be expected to decrease the number of
people who choose to apply for benefits. States also were required to
reduce or eliminate UI payments to unemployed workers receiving
pensions or social security payments. Corson and Nicholson (1988)
find that, overall, between 11 percent and 23 percent of the total
decline can be directly attributed to various federal policy changes.
Specifically, between 11 and 16 percent is due to partial taxation of
benefits and up to 7 percent to less generous EB programs.
State Policy Changes. During the 1980s, many states adopted tighter
monetary eligibility standards or stricter disqualification provisions for
their regular UI programs. GAO (1993) reports that forty-four states
tightened their standards in one or both of these regards between 1981
and 1987. Further, the increase in a state's minimum earnings require
ments was nearly five times greater among the twenty states with the
lowest levels of trust funds than among all of the remaining states.
States have also tightened other aspects of eligibility, as they increas
ingly disqualify individuals for misconduct or for refusal of suitable
work. It is likely that many of these state changes came about in
response to the federal incentives to tighten eligibility, although it is
impossible to determine the precise impact that changes in federal leg
islation alone had on the policy decisions of states.
Some research has found that these and other changes in state policy
account for a significant percentage of the decline in recipiency. Cor
son and Nicholson (1988) find that 21 to 54 percent of the decline in
recipiency between 1980 and 1986 is attributable to state policy
changes. Specifically, the decline is due to the following: 9 to 11 per
cent to increases in denial rates for disqualifying income, 3 to 11 per
cent to increases in the minimum earnings required to qualify for UI, 2
to 11 percent to increases in the denial rate for misconduct, up to 13
percent to changes in voluntary separation standards, 5 percent to
reductions in maximum duration of benefits, and 2 to 4 percent to
changes in wage replacement rates. 13 In addition, they find that the IU/
TU ratio would have increased between 1 percent and 13 percent as a
result of reductions in work test denials, thereby partially canceling the
effects of the other factors. Burtless and Saks (1984) also conclude that
state legislative and administrative changes are the primary cause of
the decline in recipiency, but they do not present estimates of the mag
nitude of the effects of these changes.
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Baldwin and McHugh (1992) suggest that state policy changes
account for 54 percent of the decline in recipiency rates between 1979
and 1990. 14 They suggest that the decline can be attributed to the fol
lowing: 21 percent to increases in the minimum earnings required to
qualify for UI, 16 percent to increases in the earnings required to qual
ify for the maximum benefit, 8 percent to increases in the number of
states with disqualification periods for job quitters, 7 percent to
increases in the number of states with disqualification periods for
refusal of suitable work, and 1 percent to increases in the number of
states with right-to-work laws. 15 An updated work, however, found
sharp reductions in the apparent effects of state policy changes (Bald
win 1993).
Blank and Card (1991) find little evidence that state policy changes
had any impact on recipiency. They do find that individual eligibility
for UI benefits appeared to decrease slightly as a result of tighter state
eligibility standards, although these effects were offset by increasing
wage levels. They suggest, however, that application rates among the
eligible appeared to fall in the early 1980s, accounting for some of the
decline in recipiency.
Population Shifts. An increasing share of U.S. unemployment is
located in southern and mountain states, where the IU/TU ratio consis
tently has been lower than the national average. Thus, as the percent
age of national unemployment located in these states increases, the
national IU/TU ratio would be expected to fall accordingly. This is a
long-term demographic trend, occurring throughout the last three
decades and continuing into the present. Blank and Card (1991) find
that these regional shifts in population accounted for approximately 50
percent of the decline in the national IU/TU ratio between 1977 and
1987. Vroman (1991) suggests that these shifts may have accounted for
25 percent of that decline, and Corson and Nicholson (1988) attribute
16 percent of the change to geographic population shifts.
Decline in Unionization. The proportion of workers who are mem
bers of unions has fallen significantly since the 1950s. Between 1979
and 1988, the unionization percentage declined from 23.8 percent of
the labor force to 18.8 percent (Curme et al. 1990 and Kokkelenberg
and Sockell 1985). Because unions have traditionally represented a
powerful source of information regarding available benefits for unem
ployed workers, it is possible that the decrease in union membership

72 Coverage and Recipiency

exacerbated any existing information problem among the unemployed.
In addition, unions have often facilitated the filing of members' UI
claims by helping to guide them through the UI system. Finally, the
members of many unions are only eligible for supplemental unemploy
ment benefits paid by their union if they apply for regular UI.
Blank and Card (1991) attribute 25 percent of the decline in recipi
ency to the decrease in unionization. Baldwin and McHugh (1992)
assign 29 percent of the reduction in recipiency to the decline in union
ization. Vroman (1991) also points to the potential importance of the
unions' information role by noting that the most important reason for
nonapplication for UI benefits by unemployed individuals is their
belief that they are ineligible for UI. If individuals' understanding of
eligibility is incorrect, then eligible workers may not be applying
because they believe they are ineligible. 16
Decline in Manufacturing. As noted, Burtless and Saks (1984) sug
gest that industrial shifts contributed to the long-term decrease in
recipiency. This trend continued in the 1980s, as manufacturing as a
percentage of total employment fell by 22 percent between 1979 and
1990. This factor has also been identified as a significant cause of the
short-term decline. Corson and Nicholson (1988) find that between 4
percent and 18 percent of the decrease in the UI claims ratio can be
attributed to the decline in the manufacturing sector, while Baldwin
and McHugh (1992) attribute 16 percent of the total decline in the IU/
TU ratio to this factor. In addition, Corson and Nicholson (1988)
observe that an unemployed worker previously employed in manufac
turing is 25 percent more likely to collect UI than a similar worker
from another industry. It should be noted that analyses by Corson and
Rangarajan (1994), and Baldwin (1993) both unexpectedly find that a
decrease in manufacturing employment actually leads to an increase in
thelUR. 17
Overall, the decline in manufacturing is closely linked to the decline
in unionization, because unions traditionally have been composed dis
proportionately of workers in the manufacturing sector. Thus, the
effects of these factors may be difficult to separate.
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Who Receives UI Today: Analysis from the

In an analysis of the characteristics of all unemployed individuals
who were not receiving benefits, the Congressional Research Service
(1990) found that such individuals were typically young, did not head
families, and were not the primary source of income within their fami
lies. Generally, they had lower-than-average incomes both before and
after their unemployment spell. As expected, the study also found that,
as attachment to the labor market decreases, the likelihood of receiving
UI benefits also falls. Even among those individuals who had been
employed full-time for an entire year before the beginning of their
unemployment spell, only 42 percent received benefits.
An additional analysis of the attributes of the unemployed who do
receive UI benefits at some point during their unemployment spell is
reported in table 2.2. These figures are based on an analysis of the Sur
vey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) and cover unemploy
ment spells that occurred between 1989 and 1991. 19
It should be recalled that there are a number of reasons that unem
ployed individuals may not receive UI benefits. These factors fall into
five general categories. First, the job may not be covered under the UI
system. (This is most likely to affect agricultural workers on small
farms or self-employed individuals.) Second, the person may not sat
isfy the monetary eligibility requirements for the program. Third, the
individual may not satisfy the nonmonetary eligibility requirements.
Fourth, some unemployed workers may satisfy both sets of eligibility
requirements and choose not to apply for benefits. Finally, some job
less persons who satisfy eligibility requirements may not realize that
they are eligible for benefits.
Effects of Demographic and Economic Factors on Recipiency
The results in table 2.2 provide some evidence that demographic and
economic factors have been responsible for at least part of the decline
in recipiency, generally supporting conclusions reached by a number of
earlier researchers.20 Specifically, the SIPP analysis found that if indi
viduals earn relatively high wages, work in the manufacturing sector,
work full time for the entire year, are a member of a union, live in the
Northeast, or are job losers (rather than job leavers) they will be more
likely to receive UI benefits when unemployed. 21

Table 2.2 Percentage of Unemployed Workers Who Receive UI Benefits, by Gender and Race
Women
Worker characteristic
Overall
Wage rate
Less than $5.00
$5.00 to $7.49
$7.50 to $10.00
More than $10.00
Poverty status prior to unemployment
In poverty
Not in poverty
Occupation/industry
Blue-collar, manufacturing
Blue-collar, nonmanufacturing
White-collar, manufacturing
White-collar, nonmanufacturing
Service
Hours of work
Full-time, full-year

Men

Total
27

White
21

Black
18

White
34

Black
25

12
31
50
63

12
31
48
39

20
40
56
na

9
28
53
70

24
38
40
67

16
30

12
23

12
25

22
36

17
27

56
41
56
25
15

50
36
50
22
16

65
45
30
na
13

58
42
62
32
14

55
33
na
38
11

51

44

60

54

51

Part-time, full-year
Full-time, part-year
Part-time, part-year
Union status
Member
Nonmember
Metropolitan status
Metropolitan area
Nonmetropolitan area
Region of the country
Northeast
South
Midwest
West
Reason for unemployment
Job loser
Job leaver

27
33
10

24
27
11

37
32
8

30
37
10

27
41
4

61
29

42
25

48
25

68
33

57
30

26
29

21
21

15
26

33
37

26
21

38
21
26
28

30
18
18
20

28
19
9
7

45
26
35
35

44
18
21
29

44
8

40
6

41
11

49
10

35
19

SOURCE: Bassi and Chasanov (1996) analysis using the SIPP research file The total sample size used vaned by worker characteristic 5,283 for the wage
rate data; 8,619 for the poverty status data, 6,260 for the occupation/industry data, 6,287 for the hours of work data; 6,504 for the union status data, 8,221
for the metropolitan status data; 8,619 for region of the country data; and 4,167 for the reason for unemployment
NOTE: "na" indicates that an estimate cannot be provided due to small sample sizes. Due to missing data, less than half of the sample was used for the fol
lowing demographic groupings: wage rate, occupation/industry, hours of work, union status, and reason for unemployment.
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Thus, as the percentage of the workforce that is in possession of
these attributes has decreased, the percentage of the unemployed work
force that receives UI benefits has declined. Further, since many of
these attributes are more likely to describe men than women, they also
help to explain why unemployed men are more likely to receive UI
benefits than are unemployed women. For similar reasons, whites are
more likely to receive benefits than are blacks.
General Effects of State Monetary Eligibility Standards
Table 2.3 summarizes the results from simulations of monetary eli
gibility among SIPP participants. 22 Overall, 56 percent of the unem
ployed satisfy their state monetary eligibility requirements; this ranges
from a little more than one-third of black females to approximately
two-thirds of unemployed white males. As expected, monetary eligibil
ity rises with wages and with attachment to the labor force.
The majority of the unemployed who do not meet their state mone
tary eligibility requirements are either new entrants to the labor force,
reentrants to the labor force, or individuals with sporadic labor force
attachment.23 Of the unemployed who do not meet their state monetary
eligibility requirements, 64 percent do not satisfy the requirement of
their state that they have earnings in at least two of the four quarters in
the base period.24 Of the monetarily ineligible individuals who do ful
fill the two-quarter requirement, 23 percent fail to meet the base-period
earnings standard. The remaining 13 percent (who meet the other two
requirements) fail to meet the high-quarter earnings requirement (table
2.4).
In all likelihood, any liberalization of states UI eligibility rules
would not affect the majority of the unemployed who do not currently
meet the two-quarter earnings requirement (since UI was never
intended to provide assistance to new entrants and reentrants to the
labor force). It is likely, however, that at least some of the unemployed
who meet the two-quarter earnings requirement but fail to satisfy the
base period or high quarter earnings requirements would be affected by
changes in state earnings standards.
Combining the results of tables 2.3 and 2.4 indicates that the group
of those who have worked for at least two quarters but still fail to meet
their state monetary eligibility requirements includes 18 percent of all
unemployed white women, 13 percent of all unemployed black

Table 2.3 Percentage of Unemployed Workers Who Meet the UI Monetary Eligibility Requirements in Their State,
by Gender and Race
Women
Men
Black
White
Black
White
Worker characteristic
Total
47
54
64
35
Overall
56
Wage rate
54
57
54
58
Less than $5.00
56
81
74
72
$5.00 to $7.49
78
76
95
91
90
93
$7.50 to $10.00
92
na
91
95
94
More than $10.00
93
Occupation/industry
75
88
81
85
Blue-collar, manufacturing
83
na
72
76
75
Blue-collar, nonmanufacturing
75
na
86
82
86
White-collar, manufacturing
84
na
66
78
White-collar, nonmanufacturing
70
70
45
47
57
58
Service
55
Hours of work
92
96
92
Full-time, full-year
95
93
84
91
86
89
Part-time, full-year
88
70
58
Full-time, part-year
67
67
67
32
42
37
45
42
Part-time, part-year
(continued)

Table 2.3 (continued)
Women
Worker characteristic
Metropolitan status
Metropolitan area
Nonmetropolitan area

Men

Total

White

Black

White

Black

57
55

55
53

36
34

64
63

49
41

SOURCE: Bassi and Chasanov (1996) analysis using the SIPP research file. The total sample size used vaned by worker characteristic: 5,283 for the wage
rate data; 6,260 for the occupation/industry data; 6,287 for the hours of work data, and 8,221 for the metropolitan status data.
NOTE "na" indicates that an estimate cannot be provided due to small sample sizes Due to missing data, less than half of the overall sample was used for
the demographic groupings above.

Table 2.4 UI Monetary Eligibility Requirements the Unemployed Fail to Meet, by Gender and Race (in percentages)
Men

Women
Fail to meet
Two-quarter earnings requirement
Base-period earnings requirement
High-quarter earnings requirement

Total
64
23
13

White
60
27
13

Black
80
10
10

White
58
26
16

Black
79
13
9

SOURCE- Bassi and Chasanov (1996) analysis using the SIPP research file
NOTE. The total sample size of unemployed who were monetarily ineligible for benefits was 3,786: 2,506 failed to meet the two-quarter requirement; of
the remaining individuals who met that requirement, 867 failed to meet the base-period requirement, and of the remaining individuals who met those two
requirements, 413 failed to meet the high-quarter requirement or similar requirements. Totals may not sum to 100 due to rounding
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women, 15 percent of all unemployed white men, and 11 percent of all
unemployed black men. Additional tabulations (not included in this
chapter) indicate that, in comparison with other unemployed persons,
the individuals in this category earn extremely low wages and have
very high poverty rates prior to the onset of unemployment.
Determinants of Receipt among the Monetarily Eligible
It should be recalled that, in addition to monetary requirements,
unemployed individuals must satisfy a variety of nonmonetary require
ments in order to qualify for and maintain ongoing eligibility for UI
benefits. No currently available data base enables distinctions to be
made among the unemployed who satisfy these nonmonetary require
ments and those who do not. The SIPP does provide information on
one important related factor: whether an unemployed individual lost
the previous job or quit the job. The vast majority of those who quit
their jobs are ultimately ineligible for UI benefits. Tabulations from the
SIPP indicate that, among the unemployed who meet monetary eligi
bility requirements, 58 percent of those who lost their jobs receive UI
benefits, while only 14 percent of those who quit receive benefits.
Some of those who have lost their jobs and who do not receive UI
benefits may have been fired for cause and, therefore, may be ineligible
for UI. Others may fail to meet some other aspect of continuing nonmonetary eligibility. Some may not be aware that they are eligible for
benefits. Still others may choose not to apply for benefits for some rea
son—perhaps they expect to be unemployed for only a short period of
time, or perhaps they have adequate income from other sources (e.g., a
working spouse) and do not go to the trouble of applying for benefits.
Recipiency Policy Issues

The decline in recipiency has raised considerable concern because it
affects the two primary functions of the UI system. First, it reduces the
capacity of the system to provide adequate insurance to workers who
face the risk of involuntary unemployment. Fewer workers receiving
benefits reduces the insurance value of the system. Second, the sys
tem's capacity to stabilize the macroeconomy through the automatic
countercyclical injection of funds into the economy is compromised.
This is affected by recipiency in two ways. First, as the percentage of
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unemployed workers who receive benefits decreases, fewer benefits are
paid during recessions. Second, the IUR is the primary mechanism
through which the EB program is activated during recessions. Because
recipiency is reflected in this measure, the decline in recipiency has
reduced the likelihood that extended benefits will trigger on during a
recession, thereby reducing its capacity to stabilize the economy dur
ing downturns.
Thus, the very effectiveness of the system is, in part, a direct func
tion of the percentage of the unemployed whom it serves. It appears
that the recipiency decline is a result of a combination of factors. To the
extent that the decline resulted from personal decisions by unemployed
individuals not to apply for benefits, there is somewhat less cause for
concern: the program has still met the first goal for those people, but
they have elected not to take advantage of it. In that case, only the sec
ond goal is endangered. However, to the extent that the decline has
resulted either from policy changes directly or from public policies that
have not been adjusted to address relevant external developments (e.g.,
demographic and economic changes, declines in unionization) there is
indeed cause for concern, for the program's capacity to achieve both
goals will have been compromised.
The discussion in this chapter suggests that the second scenario is
supported by much of the research literature. There are a number of
steps that can be taken that may help to reverse this trend and to
increase the number of recipients among involuntarily unemployed
individuals with a substantial attachment to the labor force. Perhaps
most important among these is to encourage states to determine mone
tary eligibility by using hours of work—rather than earnings—as a
measure of attachment to the labor force. Doing so would end the cur
rent situation, in which low-wage workers must work more hours than
high-wage workers in order to qualify for UI. This change could affect
the eligibility of up to 15 percent of all unemployed workers. These are
primarily low-wage workers who meet the requirement of having earn
ings in two quarters but do not have a sufficient level of earnings to
meet either the base-period or high-quarter earnings requirements.
This potential increase in eligibility resulting from a change to an
hours-of-work requirement would be partially offset by a decrease in
the number of high-wage workers with low labor force attachment who
are eligible. Alternatively, states could simply set their earnings
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requirements low enough to ensure that minimum wage workers with a
substantial labor force attachment are able to qualify (this would not
affect high-wage workers with low labor force attachment). In 1995,
the Advisory Council on Unemployment Compensation recommended
changes in state standards that would allow all workers with at least
800 hours of work in a base period to meet state monetary eligibility
requirements.25
There are also a number of steps that could be taken to decrease the
rate of nonfiling by unemployed individuals. Improving the informa
tion that unemployed workers have about the eligibility requirements
of the program could enhance filing, and might offset the portion of the
decline in recipiency that has been caused by the slippage in unioniza
tion. Changes in certain federal policy incentives, including a reduction
in the taxation of UI benefits, could also have the effect of decreasing
nonfiling.
The above changes could have a positive effect on the recipiency
rate by directly affecting UI policies. At the same time, however, it is
possible that these changes could be offset by more fundamental, struc
tural elements of the system, which also may explain some of the
decline in UI recipiency. For example, because states finance the vast
majority of UI benefits through a tax on employers, any interstate com
petition to attract businesses could serve to reduce UI tax rates (as well
as any other corporate taxes that are set by the states) to a level lower
than would prevail in the absence of competition. Because it is clear
that, in the long run, the relationship between solvency and benefits is a
direct one, then decreases in taxes would necessitate decreases on the
benefit side as well, all else being equal.
Although a number of studies have found that UI taxes do not play a
significant role in business location decisions, all that is required for
competition to develop is a perception by some states that UI taxes do
affect such decisions. There is evidence that this perception does exist
in many states. One recent study found that almost half of all states cite
low UI tax rates in their economic development literature as a positive
reason to relocate to that state. The study also found empirical evi
dence that states do compete in setting UI tax rates, and that this com
petition has had the effect of reducing average tax rates (Bassi and
McMurrer 1996). This finding supports economic analysis suggesting
that interstate economic competition would result in "inefficiently low
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levels of UI benefits [being] provided" (Hoyt 1996, MM-10). Thus, if
interstate competition were present in the UI system, it would likely
result in an ongoing decline in the relevance of the system, potentially
undermining other direct policy efforts to increase the percentage of
the involuntarily unemployed who receive benefits.

Conclusions
All else being equal, the extensions of UI coverage to new groups of
workers should have raised the percentage of unemployed workers
who receive UI benefits. However, as coverage has expanded since
1954, the percentage of the unemployed that actually receives benefits
has declined. The simultaneous occurrence of these trends in coverage
and recipiency represents cause for concern. It suggests that the overall
UI system, even as it directly changes by covering a larger percentage
of workers, has not been adjusted to respond to the evolving realities of
the work force.
The combined effect of the two trends also suggests that one form of
equity within the system has been eroded, as employer taxes that are
paid on the wages of an increasing percentage of the labor force have
gone to finance benefits for a decreasing share of the unemployed pop
ulation. Stated somewhat differently, costs of the system are currently
spread across a larger number of employers, while the percentage of
workers who actually receive benefits has decreased. This effect
increases to the extent that employers can pass UI payroll taxes on to
workers in the form of lower wages, and the effect is greater in states
that have low taxable wage bases, where low-wage workers necessarily
pay a disproportionate share of the taxes that are passed on by employ
ers.26 Overall, it is clear that the real benefits accruing from the increase
in the percentage of the labor force covered under the system have
been rendered significantly less important as they have been offset by a
substantial decline in the capacity of the UI system to be a presence in
the lives of involuntarily unemployed individuals.
Editors' Note. As this book goes to press, recent research on some issues addressed in this chap
ter has become available On the issue of interstate competition in UI tax policy, Wayne Vroman
finds no persuasive evidence that such competition has occurred Similarly, Vroman finds no evi-
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dence that states have implemented policies intended to shift costs of income maintenance from
the UI program to welfare programs. (See Wayne Vroman (forthcoming), "An Analysis of Inter
state Competition in the Unemployment Insurance Program," UI Occasional Paper, Unemploy
ment Insurance Service, Employment and Training Administration, Washington: U S. Department
of Labor, and Wayne Vroman (1997), "Unemployment Insurance, Welfare and Federal-State
Interrelations- Final Report," UI Occasional Paper 97-2, Unemployment Insurance Service,
Employment and Training Administration, Washington- U.S. Department of Labor.)

NOTES
Much of the research in this chapter is based on analyses that the authors have conducted as
staff members of the Advisory Council on Unemployment Compensation. Additional information
in some areas can be found in the three annual reports of the Advisory Council The views
expressed in this chapter are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of the
members or the staff of the Advisory Council on Unemployment Compensation
1 Many states, however, chose to employ more liberal coverage standards from the beginning,
particularly on requirements regarding the size of firm. The existence of more liberal coverage
standards in various states has continued throughout the history of the program
2. This provision did not apply to employees of churches or other religious organizations
Nonprofit employers were offered the choice of either reimbursing the state for only those benefits
chargeable to them or paying the state UI tax in the same manner as other covered employers.
Nonprofit employers were also offered the option of forming a group to pool their benefit liabili
ties through a common reserve fund. All nonprofit organizations remained exempt from the fed
eral unemployment tax.
3. The reimbursement option was made available to all state and local government employers,
and such employers remained exempt from the federal unemployment tax.
4 Estimates suggested that at least 50 percent of agricultural workers would be included as a
result of this change
5. Costs for both groups are financed entirely by the federal government out of general reve
nues.
6 See testimony from various agricultural groups at Advisory Council on Unemployment
Compensation hearing, New York City, September 8-9, 1994
7. This figure represents the estimate of the additional cost of extending agricultural coverage
to all farm workers in those states that have not yet extended coverage It was derived by extrapo
lating the experience and negative agricultural balances in the State of California.
8 There has been no evaluation of the effect of this programs, and there are no statistics avail
able on the extent to which it has been used
9 The IUR is defined as the number of regular UI benefit claimants divided by the average
number of people in Ul-covered employment over four of the last six completed calendar quar
ters The TUR is defined as the number of all active unemployed job seekers divided by the total
civilian labor force
10. The specific measure of recipiency used by researchers in examining this question has var
ied. Corson and Nicholson (1988) examined both ratios but focused upon the IU/TU, which they
call the UI claims ratio. Blank and Card (1991) also examined this measure, which they call the
fraction of insured unemployment Vroman (1991) focused upon the IU/TU ratio as well. Baldwin
and McHugh (1992) examine IU/TU, but they include EB recipients in addition to regular state UI
recipients
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11 It is likely that part of this change in dynamics can be attributed to the unusual back-toback recessions during the 1980-1983 period Some recipients who exhausted benefits during the
first recession were likely to have been ineligible for benefits during the second recession, thereby
limiting the increase in recipiency during the second recession.
12. The IUR/TUR and IU/TU ratios can be statistically predicted quite accurately for the years
up to 1980 by knowing only two variables (1) the year (a reflection of the long-term decline of
the system) and (2) the unemployment rate (because of the tendency for the ratio to increase sig
nificantly during periods of high unemployment) Since 1980, however, the recipiency ratios no
longer consistently demonstrate the same statistical relationship to these two variables
13 Any apparent discrepancy in totals is due to roundmg error.
14 Baldwin and McHugh's findings (1992) have been reformulated in the text in order to
facilitate greater comparability between these results and those of other studies. In particular,
Baldwin and McHugh report that state policy changes account for 97 4 percent (rather than 54
percent) of the total net change in the IU/TU ratio Overall, they find three primary factors that
decreased the IU/TU ratio, along with other factors that partially offset the decrease Thus, when
only the three factors that decrease the ratio are combined, they are larger than the net decline. As
a result, each of the factors independently appears to be a large percentage of the net decrease. In
order to determine the relative impact of each factor, the percentage of the overall negative impact
upon the IU/TU ratio that is attributable to each of those factors must be calculated These calcu
lations indicate that state policy changes account for 54 percent of the decline in IU/TU,
decreased unionization for 29 percent, and decreases in the manufacturing sector for 16 percent
The remaining 1 percent is attributable to the lagged unemployment level
15. Any apparent discrepancy in totals is due to roundmg error
16. A recent supplement to the Current Population Survey (CPS) will allow this question to be
answered more definitively, but the results will not be available for some time.
17. Corson and Rangarajan (1994) emphasize that this result is unexpected and suggest that it
should be viewed with caution.
18 The analysis reported in this section draws heavily on work by Bassi and Chasanov
(1996) While data limitations make it impossible to distinguish among many of these reasons for
nonreceipt of UI benefits among the unemployed, the Survey of Income and Program Participa
tion (SIPP) is arguably the best available information for these purposes Using the CPS, Blank
and Card estimate that between 1977 and 1987, only 43 percent of the unemployed met their
state's eligibility requirements. Their estimate is, however, very rough because the absence of ret
rospective earnings data in the CPS introduces error into the eligibility simulations (which require
quarterly earnings data for 18 months prior to unemployment). Two special CPS supplements
(1989-90 and 1993) do, however, include information on why unemployed individuals do not
receive UI benefits. Consequently, the CPS can be used to analyze somewhat different issues than
can be analyzed with the SIPP. Vroman (1991) is an example of this approach The SIPP is prefer
able for two main reasons (1) it contains longitudinal, quarterly earnings data, which are neces
sary for simulating UI monetary eligibility, and (2) the most recently available cohorts of the SIPP
include information on whether individuals quit or lost their jobs Individual monetary eligibility
can be estimated for each individual in the SIPP by applying simulation models of UI eligibility to
the SIPP data.
19. In interpreting this table and those that follow, it should be noted that some variables in the
SIPP (e.g , hourly wage rate and union status) are frequently missing Consequently, only a subset
of the SIPP sample is available for cross-tabulating UI receipt by these variables As a result, the
disaggregated UI receipt rates may be substantially different from the overall receipt rate
Further, the levels of UI receipt reported in the SIPP (like most other relevant data bases that
are not based on administrative data) tend to be several percentage points below the officially
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reported levels. There are several possible explanations for this discrepancy. First, the officially
reported statistics include individuals who have filed for benefits, although some of these individ
uals are not actually receiving benefits Second, it is likely that receipt of benefits is frequently
underreported by respondents to the SIPP (and other major surveys) Third, the officially reported
statistics on UI receipt implicitly weight unemployment spells by their duration, whereas the data
in table 22 are based on spells of unemployment and do not make any durational adjustment
Since individuals experiencing short spells of unemployment are less likely to apply for UI, this
conceptual difference in the two measurements undoubtedly accounts for some portion of the dis
crepancy.
20 See, for example, Baldwin and McHugh (1992), Blank and Card (1991), Burtless and Saks
(1984), and Broman (1991).
21 Individuals who had no earnings during the base period (i e , new entrants or reentrants to
the labor force) were excluded from the analysis
22 These estimates understate monetary eligibility to the extent that individuals have underre
ported their income in the IPP. According to the simulations, approximately 3 percent of the
unemployed who are calculated to be ineligible for UI report that they do, in fact, receive UI ben
efits. Thus, either the simulations are incorrect because of underreported income, or these individ
uals are receiving UI benefits in error Undoubtedly, some additional individuals who are
simulated to be ineligible do, in fact, meet the monetary eligibility rules in their states but do not
receive benefits.
An additional source of error results from using the state in which an individual resides as the
basis for the simulations. To be accurate, the simulations should be based on the state in which an
individual works (although this information is not available in the SIPP) Unlike underrreporting
of income, however, this latter source of mismeasurement is unlikely to cause any systematic bias
in these estimates of eligibility.
23. A small percentage of these individuals may have a long-term continuous labor force
attachment but may fail to meet the two-quarter earnings requirements because of two or more
spells of unemployment within a short period of time
24 It should be noted that not all states use all three of the general monetary requirements dis
cussed in this paragraph. The individuals who are reported as being ineligible by each of the
requirements are only those whose state has such a provision in its law. Thus, individuals who
worked only one quarter, but whose states do not require earnings in at least two quarters, are not
included in the groups of workers who are identified as having been disqualified for failing to
meet that requirement.
25. The Advisory Council on Unemployment Compensation made other recommendations
related to nonmonetary eligibility, including the elimination of exclusions of seasonal workers
from UI eligibility in some states, and the elimination of requirements in some states that workers
seek full-time employment
26 For evidence on the extent to which employer UI taxes are shifted to workers, see, for
example, Anderson and Meyer (1994)
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CHAPTER

Initial Eligibility for Unemployment
Compensation
Walter Nicholson
Amherst College
Mathematica Policy Research

States impose initial eligibility requirements to define which work
ers who lose jobs in covered employment may actually begin to draw
regular unemployment insurance (UI) benefits. 1 These requirements
serve two general purposes: (1) to insure that the worker has had suffi
cient employment experience to qualify for UI benefits (so called
"monetary" provisions), and (2) to test whether the worker is not
responsible for his or her job loss ("nonmonetary" provisions). Implicit
in these objectives is the philosophy that UI benefits are intended as
wage loss insurance against the risk of involuntary unemployment.
Other causes of unemployment are not compensated through the UI
system in the United States, although they often are in other countries.
This discussion of eligibility provisions begins with a description of
the general concerns that have motivated policy developments. Then a
brief survey of existing state laws is provided. Because state provisions
regarding initial eligibility are quite varied, the research on the effects
of these differences is also surveyed. Finally, there is a brief outline of
some of the remaining unanswered questions about initial eligibility
provisions and a description of how further research might inform the
development of UI policy.
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Some Conceptual Issues
Monetary eligibility provisions are employed by the states to ensure
that workers have a sufficient employment history to qualify for UI
benefit receipt. Frequently such provisions are justified as arising from
the need to assure workers' "attachment to the labor force" (Haber and
Murray 1966; U.S. Department of Labor 1994). Strictly speaking,
however, existing monetary requirements do not do that: state require
ments are not concerned with the UI recipient's current labor market
status, but rather with his or her employment history. Of course, it may
be true that, in many cases, employment history is a reasonably good
predictor of current labor force status, especially in making the distinc
tion between those workers who are unemployed and those who are not
in the labor force. However, there are important circumstances where
history is not a good proxy for current labor force status. For example,
retirees may have significant employment histories but may have no
intention of taking a new job, even if one is readily available. Alterna
tively, new entrants to the labor force may be actively seeking work but
have no employment history with which to establish an entitlement to
benefits. The distinction between current labor force status and
employment history has at times led to considerable controversy over
UI regulations, such as those related to the treatment of pension
income.2
A somewhat different rationale for monetary eligibility provisions
derives from the notion of an "earned right" to UI benefits as insur
ance. Under this conception, a worker's employment history creates an
increasing right to benefits should a layoff occur. Provisions that tie UI
entitlements to earnings history tend to reflect this insurance-like view
of eligibility provisions. The fact that eligibility also depends on the
conditions of the worker's separation from employment and on his or
her continuing availability for work might be regarded as similar to
other types of insurance provisions that seek to reduce the moral haz
ard associated with insurance coverage.
Measuring employment history to assess monetary eligibility poses
a variety of conceptual problems, and the states have taken a wide vari
ety of approaches to this matter. Some of the major issues include the
following: (1) the length of time over which the employment history is
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to be measured; (2) whether "employment" is to be measured by
weeks, hours, earnings, or by some combination of these variables; (3)
whether the specific time pattern of employment matters, or whether
individuals with identical totals (such as total weeks worked, or total
earnings during the "base" period) are to be treated identically; and (4)
whether some types of employment (for example, seasonal or informal
employment) are to be excluded from the history for purposes of eligi
bility calculations. Decisions made about each of these issues will
obviously affect the eligibility of specific types of workers for benefits.
In addition, such seemingly inconsequential definitional questions may
also build adverse incentives into the affected labor markets. For exam
ple, there has been a long-standing concern that UI coverage of sea
sonal employment may effectively provide a subsidy to such jobs
(Murray 1972). More recently, concern about displaced workers has
raised the issue of using relatively long labor market histories as a way
of targeting benefits to those for whom unemployment entails a signifi
cant loss of job-specific human capital. 3 Adoption of such special pro
visions might reduce the risks associated with long-term employment,
creating a variety of unpredictable labor market effects. Even decisions
on more mundane matters, such as whether employment is to be mea
sured by earnings or weeks, can create adverse incentive effects: an
earnings-based criterion would favor short-term, highly paid jobs
whereas a weeks-based criterion would favor part-time employment.
Often states attempt to mitigate these effects by coupling their basic
eligibility provisions with subsidiary requirements that seek to soften
such incentives.
Nonmonetary provisions that relate to initial eligibility for UI are
concerned solely with the claimant's job separation. Other nonmonetary provisions that focus on continuing eligibility (such as the claim
ant's continuing attachment to the labor force while collecting UI) are
discussed separately in chapter 4. With regard to separation, the pri
mary concerns of UI legislation have been to address the issue of
"fault." The notion that UI benefits are intended for workers who lose
their jobs through "no fault of their own" is deeply ingrained in the
philosophy of the system,4 and virtually all policy interest has been in
applying the concept of "no fault." Before examining such operational
issues, it may be useful to ask why the determination of fault has been
of such concern. After all, other forms of social insurance, such as
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workers' compensation or Aid to Families with Dependent Children
(AFDC), pay only modest attention to the question. Part of the expla
nation may lie in the nature of the moral hazard being addressed. With
workers' compensation or AFDC, there may be less concern that cli
ents become eligible through their own conscious actions (although the
vast literature on disincentive effects associated with these programs
suggests otherwise). In the case of UI, voluntary job separations are
common, so it is possible that availability of UI may have a major
impact on workers' choices.
A more important explanation for the focus by legislators on fault,
however, may be that UI is financed through an experience-rated sys
tem of employer taxes. Under such a system, many employers (that is,
those' who are not at a state minimum or maximum tax rate and there
fore are "effectively experience rated") have a direct interest is assur
ing that they are not charged for benefit payments for which they are
"not responsible." Only by so doing can they assure that their premium
payments accurately reflect the labor market risks that their operations
actually entail. Employers may therefore be quite active in pressing for
the adoption of various fault provisions into UI statutes.
Determination of fault in the job separation process has tended to
focus on three types of issues: (1) voluntary separations; (2) dis
charges, especially for employee misconduct; and (3) involvement in
labor disputes. Complex eligibility criteria have been developed for
each of these topics, often with little coordination among the states.
These varying provisions have probably had some differential impact
on the types of job separations that actually occur.
Before reviewing the relatively slim amount of empirical literature
on the possible size of the labor market impacts of differing UI provi
sions, a summary of actual state laws that pertain to initial eligibility
will be provided. Since this treatment must be brief, the interested
reader is directed to the invaluable "Comparison of State Unemploy
ment Insurance Laws," which is updated periodically by the U.S.
Department of Labor.5
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State Requirements for Monetary Eligibility
All states utilize a one year "base period" for measuring employ
ment history.6 The definition of this period varies from state to state,
however. In some cases the period consists of the 52-week period
immediately prior to layoff, whereas in others there may be a substan
tial lag between the end of the base period and the layoff date (or, more
properly, the date at which the worker first files for benefits). All states
require that an individual must have earned a specified amount of
wages or must have worked for a specified number of weeks during the
base period to qualify for benefits.
Recently, a few states have experimented with "alternative" base
periods for workers who fail to meet their usual eligibility standards. 7
The purpose of using such an alternative is to allow the states to focus
on more recent earnings history so that workers with irregular employ
ment patterns are more likely to be eligible. In his review of these pro
visions, Vroman (1995a) finds that they do indeed increase eligibility
for low-wage, part-time, and intermittent workers. Adoption of the pro
visions tends to raise the number of UI recipients by 6-8 percent and to
increase annual benefit payments by 4-6 percent.
The states have adopted a wide variety of formulas for defining
monetary eligibility. 8 A brief summary of these requirements is pro
vided in table 3.1. Four types of qualifying requirements are currently
used: (1) multiple of high quarter wages (twenty-four states), (2) multi
ple of weekly benefit amount (fourteen states), (3) a flat earnings
requirement (six states), and (4) weeks or hours of work requirements
(seven states). Many states also use alternative qualifying requirements
for those workers who do not meet the primary requirements. A brief
description of each of the primary requirements indicates how they
operate in practice.
• Multiple of High-Quarter Wages. Workers are required to earn a
certain dollar amount in the highest quarter of their base period. To
qualify for benefits, they must then have total base-period earnings
that are a multiple of this amount. Typically states require a multi
ple of 1.5 times high-quarter earnings, that is, one-third of total
base-period earnings must be outside the high quarter.
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Table 3.1 Monetary Eligibility Requirements in 1994

State
Alabama
Alaska
Anzona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
District of
Columbia
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey

Formula
1.5 HQb
Flat
1.5HQC
27 wbad
1.25HQC
40 wba
40 wba
36 wbac
1.5HQ
20 weeks
15HQ
26 wba
1.25HQ
Flat
1.25HQ
1.25 HQ
30 wba
1.5HQ
1.5HQ
Flat
1.5HQ
30 wba
20 weeks
1.25HQ
40 wba
1.5HQC
1.5HQ
Flat
1.5 HQC
Flat
20 weeks

Earnings
for
minimum
weekly
benefit
$1,032
1,000
1,500
1,215
1,125
1,000
600
966
1,950
400
1,350
130
1,430
1,600
2,500
1,090
1,860
1,500
1,200
2,287
900
2,400
1,340
1,250
1,200
1,500
5,400
1,200
600
2,800
2,460

Earnings
for
maximum
potential Distribution Seasonal
benefit
requirement8 restriction
2Q
$12,869
22,250
2Q
14,429
2Q
Xe
19,812
2Q
11,958
27,144
X
12,680
2Q
12,190
X
17,420
26,000
19,238
8,762
19,858
12,285
15,786
16,458
19,500
19,283
17,428
15,444
8,028
27,083
19,810
23,790
12,870
13,650
21,700
12,009
17,940
24,500
20,242

2Q
2Q
2Q
2Q

2Q
$440
$1,500

2Q

2Q
$750
2Q
2Q
2Q
2Q
2Q
2Q
2Q
2Q
2Q-$400

2Q
2Q-$ 1,200
2Q

X

-

X

-

X

-

X
X

-
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State
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Puerto Rico
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Virgin Islands
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming

Formula
1.25HQ
20 weeks
1.5HQ
1.5HQ
20 weeks
1.5HQ
18 weeks
40 wbac
40 wbac
1.5 HQC
1.5HQ
-40 wba
37 wba
1.5HQ
-50 wba
1.5HQC
680 hours
Flat
30 wba
1.4HQ

Earnings
for
minimum
weekly
benefit
1,285
1,600
2.324
2,795
1,702
4,160
1,000
1,320
280
1,780
900
1,288
1,560
1,480
1,900
1,628
3,250
1,287
1,825
2,200
1,380
1,650

Earnings
for
maximum
potential Distribution Seasonal
benefit
requirement8 restriction
2Q
8,537
2Q
11,980
21,996
2Q
X
19,302
2Q
12,376
2Q
X
15,405
2Q
22,720
2Q
.2 wages
13,080
X
2Q
5,320
22,389
2Q
2Q
15,834
20 wba
13,104
X
19,240
6 wba-$900
2Q
23,589
23,881
2Q
9,405
2Q
20,800
16,458
2Q
30,600
2Q
26,500
X
15,795
8 wba
X
2Q
18,333

SOURCE U S. Department of Labor (1994)
a 2Q means earnings required in two quarters in the base period Other figures refer to earnings
required outside the high quarter
b. HQ means high-quarter earnings.
c. Significant alternative qualification requirements in addition to that listed.
d wba means weekly benefit amount.
e X indicates that a state has such restrictions
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•Multiple of Weekly Benefit Amount. States first compute the
weekly benefit amount for which the worker would be eligible—
typically, a fraction (1/26 is common) of high-quarter earnings—
and specify a multiple of this amount as the base-period earn
ings required for eligibility. Because all states have minimum
weekly benefit amounts, this minimum level determines the mini
mum total earnings in the base period required for eligibility.
• Flat Amount. States require a certain dollar amount of total earn
ings in the base period. Often, flat earnings requirements are also
accompanied by quarterly distribution requirements that prevent
qualification solely on the basis of a single short-term job.
• Weeks or Hours of Work. This requirement stipulates a minimum
number of weeks (hours) of work at a specified minimum weekly
(hourly) wage over the entire base period.
The operation of these formulas in practice is more complex than these
summary descriptions imply. A state's detailed requirements are proba
bly only fully understood by individuals actually involved in the
claims-taking process. In its Summary of State Unemployment Insur
ance Laws, however, the U.S. Department of Labor does compute a
minimum base-period earnings requirement that permits some degree
of cross-state comparison. These figures are shown in the second col
umn of table 3.1. Overall, there is a considerable degree of variation in
required base period earnings among the states. Requirements range
from a low of $280 in base period earnings in Puerto Rico to a high of
$5,400 in Montana. Some authors have made use of this variation to
estimate the effects that different monetary eligibility requirements
have on patterns of UI collection. Because of the complexity of the
actual formulas, such estimates should be viewed with caution.
The third column in table 3.1 reports the minimum base-period
earnings required for receipt of a state's maximum weekly benefit
amount. Again, there is substantial variation in these figures, primarily
because maximum weekly benefit amounts also differ significantly
across the states (see chapter 5). As these figures show, obtaining a
complete picture of the overall generosity of a state UI program neces
sitates understanding the interaction between monetary eligibility
requirements and methods of computing weekly benefit amounts.
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The final two columns of table 3.1 indicate a few of the special
requirements that the states have implemented in order to bar certain
types of employment from resulting in UI eligibility. Practically all of
the states have distribution requirements that prevent eligibility based
on employment in only a single quarter. The stringency of these provi
sions varies in relatively complex ways among the states. Although
most states do not make a distinction between seasonal and other
employment in determining UI eligibility, fourteen have adopted spe
cial provisions intended to restrict the eligibility of seasonal workers.9
These states have developed a variety of different ways of defining
"seasonal employment." Some use an explicit designation of certain
industries as being seasonal. For example, processing of perishable
food is defined as seasonal in Delaware, tourism is defined as seasonal
in Minnesota, and special eligibility requirements apply to cigar work
ers in Florida. Other states have sought to establish a more universal
definition of seasonality, often based on the length of regularly recur
ring periods of employment and unemployment. In principle, wage
credits earned by workers in seasonal industries can typically be used
to establish UI eligibility only for unemployment experienced during
periods in which these workers were usually employed in their sea
sonal jobs. General UI eligibility requirements can only be met using
wage credits earned in nonseasonal work. The degree to which such
restrictions are enforced is uncertain.
State Nonmonetary Initial Eligibility Requirements

State UI laws incorporate a wide variety of nonmonetary require
ments that affect initial eligibility. Most of these relate to the condi
tions of the employee's separation from his or her employment.
Describing variations in state practices is made difficult, not only by
the large number of issues that are addressed in state laws, but also by
varying administrative procedures that have a significant impact on
how such statutes operate in practice. The first part of this section
focuses on principal variations in the laws themselves. Later, adminis
trative procedures that are used in the determination of nonmonetary
eligibility are briefly discussed.
Table 3.2 summarizes state laws as they relate to three of the pri
mary provisions affecting nonmonetary eligibility: (1) voluntary leav-

Table 3.2 Nonmonetary Initial Eligibility Provisions in 1994

State
Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
District of Columbia
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine

Voluntary leaving
Good cause
Inclusions'1
restricted3
2
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

1
2
2
2
1
2
3
4
1
4
2

Labor dispute

Misconduct
Period0
D+ lOwba
5 + 3 wba
D + 5 wba
D + 30 days
D + 5 wba
10
D + 10 wba
D + 4 wba
D + 10 wba
D -I- 17 wba
D + 10 wba
D + 5 wba
D + 16 wba
D + 4 wba
D + 8 wba
D + 10 wba
D + 3 wba
D -i- 10 wba
D + 10 wba
D + 4 wba

Period0
3-7
5
D + 5 wba
7
D + 5 wba
10
D + 10 wba
D -I- 4 wba
D + 10 wba
D + 17 wba
D + 10 wba
D + 5 wba
D + 16 wba
D + 4 wba
D + 8 wba
D+ 10 wba
D + 3 wba
D + 10 wba
D + 10 wba
D + 4 wba

Gross6
R

A
-

Period6
P
S
0
0

P

A
-

A
R
R
R
R
A,R
R
A

0
0
S

P
0
S
S
0
S
0
S
S

Excludedf
C,L
C,L
K
K
K
K
K
K
K
K
K
-

P
P

K

S

C,L

o
o

Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Puerto Rico
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota

X
X
X
X
X

s

X

-

X
X
X

-

X
X

-

X

1
4

1

4
2
1
1
2
1
-

-

2
-

X

2

D+ lOwba
D + 8 wba
D + 7 wba
D + 8 wba
D + 8 wba
D + 10 wba
D + 6 wba
7-10
D + 10 wba
D + 5 wba
D + 6 wba
D + 5 wba
D + 5 wba
D + 10 wba
D + 8 wba
D + 6 wks
D + 10 wba
D + 4 wba
D + 6 wba
D + 10 wba
D + 4 wks
D + 8 wba
D + 6 wba

5-10
D + 8 wba
D + 7 wba
D + 8 wba
D + 8 wba
4-16
D + 8 wba
7-10
D + 15 wba
D + 5 wba
5
D + 5 wba
D + 5 wba
D + 10 wba
D + 10 wba
D + 6 wks
D + 10 wba
D + 4 wba
D + 6 wba
D + 10 wba
D + 4 wks
5-26
D + 6 wba

A
A,R
A,R
A,R
A
R
R
A,R
A,R
A
R
R
A,R
-

S
S
0

p
s
s
0

s
p
s
s
0
0
0
0
0

s
p
s
s
0

p
0

K
-

K
C,L,K
K
.
L
.
.
C,L
.
.
.
.
.
K
K
C,0
K
_
K
_
K
(continued)

Table 3.2 (continued)

State
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Virgin Islands
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming

Voluntary leaving
Good cause
Inclusions5
restricted8
2
X
2
X
X
-

1
-

X
X
X
X

2
2
4
1

Labor dispute

Misconduct
Period0
D + 10 wba
D + 6 wba
D + 6 wba
D + 6 wba
D + 30 days
D + 4 wba
D + 5 wba
D + 30 days
D + 4 wba
D + 12 wba

Period0
D + 10 wba
D + 6 wba
D + 6 wba
6-12
D + 30 days
D + 4 wba
D + 5 wba
6
7+14 wba
D + 9 val

Gross6
A
A
R
A
-

S
0

Excluded'
K
K
L,K
K
-

0

K
-

Period6
P
S

s

P

s
P
s

C,K
K
-

SOURCE. U S. Department of Labor (1994)
a X indicates that good cause is restricted to work-related causes or those attributable to employer
b Good cause specifically includes sexual harassment, compulsory reitrement, to accept other work, claimant's illiness, or to join armed forces (number
indicates the number of these specific inclusions in state law)
c. D means disqualification for duration of unemployment. Other penods are in weeks. Figure after + is earnings or employment required following end of
spell to reestablish eligibility, wba refers to multiples of weekly benefit amount
d. Additional restnctlons for gross misconduct: A means additional duration or requahfication restrictions; R means restrictions on wage credits from prior
employer
e S represents occurrence during work stoppage; P represents occurence while dispute is in active progress; 0 represents other.
f. Dispute excluded if employer fails to conform to contract (C), prevailing labor law (L), or engaged in a lockout (K)
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ing, (2) discharge for misconduct, and (3) involvement in a labor
dispute. 10 All states permit workers who have voluntarily quit their jobs
for "good cause" to collect benefits if they meet other eligibility provi
sions. Definitions of good cause differ substantially among the states,
however. Table 3.2 shows that most states restrict the "good cause"
exemption to reasons for leaving that are directly related to the
employment situation. 11 States that do not impose such a limitation
sometimes permit the good cause exclusion to apply to "good personal
reasons" as well. Several states also specify by statute certain reasons
for voluntary leaving that are per se considered to be "good cause."
These are quite varied, but a few of the specified reasons for leaving a
job are common enough to be summarized in "Comparison of State
Unemployment Insurance Laws." Those specifically listed include the
following: (1) sexual harassment, (2) compulsory retirement, (3) leav
ing to accept other work, (4) illness, and (5) joining the armed forces. 12
Table 3.2 reports the number of these specific exclusions contained in
each state's laws. Of course, the precise definition that applies to each
of these conditions also varies considerably across the states, and the
specifics change frequently as a result of annual legislative initiatives
and legal determinations (many of these changes are summarized
annually in the Monthly Labor Review). Providing a simple overall
summary of whether a state has a stringent or relatively lax voluntary
leaving policy is, therefore, a difficult task.
Most states (forty-five in total) disqualify a worker who has volun
tarily left his or her prior employment without good cause for the dura
tion of the unemployment spell. In order to regain eligibility,
individuals must then earn a minimum specified amount, usually
phrased as a multiple of the weekly UI benefit. Once this subsequent
earnings requirement is met, however, claims for benefits can be made
based on base period earnings from the previous employment (i.e., the
job that was voluntarily left), although often such benefits are not
directly charged to the employer. 13 Eight states use a disqualification
period of a fixed duration. These states also usually require some mini
mum employment before reinstating the claimant's eligibility.
Disqualifications for discharges due to misconduct are in many
ways similar to voluntary leaving disqualifications. State specifications
of "good cause" restrictions are often framed in identical ways, and
periods of disqualification are in many cases the same (see table 3.2).

104 Initial Eligibility for Unemployment Compensation

The primary unique aspects of misconduct provisions relate to states'
willingness to specify degrees of misconduct together with accompa
nying differential disqualifications. Ordinarily, discharge for inability
to perform on the job is not considered misconduct. Even negligence in
performing the job may not be sufficient cause for a misconduct dis
qualification if the negligence was unintentional and had relatively
minor consequences. Repeated negligence on the job or willful viola
tion of company rules will result in a misconduct disqualification in
most states, however. Many states also include additional penalties for
especially "gross" misconduct, that is, misconduct involving illegal
activity or serious safety violations. Table 3.2 indicates those states that
either impose additional disqualifying restrictions for gross miscon
duct (denoted by A in the table) or place restrictions on the wage cred
its earned on a job from which the employee was discharged for such
conduct (R).
All states have provisions in their UI laws that disqualify workers
involved in a labor dispute. However, only a few states define "labor
disputes" explicitly. A key issue is the distinction between strikes and
lockouts. As table 3.2 shows, twenty-seven states exclude lockouts
from disqualification, but that exclusion decision has proven to be quite
controversial. It is often difficult to determine whether a particular
work stoppage is a strike or a lockout, and employers may lawfully
lock out workers when a union engages in "whipsaw strikes" (that is,
strikes against a changing set of targets of the firms in an industry).
Labor disputes that can be shown to have resulted from a firm's viola
tion of labor law or from a firm's failure to conform to an existing con
tract are also often excluded from disqualification (see table 3.2 for a
summary).
Only one state, New York, specifies a fixed period of disqualification
for participation in a labor dispute (7 weeks). Hence, in that state it is
quite possible for strikers to collect UI benefits after a period of time.
In fact, however, most strikes in New York are of relatively short dura
tion, and few striking workers actually collect benefits. Indeed, Hutchens, Lipsky, and Stern (1989) argue that the New York law is relatively
stringent because it does not require a "work stoppage" for UI disqual
ification. In many other states (those denoted by an (S) in the table),
labor dispute disqualifications come into play only when operations
have been severely curtailed at the struck establishment. In these states,
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in situations in which operations at the struck firm continue at close to
normal levels, there may be no disqualification, and strikers may col
lect benefits.
Defining which workers are actually participating in a labor dispute
has also proven to be controversial. States have tried to develop ways
of identifying "innocent bystanders," so that their unemployment can
be differentiated from that of active participants in the dispute. For
example, workers who fail to cross a picket line are usually defined to
be participants as are workers who help to finance a dispute other than
by their regular union dues. On the other hand, workers who are tem
porarily laid off at locations remote from a labor dispute (because of,
for example, parts shortages) are usually eligible for benefits, espe
cially if they can be shown not to be "directly interested" in the out
come of the dispute.
The administrative procedures through which benefits may be
denied for failing to meet nonmonetary eligibility criteria are complex
and may affect which claimants actually receive benefits. Such proce
dures can be categorized into four general stages as summarized here.
(For a further discussion, see Chasanov and Cubanski 1995.)
• Fact Finding. Information is collected from both the claimant and
the employer to determine the facts of the job separation.
• Adjudication. UI administrators examine the facts of a case and
collect whatever additional information may be necessary to deter
mine whether the separation meets the criteria specified in state
laws.
• Determination. An initial decision regarding eligibility is reached
by the UI staff. Most cases, for which there is no disagreement
between the claimant and his or her employer, do not reach the
stage in which a formal "determination" is made. Nationally, about
20 percent of new and additional claims for regular state UI bene
fits experience determinations, although this percentage does vary
significantly among the states. Somewhat more than half of all sep
aration determinations result in a denial of benefits.
•Appeal. Adverse determinations can be appealed by either the
claimant or by the employer. Most lower authority appeal deci
sions can also be further appealed to a higher level. In recent years
rates of appeal of separation determinations have risen signifi-
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cantly, especially for issues involving misconduct. Currently more
than 20 percent of misconduct determinations are appealed.
Implementing these procedures is relatively costly to the states. For
example, Vroman (1995b) estimates that issues surrounding nonmonetary determinations and appeals on separation issues account for about
15 percent of total UI administrative costs. A detailed look at the pro
cedures also shows that the states differ significantly in how they
approach the various stages. Corson, Hershey, and Kerachsky (1986)
examine six representative states and find few commonalities. The pro
cesses by which decisions are reached and the quality of information
on which those decisions are based appear to be influenced both by
general attitudes of state policy makers and by pressure to meet federal
performance standards. State procedures and their resulting outcomes
may also have been influenced by an increasing willingness of the par
ties to challenge initial findings of UI eligibility. Most importantly, a
number of observers have suggested that experience rating of firms
prompts an increasing willingness to contest claims. As shown in the
next section, however, the research evidence on this is ambiguous.
Ultimately, about 10 percent of all new and additional UI claims are
denied over separation issues through the determination process. That
figure says little about the total impact of nonmonetary eligibility pro
visions, however, since the overall level of claims activity may also be
affected by state laws and by the ways in which these laws are
enforced. What limited information there is on such overall effects is
summarized in the concluding part of the next section.

Research Findings
In comparison to the voluminous research on the job search effects
of UI benefits and potential durations, there has been comparatively lit
tle quantitative research on the effects of UI eligibility provisions.
Given the complexity of the provisions and the variety of behavioral
effects they may engender, this is not surprising. Still, this seems a very
promising area for future research. Hence, the goals of this brief survey
are to provide an overall indication of the direction that existing
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research has taken and to highlight some of the principal unanswered
questions that remain.
Monetary Eligibility

Two different approaches have characterized research on the effects
of monetary eligibility provisions. Econometric analysis has primarily
used aggregate data to examine whether differing state eligibility pro
visions have detectable effects on labor market outcomes. A common
method has been to use simplified versions of state monetary eligibility
laws, together with average wage data, to calculate the number of
weeks the average worker would have to be employed in order to
achieve eligibility. For example, Nicholson (1981) followed this proce
dure in a study of state exhaustion rates. He found that each additional
week of average earnings required for UI eligibility was associated
with a reduction of between 1.1 and 2.3 percentage points in the state
exhaustion rate (although the results were not always statistically sig
nificant). A possible interpretation of this finding is that more stringent
monetary eligibility provisions do indeed achieve the goal of eliminat
ing from UI eligibility some of those workers with weak labor force
attachments. Using a similar approach in examining reasons for declin
ing UI claims during the 1980s, Corson and Nicholson (1988) found
that more stringent monetary qualifying requirements had a signifi
cantly negative effect on UI claims. They show that changes made by
the states during the late 1970s increased the weeks employed required
by UI eligibility by 0.2 weeks, on average. This greater stringency may
have accounted for between 3 and 10 percent of the significant decline
in UI claims during the 1980s. 14
Aggregate studies of the effects of monetary eligibility provisions
have paid relatively little attention to the distribution requirements in
state laws. 15 One hypothetical simulation of earnings patterns prepared
by the Advisory Council on Unemployment Compensation (1995) sug
gests that these requirements can be quite important in determining
which types of low-wage workers qualify for UI. In general, the
requirements were found to be more likely to disqualify part-time, fullyear workers than to disqualify full-time, part-year workers (although
these workers may be affected by state seasonal restrictions). Hence,
such requirements may significantly affect part-time workers' ability to
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qualify for UI, but there appears to be no quantitative estimate of the
size of this effect.
The use of micro-level data to examine monetary eligibility require
ments is severely limited by many states' failure to retain data on ineli
gible claims. Several early studies that were used by states in
developing their eligibility requirements are reviewed by Haber and
Murray (1966, pp. 256-264). They conclude that few part-time workers
could meet the then existing UI qualifying requirements. The authors
go on to recommend that "a requirement of 20 weeks of substantial
earnings is about right" (p. 264), but the criteria being used to make
that judgment are not clearly stated. In any case, the 20 week standard
has become embedded in a variety of UI policy initiatives. For exam
ple, changes made to the extended benefits (EB) program in the early
1980s instituted a 20 weeks of work requirement (or its equivalent for
states with other types of qualifying requirements) for EB eligibility.
The intention of the change was to adopt a more uniform requirement
across the states and to focus EB eligibility on those workers with a
significant employment history. A simulation study of the effect of this
change (Corson and Nicholson 1985) found that its impact was rela
tively minor—reducing national EB first payments by approximately 5
percent. Emergency EB programs instituted since 1980 have contained
similar uniform qualifying wage requirements that have also disquali
fied relatively few recipients. 16 For more generous states, however, the
impact was much larger. In Wisconsin, for example, the authors calcu
lated that EB caseloads were reduced by over 24 percent relative to the
then existing 15 week standard in that state. Although various sugges
tions have been made about using more stringent base-period employ
ment standards, together with longer base periods, for EB eligibility,
none of these has been enacted into law.
Several recent studies have examined the effects of changing mone
tary eligibility requirements for UI in Canada. Because the Canadian
system is quite similar to that in the United States, findings from these
studies may offer insights on experiences in this country. 17 Some of the
most intriguing evidence is associated with the Canadian Variable
Entrance Requirement (VER), which tailors monetary eligibility stan
dards to provincial unemployment conditions. As a result of changes to
the VER undertaken in 1990, Canada now requires between 10 and 20
weeks of base-period employment as regional unemployment rates
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decline from 15 to 6 percent. The regional variation thereby imparted
into monetary eligibility standards and the unusual circumstances sur
rounding implementation of the new requirements have provided the
source for a variety of empirical investigations. For example, Christofides and McKenna (1996) find that a significant number of jobs termi
nate once they have reached the standards specified under the VER.
These effects seem to have been the largest in those provinces where
average job durations were the shortest. Similarly, Green and Riddell
(1993a) examine a "natural experiment" in which, because of a delay
in enacting the 1990 legislative changes, several regions had their eligi
bility standards temporarily raised from 10 to 14 weeks. This change
had a detectable effect on the labor markets of those regions. Specifi
cally, employment durations lengthened a bit (primarily because lay
offs were delayed), and the measured unemployment rate during this
period fell by as much as 0.4 percentage points.
Overall, the Canadian results suggest that monetary eligibility rules
may have their most important labor market impacts by changing the
characteristics of some, relatively marginal, jobs. That is, the rules pro
vide incentives for both employers and employees to adopt employ
ment patterns that maximize UI entitlements. The size of such effects
in the context of the total labor market in Canada is unknown, however.
In the United States, experience rating of UI taxes may work to miti
gate the size of such effects. Again, however, there appear to be no
quantitative estimates of such impacts.
Of the specific employment exclusions contained in state monetary
eligibility statutes, those related to seasonal employment have received
the most attention. Studies have focused both on simple measurement
of the number of seasonal workers who collect UI and on the potential
labor market consequences arising from the subsidization of such
employment. The important early survey by Murray (1972) provided
the impetus for much of this research. In that survey Murray reviews
many of the studies that the states used in developing their regulations
with regard to seasonal industries. Those studies tended to find that
repeat use of UI was centered in seasonal industries—especially con
struction. Murray does not explicitly evaluate the allocational signifi
cance of this finding. Rather, he adopts the position that such receipt of
UI is appropriate so long as workers continue to meet availability for
work requirements (see chapter 4) during their off-seasons.
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More recent concerns about the potential allocational effects of UI
coverage of seasonal work have focused primarily on the impact of
incomplete experience rating. Findings from large, nationwide data
bases tend to confirm that more complete experience rating dampens
seasonal fluctuations in labor demand, especially in construction and in
durables manufacturing (Card and Levine 1994) and in retail trade
(Anderson 1993). Generally, these studies do not take state seasonal
exclusions explicitly into account, however, so that their implications
for policy with respect to initial or continuing eligibility are not clear.
That eligibility provisions can have a major impact on a seasonal
industry is perhaps best illustrated by the case of the Newfoundland
fisheries. Extension of unemployment benefits (with relatively weak
eligibility provisions) to the fisheries in 1957 had the effect of signifi
cantly expanding that industry (Ferris and Plourde 1982). Indeed the
Newfoundland Royal Commission on Employment and Unemploy
ment concluded that UI eligibility had created "pressure...to qualify as
many people as possible for UI" and that this had become "the main
form of income security in Newfoundland" (cited in Green and Riddell
1993a). Whether such dramatic results characterize isolated pockets in
the more integrated labor markets of the United States is not known.
Nonmonetary Eligibility

Perhaps because of the complexities inherent in characterizing state
nonmonetary eligibility provisions, research on the effects of such
requirements is of modest proportions. A procedure followed by some
researchers is to use nonmonetary disqualification rates as explanatory
variables in regressions on outcomes such as UI claims. For example,
Corson and Nicholson (1988) find that rising separation denial rates in
the late 1970s may have accounted for between 2.4 and 24 percent of
the decline in UI claims during the 1980s. 18 However, the use of denial
rates in this way does not provide any direct means of inferring what
the effects of changes in actual UI laws or administrative practices
might be. Hence, the policy conclusions that might be drawn from such
correlations are frequently ambiguous.
The most extensive study of the relationship between actual state
practices and observed denial rates is by Corson, Hershey, and Kerachsky (1986). These authors use a pooled cross section, time series
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analysis for 51 UI jurisdictions over the period from 1964 to 1981.
Although they do find a few statistically significant relationships, over
all they encounter difficulties in differentiating between the explicit
exclusionary effects of more stringent separation regulations (which,
ceteris paribus, should increase denial rates) and the behavioral effects
of such regulations on workers' willingness to claim UI benefits in the
first place. For example, they find that states that deny benefits for the
duration of the unemployment spell for voluntary leaving have lower
denial rates than those with less stringent regulations, possibly because
these provisions deter claims. On the other hand, they find that states
that restrict good cause exemptions to employment related situations (a
more stringent regulation) have higher denial rates. Hence, the authors'
statistical analyses (and their detailed case studies of individual states)
suggest caution in interpreting the meaning of observed UI denial rates
and their possible correlations with other UI outcomes.
Similar ambiguities in the interpretation of data on administrative
actions in the UI system characterize the recent paper by Vroman
(1995b). In this paper, the author identifies two major trends in the
aggregate data. First, although nonmonetary determinations have
declined somewhat from their peak levels in the 1970s, appeals volume
increased throughout the 1965-1993 period. Within these general
trends, both determinations and appeals connected with employee mis
conduct have grown in relative importance, whereas actions involving
voluntary quits have diminished. However, major differences among
the states continue to exist in all of these measures, and reasons for
such differences remain largely unexplained.
In the final sections of his paper, Vroman uses pooled data from fifty
UI jurisdictions over the 1988-1993 period to examine UI appeals,
especially those that are employer-initiated. His general goal is to
determine whether possible increasing employer activism in contesting
claims (sometimes with the use of UI service bureaus) 19 has had any
measurable effect. Ultimately, however, the author is not able to mea
sure such impacts accurately because of the overall complexity of the
UI administrative structure and because his only measure of employer
incentives, the Experience Rating Index (ERI20), has many shortcom
ings. Still, by providing a thorough and careful examination of this
underused data set, Vroman sets forth a useful basis for future research
into UI administration of nonmonetary eligibility determination.
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With regard to the treatment of labor disputes, Hutchens, Lipsky,
and Stern (1989) provide a detailed statistical analysis of the effect of
state disqualification provisions on strike activity. As in other studies,
they utilize a pooled cross section, time series analysis over the period
from 1960 to 1974 and demonstrate that UI provisions have a clearly
detectable effect on strike frequency (although no unambiguous impact
on strike durations). Specifically, they find greater strike frequencies
tending to occur in states that permit strikers to receive benefits if oper
ations of their employers continue or in states that permit benefits to
innocent bystanders; these results are especially found in states with
generous UI programs.
Hutchens, Lipsky, and Stern also provide a detailed analysis of the
1981 strike by air traffic controllers, illustrating some of the complex
ways in which the labor dispute provisions in UI laws interact with
laws regulating misconduct disqualifications. Because the strike was
technically illegal, most states took the position that their provisions
regarding misconduct took precedence over labor dispute issues. In
these cases, most controllers could collect UI only after a disqualifica
tion period. A few states (most notably Michigan) took the position
that the strike was not sufficient in itself to warrant a misconduct dis
qualification and that normal labor dispute provisions in state law
should take precedence. In these cases, the controllers were usually
awarded benefits. This wide variety of outcomes, experienced by work
ers who were all in essentially the same position, highlights the
increased fairness that might be achieved by moving toward more uni
form nonmonetary eligibility provisions on a national basis.

Conclusion
This review of state provisions for initial eligibility for UI suggests
four broad areas in which future research might aid in the formulation
of policy.
• the usefulness of variable monetary eligibility requirements
• how monetary eligibility provisions affect the ability of workers in
"nonstandard" employment situations to collect benefits
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• relationships between seasonal exclusions and incomplete experi
ence rating
• the desirability of moving toward more uniform nonmonetary eli
gibility requirements
Variable Eligibility Requirements

The minimum earnings required for UI eligibility are relatively
modest in most states.21 Although greater earnings are often stipulated
if the worker is to qualify for maximum benefits or durations, these
extra requirements are also quite modest in many cases. As discussed
earlier in this chapter, little is known about the effects of these require
ments or about their ability to target UI benefits to recipients in the
most efficient ways. Policy makers have similarly made few attempts
to explore the utility of tailoring monetary eligibility standards to meet
specific policy goals. Two such adaptations are used frequently in other
countries and might be more seriously considered for the United
States: (1) varying eligibility standards in response to labor market
conditions, and (2) tying the potential duration of benefits more closely
to work history.
Basing eligibility standards on labor market conditions might
achieve two goals. It would make the UI system even more responsive
to the business cycle by increasing payments to those recession victims
who have been laid off after only a short time on the job. This
increased sensitivity might improve the economic stabilization proper
ties of the regular UI system and (perhaps) mitigate some of the need
for the adoption of emergency extensions during recessions. Reducing
eligibility standards during periods of declining labor demand would
also provide increased protection to newly hired workers when they
most need it. This would, therefore, represent a way of providing
greater insurance protection during periods of higher layoff risk in
much the same way that extending UI potential durations provides
increased protection against the lengthening unemployment spells
experienced during recessions. Similarly, because of the strong procyclical behavior of quits, such a policy change might mitigate the
need to monitor and adjudicate voluntary leaving issues.
There are several ways in which state UI systems could tighten the
connection between potential durations and work history. Most obvi-

114 Initial Eligibility for Unemployment Compensation

ously, states could adopt increasingly stringent base-period employ
ment requirements if workers are to be eligible for maximum potential
durations. This would further strengthen the notion of an "earned
right" to more generous UI benefits. To the extent that prior employ
ment tenure is correlated with workers' losses of job-specific human
capital, such an approach would also be consistent with providing
greater benefits to those who have suffered the greatest losses.
Any explicit use of employment history to target special re-employ
ment assistance to displaced workers would probably require the use of
a longer base period, however. That purpose is already served to some
extent in the Trade Adjustment Assistance program by requiring certifi
cation of trade impact. Currently, such certification enables workers
who can demonstrate that imports contributed to their unemployment
to receive an additional 26 weeks of UI benefits following exhaustion,
providing they agree to enter an appropriate training program. This has
the effect of focusing benefits on workers with significant employment
histories (Corson et al. 1993). Devising administrative methods for col
lecting longer base period employment information might provide a
similar way of focusing longer UI potential durations on more general
categories of displaced workers, especially those suffering major eco
nomic hardships.22 Administrative costs associated with moving to
longer base periods in the context of current UI data systems could be
quite high, however.
Monetary Eligibility and Nonstandard Employment

Existing provisions for monetary eligibility are implicitly based on a
"standard" model of employment in which a single employer certifies
that the worker has had sufficient employment during the base period
specified in state law. The employer usually must also certify that the
worker meets nonmonetary eligibility provisions—most importantly,
that he or she has been involuntarily laid off. As employment situations
become increasingly diverse, this model may no longer be appropriate
in many circumstances, including (1) regular, part-time employment;
(2) temporary employment; and (3) self-employment or independent
contractor status.
Current monetary eligibility standards tend to discriminate against
those whose employment is part-time, especially for low-wage workers
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(Advisory Council on Unemployment Compensation 1995). This
approach may possibly have been acceptable in earlier times, when
part-time work tended to be associated with weak labor market attach
ment. However, the rapid growth in flexible working arrangements has
made such an assumption increasingly untenable. Deciding whether it
is desirable to expand UI coverage to workers whose employment is
primarily part-time involves a number of important trade-offs.
Although much early research tended to treat growth in part-time
work arrangements as a labor supply phenomenon, more recent
research focuses on the demand side of the market. Assuming that parttime and full-time workers are nearly perfect substitutes, an increasing
use of part-time workers may be explained by a decline in their relative
costs—especially because the hiring of such workers may involve
lower levels of "quasi-fixed" costs (Oi 1962; Ehrenberg and Smith
1991). Whether the exclusion of low-wage, part-time workers from UI
eligibility has contributed to this trend is not known. Given prevailing
levels of UI taxation, such an effect does not seem implausible, how
ever. Hence, relaxation of monetary eligibility requirements to increase
the eligibility of part-time workers (this would primarily necessitate
the relaxation of the requirements that most earnings occur in the high
quarter) could have the effect of slowing the growth in such arrange
ments.
Reducing restrictions on part-time workers' access to UI might also
pose administrative difficulties in assessing both initial and continuing
eligibility. Certainly existing voluntary leaving statutes would have to
be modified to develop clear standards about when a separation had
actually occurred. In addition, continuing eligibility provisions would
have to be adapted to meet the circumstances of individuals looking for
part-time work. Making such changes does not seem to pose insur
mountable problems, however, if the goal of providing increased pro
tection to part-time workers were judged to be an important expansion
of the safety net that UI provides.
The challenge in providing adequate UI coverage to workers in tem
porary employment centers on how job separations are to be defined.
In this regard, the situation is similar to seasonal employment in that
workers maintain some attachment to their jobs. In the seasonal case, it
appears likely that UI coverage of gaps in employment will provide a
clear subsidy to temporary jobs. From workers' perspectives, however,
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there may be somewhat more certainty associated with return to work
at a seasonal job than with the assurance that a new temporary job will
materialize. Hence, availability for work may be more difficult to
appraise. Although anecdotal evidence suggests that regular, temporary
employment may be on the increase, there is currently little data with
which to estimate its relative importance or simulate possible effects of
alternative UI eligibility criteria. For workers associated with tempo
rary employment agencies or who work on a temporary basis for a sin
gle employer, it may be possible to devise eligibility standards based
on past patterns of regular employment, but no state has as yet made
any major moves in that direction.
As described in chapter 2, the most significant issue involving UI
eligibility for ostensibly self-employed workers involves the potential
misclassification of employees as independent contractors. Because
firms can significantly reduce their liabilities for both taxes and fringe
benefits through such a classification, it seems likely that it has been
adopted for many workers in types of situations that meet IRS stan
dards for "employment." Whether UI coverage is extended to such
workers depends on future initiatives by the U.S. Internal Revenue Ser
vice.
For workers whose jobs are truly of a self-employed character,
extension of UI coverage poses a number of thorny issues. Again, most
of these focus on matters of nonmonetary qualification. Because the
adversarial conflict between employer and employee cannot be relied
upon in this situation to provide unbiased information about the nature
of the job separation, some other mechanism must be found. California
has experimented with interview-oriented procedures, but their imple
mentation remains controversial—especially with regard to how the
self-employed should have UI tax liabilities assessed.
Seasonal Exclusions

The statistical research reviewed in the previous section confirms
that availability of unemployment benefits may significantly increase
the seasonal sensitivity of employment, especially in the presence of
incomplete experience rating. The majority of this research has paid
relatively little attention either to the explicit seasonal exclusions in
state laws or to the probably more important implicit seasonal exclu-

Unemployment Insurance in the United States

117

sions created by the distribution criteria in state monetary eligibility
standards. Hence, we have a very incomplete picture of how unem
ployment compensation and seasonal employment are related. A more
comprehensive examination would require both an appraisal of how UI
availability affects the level of employment in seasonal industries and
how such availability affects seasonal wage premia. In the absence of a
relatively full modeling of the total labor market impact of UI, it is dif
ficult to determine whether the correct policy response to potential sub
sidies to seasonal industries is the adoption of more complete
experience rating or appropriate modifications to explicit and implicit
seasonal exclusions by states.
Uniformity in Nonmonetary Eligibility Requirements

The significant interstate variation in nonmonetary eligibility
requirements surveyed earlier in this chapter raises the issue of whether
potential gains in simplicity, efficiency, and fairness might be achieved
by moving toward more uniform national standards. Some very prelim
inary moves in that direction have been made with regard to continuing
eligibility conditions that apply to extended benefits (see Corson and
Nicholson 1985). Very little has been done about regular UI, perhaps
because of constitutional difficulties in implementing national stan
dards, but existing differences may pose inequities for claimants who
can find identical circumstances treated very differently (as illustrated
by the air traffic controller case). More generally, differences in state
nonmonetary eligibility provisions may have allocative significance
both in terms of how local labor markets operate (the evidence from
Green and Riddell (1993a), on local Canadian labor markets is quite
convincing on this point) and in terms of the overall location of eco
nomic activity among the states. For example, it would be surprising if
the significant effects of UI on strike activity found by Hutchens,
Lipsky, and Stern (1989) had no impact on the willingness of some
firms to locate in a state. Given the difficulties in characterizing state
laws and procedures, however, relatively little is currently known about
the likely size of such effects.
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NOTES
I would like to thank Patncia Anderson, Walter Corson, Alec Levenson, Karen Needels, Chris
O'Leary, and especially Craig Riddell, who offered a number of suggestions about ways in which
this chapter could be improved. Participants in the conference "Unemployment Insurance in the
United States," sponsored by the W. E. Upjohn Institute and the U S. Department of Labor, also
offered many thoughtful insights on this topic.
1 Eligibility requirements for the regular UI program also apply to programs for military per
sonnel (UCX) and for federal employees (UCFE). They are also relevant to programs that require
regular UI collection prior to participation, including regular extended benefits (EB), emergency
extended benefits (FSB, FSC, and EUC), and trade adjustment assistance (TAA) benefits.
2 For a discussion of the evolution of pension offset legislation in UI laws, see chapter 12.
3 No state currently uses more than one year of labor market history in determining UI eligi
bility, although such provisions are relatively common in other countries (Congressional Research
Service 1992)
4 The history of the notion of "fault" as it relates to job separations in both private and public
UI systems is discussed in Blaustem (1993)
5 An annual summary of changes in state laws also appears in the Monthly Labor Review
6 In some cases, mainly involving disabilities, the base period may be extended.
7 The six states that include an alternative base period in their eligibility provisions are
Maine, Massachusetts, Ohio, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Washington
8 Throughout this discussion, the fifty-three primary UI jurisdictions (fifty states, the District
of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands) will be referred to as "states."
9 Other special exclusions in UI initial eligibility laws include students hired by their educa
tional institutions, school employees during the summer months, and professional athletes during
the off-season Most states also disqualify self-employed earnings from conferring UI eligibility,
although a few (for example, California) have experimented with limited inclusions of such earn
ings.
10 Other disqualification provisions relate to fraudulent misrepresentation and to the receipt
of certain kinds of income, such as severance pay, workers' compensation, and pensions. These
provisions will not be explicitly examined here
11 Although "good cause" is defined in relationship to the employment situation, there is usu
ally no necessary finding of employer "fault." In some states, good cause also includes situations
where family obligations lead the employee to leave his or her job. These obligations can include
leaving to marry, leaving to move with a spouse, and leaving to perform domestic obligations. In
many cases, these inclusions relate only to initial eligibility, and standard provisions for continu
ing eligibility still apply The situation of workers who leave employment because of pregnancy is
quite complex, involving issues both of initial and continuing eligibility For a discussion see
Brown (1995).
12. These exemptions must also be understood in the context of the continuing eligibility pro
visions of states For example, a worker who leaves to accept other employment would be eligible
only if that new job did not work out and he or she is then found to be able and available for work.
13. A few states also reduce UI entitlements either by an amount equal to the number of weeks
of disqualification or by a fixed percentage
14 A simple regression using cross section data for 1993 suggests that similar results hold
across the states In this regression, each additional week of employment required for UI eligibil
ity was estimated to be associated with a reduction of approximately 2 percent in the ratio of
insured to total unemployment
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15. The Nicholson (1981) study of exhaustion rates does report that states with no distribu
tional requirements in their monetary eligibility provisions have significantly lower exhaustion
rates. A possible explanation is that such states make it easier for seasonal workers to qualify for
benefits, and that those workers typically do not exhaust their UI entitlements
16. For example, Corson, Grossman, and Nicholson (1986) find that approximately 4 percent
of regular UI recipients were made ineligible for the Federal Supplemental Compensation (FSC)
program by the adoption of such requirements
17. Monetary eligibility in Canada is based on weeks of employment. A "week of employ
ment" is defined as any week in which the individual works at least 15 hours for pay or in which
he or she earns 20 percent of the maximum insured earnings Voluntary quits also incur disqualifi
cations in Canada. Unlike the United States, however, in some cases new entrants and reentrants
are eligible for UI in Canada. Also, in Canada, UI taxes are not experience rated For a summary
of various issues related to the Canadian system, see Green et al. (1994) and Green and Riddell
(1993b)
18 The wide range in estimated effects stems primarily from complications in interpreting the
impacts of falling voluntary separation denial rates during this period The authors see this trend
as arising from increasingly clear and stringent voluntary leaving provisions being adopted by the
states, although they admit to some ambiguity on the point. A simple cross section regression
using recent data from the states shows a negative correlation between misconduct denial rates
and UI claims, but no significant effect for voluntary leaving denials.
19 These service bureaus contract with firms to handle their Ul-related activities Frequently,
such services are also provided by accounting companies that handle firms' other payroll needs as
well Because providers of such services may encounter substantial economies of scale in
addressing technical issues related to UI eligibility, it is possible that they may have been effective
in contesting claims in order to reduce their clients' UI tax liabilities. Although employers' use of
these services has expanded rapidly in recent years (and utilization rates are concentrated geo
graphically), there are no quantitative estimates of their overall impact on the UI claims process.
20. The ERI is defined as the ratio of fully charged UI benefits to total UI benefits paid. This
measure varies both from state to state and over the business cycle for a variety of reasons, many
of which are unrelated to the effective degree of experience rating for the typical firm.
21. Generalizing from the wide variety of state requirements is difficult: it does appear that
most state minima fall well short of requirements in other countries, although many other coun
tries also offer unemployment assistance to those with little or no employment history. For a sum
mary, see Congressional Research Services (1990)
22 For an analysis, see Congressional Budget Office (1990).
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CHAPTER

Continuing Eligibility
Current Labor Market Attachment
Patricia M. Anderson
Dartmouth College

While one of the objectives of unemployment insurance (UI) is to
reduce the financial hardship of job loss, it was not originally designed
to be simply a welfare program for the indigent: it was to be an earned
right for workers who become unemployed. 1 Thus, the program
requires not only that recipients demonstrate past labor market attach
ment but that they maintain that attachment. The exact requirements
for continuing eligibility for UI differ across state programs but share
certain common characteristics. Thus, in all states, claimants must
demonstrate that they are able and available for work, and, in most
states, they are required to undertake an active search for a new job. All
states also impose a disqualification for refusal to accept an offer of
suitable work, although the severity of the penalty varies. Additionally,
states differ in their definitions of suitable and of able and available, as
well as in deciding what constitutes an active search.
The variation in state approaches to the issue of continuing eligibil
ity is testament to the fact that there is no one way that is clearly opti
mal. However, the costs and benefits of the different choices made are
often evident, as are the considerations that are likely to affect these
costs and benefits. The next section begins to explore the various state
approaches to continuing eligibility, starting with the able and available
for work requirement. This discussion is followed by an analysis of
active search requirements, and the section concludes by looking at the
varying definitions of suitable work. The subsequent section looks at
state practices in disqualifications, beginning with the types of disqual-
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ifications imposed by the states and the trends in state laws regarding
this issue. Some background on the determination and appeals process
is also provided. In the last two sections, the determinants of differ
ences across states in continuing eligibility practices and in denial and
appeal rates are explored, and some conclusions and directions for fur
ther research are provided.

Work Search Issues
Able and Available for Work

A basic requirement for continuing eligibility for UI benefits is that
the claimant be "able and available" for work. Such a stipulation may
at first seem to be a straightforward application of the notion that UI is
only for workers with a current labor market attachment. However,
there are several areas of controversy. This fact is illustrated by the
variation across states and over time in the definitions of able and avail
able for work. While the line between ability and availability may
appear somewhat fuzzy, the question of whether a claimant is able to
work is essentially one concerning the physical or mental condition of
the worker. Since the claimant must have recently been able to work in
order to obtain monetary eligibility for UI, this issue often boils down
to the treatment of temporary health conditions. As seen in table 4.1,
eleven states have a special provision that claimants "are not ineligible
if unavailable because of illness or disability occurring after filing a
claim and registering for work if no offer of work that would have been
suitable at time of registration is refused after beginning of such dis
ability" (U.S. Department of Labor 1994a). Within this group, Massa
chusetts and Alaska limit the period of time for which this waiver is in
effect, to three and six weeks, respectively. Also, North Dakota limits
the waiver to illnesses not covered by workers' compensation.
There has been very little change in state laws regarding ability to
work since the issue was reviewed by Haber and Murray (1966), who
noted that in January of 1965 there were nine states with temporary ill
ness provisions. It is interesting that there has been almost no increase
in this number over the past 30 years, even though at that time the
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Table 4.1 1994 State Provisions on Ability and Availability for Work

State
Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
District of Columbia
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire

Special
disability
provision
No
Yes
No
No
No
No
No
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
No
Yes
No
Yes
No

Able and available for
Any Suitable Usual
work
work
work
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
No
No
Yes
No
No
Yes
No
No
Yes
No
No
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
No
Yes
No
No
Yes
No
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
No
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
No
No
Yes
No
No
Yes
No
No
Yes
No
No
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
No
No

Special
student
provision
No
Yes
No
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
No
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
No
No
No
No
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
No
No
(continued)
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Table 4.1 (continued)

State
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina

South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming

Special
disability
provision
No
No
No
No
Yes
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
Yes
No
No
Yes
No
No
No
No
No

Able and available for
Any Suitable Usual
work
work
work
No
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
No
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
No
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
No
Yes
No
No
Yes
No
No
No
No
Yes
No
No
Yes
No
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
No

Special
student
provision
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
Yes
No
No
No
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authors commented that "the continued payment of unemployment
compensation during a temporary illness, particularly when no suitable
job is available, is on the side of realism and meets a real need" (pp.
266-267). It would appear, though, that the majority of states have
determined that this need is not best met by the UI system. The fact
that the system is experience rated may explain this outcome, provid
ing an argument for instead providing a separately funded disability
insurance program.2 As was discussed by Haber and Murray, while the
fact that the system is experience rated does not actually mean that
employers will pay only for unemployment for which they are directly
responsible, this general feeling remains among employers. 3 Thus,
periods of nonwork due to illness or disability may be seen to be out
side the purview of an experience-rated UI system. Even without expe
rience rating, if the system is meant only to provide insurance against
unemployment, then other causes of non-work would fall outside the.
scope of the system.
The treatment of availability for work is somewhat more varied than
that of ability. As seen in table 4.1, while all states require some sort of
availability, certain states qualify that requirement to mean available
for suitable work, while others require only availability for work in the
claimant's usual occupation. Clearly, availability for usual work is less
strict than availability for suitable work, while both are more liberal
than requiring availability for any work. In practice, though, availabil
ity is often determined either in the affirmative based on job search
activity or in the negative by job refusal. Thus, further exploration of
the implications of different approaches to defining the type of work
for which a claimant is available will be postponed until after the con
sideration of refusal of suitable work.
One of the most discussed availability issues in the Haber and Mur
ray study is almost a nonissue today—that of the availability of
women. In 1960, the labor force participation rate for all women was
37.7 percent, and for married women it was just 31.9 percent. The con
cern at that time was that women were not truly unemployed, but rather
were occupied with household duties and thus were not available for
work. By 1992, though, participation rates had risen to 57.9 and 59.4
percent, respectively (Ehrenberg and Smith 1994). Thus, the assump
tion that women in general, and married women in particular, are only
marginally attached to the labor market has become much less valid.
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Also 37 states had special provisions for pregnant women in 1960,
with several states disqualifying pregnant women for the duration of
their unemployment. Others imposed disqualifications ranging from
four weeks to four months before childbirth and up to three months fol
lowing delivery (Haber and Murray 1966). Again, the understanding
was that new mothers were busy with household duties and were not
available for work. Similarly, pregnant women were simply assumed to
be unable to work, no matter what the actual health status of the
woman was or the type of job. Today, federal standards prohibit such
wholesale disqualifications (Blaustein 1993). As noted by Haber and
Murray, pregnancy is probably best treated simply as an ability-towork issue, which will differ across specific women and jobs. As was
the case when considering temporary disability, it then becomes a
question of the proper role of the UI system, in which it may be reason
able to consider a separate system of maternity benefits.4
One current availability issue to which states take slightly different
approaches revolves around geographic location. In some states, claim
ants are deemed unavailable for work any time that they are outside of
a certain geographic area. For example, Illinois considers claimants to
be unavailable if they move to an area where the opportunities are sub
stantially less favorable than in the original locality. Oregon and Vir
ginia both consider claimants to be unavailable if they leave their
normal labor market for the major portion of the week, unless they can
show that a bona fide work search was under way in the labor market in
which their time was spent. Alabama, Michigan, Ohio, and South
Carolina require that the claimant be available in the locality in which
the base-period wages were earned, or in a locality where similar work
is available or normally performed. Arizona simply requires that the
claimant live in Arizona or in any other state or foreign country with
which it has a reciprocal arrangement. A requirement that a claimant
look for work where the jobs are seems reasonable, and many states
implicitly impose similar requirements under the rubric of the active
search requirement. However, strict geographic stipulations that are
tied to the past employment situation may be counterproductive if con
ditions have changed. In such cases, the state law may prove to be an
impediment to mobility and may thus lead to inefficiencies.
Perhaps one of the most interesting issues raised in considering
availability requirements is the treatment of students or of other indi-
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viduals undergoing training. Based on a simple test of availability,
many, if not most, individuals in school or training would be consid
ered ineligible for benefits. In 1960, only a handful of states had provi
sions under which individuals in approved training programs could be
considered available. By January of 1966, however, 22 states had such
provisions, stimulated at least in part by debates surrounding the Area
Redevelopment Act and the Manpower Development and Training Act
([MDTA] Haber and Murray 1966). Today, in order to receive the nor
mal tax credit under the Federal Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA),
states must not deny benefits to otherwise eligible individuals attending
an approved training course. Thus, all state laws contain such provi
sions, although states may use any standard to approve training
courses. In most cases approved training includes only vocational or
basic education, so that most regularly enrolled students remain
unavailable (U.S. Department of Labor 1994a).
As was the case with temporary disability insurance or maternity
benefits, one could argue that training allowances are best handled out
side the UI system. In fact, the MDTA program did provide for such
allowances. Additionally, Haber and Murray indicate that, based on
experience rating concerns that have been discussed, some employers
opposed the new training provisions enacted at that time. A possible
key to understanding the difference in the treatment of the issues of
training and disability may lie in recognizing the different long-term
implications of each. Clearly, looser availability requirements result in
more current benefit payments by the state. However, in the case of
training programs, it is possible that the investment in human capital
could result in more stable employment in the future, leading to benefit
savings in the long run. Additionally, earnings increases due to this
investment may raise state UI tax receipts, although this benefit will be
limited due to the low UI taxable wage base.5
Several experiments have been undertaken that attempt to measure
the impact of training programs on UI outcomes. 6 For example, in
Texas, New Jersey, and Buffalo, New York, short-term (either on-thejob or classroom) training was offered to dislocated workers. None of
these three demonstrations found a significant impact of short-term
training on earnings or employment (U.S. Department of Labor
1994b). However, the Texas study looked only at the first year follow
ing training, while in Buffalo only the first six months were considered,
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so any possible long-term impacts would not be detected in these stud
ies. Only the New Jersey experiment had a long-term follow-up,
although in that case the evidence on the likelihood of long-run bene
fits (Anderson, Corson, and Decker 1991) was mixed. 7 While the earn
ings and UI experience of the Job Search Assistance (JSA)-plustraining group in New Jersey were not significantly different from the
experience of JSA-only group in the four years following the experi
ment, only a small fraction of the JSA-plus-training group took up the
offer of training. Although conclusions based only on those receiving
training are likely to be contaminated by selection issues, there is evi
dence that UI receipt in the years following the initial claim was
slightly lower for the training recipients, while earnings were to some
extent higher.
Programs not targeted specifically at dislocated workers have shown
somewhat more positive effects on earnings (U.S. Department of Labor
1994b). For example, experiments undertaken at the San Jose Center
for Employment and Training (GET) found that training resulted in
earnings gains averaging more than $1,000 per year. Similarly, evalua
tion of the Job Training Partnership Act (JTPA) indicated that adults
had earnings gains in the second year after completing training that
averaged around $850. In both cases, the training programs were deter
mined to have been cost effective from a societal viewpoint. Thus,
while the evidence is somewhat mixed overall, there does exist some
support for the idea of long-run savings to the UI system from encour
aging training receipt.
Considerations of such possible long-run benefits of training cannot
be the whole story behind the favorable treatment of training programs
by the UI system, however, since such benefits are likely to accrue
from many types of human capital investment. In fact, there is mount
ing evidence on the growing importance of general education to labor
market outcomes. 8 As stated previously, though, most states make no
exception for regularly enrolled students. In fact, as seen in table 4. 1,
many states have special provisions showing that students are ineligi
ble while attending school, with seven states explicitly continuing that
ineligibility during school vacation periods, when the claimant is argu
ably available for work. Many of the states do qualify the blanket ineli
gibility of students, however. For example, Kansas and North Carolina
do not disqualify those in full-time work concurrent with their school
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attendance. Similarly, Minnesota, Nebraska, and North Dakota allow
receipt for students if the major portion of their base-period earnings
came from services performed while in school. Other states' excep
tions are somewhat more restrictive. Thus, Ohio indicates that individ
uals who become unemployed while attending school and whose baseperiod wages were at least partially earned while attending school will
meet the requirement if they are available for suitable employment on
any shift. Oklahoma will not disqualify students if they offer to quit
school, adjust class hours, or change shifts in order to secure employ
ment.
Job Search Activity

As noted earlier, one indication of availability for work is the act of
searching for work. All states require registration at a local employ
ment office as evidence of job search. Most states additionally require
that claimants undertake an "active search" for work. States differ in
how this requirement is imposed, but typically claimants must provide
evidence of employer contacts each week.9 Additionally, after some
period of unemployment, an eligibility review meeting with UI staff is
often required. As noted by Haber and Murray, one possible drawback
to such active search requirements is that they may "result in a great
deal of wasted effort that is a nuisance to employers and demoralizing
to the worker" (pp. 268-269). Nonetheless, the number of states with
an active search requirement has increased from thirty in 1966 to forty
in 1994. Several states (Michigan, Delaware, Maryland, New Jersey,
and Virginia), do allow for flexibility in reaction to changing economic
conditions. Similarly, the provision is not mandatory in several other
states (Oklahoma, Vermont, Washington, and Wisconsin).
While one intention of work search requirements, like other con
tinuing eligibility requirements, is to prevent the UI system from
becoming a welfare program, an obvious side benefit may be to assist
in the reemployment of unemployed workers. The question then arises
as to what sort of requirements can best meet these dual goals. Several
experiments have been carried out assessing the impact of different
approaches to work search. As noted by Meyer (1995), since most of
these experiments offered additional job finding services, as well as
imposed additional job reporting requirements, it is difficult to untan-
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gle whether it was the extra services or the tightened eligibility require
ments that led to the observed outcomes. In general, the more intensive
treatments were found to have resulted in reduced UI receipt and
increased earnings that outweighed the increased administrative
costs. 10
Only the Washington Alternative Work Search Experiment also
evaluated the effect of lowering the work search requirements. The
results from this demonstration indicate that abandoning an active
search policy would increase UI outlays by $265 per claimant, making
it unlikely that any savings from reduced monitoring costs would be
large enough to offset this amount. In fact, the administrative cost of
the most intensive reemployment services tested in Washington was
estimated to be only $14.50, while that treatment reduced UI payments
by $70 per claimant (Johnson and Klepinger 1994).
A second recent area of research concerns self-employment. For a
displaced worker, it is conceivable that the most productive reemploy
ment option is self-employment. However, individuals in the process of
starting up their own business would not meet the requirements of
being available and searching for work. Thus, the search requirements
of the UI system may actually serve as an impediment to productive
employment in this case. Recently, demonstration projects were under
taken in Washington and Massachusetts to determine the impact of
allowing for at least some claimants continuing access to the UI system
while they are starting up their own business. 11 In both cases, treatment
group members were more likely to become self-employed. Addition
ally, the length of unemployment spells was reduced. However, only a
small number of claimants actually became self-employed, implying
that the overall effects on unemployment were negligible.
Based on the encouraging results of demonstrations such as these,
federal legislation was enacted in 1993 to allow for self-employment
assistance programs conditional on the provision of increased reem
ployment services. Under the North American Free Trade Agreement
Implementation Act, states are permitted to establish self-employment
assistance programs that allow selected claimants who are engaged in
establishing a business to continue to receive periodic unemployment
payments (Runner 1994).
Additionally, Public Law (P.L.) 103-152 was enacted in November
of 1993 and requires states to establish and implement a Worker Profil-
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ing and Reemployment Services System. This law defines such a sys
tem as one that
(A) identifies which claimants will be likely to exhaust regular
compensation and will need job search assistance services to
make a successful transition to new employment;
(B) refers claimants identified pursuant to subparagraph (A) to
reemployment services, such as job search assistance services,
available under any State or Federal law;
(C) collects follow-up information relating to the services
received by such claimants and the employment outcomes for
such claimants subsequent to receiving such services and utilizes
such information in making identifications pursuant to subpara
graph (A); and
(D) meets such other requirements as the Secretary of Labor
determines are appropriate.

The law adds a
requirement that, as a condition of eligibility for regular compen
sation for any week, any claimant who has been referred to reem
ployment services pursuant to the profiling system under
subsection (j)(l)(B) participate in such services or in similar ser
vices unless the State agency charged with the administration of
the State law determines (A) such claimant has completed such services; or
(B) there is justifiable cause for such claimant's failure to partici
pate in such services (U.S. Department of Labor 1994b, p. 18).

Thus, the law tightens continuing eligibility standards for claimants
identified as likely to exhaust benefits by requiring them to participate
in enhanced reemployment services.
These new programs are arguably the most significant changes to
continuing eligibility requirements in quite some time. Unfortunately,
it is too soon to evaluate their impacts. It will be interesting to study the
effect of the laws, not only on claimants' unemployment durations and
reemployment outcomes, but also on eligibility determinations. One
would expect that P.L. 103-152 would increase disqualifications, as
claimants who would otherwise have been eligible can now be disqual
ified due to a failure to participate in the new services. At the same
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time, the availability of self-employment assistance would reduce dis
qualifications. Clearly, following up on the impact of these programs
will be of much interest in the future.
The discussion so far has focused only on the search activity of a
permanently displaced worker, but an important source of wasteful
search may be that undertaken by those who are awaiting recall. 12
Thus, several states make exceptions for these claimants. For example,
Delaware, Michigan, Ohio, Arkansas, and Missouri each specify that a
claimant is deemed available and actively searching if the employer
notifies the agency that the layoff is temporary. The proper treatment of
those who expect recall, but are not given an explicit recall date is per
haps less clear. On the one hand, a large fraction of those who expect
recall are actually recalled. 13 However, recent studies have found that
those whose expectations are incorrect have longer unemployment
spells (Katz and Meyer 1990 and Anderson 1992, for example). In
many ways, then, the treatment of those expecting recall may really be
considered as part of the broader question of whether search require
ments should be revised during the length of the claimant's spell.
Since, in practice, most states incorporate such changes under the
scope of defining what constitutes suitable work, it will be discussed in
this context.
Refusal of Suitable Work

All states provide for disqualification due to a refusal of suitable
work. The states differ, however, in their approaches to defining what is
suitable and in the penalties imposed for a refusal. Because of concern
for labor standards, FUTA requires all states to provide that
compensation shall not be denied in such State to any otherwise
eligible individual for refusing to accept new work under any of
the following conditions:
(A) If the position offered is vacant due directly to a strike, lock
out, or other labor dispute;
(B) if the wages, hours, or other conditions of the work offered are
substantially less favorable to the individual than those prevailing
for similar work in the locality;
(C) if as a condition of being employed the individual would be
required to join a company union or to resign from or refrain from
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joining any bona fide labor organization (U.S. Department of
Labor 1994a, pp. 4-9).

Beyond this, states are free to use any criteria to define the suitability
of a job, with most states using such things as the degree of risk to the
claimant's health, safety and morals; the physical fitness and prior
training, experience, and earnings; the length of unemployment, and
prospects for securing local work in a customary occupation; and the
distance of the available work from the claimant's residence (U.S.
Department of Labor 1994a). 14
As was mentioned when discussing the role of recall, it is possible
that unrealistic expectations can result in delays in reemployment.
However, the problem is not restricted to recall expectations, but may
also apply more generally to the case of a worker who is not well
informed about the wage offer distribution. Several states explicitly
incorporate this type of thinking into their statutes, broadening the def
inition of suitable work as the spell continues. Many states adjust the
definition of suitability based on earnings, although the minimum wage
supersedes any other lower bound. For example, after 25 weeks of ben
efits have been received in any year, Florida declares suitable any job
that pays at least 120 percent of the individual's weekly benefit
amount. North Dakota specifies that, after 18 weeks, any job paying
wages equal to the weekly benefit amount will be considered suitable.
Iowa lowers the amount of gross weekly wages required for a job to be
considered suitable in a stepwise fashion. Thus, in the first 5 weeks it
must be at least 100 percent of the individual's high-quarter weekly
wage, but, in weeks 6 to 12, just 75 percent, followed by 70 percent in
weeks 13 to 18 and then 65 percent after that.
Thus, if misinformation about the job market led the individual's
reservation wage to be set too high, requirements such as these that
quickly revise reservation wages downward may not result in earnings
losses due to inefficient job matches. Additionally, there will be the
clear short-term gains to the UI system from decreased benefit pay
ments, due either to earlier job acceptance or to more disqualifications.
However, to the extent that the individual's reservation wage was set
appropriately, such requirements may lead to earnings losses and thus
result in long-term costs. Evidence on the role of Ul-induced changes
in unemployment on reemployment earnings is somewhat mixed. Early
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studies, such as those by Ehrenberg and Oaxaca (1976), Burgess and
Kingston (1976), Classen (1977), and Holen (1977), found generally
positive effects of UI benefits on both duration and reemployment
earnings. Such results would indicate that the subsidy to search pro
vided by UI allowed claimants to obtain better jobs, and by extension
would imply that there could be losses from earlier returns to work.
However, recent evidence from several bonus experiments indicates
that the shorter spells induced by the bonus did not come at the
expense of lower earnings (Meyer 1995), tempering this conclusion.
The prediction of long-term losses from less search is also depen
dent upon the proposition that on-the-job search is significantly less
efficient than search while not employed. The relative inefficiency of
on-the-job search is a basic tenet of theoretical models of search unem
ployment, but the empirical evidence is mixed. For example,
Gottschalk and Maloney (1985) note that about half of all job changers
are never unemployed, implying that their job search was on the job
rather than off. Additionally, Blau and Robins (1990) find that the offer
rate per employer contact is higher for employed searchers than for
unemployed searchers. These findings would then indicate that on-thejob search may be just as efficient if not more so than unemployed
search. By contrast, though, Holzer (1987) finds evidence that at least
among the young, unemployed search is more effective. Also, individ
uals do quit into unemployment (about 37 percent of voluntary separa
tions according to Gottschalk and Maloney), which would indicate that
there are advantages to unemployed search for these individuals. Thus,
the issue remains unsettled.
Beyond making a decision on the definition of suitable work, states
must determine what constitutes an offer and a refusal. For example, if
a claimant walks past a store with a "Help Wanted" sign in the window,
has a job been offered and refused? As noted by Haber and Murray, "it
is generally agreed that it must be clear to the claimant that he is being
asked to take a job, that the conditions of the job are specified, and that
definite acceptance or rejection of the offer is required" (p. 291). Ques
tionable situations may arise, however. For example, an offer may not
be made because the employer finds the person to be unsuitable.
Depending on the cause of this nonoffer, it may still be reasonable to
disqualify the worker. If individuals deliberately sabotage their reem
ployment chances because they do not want to have to take the job, it is
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essentially equivalent to refusing an offer. Questionable situations such
as these are typically considered on a case-by-case basis, so that in
some instances it may be determined that an offer has in fact been
refused, while in others it may be determined that a definite offer was
not made.
Overall, the considerations that will affect the costs and benefits of
different approaches to the definitions of suitable work and of an offer
and a refusal are clear. However, given that the actual size of the rela
tive costs and benefits remains undetermined, it is not surprising that
the states have chosen to take many different approaches. No matter
the definitions used, all states impose some type of disqualification
once a determination has been made that an offer of suitable work was
refused. Note that this is in contrast to the approach taken to ineligibility due to inability or unavailability for work. In those cases, payments
are withheld for weeks in which the claimant is unable to work or is
unavailable, but will be resumed when the condition changes. Refusal
of suitable work instead leads to denial of benefits for a specific time
period following the refusal, with determination of this time period dif
fering across states. The next section will examine state approaches to
disqualifications more closely.

Disqualification Practices
Types of Disqualifications

There are three main approaches taken by the states in imposing dis
qualifications for refusal of suitable work: disqualifying applicants for
a fixed number of weeks, for a variable number of weeks, or for the
duration of unemployment. 15 As seen in table 4.2, the majority of states
(thirty-nine) disqualify claimants for the duration of unemployment,
while only eight states impose a variable week disqualification, and
just six states impose a disqualification of a fixed number of weeks. 16
The decision to impose a durational disqualification (as it is called),
rather than a fixed or variable week disqualification, reflects a basic
difference in assumptions about the source of unemployment. In limit
ing the length of the disqualification, a state is implicitly assuming that
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Table 4.2 1994 State Provisions on Refusal of Suitable Work

State
Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
District of Columbia
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire

Benefits postponed for
Variable
number
Duration of
Fixed number
of weeks
unemployment
of weeks
1-10
No
No
5
No
No
No
No
Yes
7
No
No
1-9
No
No
20
No
No
No
No
Yes
No
No
Yes
No
No
Yes
1-5
No
Yes
No
No
Yes
No
No
Yes
No
No
Yes
No
No
Yes
No
No
Yes
No
No
Yes
No
No
Yes
No
No
Yes
No
No
Yes
No
No
Yes
5-10
No
No
No
No
7
No
6
No
No
No
Yes
No
1- 12
No
No
No
Yes
No
No
Yes
7-10
No
No
No
No
Yes
No
No
Yes
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State
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming

Benefits postponed for
Variable
number
Duration of
Fixed number
of weeks
unemployment
of weeks
No
No
3
No
No
Yes
No
No
Yes
No
5+
Yes
No
No
Yes
No
No
Yes
No
No
Yes
No
No
Yes
No
No
Yes
No
No
Yes
No
No
Yes
No
No
Yes
No
No
Yes
No
No
Yes
No
No
Yes
No
No
Yes
No
No
Yes
No
No
Yes
No
4+
No
No
No
Yes
No
No
Yes
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after some period of time, general economic conditions are more
responsible for the claimant's continued unemployment than is his or
her earlier refusal of work. Additionally, this approach recognizes the
fact that, in practice, the distinction between suitable and unsuitable
work may be a fine one. This recognition is especially relevant to the
case of variable week disqualifications, as it is possible to impose
lower penalties in situations that seem particularly unclear. Recall, for
example, the earlier discussion of difficulties that may arise in deter
mining whether or not an offer has been made and refused.
By contrast, the assumption behind the use of durational disqualifi
cations is that, had the claimants not refused the job, they would now
be employed, and thus continued unemployment of any length should
be considered voluntary and beyond the scope of the UI system. Most
of the states imposing a durational disqualification also specify that a
claimant must work a given amount of time or earn a certain amount
before requalifying for benefits. In theory, then, the disqualification
may last beyond the duration of unemployment and thus takes on a
punitive characteristic. For example, consider a worker who at some
point after being disqualified for a refusal accepts a new job. If the indi
vidual is then laid off from the new job prior to working long enough
or earning enough to requalify, this new spell of unemployment will be
uncompensated for as long as it lasts. In practice, however, the require
ments for requalification are relatively low in most states, and thus the
actual number of claimants affected in this way by such provisions is
likely to be small. Perhaps more clearly punitive in nature is the prac
tice of reducing benefits in conjunction with a disqualification. The
reduction amount varies but is often set equal to the weekly benefit
amount multiplied by the number of weeks of disqualification. Thus, in
terms of future eligibility, it is as if the claimant collected benefits dur
ing the disqualification period.
As was the case with disability provision, the actual trends in state
laws since 1966 have generally conflicted with the spirit of the discus
sion by Haber and Murray. At that time, they stated that "we would
recommend against disqualification for the duration of unemployment
in cases of refusal of suitable work" (p. 304). Despite such recommen
dations, the number of states using durational disqualifications along
with requalifying requirements has grown substantially. In 1966, there
were twenty-three states that disqualified a claimant for the duration of
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unemployment after a refusal of suitable work, while today that num
ber has risen to thirty-nine. The tally of states reducing the number of
weeks of benefits for which a worker is subsequently eligible has actu
ally declined slightly, though, from 15 to 13. However, this is a fairly
small change considering the strong statement by Haber and Murray:
"Reduction or cancellation of benefit rights is punitive in character and
has no proper place in an insurance program" (p. 305).
The Determination and Appeals Process

Given the severity of and possibly long-term consequences of dis
qualification, it is important to provide for an appeals process. In fact,
federal law requires that there be an "opportunity for a fair hearing
before an impartial tribunal, for all individuals whose claims for unem
ployment compensation are denied" (U.S. Department of Labor
1994a). All states allow not only individuals whose claims are denied,
but also employers who have an interest, to appeal decisions on claims.
Most states also provide for two appeal stages before cases can be
taken to the state courts, with the decision of the first-stage appeals
body being final in the absence of an appeal. Some states do allow for
reconsideration of a decision within the appeal period, however. States
are approximately evenly split between those that have a special board
of review, board of appeals, or appeals board, and those where an exist
ing commission or agency head handles appeals. In the former case,
the members generally represent labor and employers, and, in some
cases, the public. In the latter case, the appeals board is often the inde
pendent commission that administers the UI system in the state.
Finally, all states also provide for judicial review by the courts, with
the time limit generally ranging from 10 to 50 days.
Prior to the appeals stage, an initial determination was obviously
made. The actual process of making a determination on whether an
infraction has taken place is a multistep one. First, the state must iden
tify that a situation exists requiring further investigation. The state then
collects information on the circumstances from the claimant and from
any other interested parties. This fact-finding procedure is followed by
a formal hearing, during which the evidence is weighed and rules are
interpreted as to how they apply to the case at hand. While these same
basic steps are followed in all states, Corson, Hershey, and Kerachsky
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(1986) find that there is significant variation across states in carrying
out these procedures. The result is a wide variance in the number of
determinations made in each state, and, ultimately, in the number of
denials.
Given this variation, for some states the appeals process may be a
key component of the system. Reliance on appeals may be especially
common if the laws regarding continuing eligibility are exceptionally
unclear or are administered in an inconsistent manner. Based on a sur
vey of UI directors in each state carried out by the Interstate Confer
ence of Employment Security Agencies (ICESA), the Advisory
Council on Unemployment Compensation (ACUC) indicates that such
problems are particularly likely in the case of refusal of suitable work.
For example, while 42 states will consider a claimant to still be eligible
if the refusal of suitable work is for "good cause," the survey reveals
that the definition of good cause is generally determined on a case-bycase basis. Additionally, a follow-up survey of five states designed to
assess the internal consistency of such determinations within a state
found that three of the five states provided inconsistent responses to the
question of refusal of suitable work. The ACUC goes on to note that
"the general lack of published information regarding state nonmonetary eligibility conditions is likely to cause misunderstandings regard
ing nonmonetary eligibility. Such misunderstandings harm both
claimants and employers, and also may place strains on resources of
the UI system by causing additional appeals" (ACUC 1995).
In fact, total appeals have increased over threefold in the past
twenty-five years or so, reaching 1.2 million in 1994 (ACUC 1996). 17
This growth took place both at the lower authority and higher authority
level, but higher authority appeals have remained a fairly constant pro
portion of lower authority appeals over time. By contrast, the number
of lower authority appeals has risen, not just in levels, but as a fraction
both of initial claims and of total denials. A majority of appeals are
filed over separation issues: nonseparation issues such as those dis
cussed in this chapter made up just 33 percent of all appeals in 1994.
On the other hand, nonseparation appeals as a percentage of nonsepa
ration denials have doubled since 1971, increasing from 8 percent to 16
percent. Looking at the type of nonseparation issue, appeals related to
both able and available for work and refusal of suitable work have
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fallen over this time period, while all other nonseparation appeals have
increased.
Claimants continue to file appeals at a higher rate than do employ
ers, but total employer appeals have increased in recent years. The rate
of claimant appeals in 1994 was about the same as in 1983. 18 By con
trast, the employer appeal rate doubled in that period. At the same time,
the success rate of employers has been falling, both at the lower
authority and higher authority level. It would seem, then, that employ
ers have become more likely to appeal any given claim. Such behavior
would be rational if either the costs of appealing had fallen or if the
benefits of doing so had risen. One possible contributor to lower costs
of appeal is the increased availability of third-party administrators, or
so-called UI service bureaus. At the national level, these include such
firms as the Frank Gates Service Company and the Frick Company.
Similar services may also be provided by local associations. For exam
ple, the Employers Group (formerly the Merchants and Manufacturers
Association and Federated Employers) provides human resources man
agement to "nearly 5000 California private and public sector employ
ers of every size and business classification" and lays claim to being
"the nation's leading non-profit human resources management associa
tion." 19
As is typical of UI service bureaus, the Employers Group offers to
provide a multifaceted cost control program that covers six major
activities: counseling, training, claims handling, auditing, analysis and
reporting. Among other things, such UI service bureaus will take the
lead in protesting claims and will provide representation at appeals
hearings. These services are likely not only to reduce the cost of
appeals (the service is generally covered as part of the overall agree
ment with the company) but may also increase the benefits if skilled
representation raises the probability of a successful appeal. Studies of
the appeals process provide somewhat mixed evidence on this proposi
tion. Using 1994 data on appeals in Wisconsin, Ashenfelter and Levine
(1995) find that retaining representation has no effect on the
employer's success rate, although claimants who obtain representation
are more likely to win. Kritzer (1995) comes to a similar conclusion,
also with data from Wisconsin, but he notes that the most effective rep
resentation stems from expert knowledge of the UI system. Thus, ser
vice bureaus may be more successful than the average representative. It
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is important to realize, however, that there are significant differences
across states in the total appeals rate, and thus the Wisconsin experi
ence may not be typical. While less up to date, evidence in Rubin
(1980), using over 11,000 appeals cases in twenty-four states from
April of 1979, is supportive of these findings. Rubin concludes that,
although claimants are more likely to win an appeal if represented,
employers, on average, are actually less likely to win if represented.
Each of these studies finds no significant overall benefit to employers
of being represented, but the ACUC (1996) does find a positive effect
for both employers and claimants.20 While the evidence is weak for the
positive benefits of representation, it still remains true that the costs of
appeal are reduced via service bureaus, so we cannot dismiss the possi
bility that their increased use has affected the appeals procedure.
In sum, a recognition that there may be no "best" approach may well
be the key factor in understanding why there appear to be so many dif
ferences across states in their approaches to the issue of continuing eli
gibility. For example, states face a precarious balancing act in setting
policies on disqualifications for refusal of suitable work. A job that is
clearly suitable for one individual may be just as clearly unsuitable for
another individual. Thus, while there may generally be an advantage to
explicit eligibility laws that are consistently applied, there is the real
risk of losing the flexibility to deal with claimants as individuals, with
the resultant determinations possibly being suboptimal. Consequently,
we observe different practices and different outcomes across states.
Possible determinants of this variation are considered in the next sec
tion.

Determinants of State Practices and Outcomes
Differences in State Continuing Eligibility Rules

While the costs and benefits of the various state strategies are fairly
evident, it remains difficult to fully discern the causes of the differ
ences in legislation across states. Some possible candidates include the
political climate of the state, the level of experience rating, and the
health of the state trust funds. It is hard to quantify such considerations,

Unemployment Insurance in the United States

147

but some basic indicators of these state attributes are available. In an
attempt to evaluate whether these types of factors seem promising as
explanations of state differences in approaches to continuing UI eligi
bility, I estimated some very simple empirical models. Specifically,
probit models were estimated on the probability of not having special
disability laws, the probability of requiring availability for suitable,
usual, or any work; the probability of having special student restric
tions; and the probability of having variable, fixed, or durational dis
qualifications for refusal of suitable work.
The state characteristics used as explanatory variables are the aver
age fraction of the state legislature that was Democratic over the 1980s,
the fraction of that time period during which the governor was a Dem
ocrat, the average experience rating index (ERI) over the 1988-1992
period, and the state reserve ratio multiple (RRM) at both the peak
(1989) and trough (1992) of the business cycle. 21 The political vari
ables are meant to capture the inherent "liberalness" of the state and
should be negatively related to stricter legislation. By contrast, the ERI
should be positively related to stricter measures, since greater experi
ence rating should increase employer opposition. The use of averages
over past years is meant to be a proxy for long-run values of these
attributes. The role of the RRM measures is slightly less clear, since
stricter states are likely to see their reserves fall less quickly in a down
turn, while states with generally lower reserves should be less likely to
have more generous laws. It may be most appropriate, then, to think of
the RRM at the peak as reflecting the adequacy of the state's reserves
more generally, conditional on the RRM at the trough. Thus, the two
measures are entered separately, rather than using an average, with the
coefficient on the 1989 measure (the peak) generally being the one of
most interest.
Table 4.3 presents the results of this exercise, along with a summary
of the expected signs of the coefficients. For each of the models, a pos
itive coefficient indicates that this state characteristic implies more
severe provisions. Given the simplicity of this exploratory analysis, it
is perhaps not surprising that the explanatory value of the models is
generally low. Many of the coefficients are of the expected sign,
although the majority of coefficients are not significantly different
from zero.22 Taking each of the basic state characteristics in turn, we
see that having a Democratic governor is generally negatively related

Table 4.3 Exploring the Determinants of State UI Provisions
Type of able
Type of
Active search
Has special
and
No special
Predicted sign
disqualification
required
of coefficient disability provision available student provision
(5)
(4)
(3)
(2)
(1)
-0.285
-0.352
-0.487
0.787
-0.889
(-)
Democratic governor
(0.809)
(0.792)
(0.701)
(0.670)
(0.823)
-3.003**
1.520
-0.555
-0.480
2044
(-)
Democratic legislature
(1.397)
(1.528)
(1.237)
(1.093)
(1.536)
0.010
0.023
-0.008
-0.017
0.0122
(+)
Experience rating index
(0.029)
(0.031)
(0.024)
(0.024)
(0.030)
-3.287**
-1.874*
-0.061
-0.809
-1.842
(-)
Reserve ratio multiple (1989)
(1.059)
(1.404)
(1.064)
(0.914)
(1.237)
2.555**
0.348
1.345*
-0.092
1.408
(+)
992)
1
(
Reserve ratio multiple
(0.822)
(1.018)
(0.758)
(0.670)
(0.934)
45
47
47
47
43
Number of observations
0.141
0.216
0.077
0.119
0.112
Pseudo R2
NOTES: Positive coefficients imply increased seventy of state provisions. Models (1), (3), and (4) are probit models on the presence of
the named provision. Models (2) and (5) are ordered probits on the type of named provision. Standard errors are in parentheses. See the
text for a complete description of explanatory variables. All models exclude Alaska, the District of Columbia, Hawaii, and Nebraska.
Model (1) also excludes those states with separate disability programs. Model (5) also excludes states with combination provisions,
indicates significance at the 90% level, **at the 95% level.
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to stricter state provisions, as expected. The one exception is that a
Democratic governor is not negatively related to increasingly strict
designations of the type of work for which an applicant must be able
and available. Results are slightly more mixed for the impact of a Dem
ocratic legislature. There is a significantly negative effect on the proba
bility of having stricter disqualification provisions for refusal of
suitable work. The expected negative sign is also found for having a
special student disqualification provision and for having increasingly
strict designations of the type of work for which an applicant must be
able and available, although these are not significantly different from
zero. While still insignificant, the estimated impact of a Democratic
legislature on the probability of not having a disability provision and
on having an active search requirement is unexpectedly positive. Esti
mates of the effect of the state experience rating index are always
insignificant, and the signs are also mixed. Only the peak reserve ratio
multiple (1989) provides the predicted estimated effect for all five
models. However, only the probability of having an active search
requirement is significantly reduced. A corresponding, significantly
positive effect on active search is estimated for the reserve ratio multi
ple at the trough (1992). While this exercise is suggestive of the types
of state attributes that may be important, the overall results are disap
pointing and leave many questions unanswered.
Differences in Disqualification Rates

Not only do states take different approaches to setting the require
ments for continuing eligibility for UI benefits, but there are significant
differences across states in the determination of eligibility. Table 4.4
presents denial rates for able and available for work issues and for
refusal of suitable work, by state, for 1982 and 1991. 23 In each case the
rate is presented as the number of denials per 1,000 claimant contacts.
The table also provides the mean and median denial rate for each year,
as well as the standard deviation of the mean. Looking first at denials
for able and available issues, the mean and median in 1982 are 5.4 and
4.9, respectively, but rates range from just 0.6 in Tennessee to 21.9 in
South Dakota. In 1991, the mean and median are 5.9 and 4.3, respec
tively, and the range is similar to that of 1982, although now Utah reg
isters the highest rate of 21.4, while Tennessee remains the lowest, at
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Table 4.4 State Disqualification Rates per 1,000 Claimant Contacts, 1982
and 1991
State
Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
District of Columbia
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey

Able and available
1991
1982
3.4
3.6
10.0
5.3
10.2
11.5
7.0
5.7
8.3
6.4
7.4
3.6
3.1
4.6
4.9
1.9
1.9
1.1
5.2
9.0
4.8
5.2
9.1
6.1
7.5
5.3
4.5
2.8
2.8
1.6
3.3
6.8
15.1
14.5
2.9
3.8
4.2
3.2
4.8
7.0
5.0
2.3
1.1
2.2
4.0
2.5
3.6
6.9
5.1
2.8
18.2
9.5
2.6
6.0
15.3
17.9
4.3
6.0
4.9
5.0
3.8
6.9

Refusal of suitable work
1991
1982
0.2
0.1
0.3
0.3
0.3
0.3
0.3
0.3
0.2
0.2
0.1
0.3
0.1
0.4
0.2
0.2
0.0
0.0
0.2
0.3
0.2
0.1
0.5
0.4
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.2
0.3
0.2
0.2
0.2
0.4
0.3
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.2
0.6
0.5
0.2
0.3
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.2
0.2
0.2
0.6
0.2
0.3
0.3
0.0
0.2
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.4
•0.3
0.2
0.2
0.2
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State
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming
Mean, Median
Standard Deviation

Able and available
1982
1991
2.8
5.0
7.8
2.5
4.2
1.8
11.6
3.1
4.7
1.9
1.9
1.4
4.9
5.5
2.2
2.2
4.3
2.1
3.0
3.6
21.9
16.5
0.6
0.5
7.6
4.7
21.4
7.7
1.8
1.8
7.1
9.7
4.6
3.3
2.5
2.0
1.4
4.9
5.8
8.7
5.4, 4.9
5.9, 4.3
(3.9)
(4.8)

Refusal of suitable work
1991
1982
0.2
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.2
0.2
0.3
0.3
0.1
0.1
1.3
0.4
0.3
0.3
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.3
0.1
0.1
0.5
0.7
0.2
0.1
0.2
0.2
0.2
0.3
0.2
0.3
0.8
0.5
0.3
0.0
0.2
0.1
0.4
0.2
0.4
0.0
0.2, 0.2
0.3, 0.2
(0.2)
(0.1)
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0.5. Overall, the variation across states in 1991 is slightly larger than in
1982.
A similar pattern is seen for the denial rate for refusal of suitable
work, although the levels are much lower. In this case, the mean is 0.2
and 0.3 in 1982 and 1991 respectively, with a median of 0.2 in both
years. Rates in 1982 range from negligible in the District of Columbia,
Washington, and Wyoming to 0.7 in South Dakota. Similarly, in 1991,
rates are negligible in the District of Columbia, Massachusetts, and
Montana, but reach 1.3 in Oklahoma. As was the case earlier, the varia
tion across states is slightly larger in 1991 than in 1982. There is, how
ever, a strong correlation between denial rates in the two years within
states. For example, as shown in table 4.5, the correlation between
denial rates for able and available for work over the two years is 0.6927
and is significantly different from zero. Note that a correlation of 1
would imply that the two rates were identical, while a correlation of 0
would imply that there was no relationship across the two years. Look
ing at disqualifications for refusal of suitable work, there is a signifi
cant correlation of 0.5148 between the two years. There is also a
correlation between the two different types of disqualifications within
each year. This correlation is strongest in 1982, where it is 0.5699 and
statistically significant. The correlation falls to 0.2190 in 1991 and is
not significant at conventional levels.
Table 4.5 Correlations of State Denial Rates

Able and available 1982

Able and
available
1982
1.00

Able and available 1991

--

Refusal of suitable
work 1982
Refusal of suitable
work 1991

Able and
available
1991
0.6927
(0.0000)
1.00

Refusal of
suitable work
1982
0.5699
(0.0000)
N.A.

1.00

Refusal of
suitable work
1991
N.A.
0.2190
(0.1225)

0.5148
(0.000)

1.00
NOTES' Probability of obtaining the estimated correlation if the true correlation was zero is
given in parentheses All correlations are calaculated based on the state denial rates shown in
table 4 4
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These strong within-state correlations, combined with the large dif
ferences across states raise the question of what the key determinants
of denial rates are. This topic is explored in some detail by Corson,
Hershey, and Kerachsky (1986). They divide the factors likely to affect
denial rates into five categories: (1) the characteristics of state laws, (2)
the thoroughness of the administrative process in UI determinations,
(3) the generosity of UI benefits, (4) the state of the economy, and (5)
the general philosophy of the state towards UI claimants. Using quar
terly data on denial rates by state from 1964 through 1981, they then
estimate separate models for denials for able and available and for
refusal of suitable work issues. In both models, state laws, other UI
characteristics and external economic factors are used as explanatory
variables.
Results from this exercise are generally disappointing, with only a
few significant effects and some coefficients of the unexpected sign.
For example, only the wage replacement ratio, insured unemployment
rate, percentage insured unemployed in construction, percentage
insured unemployed in manufacturing, and percentage men were sig
nificant in both cases, and, for refusal of suitable work, the presence of
durational disqualifications was also significant. In all cases, each of
these variables was estimated to have a negative effect on the denial
rate. The negative effects of the composition of the insured unem
ployed were as expected, since these groups are more likely to be on
temporary layoff and thus may be exempt from many of the require
ments. The negative effect of the overall insured unemployment rate is
supportive of the idea that in a weak economy there are fewer job
offers to refuse. Its role in affecting denials for able and available
issues is less clear. It may be that claims examiners are simply less
likely to deny benefits when times are bad. Alternatively, active search
requirements are often weakened during downturns, and able and
available determinations are strongly influenced by findings on active
search. Somewhat more puzzling is the role of the benefit replacement
rate. The authors theorize that the replacement rate should enter posi
tively, since more generous benefits should induce more marginally eli
gible people to make claims, and thus the negative effect can be
considered surprising.
A similar model is estimated in ACUC (1996) on overall denials for
nonseparation issues for states from 1978 to 1990, with correspond-

154 Continuing Eligibility

ingly disappointing results. Only lower reserve ratios, lower unem
ployment rates, lower unionization rates, and unexpectedly shorter
duration of UI benefits were significantly related to higher nonseparation denial rates. Thus, many significant across-state differences
remain. Interestingly, some apparent regional patterns to the differ
ences were found. For example, many of the states in the West have
denial rates above what would be predicted from the model, while sev
eral states in the Southeast have denial rates below that predicted from
the model. The study notes that similar behaviors by contiguous states
may be interpreted either as cooperation or as competition among these
states.
Corson, Hershey, and Kerachsky (1986) follow up their regression
research with an in-depth process analysis carried out in six states.
While the state-level regression models provide fairly unsatisfactory
results, several conclusions emerge from this work. First, the authors
find that a key factor is the rate at which states detect issues (referred to
as making a determination), rather than the rate at which such determi
nations are denied. They then note that these determination rates "seem
to reflect three general factors that vary from state to state: (1) the
scope of work-search requirements and the methods used to monitor
compliance; (2) the purposefulness and frequency with which claim
ants are questioned about ongoing eligibility issues; and (3) the consis
tency with which ongoing claims are reviewed." Additionally, they
note that the organization of fact-finding and adjudication is likely to
affect denial rates, with there being three main variable factors across
states. These factors are identified as "the extent to which they insisted
on conducting all fact-finding within the context of a recognized deter
mination process," the "extent to which states relied on in-person inter
views," and the extent to which the same staff person carried out both
the fact-finding work and the adjudication.
While such conclusions are undoubtedly valid, they do not answer
the more fundamental question of why there are such differences in
these factors across states. As before, consideration of the costs and
benefits of the approaches is likely to be informative. Many of the
types of issues that should be considered have already been discussed
in related contexts. For example, determination and denial rates are
likely to be higher/lower if there are more/fewer requirements for con
tinuing eligibility. Thus, the earlier analyses of special disability provi-
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sions, special student provisions, and of the definition of suitable work
are applicable for ascertaining the likely costs and benefits of higher
and lower denial rates. Few details are available on the administrative
costs of the different approaches, although the work search experi
ments that were discussed provide some information. It is certainly
likely, however, that the marginal cost of ferreting out every last ineli
gible claimant would vastly exceed the cost of maintaining such per
sons on the UI rolls. There may also be additional benefits from stricter
enforcement in the form of deterrent effects. That is, unemployed indi
viduals may not even apply if they think they will be denied UI bene
fits, although this form of deterrence is likely to be much more
important for initial eligibility determinations than for continuing eligi
bility issues. However, Corson and Nicholson (1988) do find some sig
nificant effects of continuing eligibility variables on the ratio of the
insured unemployment rate to the total unemployment rate. Similarly,
Blank and Card (1991) find that the disqualification rate has a signifi
cantly negative effect on the take-up rate, as measured by the ratio of
insured unemployment to initially eligible unemployment. It is likely,
though, that the mechanism of the effect is through increased denials
rather than via reduced applications for benefits.
Across-state differences in the rate of appeals of nonseparation
issues have not been studied, but consideration of the results of analy
ses of total appeals may still be useful. The variation in appeals rates
across states is large. ACUC (1996) notes that appeals as a percentage
of denials as of 1994 range from highs of 73 percent and 56 percent in
the District of Columbia and New Mexico, respectively, to lows of 4
percent and 5 percent in Nebraska and Idaho, respectively. As has gen
erally been the case in this section, the results from attempts to explain
such cross-state differences are somewhat disappointing. ACUC
reports the results from regressions on appeals by employers and
appeals by claimants, as well as on success rates by those groups, using
state data for 1978 to 1990. While several variables are associated with
higher appeals rates, the across-state differences remain significant.
Again, there appears to be some geographic clustering, with a group of
Midwestern states and a group of Southwestern states each exhibiting
higher claimant appeals rates than would be expected. There is no sign
of such geographic clustering in employer appeals rates. Similarly, sev
eral variables are associated with higher success rates, but the overall
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model fit very poorly. In this case, there was no apparent geographic
clustering.

Conclusions
All states impose some sort of continuing eligibility requirements
on UI recipients. While the specifics of the state laws vary, the basic
requirements can be simply summarized. Claimants must demonstrate
that they are able and available for work and generally must provide
evidence of an active search for work. Benefits will be denied in any
week that a claimant is unable to meet these requirements. Addition
ally, claimants may not turn down an offer of suitable work. Such a
refusal will lead to a disqualification from benefits for not only that
week, but for a specified number of weeks following the refusal. In
many states, this disqualification is for the remainder of the unemploy
ment spell. Exact procedures for denying benefits also vary by state,
but, again, share common characteristics. Indications that continuing
eligibility requirements are possibly not being met are investigated,
and, following this fact-finding process, a formal hearing takes place.
The determination may then be appealed, with most states providing
two levels of appeals. If the appeals process has been exhausted, the
determination may be brought to civil court for judicial review.
The absence of standardization across states appears to reflect the
reality that there is no single approach that is clearly dominant in all
aspects. Rather, there are costs and benefits attendant to the different
approaches, and these costs and benefits are likely to vary across states.
Another consideration is that the costs and benefits of the various
approaches may fall on different segments of the population. It is well
known that the political process can generally not be relied upon to
provide the socially optimal result, even with the assumption of "one
man, one vote" and truthful revelation of preferences. Given the even
more likely scenario of differential political influence of the interested
groups, the probability of not all of the states implementing the optimal
legislation rises dramatically. Thus, a significant source of variation
across states may well be differences in the political process.
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Empirical analyses that attempt to pin down sources of variation in
state laws, and in denials and appeals for continuing eligibility issues
have generally provided disappointing results. Descriptive, yet indepth, analyses of specific states have tended to be more successful at
pointing to major causes of differences across states. These two obser
vations are not inconsistent, since the descriptive analyses tend to pin
point factors that are difficult to quantify and thus have been excluded
from the simpler empirical exercises. Overall, a deeper understanding
of the issues that must be considered when deciding among the differ
ent approaches is likely to provide the most useful information on the
variance across states. Consequently, the main focus of this chapter has
been on discussing these issues and on discussing the most recent evi
dence relating to the likely costs and benefits of the choices made by
the states.
While legislative change has generally been fairly slow, recent years
have seen a marked acceleration in the adoption of new legislation on
continuing eligibility. First, we have seen some states adopt a selfemployment alternative to the work-search requirement. Second, all
states have now begun to implement a profiling system. As part of this
profiling system, some workers will be required to participate in reemployment services in order to maintain eligibility for benefits. Each of
these changes was influenced by the results of random assignment
experiments estimating the costs and benefits of different approaches.
Careful testing of proposed legislation of this type is to be commended
and encouraged. Additionally, study of the results of the actual imple
mentation of these programs should be a high priority in the future.
NOTES
I thank Phil Levme, Chris O'Leary, and Henry Felder for their comments on earlier drafts of
this chapter
1 See Blaustem (1993) for a complete discussion of the evolution of the UI system in the
United States.
2 The question of whether such insurance should be privately purchased or publicly provided
is beyond the scope of this chapter Note that an additional five states (California, Hawaii, New
Jersey, New York, Rhode Island and Puerto Rico) run a separate disability insurance program that
provides benefits for workers unable to work due to nonwork-related disability.
3. Pages 285 to 288 discuss this issue in detail. For the most part the points raised remain valid
today
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4 As before, the question of whether these should be privately purchased or publicly provided
is beyond the scope of this chapter
5. The federal taxable wage base is currently just $7,500, although states can and do set higher
levels Chapter 8 of this volume discusses this issue in more detail.
6 Meyer (1995) reviews the UI experiments in general, although training issues are not dis
cussed in depth.
7 See the full report for more details on the design and implementation of the experiment.
8. Levy and Murnane (1992) review the evidence for increasing earnings differentials among
college-educated and noncollege-educated workers. Additionally, estimates of the return to educa
tion rise anywhere from 13 to 19 percent in studies using instrumental variables techniques to
adjust for measurement error For example, see Card (1993) and Butcher and Case (1994).
9 States differ in the mechanics of certifying continuing eligibility. Often, a claimant must
send in a postcard on a regular basis. This practice can have interesting repercussions. For exam
ple, in Illinois—and many other states—the claimant must file every two weeks As a result, anal
ysis of the Illinois bonus experiment revealed that the hazard spikes every two weeks. See, for
example, Meyer (1988) and Levme (1991).
10. See Meyer (1995) for more details on the design and outcomes of each of the experiments,
which took place in Charleston, South Carolina and in New Jersey, Washington, Nevada, and Wis
consin.
11. Detailed discussions of the genesis of these demonstrations can be found in Wandner
(1992), and a summary of the results is in Benus, Wood, and Grover (1994)
12. One should note, though, that requiring even claimants expecting recall to search may pro
vide some benefits: individuals may enter into a more productive and/or more stable job match
than the one to which they expect to be recalled.
13 According to a study by Katz and Meyer (1990), this fraction is almost 72 percent.
14 See U S Department of Labor (1994a) for more specific information regarding the stipula
tions made by different states.
15 For the case of variable week disqualifications, the exact number of weeks is set at the
time the determination is made.
16 Florida and North Carolina have aspects of both variable and durational disqualifications
and thus are each counted twice.
17. All of the statistics on appeals presented in this section are from ACUC (1996)
18 Note that this discussion refers to both nonseparation and separation issues, since the two
were not reported individually However, the majority of employer appeals concern separation
issues. Also, for claimant appeals of nonseparation issues, the state is often the secondary party to
the dispute, rather than the employer.
19. All quotes from the Employers Group are taken from their Web page at httpV/www.hronline org/info/mfo.htm.
20 This study uses the same basic data as the other studies from Wisconsin, but the source of
the difference is difficult to pinpoint It does appear that a lower percentage of the appeals from
this study are coded as having representation, and that the total number of appeals is slightly
higher
21 Anne Case and Tim Besley provided me with the political variables (see Besley and Case
1994), while the ERI and reserve ratio multiples were obtained from Vroman (1994, tables 5 and
3), respectively. Since Nebraska has an atypical state legislative structure, it is excluded from the
analysis
22. A rule of thumb for determining statistical significance is that the reported coefficient be at
least twice as large as the reported standard error
23. I would like to thank Walter Corson for providing me with the rates for 1991. The 1982
rates are from table 2 1 in Corson, Hershey, and Kerachsky (1986)
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Overview
The unemployment insurance (UI) system was established to allevi
ate the distress and hardship caused by involuntary unemployment.
Through weekly benefit payments to eligible claimants, the system
helps maintain living standards during active job search. The adequacy
of the weekly benefit amount in performing the income maintenance
function can be gauged by the percentage of lost income that benefits
replace. More directly, adequacy depends on how the weekly benefit
contributes to maintaining usual levels of household expenditure.
When the federal-state UI system was established in the depths of
the Great Depression, benefit levels were set at amounts widely
regarded as adequate in terms of income replacement. Due to rapidly
rising wage levels, by the end of World War II, UI benefit levels came
to be viewed as inadequate. Since that time there has been continuing
controversy over what the level of benefits should be and how the sys
tem should operate to provide these benefits.
Criticisms—that benefits are either inadequate or excessive—regu
larly surface during legislative considerations of benefit changes at
both federal and state levels. Advocates of more generous benefits as
well as proponents of benefit cutbacks can usually find support for

163

164 Adequacy of the Weekly Benefit Amount

their cause from research studies conducted over the years. During the
1950s and 1970s, benefit adequacy studies indicated that benefit ceil
ings were too low to allow many unemployed workers, particularly
those with dependents, to meet basic expenses. On the other hand,
studies of claimant job search behavior done over the past twenty years
have focused on how the mere availability of unemployment benefits
tends to cause substantial numbers of claimants to delay their return to
work. Much of the history of the program, at both federal and state lev
els, reflects efforts to resolve in one way or another the inherent con
flict in the UI program's main objective of providing adequate income
replacement.
Over the years, a widely held view has formed that the weekly bene
fit amount should be high enough to sustain a worker and family with
out their having to resort to public welfare assistance, but that benefits
should not be so high as to undermine the incentive to return to work.
There has been little agreement on the specifics of how this principle
should be implemented. For example, there is concurrence that the
benefit should be wage related, but states differ widely in how they
measure past wages, the amount of wages to be replaced by the bene
fits, and the highest amount of benefits that should be payable. There is
disagreement also on such issues as to whether the benefit should rep
resent a higher percentage of the wages of lower-paid workers and
whether benefits should be increased for claimants who have depen
dents. These issues are the subject of this chapter.
The Right to Unemployment Benefits
The UI system was designed to be completely separate from depres
sion-era relief programs, with eligibility determined by labor force
attachment and benefit levels based on prior earnings experience. No
stigma is related to the receipt of UI, which provides "compensation
for wage loss as a matter of right, with dignity and dispatch . . . during
periods of involuntary unemployment due to lack of work" (Blaustein
1993, p. 47).
UI presumes need due to the economic loss resulting from unem
ployment, while general relief programs require demonstration of need
often to include the shedding of personal assets. The idea of basing
benefits on demonstrated need was rejected at the outset so as to pre-
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serve the dignity of workers who find themselves in financial distress
due to involuntary job loss, and to maintain the insurance nature of the
program.
It may be that UI would generate less controversy if the objectives
of the benefit amount were to relieve instead of to prevent poverty; if
benefits were payable only to those unemployed who were clearly in
need; and if the benefit amount were based on a calculated minimum
budget somewhat above the poverty level for specific family sizes. On
the other hand, one of the strengths of the UI system, which has gener
ated widespread support, is the potential availability of benefits to vir
tually all workers who face the risk of layoff.
Federal law has been regularly interpreted as prohibiting states from
establishing an income or means test as a condition for benefits. 1
Numerous state proposals to base benefits on factors other than unem
ployment and claimants' past work and wage experience have been
successfully challenged as violative of the federal prohibition against
using unemployment funds for purposes other than to pay "compensa
tion," defined in federal law as cash payments (solely) with respect to
unemployment (Dahm and Fineshriber 1980, pp. 84-87).
For example, proposals to require a longer waiting period for claim
ants with base-period earnings in excess of a specified amount have
been rejected as introducing an element of need even though no means
test was involved. A similar reaction awaited a variety of other propos
als to introduce elements other than work experience as a basis for ben
efits: to establish stiffer qualifying requirements for claimants with
working spouses; to reduce the severity of disqualifications for claim
ants with dependents; to increase benefits for individuals who are their
family's principal support; to establish a schedule of lower benefits
payable to higher-wage claimants.
A change from a program of wage-related benefits, payable as a
matter of right without a means or income test, to a needs-based pro
gram would sacrifice a principle that is still vital to many. It would also
alter a basic UI objective—from preventing poverty to alleviating pov
erty.
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Wage-Related Benefits
Ideally, unemployment benefits should be sufficient to provide for a
worker and family during a period of temporary unemployment with
out requiring drastic cuts in their standard of living. Since income and
living standards vary widely among workers, an identical benefit
amount for everyone would be too high in relation to some claimants'
living standards and wholly inadequate for others. Nor is it a practical
alternative simply to key each worker's benefit directly to the level of
those expenditures that constitute the individual's living standard.
Ordinarily, living standards are established by income levels, which
depend in most cases on earnings from employment. Therefore, a ben
efit amount directly related to wages will usually be related also to liv
ing standards. Moreover, a wage-related benefit reinforces the concept
that UI is an earned right, based on contributions required by law to be
paid by the worker's employer as "insurance premiums" against the
risk of unemployment. A wage-related benefit will not improve a low
standard of living caused by low income. The benefits merely support
whatever standard of living was established by the claimant's wages.
The benefits will also not support a sumptuous living standard created
by a high income. Since UI is a social insurance program with the fun
damental social aim of preventing widespread poverty, UI maximum
benefit rates are imposed in all states to conserve funds so as to spread
resources as widely as is practical.
There has never been much controversy in the United States over
tying benefits to prior earnings. This practice is at odds with the eightyyear British custom of paying aflat rate benefit to all eligible claim
ants. This distinction is particularly surprising since so much else was
borrowed from the British system. A flat rate for all has certain advan
tages. It can be keyed to an objectively established subsistence level—
or accommodate any other objective desired; it is relatively simple to
administer, easily adjustable, predictable, and easy to understand. It
requires no means test, and it ensures an income floor for all unem
ployed who qualify.
The United States, and most other countries with UI systems, chose
a different route. In every state in the nation, the amount of the weekly
unemployment benefit is related to the unemployed worker's former
wage. A uniform flat benefit for all recipients, regardless of the level at

Unemployment Insurance in the United States

167

which it was set, was never considered feasible for the United States.
This was partly because wage-related benefit precedents had been
established, particularly in Wisconsin, but also because substantial
regional, interstate, and area wage variations precluded the establish
ment of a flat sum that would be adequate, by any measure, for even a
majority of beneficiaries. The flat benefit is also inappropriate where
wage levels vary greatly within the same locality.
Replacing One-Half of Lost Wages

Since the beginning of the federal-state UI program in the United
States, there has been general acceptance of the idea that the weekly
benefit should replace one-half of the worker's lost weekly wages.
There is little historical evidence concerning the 50 percent concept,
but it appears that the idea initially became established primarily
through the influence of the first UI law in Wisconsin. 2 Preliminary
versions of the Wisconsin statute called for a flat-rate benefit, but, in
the early 1930s, the idea of a wage-related benefit evolved. The only
antecedent offering guidance about the rate of wage replacement was
the workers' compensation program, wherein two-thirds of former
earnings were usually replaced. While this seemed reasonable for
workers who had lost the physical capacity to work, it was viewed as
excessive for those required to be able and available for work. Further
more, it was feared that two-thirds wage replacement would substan
tially diminish the incentive to actively seek work. One-half wage
replacement was chosen as the natural alternative; the ratio was also
selected because it was easy to understand and administer. 3 The Com
mittee on Economic Security (1935) and the Social Security Board
(1936) both recommended that benefits replace one-half of full-time
weekly earnings. By 1938, all states had benefit rules that applied this
principle.
The ratio suggested by the Social Security Board (1938) for consid
eration by the states was 50 percent of the unemployed worker's fulltime weekly earnings. Reports on full-time wages were difficult to
obtain from employers, particularly for workers with variable work and
pay patterns. For this and other reasons, states increasingly began to
approximate weekly wages on the basis of quarterly wage data. A few
states have implemented an annual wage formula, which makes the
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weekly benefit a percentage of annual wages and thus departs entirely
from a weekly wage-based benefit.
Most states now set the weekly benefit as a fraction of the claimant's
earnings in the high quarter or two highest quarters of the base period
in which the claimant earned the most. Most high-quarter formulas
apply the 50 percent wage replacement concept by establishing the
weekly benefit amount as half of 1/13 of the earnings of that quarter (or
1/26 of the high-quarter wages) on the assumption that the high quarter
reflects full-time employment for all 13 weeks of the quarter.
While the principle of replacing 50 percent of lost wages has been
widely accepted, many states now approximate a slightly different
replacement rate. Currently, several states provide a basic weekly ben
efit amount equal to over 54 percent (1/24 or more of high-quarter
wages), and a few states provide under 50 percent—not counting the
states using the annual wage formula.
Some benefit formulas are weighted in favor of lower-paid workers.
These workers' weekly benefits represent a higher percentage of their
normal wages than do benefits payable to higher-wage workers. This is
based on the idea that lower-paid workers generally spend a greater
proportion of their income for necessaries than do others. Other states
pay allowances for claimants' dependents, thereby also deviating from
the 50 percent rule. The ceiling all states put on the weekly benefit
amount is another exception to the 50 percent rule.
One-Halffor Four-Fifths

The percentage of the beneficiary population eligible for one-half
wage replacement depends on the level of the benefit maximum. In his
January 1954 Economic Report to Congress, President Eisenhower
recommended
that the states raise the dollar maximums so that the payments to
the great majority of the beneficiaries may equal at least half their
regular earnings (Haber and Murray 1966, p. 180).

Soon thereafter, the goal was stated more clearly by the Federal
Advisory Council on Employment Security which recommended that
the maximum should be from 60 percent to 67 percent of the statewide
average weekly wage. This was based on an estimate by Professor
Richard Lester of Princeton University that the maximums in the origi-
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nal state laws would have been the equivalent of from three-fifths to
two-thirds of average weekly wages in manufacturing in 1939. In that
year, only 25.8 percent of claimants received the maximum benefit
amount, indicating that the great majority of beneficiaries received 50
percent wage replacement.
The Kennedy and Johnson administrations recommended a benefit
standard in their legislative proposals for UI, including a maximum
weekly benefit equal to at least two-thirds of the statewide average
weekly wage in covered employment. The same two-thirds recommen
dation was included in the Nixon administration's 1973 UI proposals,
on the grounds that this would meet the goal of providing "at least
four-fifths of the Nation's insured workforce half-pay or better when
unemployed" (Becker 1980, p. 4).

Evidence on Wage Replacement Standards

From the earliest days of UI in the United States, there has been a
presumption that if half of lost wages were replaced there would be the
right balance between compensation for lost income and the incentive
for return to work. This section begins with a review of the fraction of
lost wages that has actually been replaced by the UI system on average
over the years. This is followed by a review of constructive studies of
benefit adequacy that have been done to estimate the appropriate level
of wage replacement. The research is divided into five groups: house
hold expenditure studies that estimate the spending habits of families
at risk of unemployment, optimal UI studies that mathematically
model ideal UI systems, consumption smoothing studies that examine
the degree to which household spending patterns change due to unem
ployment, compensating wage differentials studies that analyze how
wages differ depending on the risk of unemployment, and finally stud
ies of what full unemployment compensation would be based on the
economic theory of choice by the consumer-worker.

170 Adequacy of the Weekly Benefit Amount

Aggregate Wage Replacement Ratios
While most states have benefit formulas intended to replace approx
imately one-half of lost wages, the maximum on payments guarantees
that many high-wage workers will receive less than half their average
lost earnings, and the minimum means that some low-wage workers
may receive more than half their average earnings. The data in table 5.1
summarize the national historical experience on benefit adequacy using
a very aggregate measure—the average wage replacement ratio
(WRR). The national average WRR is defined by

WRR=
m
EWEj/m

where WBAj = the weekly benefit amount received by the ith UI recip
ient, n = the number of UI recipients, WEj = the weekly earnings of the
jth covered worker, and m = the number of workers covered by UI.
In the first few years of UI, earnings of covered workers were quite
low, the WRR was quite high, and there was little controversy about
the adequacy of the weekly benefit amount. Leading up to U.S.
involvement in World War II, average weekly wages of UI covered
workers gradually rose, causing the WRR to fall. This continued until
1945 when the WRR spiked up to reach 0.416 when first UI payments
jumped from only half a million the previous year to over 2.8 million.
In 1945, as the first postwar transition layoffs occurred among the aver
age base-period earnings of claimants was dramatically higher for dis
placed workers with recent histories of high wages and long hours.
Following this, as figure 5.1 shows, the WRR trended downward
through the early 1950s. Since that time, the WRR has ranged between
32 and 37 percent, being approximately 36 percent in recent years.
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Table 5.1 Average UI Weekly Benefit Amount (WBA) in Dollars
and Wage Replacement Ratio (WRR) in the United States,
1938-1995
Year
1938
1939
1940
1941
1942
1943
1944
1945
1946
1947
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966

WBA
10.94
10.66
10.56
11.06
12.66
13.84
15.90
18.77
18.50
17.38
19.03
20.48
20.76
21.09
22.79
23.58
24.93
25.04
27.02
28.17
30.54
30.41
32.87
33.80
34.56
35.28
35.96
37.19
39.76

WRR
0.431
0.408
0.391
0.366
0.353
0.336
0.359
0.416
0.396
0.346
0.341
0.360
0.344
0.322
0.330
0.323
0.335
0.321
0.333
0.335
0.353
0.334
0.352
0.354
0.349
0.346
0.338
0.338
0.347

Year
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995

WBA
41.25
43.43
46.17
50.31
54.35
55.82
59.00
64.25
70.23
75.16
78.71
83.67
89.68
98.95
106.61
119.34
123.59
123.47
128.23
135.72
139.74
144.91
151.76
161.56
169.88
173.64
179.69
181.53
187.30

WRR
0.347
0.343
0.344
0.357
0.365
0.361
0.361
0.365
0.371
0.371
0.364
0.364
0.361
0.364
0.359
0.371
0.368
0.353
0.351
0.357
0.352
0.348
0.355
0.361
0.364
0.354
0.369
0.361
0.363

SOURCE. U.S Department of Labor (1992). Figures for 1993 and 1994 averaged from the four
quarterly issues of UI Data Summary, U.S Department of Labor.
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Figure 5.1 also shows a general upward trend in the WRR since
about 1950. Controlling for the changing occupational mix of UI
claimants, Right (1980) arrived at lower bound estimates of a 0.10 to
0.29 percent increase in the WRR per year over the 1950-1977 period.
He concluded that there have been some real gains in adequacy over
these years. Table 5.2 lists the WRR for each state in 1994. While the
national WRR was 36.05 percent in 1995, WRRs across the states
ranged from a low of 26.1 percent in California to a high of 52.8 per
cent in Hawaii. A total of fifteen states had WRRs greater than 40 per
cent in 1995.
Presumably, the WRR is used as a rough gauge of benefit adequacy
because the data needed to compute it are readily available. It is the
main measure of benefit adequacy regularly reported by the U.S.
Department of Labor.4 However, the WRR as computed by the preced
ing formula is a bit misleading. The denominator in the WRR considers
wages for the entire population of covered workers, while the numera
tor considers only payments to beneficiaries. Properly, we should exam
ine benefit payments relative to lost earnings of beneficiaries.
Vroman (1980), who provided a comprehensive review of possible
wage replacement rate computations, called the series presented in fig
ure 5.1 and tables 5.1 and 5.2 a "gross narrow wage replacement ratio."
Vroman (1980, p. 170) also cited criticism that the measure underesti
mates the "true" replacement ratio because "unemployed workers
receive lower wages than the average worker covered by the program."
Using unpublished micro data on the actual pre-unemployment earn
ings of beneficiaries from Illinois, Michigan, Pennsylvania, Texas,
Washington, and Wisconsin for various periods during the 1980s, the
Advisory Council on Unemployment Compensation (1995, p. 138)
estimated that the gross narrow wage replacement ratio understates the
actual replacement rates by 25 to 30 percentage points.
The dramatic difference in wage replacement ratio estimates
computed by the rather misleading gross narrow WRR formula and
those produced using micro data on actual benefits and prior earnings
convinced the Advisory Council on Unemployment Compensation
(1995, p. 21) to recommend the following:
The U.S. Department of Labor should calculate and report the
actual replacement rate for individuals who receive Unemploy-
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Table 5.2 State Wage Replacement Ratio (WRR), 1995
State Maximum Weekly Benefit Amount (MaxWBA) in dollars,
January 1996
Max WBA as a Fraction of State Average Weekly Wage
(AWW), 1996
and Any Statutory Rule for MaxWBA as a Percentage of AWW
State
Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
District of Columbia
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada

WRR
0.303
0.279
0.310
0.410
0.261
0.393
0.318
0.350
0.316
0.366
0.323
0.528
0.404
0.361
0.366
0.445
0.435
0.374
0.267
0.380
0.342
0.395
0.377
0.436
0.336
0.312
0.415
0.368
0.374

MaxWBA
180
212
185
264
230
272
350
300
359
250
205
347
248
251
217
224
260
238
181
202
250
347
293
303
180
175
228
184
237

MaxWBA/
AWW
0.393
0.342
0386
0.645
0.392
0.528
0.519
0.537
0.490
0.532
0.409
0.678
0.573
0.436
0.445
0.513
0.578
0.532
0.398
0.463
0.460
0.560
0.500
0.579
0.451
0.358
0.594
0.432
0.467

Statutory rule
(%)

662/3
55
60
50

70
60
49.5
53
60
55
662/3
52
57.5
58
60-66 2/3

60
50
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State
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Puerto Rico
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Virgin Islands
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming

WRR
0.291
0.382
0.358
0.310
0.407
0.429
0.384
0.405
0.374
0.412
0.312
0.449
0.364
0.387
0.316
0.365
0.430
0.369
0.338
0.365
0.392
0.387
0.414
0.425

MaxWBA
216
362
212
300
297
243
253
247
301
352
133
324
213
180
200
252
263
212
208
214
350
290
274
233

SOURCE- U S. Department of Labor (1995a and 1995b)

MaxWBA/
AWW
0.426
0.547
0.496
0.448
0.638
0.628
0.493
0.580
0.612
0.661
0.452
0.644
0.480
0.480
0.421
0.492
0.590
0.472
0.414
0.480
0.671
0.652
0.570
0.552

Statutory rule
(%)
562/3
50
662/3
60
50-60
64
662/3
50
67
662/3
50

60

50
70
662/3
55
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ment Insurance. This replacement rate should be calculated by
dividing the weekly benefits paid to individuals by the average
weekly earnings paid to those individuals prior to unemployment
(1995, p. 21).5

Vroman (1980, pp. 170-172) reported that some researchers using
micro data have arrived at very high net WRR figures. Feldstein
(1974), who was concerned with the adverse incentive effects of UI,
estimated that the net wage replacement ratio is often more than 70
percent. Munts and Garfinkel (1974) found replacement rates in Ohio
in 1971-1972 to range from 0.38 to 0.89 for several distinct types of
family units. Corson et al. (1977) determined the average ratio of ben
efits to lost wages in 1977 to be 0.66.
However, when broader measures of macro wage replacement that
consider uncovered workers and noncompensated weeks are com
puted, replacement rates are much lower. For example, Gramlich
(1974) found that during the 1970-1971 recession, UI replaced only 6
to 8 percent of lost earnings for families headed by men, and 14 to 18
percent for families headed by women. While the gross narrow WRR
for 1971 was 0.363, Edgell and Wandner (1974) estimated the macro
replacement rate for UI in the U.S. economy to be as low as 20 percent.
The wage replacement ratio estimates produced in the 1970s also
varied because of differential treatment of taxes in the computations.
This was a very important issue prior to the 1986 federal income tax
changes that placed income received as unemployment compensation
benefits in the same tax category as income from labor earnings.
Household Expenditure Studies
The adequacy of a wage-related benefit is difficult to measure. The
unemployment benefit does not guarantee anyone an adequate mini
mum standard of living: it provides partial wage replacement. The
unemployed low-wage worker whose income was insufficient to main
tain any but the barest living standard can count on only a minimum
benefit (if he or she manages to qualify at all) providing an even leaner
existence. For the unemployed wage earner whose income is high but
whose family responsibilities are heavy, the maximum weekly benefit
amount may often cover only a small portion of expenses. However,
the same benefit amount may adequately cover not only necessities but
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also many incidentals for a single wage earner with a paid-off mort
gage and few financial obligations.
In the early 1950s, when most claimants were unable to receive a 50
percent wage replacement because of low maximums, the pressure to
raise maximums was often resisted by allegations that many claimants
did receive a benefit equal to about half their take-home pay. No firm
evidence was available to indicate how claimants were actually manag
ing on their benefits while unemployed. As a result, the U.S. Depart
ment of Labor financed a series of UI benefit adequacy studies.
The results of these studies have been summarized by Becker
(1961), Lester (1962), and Haber and Murray (1966). Becker (1980),
while discussing the principles that should underlie any proposal for a
federal benefit standard, reviewed the evidence from research in
Tampa, Florida (1956), Anderson, South Carolina (1957), Albany, New
York (1957), Portland, Oregon (1958), St. Louis, Missouri (1958), and
Utica, New York (1958). These six similar studies were based on retro
spective data on the income and expenditures of respondents during the
period just prior to the survey date. Expenditures were divided into
deferrable and nondeferrable categories. Spending on food, clothing,
medical care, and housing constituted the nondeferrable group. Infor
mation was gathered on four household types. After examining these
studies, Becker concluded that
[n]one of the states came close to the proposed goal of paying 80
percent of the beneficiaries half or more of their gross wage . . .
[and i]t is one of the weaknesses of the system that claimants
without dependents' are treated much better than claimants with
dependents (1980, p. 26).

He suggested that benefit adequacy could be generally improved if
benefit maximums were raised and programs for dependents' allow
ances were expanded.
Becker (1961) found that benefits amounted to two-thirds or more of
the income of unemployed single beneficiaries, more than 50 percent
of family income for families with one wage earner, and about 40 per
cent for families with two wage earners. The 1950s studies demon
strated the usefulness of the one-half wage norm for assessing benefit
adequacy. On average, benefits that were half or more of the wage were
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sufficient to cover nondeferrable expenses for all claimant household
types (Becker 1980, p. 13).
The deferrable/nondeferrable distinction used in the 1950s studies
was expanded by Blaustein and Mackin (1977). They added expendi
tures made on a regular basis to repay outstanding debt to outlays for
food, clothing, medical care, and housing, and labeled this total as
"recurring" expenses. Using this concept as a basis for evaluating UI
benefit adequacy, they found that over two-thirds of the beneficiary
households in South Carolina had adequate income in 1977. Nonethe
less, they recommended increasing benefit maximums to improve ade
quacy.
Burgess, Kingston, and Walters (1978a, 1978b), who conducted a
detailed benefit adequacy study in Arizona, expanded the BlausteinMackin definition of recurring expenses to include expenditures on
transportation, insurance, regular services, and regular support pay
ments. They labeled this concept "necessary and obligated" expenses
and used it to assess benefit adequacy for seven recipient household
types.
Burgess, Kingston, and Walters showed a wide disparity in how
closely benefits came to meeting the ten groups of necessary and obli
gated expenses for different categories of beneficiaries. As in the previ
ous studies, the two most important factors, in addition to the weekly
benefit amount, in determining the economic condition of the family
during unemployment were the number of members to be supported
and the number who were contributing to the support. Benefits were
most adequate for recipients who had no other household members and
who lived with relatives: 44 percent received a benefit equal to 100 per
cent or more of their share of the ten categories of necessary and obli
gated expenses. The next most adequate category consisted of husband
and wife units in which both members worked. For 23.4 percent, the
benefit amount represented 100 percent or more of expenses.
Benefits were least adequate in situations where the recipient was
the only earner in a household with three or more persons. For only 2.3
percent did the weekly benefit amount cover 100 percent or more of
their expenses. For a majority of this category (56.1 percent), the bene
fit was half or less of the expenditures.
The low maximum weekly benefit amount was the principal reason
for the disparity in the benefit-expense ratios among the different cate-
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gories of Arizona beneficiaries studied. Sole wage earners, in house
holds with two or more members including a spouse, generally had the
highest wages and, consequently, were most often cut off by the maxi
mum. For those individuals, the weekly benefit amount—usually the
$85 maximum—was less adequate than for any other category of bene
ficiary.
The expenditure studies essentially consider benefit adequacy in
terms of the extent to which gross wages or take-home pay are replaced
for claimants at different income levels. A 1988 Congressional
Research Service benefit adequacy study established three hypothetical
claimants (each married with two children) at three preunemployment
wage levels: low wage (102 percent of the 1986 poverty threshold for a
four-person family); average wage (state 1986 average weekly wage
for workers in covered employment); high wage (four times the 1986
poverty threshold for a four-person family). Benefits were calculated
according to each state's provisions as of January 1, 1988. States were
ranked from that with the highest replacement rate to the lowest (Con
gressional Research Service 1988, pp. 210-248).
Optimal Unemployment Insurance

Baily (1978) and Flemming (1978) originated theoretical, optimal
UI models. The models are similar in that both attempt to solve for
characteristics of the UI system that would maximize the expected life
time utility of a representative worker. The UI program choice parame
ters for this problem are the wage replacement rate and the potential
duration of benefits. Both Baily and Flemming assume an infinite
potential duration of benefits, and each determines that optimal
replacement rates are in the range of those provided by the states. Baily
finds that
[if the] degree of relative risk aversion by workers [is] unity, and if
workers do not prolong their duration of unemployment very
much as a result of UI payments [i.e., if the elasticity of a spell of
unemployment with respect to a change in the benefit amount is
about 0.15] then if the benefit-wage ratio is 50% it is about right
(1978, p. 393).

The elasticity of unemployment with respect to the benefit amount
assumed by Baily (1978) is in line with estimates summarized in chap-
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ter 7. Flemming qualifies his statements with capital market consider
ations concluding that, under perfect capital markets, a replacement
rate of 50 percent is too high, and "[i]f there is no lending or borrowing
the optimal rates rise to about 75 percent (1978, p. 403)."
Davidson and Woodbury examine optimal UI with "an equilibrium
search and matching model calibrated using data from the reemployment bonus experiments and secondary sources" (1996, p. BB-4). As
did Baily and Flemming, they find that, if potential UI duration were
infinite, replacement rates should optimally be 50 percent. However,
Davidson and Woodbury also estimate that, if potential duration is lim
ited to the standard 26 weeks, then the UI system should optimally
replace all of lost earnings.
Consumption Smoothing

An indirect way of assessing the adequacy of existing UI benefit
replacement is to investigate how workers' customary consumption
patterns change when they become unemployed. That is, would con
sumption decline appreciably during periods of unemployment in the
absence of UI benefits? Alternatively, is personal saving the real foun
dation for consumption smoothing, with UI simply acting to reduce the
dissaving that would naturally occur during periods of unemployment?
Grossman (1973), using data from the six state studies of UI benefit
adequacy done in the 1950s under the sponsorship of the U.S. Depart
ment of Labor, addressed the expenditure response to unemployment
for different categories of household members. Applying an allocation
of time model of consumer-worker behavior, he predicted that, in an
effort to maintain real income, people who become unemployed would
increase consumption of goods that involve relatively more homebased production activity. Grossman found that the unemployed do
substitute leisure for market goods in an attempt to maintain customary
consumption levels, but that the response to unemployment of second
ary market workers is much greater than for the primary earner in a
household.6 He suggested that, as the labor force changes to include a
greater share of secondary workers, the transitory component of aggre
gate consumer expenditure would increase.
Hamermesh also studied how UI affects the pattern of consumption.
He concluded that UI benefits only partly help to smooth consumption
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during periods of lost earnings due to unemployment, and that as much
as half of the benefits received are spent as if "individuals were fully
able to borrow or had sufficient savings to meet transitory losses of
income without any disruption in their consumption spending." From
this he argues that a "large part of UI benefits does little to stabilize the
economy, because people consume them as if they were fully
expected" (1982, pp. 110-111).
More recently, Gruber estimated that, in the absence of UI, average
consumption expenditure by unemployed persons would fall by 22 per
cent (1994, p. 30). This is more than three times the decline estimated
in the presence of UI. He suggested that the observed levels of wage
replacement are appropriate only at fairly high rates of relative risk
aversion.7 Gruber also finds that UI helps to smooth consumption dur
ing the period of job loss but that it has no permanent effect.
Burgess, Kingston, and Walters (1978b) showed that Arizona recipi
ents unemployed for 13 weeks reduced their spending on necessary
and obligated expenses by at least 20 percent from pre-unemployment
levels. Spending patterns were governed by the availability of other
income as well as benefits: sources included savings, borrowing, sales
of assets, and income from working members of the family. The
amount of retrenchment was determined also by such intangible fac
tors as claimants' prior anticipations of layoffs and expectations of
reemployment.
For the 1950s studies, Becker (1961) found that, in states experienc
ing periods of prosperity, beneficiaries maintained their expenditures at
almost normal levels. The cut in spending was much greater in states
having recessions. Given these variables, perhaps all that can be con
cluded is that without UI, retrenchment would have come earlier and
been more drastic—particularly for those families without much other
income.
In an extension of the consumption smoothing studies, Hamermesh
and Slesnick (1995) approached the question of UI benefit adequacy
from the perspective of applied welfare theory and estimated house
hold equivalence scales. Using quarterly household panel data for
1980-1993 from the Consumer Expenditure Survey published by the
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, they investigated the question: How
well do UI benefits insure consumption streams against spells of unem
ployment? Their essential finding was that current levels of benefits
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adequately compensate households that receive UI benefits. However,
they tempered their conclusion by noting that UI benefit recipiency is
not universal among unemployed American workers.
While replacing lost income is the prime aim of UI, an explicit cor
ollary goal of the system is to stabilize aggregate spending by main
taining purchasing power during economic down turns. Blaustein
reviewed the aggregate adequacy of benefit payments in performing
the countercyclical function of stabilizing aggregate spending in the
economy (1993, pp. 59-60). Citing research summarized by Hamermesh (1977, pp. 62-64) and the econometric studies by Oaxaca and
Taylor (1986), he concludes that UI has a small but significant influ
ence in maintaining purchasing power so that "economic stabilization
can legitimately be considered as one of the objectives of unemploy
ment insurance." This is consistent with studies of consumption
smoothing based on household survey data.
Compensating Wage Differentials

If labor markets are efficient, wages will adjust to compensate work
ers in jobs with a relatively high risk of unemployment. Efficient labor
markets take into account the fact that UI provides direct compensation
to beneficiaries involuntarily out of work. As a result, wage differen
tials across Ul-covered jobs with varying layoff risks are smaller than
they would be in the absence of UI.
Using data from the first nine waves of the Panel Study of Income
Dynamics, corresponding to calendar years 1967-1975, Abowd and
Ashenfelter (1981) estimated that compensating wage differentials
range from about 1 percent in industries where workers experience lit
tle anticipated unemployment to over 14 percent in industries with sub
stantial anticipated unemployment and unemployment risk. By one
method they also estimate that the implicit price of UI, in terms of
wage reductions, is about equal to the expected UI benefits. Abowd and
Ashenfelter performed their computations based on sample average UI
wage replacement rates by industry.
Anderson (1994), who has studied compensating wage differentials
in a model of optimal UI, used replacement rates simulated for each
individual from the statutory provisions of the states. He asserts that UI
benefit levels prior to the 1970s were inadequate, but that past deficien-
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cies have been corrected. Based on empirical analysis of data from the
1986 Current Population Survey, Anderson concludes that the prospect
of UI induces workers "to accept a somewhat lower wage in industries
that involve higher unemployment risk" (1994, p. 653). He also says
that actual "UI benefits approximate the level that would exist if an
efficient UI market were available...and that...the average wage offset
for UI benefits is approximately equal to the cost of their provision."
The studies of compensating wage differentials find that markets do
adjust wages to account for the risk of unemployment and for the pres
ence of UI. The research also suggests that if the UI market were fully
private, given wage rates currently prevailing in the economy, agents
would voluntarily choose the level of income protection afforded by
the present federal-state system of UI.
Consumer Choice Theory and Unemployment Compensation

Consumer expenditure surveys of the type done in the 1950s and
1970s, while extremely valuable, have proven to be quite expensive.
Becker noted that for the benefit adequacy studies done in the 1950s,
"[t]he time spent per interview averaged about three hours, with a
range from one to fourteen hours, exclusive of the time spent in reinterviews of the more difficult cases" (1961, p. 23). The high cost of
gathering data has resulted in small sample sizes, but a more funda
mental problem exists with the traditional approach. These studies
presume that the analyst may determine which categories of expendi
ture are "necessary" or which items a household may need most.
The problems of sample size and expenditure category selection
have been addressed by using readily available large data sets and an
agnostic approach to measuring unemployment compensation based
on the economic theory of consumer-worker behavior. The methodol
ogy relies on a natural, theoretical approach to estimating the upper
limit on unemployment compensation: solve for the lump sum pay
ment, which, when given to unemployed individuals, makes them
indifferent between their current lot and their pre-unemployment one.
This lump sum payment might be termed "full unemployment com
pensation." It should be noted that this full compensation will be less
than lost earnings, because there is a positive economic value to lei
sure.
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The labor-leisure choice model of economic consumer theory can be
used to examine compensation required for a worker who experiences
involuntary unemployment. The ideas embodied in this approach may
be understood by referring to the indifference curve analysis of figure
5.2. An unconstrained individual, with preferences as represented by
the map of indifference curves labeled U 1 and U° in the figure, would
reach an unconstrained optimum equilibrium on U° at point E enjoying
L° units of leisure and Y° unites of income to purchase goods in the
market. With T representing total hours available for leisure, L, and
hours of work H, if market opportunities allow sales of fewer than the
desired hours of labor services, say # = r - L1 , a lower level of utility is
reached on the indifference curve U 1 where L1 units of leisure and Y 1
units of income are consumed. While there is a hardship experienced
as a result of the associated earnings loss (Y° - Y1), the utility loss is
partly compensated by an increase in leisure, and the income required
to fully compensate the constrained individual (Y - Y1) is less than the
earnings loss.
Figure 5.2 An Indifference Curve Analysis of Full Unemployment
Compensation

Leisure
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Alternatively, full compensation for hours of work at H which is less
than the desired hours H° can be represented by the crosshatched area
in figure 5.3. The compensated labor supply curve is constructed
around the equilibrium (H°, w°) so that utility is constant. It is more
wage elastic than the ordinary money income constant labor supply
curve. The consumer-worker is indifferent between working H° at the
wage rate w° and working H at w° if given the lump sum income repre
sented by the crosshatched area in figure 5.3. 8
Kingston et al. (1981) investigated the possibility of evaluating ben
efit adequacy on the basis of readily available survey (Continuous
Wage and Benefit History (CWBH) and claims data. The authors con
cluded, however, "that information on income and household composi
tion must be supplemented with actual or estimated data on household
expenditure patterns to predict individual benefit adequacy values with
a reasonable degree of accuracy" (Kingston et al. 1981, p. 43). Other
writers have presented results that suggest a greater potential for
applied theoretical methods to yield reasonable estimates of adequate
UI compensation.
Figure 5.3 A Triangle Approximation to Full Unemployment
Compensation
Wage
Compensated Labor
Supply Curve
Uncompensated Labor
Supply Curve

H

Hc

Hours
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Ashenfelter (1980), in the context of a household model where
unemployment is treated as a rationing constraint, estimated an
approximation to a quantity that he refers to as the "lump-sum com
pensation required to restore the unemployed [rationed] worker's fam
ily to the welfare level of the fully employed family" (p. 552). 9 Kurd
(1980) examined the cost of unemployment to the unemployed using
an approximation similar to that of Ashenfelter, to study the experience
of respondents to the 1967 Survey of Economic Opportunity. He esti
mated the required lump sum compensation to unemployed individuals
by evaluating the area under this locus between the actual (constrained)
and fully employed levels of labor supply. 10
O'Leary (1990) estimated the lump sum compensation required to
restore a single unemployed person with no dependents to the welfare
level of a fully employed worker using both approximation and direct
closed form solution methods. He also compared these results to the
compensation forthcoming under various state UI programs. O'Leary
(1996) then expanded the application of directly computing estimates
of full compensation from closed form solutions, applying the method
to six different types of household members working in the labor mar
ket, with and without dependents.
Empirical results based on theoretical models of consumer-worker
behavior presented by Ashenfelter, Hurd, and O'Leary all suggest that
the current UI practice of replacing one-half of lost wages tends to
overcompensate for short spells of unemployment and undercompensate for long spells. O'Leary (1996) found that the presence of depen
dents affects full compensation to men and women in opposite ways.
For the specification yielding the most plausible set of empirical
results, O'Leary found that the presence of dependents significantly
increases the full compensation required for unemployed women but
slightly decreases the compensation due men. 11 Since UI is not
intended to fully compensate the loss an individual experiences as a
result of being unemployed, a financial inducement should remain for
returning to work. Full compensation estimates suggest an upper
bound on the share of lost income that benefits might replace.
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Policy Issues
While there is a broad consensus on both the 50 percent wage
replacement criterion and the concept of tying benefit amounts to pre
vious wages, there remains controversy over how to accomplish these
aims in practice. In addition to these matters, this section discusses
practical aspects of allowances for dependents.
Benefit Formula

As summarized in table 5.3, four different kinds of basic weekly
benefit amount formulas are used. Various applications of these four
types result in a great variety of wage replacement rates (U.S. Depart
ment of Labor 1995a, table 304). Blaustein (1980), who studied thir
teen states, showed that for claimants with 26 weeks of work at the U.S
average weekly wage (then $233.30), the weekly benefit amount would
range from 28 percent to 53 percent of wages across the states. At the
extremes, claimants with identical wage and base-period employment
experience could draw a weekly benefit almost twice as large in one
state as in another. The actual weekly amounts for these claimants
ranged from $65 to $123.
Table 5.3 Distribution of States by Weekly Benefit Amount Formula Type
for the Years 1948,1971,1990, and 1995
Type of formula
High-quarter wages
Multi-quarter wages
Average weekly wage
Annual wages
Total number of programs

1948
41
2
8
51

Number of states by year
1990
1971
28
37
14
10
6
5
5
52
53

1995
29
13
6
5
53

SOURCE: Blaustein (1993, p. 293) and U.S. Department of Labor (1995a, pp. 3-35 to 3-38).

The major reason for the great diversity is that the states alone deter
mine the weekly benefit amounts. State autonomy over basic program
elements is a fundamental principle of the American UI system. The
diversity itself has sometimes been an issue. Extreme differences
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across states in treatment of similar claimants provide support for those
who urge greater uniformity through minimum federal benefit stan
dards.
The four general types of formulas used by the states to compute
benefits are as listed in table 5.3: high-quarter wage, multi-quarter
wage, average weekly wage, and annual wage. Brief discussions of
each type follow.
High-Quarter Formula
In more than half of the 53 UI programs in the United States, the
weekly benefit amount is computed as a percentage of the claimant's
wages in the calendar quarter of his or her base period in which earn
ings were the highest. In the majority of these "high-quarter states,"
weekly benefits are computed as 1/26 of high-quarter wages, on the
assumption that the high-quarter wage represents income for full
employment for all 13 weeks of the quarter. However, many claimants
do not have 13 weeks of steady employment, even in their highest
earning quarter. For them, the 1/26 fraction produces less than a 50
percent wage replacement. Accordingly, some states provide a fraction
larger than 1/26 of high-quarter earnings. A 1/20 fraction would pro
vide a 50 percent wage replacement for a claimant who had only 10
weeks of work in the high quarter and a 65 percent wage replacement
for one who worked all 13 weeks. A 1/24 fraction represents a 50 per
cent wage replacement for an individual who missed one week, 46 per
cent for one who missed two, and 54 percent for a claimant with 13 full
weeks of employment in the high quarter.
Some states specify more than one fraction (e.g., 1/20-1/25) for
computing benefits. These "weighted" formulas provide benefits repre
senting a greater percentage of pay to relatively low-wage claimants
than to high-wage claimants. They thus offer wage-related benefits, but
the benefit-wage ratios vary according to income. For this reason, these
formulas have been opposed by some as introducing an element of
need into the program. Others contest the premise that since low-wage
workers spend a larger percentage of their income on essentials, their
benefits should replace a higher share of their income. In this case, the
argument is that many low-wage workers are members of high-income
faniilies.
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Another problem of the high-quarter formula is that there may be a
substantial gap between the time the claimant's earnings are measured
for benefit purposes and the time they were actually earned. This is due
more to the definition of the base period than to any inherent defect in
the high-quarter formula. For example, most states define the base
period as the first four of the last five completed calendar quarters
immediately preceding the filing of a new claim. This is to allow a
quarter interval for obtaining and recording wage data.
Accordingly, the base period for a claim filed April 1 would be the
previous calendar year. The "lag period" would be three months. How
ever, if the claim were filed March 31, for example, the first four of the
last five completed calendar quarters would be the four quarters ending
September 30 of the previous year. There would thus be a gap between
the base period and the claim of almost six months. If the high quarter
were the first quarter of the base period, high-quarter wages could be
almost 15 months old. For this reason, some high-quarter states have
narrowed the gap by defining the base period as the most recent four
quarters under certain conditions. 12
Multi-Quarter Formula
While some states with a high-quarter benefit formula have boosted
the fraction applied to earnings somewhat above 1/26 to compensate
for possible unemployment during the high quarter, the quarter with
the highest earnings in the year certainly has either the least unemploy
ment or the most overtime earnings and perhaps both. In recent years,
several states have switched from computing benefits as a percentage
of the claimant's high-quarter earnings to setting the weekly benefit
amount as a percentage of the average quarterly income in more than
one quarter, usually in the two highest income quarters in the base year.
Washington State in 1977 was the first to use a multi-quarter formula.
As shown in table 5.3, since that time fourteen states have tried this
approach.
The multi-quarter alternative reflects a desire to balance the compet
ing factors that influence fluctuations in average weekly earnings: time
out of work due to unemployment and earnings in excess of the norm
due to overtime hours. A multi-quarter formula is more likely to reflect
usual full-time wages than is the high-quarter formula since, by consid-
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ering a greater fraction of a calendar year, a better estimate of custom
ary earnings will be provided.
Average Weekly Wage Formula
Only a half-dozen states compute the weekly benefit as a percentage
of the claimant's average weekly wages in the base period, or in a part
of the base period. In the calculation of the benefit, these states disre
gard weeks with no earnings or weeks in which earnings were below a
stated amount. How a week of work or the average weekly wage are
defined is crucial to whether or not the formula will yield a realistic
benefit.
The average weekly wage formula has the advantage of making it
possible to incorporate a base period immediately prior to the begin
ning of unemployment, thus permitting the use of recent wages as the
basis for benefits. The wage data are usually obtained on a request
basis from employers, as needed. In the late 1980s, several states with
average weekly wage formulas switched to quarterly formulas,
dropped request wage reporting, and forfeited the contiguous base
period-benefit year. In large part, this was due to a 1984 federal law
amendment that all states require employers to make quarterly reports
of wages to a state agency. 13 The goal was to facilitate another require
ment for a wider range of cross-checking among benefit and other pro
grams for purposes of income and eligibility verification.
Annual Wage Formula
As of 1995, only five states compute the weekly benefit as a percent
age of annual wages. The rationale for these formulas is the notion that
a worker's annual earnings, rather than the weekly paycheck, deter
mine the individual's standard of living. The first proposal for an
annual wage formula was made by Frank B. Cliffe of the General Elec
tric Company (Haber and Murray 1966, p. 176). He recommended that
1 percent of annual earnings be set as the weekly benefit amount. This
would yield a 50 percent replacement of full-time wages only for
workers who had 50 weeks of full-time work in the base period. Cur
rently, the fractions range from 0.8 percent to 4.4 percent of annual
wages. 14 Two states weight the schedules by providing claimants with
lower annual earnings a higher percentage of annual wages.
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Under the annual wage formula, it is not possible to ensure that the
weekly benefit will be a fixed proportion of normal weekly wages. For
example, a worker who earned $12,000 in the base period would qual
ify for a weekly benefit amount of $240 if the benefit is set at 2 percent
of wages. The $240 benefit would represent 50 percent of the claim
ant's weekly wages only if the $12,000 represented 25 weeks of work.
If the individual had worked more than 25 weeks to earn the $12,000,
the $240 would be more than 50 percent of the weekly wage. If the
claimant earned the $12,000 in fewer weeks, the benefit would be a
percentage smaller than 50 percent of the weekly wage.
Annual wage formulas generally have the highest qualifying
requirements of all states, but they also regularly provide the smallest
weekly wage replacement ratio, particularly for workers with some
unemployment or underemployment during the base period. Blaustein
(1980, p. 194) showed that for half of the annual wage states examined,
unless claimants had from 40 to 47 weeks of employment at a constant
wage, individuals could not draw a weekly benefit amount representing
half their weekly wages.
The Maximum Weekly Benefit Amount

On an individual level, the wage replacement ratio is a useful mea
sure of benefit adequacy. For a given benefit formula, the maximum
weekly benefit amount determines what proportion of claimants will
receive the wage replacement ratio prescribed by the formula. There is
little agreement on where the maximum should be set. Too high a max
imum invites public criticism. Too low a maximum will prevent an
excessive number of claimants from receiving a reasonable wage
replacement. This is because, with a low maximum, the majority of
claimants will receive the maximum rather than a benefit equal to half
their lost wages (or whatever wage replacement ratio is intended by the
benefit formula).
Benefit Maximums
Setting a maximum level on the weekly benefit amount is necessary
to conserve the fund and to prevent inordinately high benefits being
paid to any individual claimant. The Social Security Board (1938) sug
gested a maximum of $15 per week, which was in accord with the level
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Table 5.4 Percentage of UI Beneficiaries Eligible for the Maximum
Weekly Benefit Amount by State, Various Years 1975-1995
State
Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
District of Columbia
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York

1975

1980

1985

1990

1995

35
54
50
14
30
22
32
49
37
41
41
35
37
41
68
56
44
58
43
44
50
31
62
38
44
55
49
42
42
29
56
40
38

55
42
63
20
26
55
34
43
24
32
52
36
42
50
78
53
51
51
34
48
51
57
75
33
41
56
50
53
48
26
45
42
35

50
38
66
17
26
59
58
34
31
26
44
29
44
40
80
54
41
43
32
—
39
29
42
32
41
61
40
49
41
9
35
56
41

44
40
50
13
20
34
38
-29
24
37
35
29
81
86
54
37
38
21
45
49
26
38
34
35
55
28
59
45
19
35
34
32

39
36
57
16
25
18
23
37
23
22
38
40
28
48
56
50
36
34
25
36
48
22
36
35
37
37
-48
-11
29
34
30
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State
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Puerto Rico
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Virgin Islands
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming

1975
18
48
59
29
43
32
33
25
23
55
33
52
32
29
33
-50
15
31
55

1980
17
44
54
29
45
30
27
32
34
56
26
43
35
30
34
37
45
27
27
35

1985
19
33
65
27
31
20
31
21
47
62
29
35
36
38
33
40
37
21
33
38

1990
11
28
53
35
31
23
28
33
-65
20
31
29
44
37
38
30
21
38
41

1995
14
24
22
26
22
22
27
26
33
61
32
31
31
37
34
40
22
22
35
59

SOURCE. Unpublished data provided by the Division of Actuarial Services, Unemployment
Insurance Service, U.S. Department of Labor

194 Adequacy of the Weekly Benefit Amount

fixed by most states at the time. Some states adopted higher maximums: the maximum in Michigan was $16; in Wyoming, $18. The first
UI check, issued August 17, 1936 by the Wisconsin agency to Neils B.
Ruud, was for the $15 maximum.
Benefit maximums limit the extent to which the 50 percent concept,
or other wage replacement rates intended by a benefit formula, can
apply. With a 50 percent wage replacement rule, only those claimants
with wage levels not more than twice the maximum will receive a 50
percent wage replacement. In most states, payments below the maxi
mum are made at the rate of approximately 50 percent of lost wages;
therefore, the proportion of beneficiaries receiving less than the maxi
mum is a proxy for the proportion "adequately" compensated. Becker
(1980, p. 13) found that roughly 34 percent of payments have been at
the maximum, so that in broad terms the popular norm of adequacy—
one-halffor four-fifths—has not been met.
Table 5.4 lists the percentage of UI beneficiaries eligible for the
maximum weekly benefit amount, by state, for various years since
1975. This table indicates that, over the past twenty years, there has
been general improvement in the fraction of claimants receiving onehalf wage replacement. It is interesting to note, by reference also to
table 5.2 where statutory rules for setting state maximum weekly bene
fit amounts are listed, that the gain in the extent of benefit adequacy has
been steadiest in states that currently adjust their maximum by statu
tory rule. Over the past twenty years the share of beneficiaries at the
maximum weekly benefit amount has steadily declined in two states,
Florida and Texas, which adjust their maximum by legislative discre
tion, as well as in three other states, Kentucky, North Dakota, and
Washington, where the maximum is adjusted by statutory rule. Over
the past ten years, among the sixteen states showing steady progress in
this measure of adequacy, eleven adjust the maximum by rule and five
adjust by discretion. 15
The Level of the Maximum
The major issue is the level at which the maximum should be set. In
this evaluation, one criterion of adequacy has been the percentage of
claimants who are prevented from receiving at least a 50 percent wage
replacement because of the maximum. Generally, the level is consid
ered too low if a majority of claimants are eligible for the maximum.
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With a maximum that equals 50 percent of the statewide average
weekly wage, only claimants who earned the average wage in the state
or less will receive half their lost wages. In most states, this will proba
bly be fewer than half the number of claimants. Accordingly, if the
majority of claimants are to receive half their lost wages rather than the
maximum, the maximum will need to be set at more than 50 percent of
the statewide average weekly wage. Table 5.2 provides a listing of the
weekly benefit amount maximums by state and of the weekly benefit
amount maximums as percentages of state average weekly wages.
A federal standard requiring the maximum weekly benefit amount
to equal or exceed two-thirds of the statewide average weekly wage
would allow a majority of covered workers to receive at least 50 per
cent wage replacement and would eliminate the wide variation among
states in the proportion of workers eligible to receive such a percentage
of lost wages. It would not, however, necessarily provide a 50 percent
wage replacement to the "great" majority. Crosslin and Ross (1980)
showed that a maximum equal to two-thirds of the statewide average
weekly wage would not, with few exceptions, provide 80 percent of
beneficiaries with a 50 percent wage replacement, regardless of
whether the target group was covered workers, insured workers, claim
ants, or beneficiaries. The researchers found that the maximum weekly
benefit amount would have to be set at 75 percent of average state
wages if covered workers were the target group, 80 percent if insured
workers were selected, and 85 percent for either claimants or beneficia
ries (Crosslin and Ross 1980, p. 73).
The proportion of workers able to receive a 50 percent wage
replacement is governed primarily by the level of the maximum, but it
is also influenced by the benefit formula. The percentage of workers
eligible for a 50 percent wage replacement below the maximum influ
ences the effectiveness of the maximum. A state with a 1/20 high-quar
ter fraction, for example, will require a lower maximum to reach an
overall wage replacement goal than would a state with a less generous
fraction.
Another factor influencing the proportion of workers able to receive
a 50 percent wage replacement is the distribution of income levels
within a state. For example, although the 1980 maximums for Rhode
Island and South Carolina were both set at 55 percent of the statewide
average weekly wage, Crosslin and Ross (1980) showed that this
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would allow 70 percent of claimants in South Carolina to qualify for a
50 percent wage replacement, but only 63 percent of those in Rhode
Island.
It has been recommended that the maximum weekly benefit amount
equal two-thirds of the average wage in covered employment to meet
the one-half for four-fifths standard. Presently, legislation in nine states
specifies that the maximum weekly benefit amount shall be 2/3 or more
of the average weekly wage in the state. Table 5.2 lists percentages of
state average weekly wages at which the maximum weekly benefit
must be set by statute, along with the actual maximum weekly benefit
amount as of January 1996 and the ratio of that maximum to state aver
age weekly wages in the prior year. 16 According to Papier the maxi
mum weekly benefit amount should be tied to average base period
earnings of beneficiaries (1974, p. 390). Papier estimated that to
achieve one-half for four-fifths wage replacement, maximums would
have to be set at 70 percent of average base-period earnings for benefi
ciaries without dependents and at 80 percent for beneficiaries with
dependents.
Flexible Maximum
During the 1940s and into the 1950s, benefit maximums generally
declined in relation to state average wage levels. Although wage levels
rose rapidly, most states increased their maximums infrequently and by
small amounts. Each increase required legislative action. Most legisla
tures convened only once every two years. Failure to increase the max
imum at least every legislative year meant that the maximum lost
ground in relation to wages.
As wages rise, proportionately more claimants qualify for the maxi
mum, instead of a benefit related directly to their wages, unless the
maximum also increases. To avoid the need for periodic legislative
adjustments, by the mid-1950s several states turned to the "flexible
maximum" concept, which sets the maximum as a specified percentage
of the state average weekly wage in covered employment. Without fur
ther legislative action, the maximum amount is adjusted periodically,
usually once a year, to maintain a constant relationship with wage lev
els.
As shown in table 5.2, thirty-three states specify that the maximum
weekly benefit amount shall be adjusted annually to equal a fixed frac-
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tion of the state average weekly wage. It should be noted that this list
does not include some large states such as New York, California, and
Florida. Moreover, because of state trust fund conditions, the maxi
mum has been "frozen" in several states either indefinitely or for spec
ified periods (U.S. Department of Labor 1995a, table 305). Still other
states have provisions that limit the statutory increase in the maximum
weekly benefit amount if the state UI benefit trust is poorly funded.
Other Considerations in Setting the Maximum
Not all states accept the concept of the flexible maximum. Some
states are reluctant to relinquish legislative control over the maximum,
preferring to retain increases as legislative options. Others may fear the
inflationary potential of indexing benefits to wage levels.
States are not uniformly willing to establish a maximum high
enough to ensure that a majority of workers receive 50 percent wage
replacement if they become unemployed. For some, cost is a barrier.
For example, the National Commission on Unemployment Compensa
tion estimated that the increase in costs in 1980 of setting all benefit
maximums to at least 55 percent of statewide average weekly wages
would have been about 15 percent in total. The cost impact would have
ranged from no increase in several states that already provided a maxi
mum that high, to an increase of more than 100 percent in Alaska. A
rise in maximums to 60 percent would have meant an increment in
national costs of about 19 percent, and, if the maximum had been set at
two-thirds, national costs would have increased by about 25 percent
over 1979 levels. The commission estimates were based on the
assumption of a 7.5 percent unemployment rate (National Commission
on Unemployment Compensation 1980, pp. 40-41).
Some state legislative provisions reflect the belief that claimants
should share with employers the obligation for fund solvency, or at
least for restoring depleted funds. A few states tie the maximum to a
specific fund level, or condition any rise in the maximum on a solvency
criterion. Opponents of these practices argue that unemployed claim
ants should not have to share the additional burden of ensuring that suf
ficient funds are available to maintain adequate benefits. Other states
may simply oppose dollar figures that appear too high in relation to the
wage levels of many workers. Some may prefer to focus on improve-
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ments in such priorities as benefit formulas or benefit duration, or they
may opt for a program of minimum benefits.
Other Policy Issues
Minimum Weekly Benefit Amount
The original laws of almost all the states included a minimum
weekly benefit of $5. Ignoring dependents' allowances, in 1995 the
minimum ranged from $5 in Hawaii to $75 in New Jersey. A few states
provide flexible minimums, established as either a percentage (10 per
cent or 15 percent) of the statewide average weekly wage, a percentage
of the maximum weekly benefit amount (19 percent or 25 percent), or
a percentage (4 percent) of the qualifying wages in the high quarter.
One simple objective explanation for why minimums on weekly
benefits are set by states is to relieve the administrative burden of pro
cessing weekly payments smaller than some reasonable amount. A nor
mative rationale for setting a minimum is based on benefit adequacy
concerns. A 1962 Department of Labor recommendation urged that the
minimum "be related to the weekly wages of the lowest wage group in
the state for which the unemployment insurance program is considered
appropriate" (U.S. Department of Labor 1962). In general, it is the
minimum qualifying requirement that is set in relation to the lowest
income group for whom the program is considered appropriate, and the
minimum benefit is a by-product of that requirement.
The minimum weekly benefit and the state's minimum qualifying
requirement are usually interrelated, and a change in one will often
automatically provide a change in the other. For example, in a state
with a high-quarter formula, where the minimum weekly benefit
amount is set at 1/25 of the minimum qualifying income of $1,000 in
high-quarter wages, a $200 increase in the high-quarter requirement
will automatically result in increasing the $40 minimum benefit to $48.
Conversely, a change in the minimum weekly benefit amount can result
in an automatic change in the qualifying requirement. If Connecticut,
for example, were to raise its $15 minimum to $25, its qualifying
requirement of 40 times the weekly benefit amount would automati
cally increase its current $600 base-period minimum qualifying
requirement to $1,000.
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If the object is to key the minimum qualifying requirement (or the
minimum benefit) to the needs of the lowest appropriate wage group,
the goal may be defeated by the flexible minimums that have been
described, which are tied directly or indirectly to changes in the state's
average weekly wage. Increases in the state average wage may not be
representative of the wage status of the lowest-wage group for whom
the program is considered relevant.
Dependents 'Allowances
The principal argument for dependents' allowances is simple: work
ers with dependents generally have less short-term flexibility for reduc
ing expenditures than do other workers. While household heads have
higher average wages than either single or married secondary workers,
beneficiary studies also indicate that family heads devote a greater per
centage of their earnings to meeting nondeferrable expenses (Haber
and Murray 1966, p. 180).
The principal objection to dependents' allowances has been that
they introduce an element of need into UI. Opponents argue that,
although neither income nor means tests are involved, the payment of
allowances and the required proof of dependents depart from the con
cept that benefits should be based solely on wages and payable to those
who meet qualifying requirements as a matter of right.
Advocates, however, argue that allowances reflect only the general
presumption, from a benefit adequacy perspective, that workers with
dependents need more than do other workers:
The vital difference that still exists between unemployment insur
ance and relief is that no individual inquiry and determination is
made as to whether the claimant actually needs the dependents'
benefit in order to house, feed, and clothe the dependent. The
claimant merely has to establish that he has legal dependents; his
personal affairs are not investigated (Haber and Murray 1966, p.
193).

Opponents have also contended that dependents' allowances have
too often been used as substitutes for adequate basic benefits. Their
position is that, since workers with dependents tend to have higher
wages than those without, the "presumptive greater needs" of these
workers can be met by higher benefit maximums, without the complex-
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ities and inequities of the allowances (Dahm and Fineshriber 1980, pp.
78-81).
Dependents' allowances tend to favor men over women claimants.
Women are usually required to give more information and to answer
more questions than men in claiming allowances. Generally, allow
ances are payable only to claimants who provide more than half of the
support for a dependent. Working wives often earn lower wages than
their husbands do and, consequently, qualify less frequently. Data for
10 states with dependents' allowances showed that, over a ten-year
period (1968-1977), a far higher percentage of male claimants received
such allowances. Except in two states where no allowances were pay
able to claimants at the maximum, about 17 percent of the women ben
eficiaries received allowances in 1977, in contrast to 48 percent of the
men (Dahm and Fineshriber 1980, p. 89).
Originally, only the District of Columbia provided for dependents'
allowances. In 1995, thirteen states paid higher weekly benefits to
claimants with dependents. This compares with fourteen states in
1990, ten states in 1971, and five in 1948. The weekly benefit provi
sions of half of the ten largest states took account of dependents in
1995. The states vary in the definition of compensable dependent and
in the amount of the allowance granted (U.S. Department of Labor
1995a, tables 307 and 308). All include children, usually under 18, typ
ically encompassing stepchildren and adopted children. All but one
include older children unable to work because of physical or mental
disability. Most include a nonworking spouse. Three states include par
ents unable to work because of disability or infirmity. Three include a
brother or sister under 18 orphaned or whose living parents are depen
dents.
Children and a nonworking spouse usually can be counted as depen
dents if the claimant provided more than half of their support and they
are unemployed or have limited earnings. In almost all states, only one
parent may draw allowances if both are receiving benefits simulta
neously.
In seven states, the allowance for each dependent is a fixed amount.
Two states make the allowance a percentage of the individual's weekly
benefit amount. A few states base the allowance not only on the num
ber of dependents but also on the amount of the claimant's earnings. In
these states, the maximum weekly benefit amount and the earnings
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required to qualify for the maximum weekly benefit amount vary
according to the number of dependents. The higher the number of
dependents, generally, the higher the maximum weekly benefit amount
and the higher the wage requirement for the maximum. All states have
a limit on the total amount of dependents' allowances payable in any
week, in terms of dollars, number of dependents, or the percentage of
basic benefits, of high-quarter wages, or of average weekly wage. The
dependents' allowance affects the maximum benefits payable on a
claim in Alaska and Rhode Island where the fixed dependents' allow
ance is paid in any compensable week whether the claimant is fully or
partially unemployed.

Recommendations of Federal Advisory Councils
In 1939, the scope of the Federal Advisory Council on Employment
Security was broadened to include UI. As mentioned earlier, regarding
pronouncements on benefit policy, Haber and Murray say that as early
as 1955 the "Advisory Council recommended that the maximum
should be equal to from three-fifths to two-thirds of the state-wide
average weekly wage" (Haber and Murray 1966, p. 183). Few other
recommendations of this council are noted elsewhere. In concluding
their book, Haber and Murray recommend the following:
A high level commission should be periodically appointed by the
President, possibly in cooperation with congressional leaders, of
persons of the highest standing in the ranks of management, labor,
and the general public, to give a comprehensive view of the major .
policy issues regarding unemployment insurance (1966, p. 504).

Since that time, two such bodies have been created. Both have made
clear proposals for benefit levels. The proposals are virtually identical.
The National Commission on Unemployment Compensation was
established by Congress as part of Unemployment Compensation
Amendments of 1976 (Public Law 94-566, Section 411, approved
October 20, 1976). It was the first comprehensive review mandated by
Congress. When making recommendations concerning the weekly
benefit amount for federal guidelines to be specified in Federal Unem-
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ployment Tax Act (FUTA) amendments, the National Commission on
Unemployment Compensation proposed the following two rules:
(1) Each state must have a maximum weekly benefit amount
which is not less than two-thirds of the average total weekly
wages in covered employment in the state in the preceding year.
(2) Each state must provide a weekly benefit amount between the
minimum and maximum weekly benefit which averages at least
50 percent of the individual's average weekly wages (1980, p. 42).

Amendments to Section 908 of the Social Security Act, as contained
in the Emergency Unemployment Compensation Act of 1991, provided
for establishment of the Advisory- Council on Unemployment Compen
sation. In its second annual report, presented in February 1995, the
Advisory Council on Unemployment Compensation proposed the fol
lowing:
For eligible workers, each state should replace at least 50 percent
of lost earnings over a six-month period, with a maximum weekly
benefit amount equal to two-thirds of the state's average weekly
wages (1995, p. 20).

Both the National Commission on Unemployment Compensation
and the Advisory Council on Unemployment Compensation sought to
ensure one-half wage replacement for at least 80 percent of beneficia
ries. The popular standard of UI benefit adequacy first stated in the
1950s as one-half for four-fifths, continues to be the preferred norm.

Summary and Conclusion
A broad consensus has evolved that weekly UI benefits should
replace about half of lost weekly earnings. This level of adequacy has
been shown in numerous studies to satisfy the short-term spending
needs of households. The states have chosen to determine weekly ben
efit amounts using various formulas; the most popular ones are based
on earnings in the quarter of the base year when earnings are highest. If
the unemployment compensation paid to beneficiaries were compared
to the individuals' prior earnings, most states would be seen to meet
the one-half wage replacement criterion of adequacy.
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In all of the consumer expenditure studies of benefit adequacy, the
level of the maximum appears to be the most important single factor in
determining the average benefit-wage ratio and, consequently, the ben
efit-expense ratio. The level of the maximum also directly affects the
proportion of claimants eligible for one-half wage replacement. Since
the 1950s the publicly stated federal goal has been one-half for fourfifths, or 50 percent wage replacement for at least 80 percent of claim
ants. The most popular benefit maximum rule to help achieve this goal
is to set the state maximum weekly benefit amount at two-thirds of the
average weekly wage in Ul-covered employment.
The issues of dependents' allowances and minimum weekly benefit
amounts raise questions about whether aspects of need should be
addressed by UI. Some argue that neither wage levels nor household
composition should influence benefit rules. However, benefit adequacy
studies show that low-wage workers and those with dependents suffer
the greatest reductions in consumer expenditure when becoming
unemployed. About one-quarter of the states provide additional bene
fits per dependent up to a certain limit, and several states provide mini
mum weekly benefits that exceed 50 percent wage replacement for
low-wage workers. There is no real consensus on these aspects of ben
efit adequacy. However, these seem to be relatively low-cost areas
where the social demands outweigh the insurance principles guiding
the system.
Inadequacies and excesses occur with a wage-related benefit,
regardless of what test of adequacy is applied. Benefits replace a por
tion of wages lost through unemployment, independent of the impor
tance those wages have in the individual or in the family budget. For
the wage earner with heavy family responsibilities, unemployment
benefits often cover only a small portion of essential expenses. Pre
cisely the same benefit amount may cover not only necessities, but also
many incidentals, for a single wage earner, a worker with substantial
income from investment or properties, or the member of a family with
multiple wage earners.
The uneven results are inherent in a wage-related benefit that is not
keyed to individual worker or family need. However, to criticize the
benefit as inadequate or excessive in terms of meeting any particular
individual's or family's circumstances is to ignore the objective of the
program. The requirements UI addresses are not those of individual
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claimants, but the presumed need of all workers who become unem
ployed—for some degree of income replacement.
The program is not designed to relieve poverty. Such relief presup
poses a means test to ensure the individual is indeed destitute and
offers a benefit keyed to the individual's needs. Instead, UI seeks to
prevent poverty, by sustaining, to a "substantial" extent, whatever stan
dard of living the insured worker's former wage provided—until he or
she manages to get back to work.
UI beneficiaries are not poor. They have significant attachment to
the labor force and represent all income categories. The program has
been criticized by some who contend that tax dollars should be limited
to helping only those who are truly in need. The principal purpose of
UI, however, is to prevent unemployed workers from descending into
poverty before they can find suitable employment. The program thus
seeks to prevent both drastic reductions in unemployed workers' living
standards and further damage to their self respect and confidence.
These are realistic and desirable goals. Like preventative medicine, UI
can help avoid considerable welfare and psychological costs.
NOTES
This chapter incorporates previous work done by Murray Rubin. My work on this chapter ben
efited from valuable suggestions and guidance from Ronald Oaxaca, Michael Ransom, Paul Bur
gess, Stephen Woodbury, and Kenneth Klme. Insightful comments were offered by conference
discussant Robert St. Louis Claire Black and Ellen Maloney provided clerical support. Remain
ing errors are mine alone
1. Sections 3304(a)(4), (h), Federal Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA); section 303(a)(5), Social
Security Act (SSA).
2. Hoar (1934, p 26) writes that the 1934 Wisconsin law called for benefits to be "half the
average weekly wage, but not less than $5, nor more than $10."
3 Raushenbush and Raushenbush (1979, chapter 2) discuss the evolution of the Wisconsin
law and the influence of the earlier workers' compensation law enacted by Wisconsin in 1911.
4. It is reported quarterly by the U.S. Department of Labor in UI Data Summary and annually
in updates to UI Financial Data, ET Handbook No 394.
5. Under certain assumptions, this calculation could be done using sample data from the ran
dom audit benefits quality control program. Computation of the replacement rate recommended
by the Advisory Council on Unemployment Compensation would impose a significant data pro
cessing burden on states. The process would involve weekly computations based on individual
records
6 Grossman considers the primary market worker in a household to be the one with the high
est annual earnings, he labels other members with earnings as secondary market workers (Gross
man 1973, p 208)
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7. Simulated levels of UI earnings replacement in the Panel Study of Income Dynamics data
used by Gruber averaged around 50 percent. Relative risk aversion is the elasticity of the marginal
utility of income with respect to income.
8. The full compensation triangle depicted in figure 5.3 is simply a two-dimensional represen
tation of the quantity (Y - Y 1 ) represented by a vertical line in figure 5.2 Hurd (1980, p 227-228)
gives a full exposition of this idea.
9 The estimate is achieved by taking a second-order Taylor Series approximation of the dif
ference between the exogenous cost of achieving the unconstrained utility level in the presence of
the ration and the cost of achieving the same level in the absence of any constraint, around the
fully employed point. The result is "a conventional Harberger (1971) type triangle measure of
welfare loss" (Ashenfelter 1980, p. 553), which is applied to aggregate time series data
10. Hurd (1980) estimated the parameters of a Taylor Series approximation of the substitution
effect of a wage change on hours of work, integrated to find the compensated labor supply func
tion, and then solved for the utility constant wage acceptance locus by inversion.
11. The results in O'Leary (1996) based on the Stone-Geary specification of utility are much
more plausible than those based on a linear labor supply specification such as that used by Hurd
(1980). It may be that the greater flexibility of the Stone-Geary form more fully captures underly
ing behavior.
12. This potentially long lag in how earnings influence benefits has not gone unnoticed by
employers whose experience-rated tax liability can be shifted by specific short-term employment
patterns.
13 Public Law 98-369, approved July 18, 1984. Michigan will soon switch from a wage
request to a wage reporting state and simultaneously switch from an average weekly wage benefit
computation to a high-quarter formula
14. The 4.4 percent rate applies in Alaska, which creatively deals with a large population hav
ing a highly seasonal income pattern.
15 Steady reduction in the fraction at the maximum weekly UI benefit amount was achieved
in the 1985-to-1995 period in Alabama, Florida, New York, Ohio, and Texas, which currently
adjust the maximum by legislative discretion, and in Colorado, Connecticut, the District of
Columbia, Idaho, Kansas, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Michigan, North Dakota, Puerto Rico, and
Washington.
16. Even for states where the maximum weekly benefit amount is set by law to be a fraction of
the average weekly wage in the state, the ratio of maximum weekly benefit amount to the average
weekly wage may not appear to conform with the statute because of differences in the period over
which state-covered wages are averaged and the date the adjustment is to be made. In table 5.2,
there are thirty-three states indicted as having a statute for annually adjusting the maximum
weekly benefit amount Among these states, the most popular type of formula calls for averaging
wages in the previous calendar year and adjusting the maximum in July. The figures in table 5 2
involve the maximum weekly benefit amount as of January 1996 and the average weekly wage in
state Ul-covered employment in calendar year 1995
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The Duration of Benefits
Stephen A. Woodbury
Michigan State University and W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research
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Unemployment insurance (UI) benefits have two dimensions: the
weekly benefit amount and the potential duration of benefits. How
much is paid per week and for how long are the two questions upper
most in the mind of an eligible UI claimant.
This chapter is concerned with issues involved in establishing both
"regular" benefit duration and the duration of "extended" benefits. By
"regular benefits," we mean the benefits provided by states during nonrecessionary times. Regular state benefits are often referred to as the
"first tier" of the UI system. By "extended benefits," we mean benefits
that are paid in periods of high unemployment.
There have been two types of extended benefit programs in the
United States. The first is the permanent standby Extended Benefit
(EB) program enacted under the Federal-State Extended Unemploy
ment Compensation Act of 1970. This program is supposed to activate
automatically in a recession so as to provide extra weeks of unemploy
ment benefits to workers who cannot find reemployment in hard times.
The EB program is often referred to as the "second tier" of the UI sys
tem. The second type of extended benefit program is the federal "emer
gency" program. Congress has extended the duration of UI benefits on
a temporary and discretionary basis during each of the last six reces
sions in the belief that the benefit durations provided by the first and
second tier programs were insufficient. The various emergency pro
grams are often referred to as the "third tier" of the UI system. The fol-
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lowing two sections focus mainly on regular benefits, whereas the third
section discusses the various extended benefit programs.
Three main questions arise in making policy on benefit duration.
First, should benefits be offered to workers for a limited time or in per
petuity, and if they are offered for a limited time, what is the correct
limit? Second, should all eligible workers face the same potential dura
tion of benefits, or should potential duration vary with the work history
and earnings of a worker? Third, should the duration of benefits be
extended when labor markets are slack, and if so, what should be the
relationship between labor market conditions and the potential dura
tion of benefits?
We treat these questions from both institutional and analytical per
spectives. In the first section, which follows, we review actual prac
tice—how states set regular benefit durations—and briefly discuss
some of the implications of that practice. We also discuss the waiting
period and other interstate differences in potential duration. In the sec
ond section, we treat the adequacy and optimality of UI benefit dura
tion, reviewing both the traditional institutional approach and modern
analytical ways of examining duration adequacy. We discuss the histor
ical and institutional reasons for existing practice in the states, empiri
cal measures of duration adequacy such as the UI exhaustion rate and
experience of UI exhaustees, the work disincentive effects of increas
ing the potential duration of benefits, and analytical work on optimal
UI. Our goal is to provide a framework in which existing practice can
be evaluated. In the third section, we address the matter of extending
benefits during economic downturns. Along with issues of UI eligibil
ity and coverage (treated by Bassi and McMurrer in chapter 2), benefit
extensions have been the most visible source of contention and debate
in UI during the last twenty-five years. Benefit extensions raise again
many of the issues discussed in the next two sections, and provide a
test of whether research on the duration of benefits has been fruitful.
The final section provides a summary and some provisional conclu
sions.
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How States Determine the Potential Duration of Benefits
From the beginning of the UI program in the United States, the gen
erally accepted goal has been to provide a limited number of weeks of
benefits, payable only long enough to tide an unemployed worker and
household over a temporary spell of unemployment. Consensus on the
meaning of "temporary" has changed over time—from 15 weeks,
which was the most common potential duration at the beginning of the
program in 1935, to 26 weeks, which is the maximum in all but two
states today.
The apparent consensus in the United States that 26 weeks is a rea
sonable duration of benefits masks considerable variation among the
states in how the duration of benefits is determined. Some states pro
vide the same duration of benefits to all eligible claimants, whereas
others vary benefit duration according to a claimant's past employment
or wages. As a result, there are substantial differences among the states
in the amount of prior work or wages required to qualify for different
benefit durations. In the first part of this section, we review the various
formulas used to compute benefit duration.
In addition, states differ in how long an unemployed individual must
wait before receiving benefits. Originally, uncompensated waiting peri
ods of two or more weeks were common. Currently, one week is
required in most states and none in a few. Issues pertaining to the wait
ing period are reviewed in the second part of this section.
Finally, a few states provide benefits beyond the regular duration
under special circumstances, for example, when workers are dislocated
by a plant closing or by general permanent shrinkage of an industry.
Also, two states have a regular maximum duration of 30 weeks, rather
than the otherwise universal 26 weeks. These interstate variations are
reviewed briefly in the last part of this section.
Potential Duration Formulas

Table 6.1 provides a summary of the practices used by the states to
determine the potential duration of benefits. As can be seen in the first
two columns, nine states currently provide the same potential duration
of benefits to all who meet the minimum qualifying requirement (that
is, the minimum and maximum potential durations are the same).

Table 6.1 Potential Duration of UI Benefits: Summary of State Practices, 1995
Potential duration
(weeks)
State
Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
District of Columbia
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky

Minimum
15
16
12
9
14
13
26
23
20
10
9
26
10
26
14
11
10
15

Maximum
26
26
26
26
26
26
26
26
26
26
26
26
26
26
26
26
26
26

Minimum requirement
for maximum
potential duration
Base-period High-quarter
earnings ($)
earnings ($)
516
1,716
250-286
1,000
3,120
1,000
897-1,183
3,588
900-920
2,080
488-649
1,950
150
600
2,184
966
1.300
2,600
260
1,040
962
3,848
32.5-105
130
1,144
3,690
400-1,160
1,600
4,800
18,757
740
2,496
1,229-1,482
4,914
750
1,857

b
a
0.33
1.31
0.33
0.33
0.50
0.33
0.65
0.50
0.50
0.25
0.25
1.00
0.31
0.83
0.28
0.33
0.33
0.33

4.17
17.60
4.00
3.85
4.35
3.85
3.85
4.35
3.85
3.85
4.00
4.76
3.85
3.77
5.00
4.34
4.25
4.74

g
7.91
7.44
8.25
8.57
11.49
8.57
16.88
11.49
12.99
6.49
6.25
21.00
8.05
22.02
5.60
7.60
7.76
6.96

State
minimum
weekly benefit
amount
22
44
40
46
40
25
15
21
50
10
37
5
44
51
50
32
63
22

Louisiana
Main
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Puerto Rico
Rhode Island

8
21
26
10
15
10
13
11
8
20
12
26
15
19
26
13
12
20
20
4
16
26
15

26
26
26
30
26
26
26
26
26
26
26
26
26
26
26
26
26
26
26
26
26
26
26

3,081
2,730
900
2,000
2,100
2,999
2,340
3,510
4,469
1,575
1,248
2,800
4,375
1,777
1,600
2,603
3,572
6,864
1,000
5,304
1,357
280
2,961

800
683
576
500
525-781
1,000
780
1,000
1,117-1,375
394-400
400
1,200
1,094-1,623
1,068
400
651-868
1,118
1,716
2,600
1,326-1,360
900
75
890

0.27
0.33
0.72
0.36
0.52
0.33
0.33
0.33
0.32
0.33
0.33
0.30
0.45
0.60
0.65
0.33
0.32
0.25
0.40
0.33
0.69
0.58
0.36

4.00
4.55
4.17
3.85
5.38
3.85
3.85
450
4.00
5.00
4.00
4.40
4.62
3.85
3.85
3.85
3.85
3.85
4.00
5.00
4.00
9.30
4.62

6.75
7.25
17.27
9.35
96.7
8.57
8.57
7.33
8.00
6.60
8.25
6.82
9.74
15.58
16.88
8.57
8.31
6.49
10.00
6.60
17.25
6.24
7.79

10
35
25
14
42
38
30
45
55
20
16
32
75
41
40
25
43
66
16
68
35
7
41
(continued)

NJ

Table 6.1 (continued)

ON

Potential duration
(weeks)
State
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Virgin Islands
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming

Minimum
15
15
12
9
10
26
12
13
16
26
12
12

Maximum
26
26
26
26
26
26
26
26
30
26
26
26

Minimum requirement
for maximum
potential duration
Base period High-quarter
earnings ($)
earnings ($)
540
1,560
728
2,183
3,120
780
1,011-1,050
4,044
450-486
1,800
1,163
1,628
1,625
6,760
858
2,574
1,825
5,694
550-600
2,200
1,250
3,250
1,000
3,467

a
0.33
0.33
0.25
0.27
0.27
0.42
0.25
0.33
0.33
0.28
0.40
0.30

b
(%)

8

3.85
3.85
3.85
4.00
3.85
4.44
4.00
3.85
4.00
4.00
4.00
4.00

8.57
8.57
6.49
6.75
7.01
9.46
6.25
8.57
8.25
7.00
10.00
7.50

State
minimum
weekly benefit
amount
20
28
30
42
17
25
65
33
73
24
50
16

NOTES Parameter a is the maximum proportion of base-period earnings that can be paid in UI benefits during a given benefit year (see equation 3 in the
text).
Parameter b is the proportion of high-quarter earnings paid as the weekly benefit amount (see equation 4 in the text)
Parameter g = a/b and is an index of the state's potential duration generosity
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These are usually referred to as uniform duration states. The number of
states providing uniform duration has fallen over the years, as
Blaustein (1993, table 10.7, p. 304) has discussed.
The other forty-four states vary potential duration according to each
claimant's past employment or earnings. These states use one of two
methods to compute potential duration. In six states—Florida, Michi
gan, New Jersey, Ohio, Oklahoma, and Pennsylvania—potential dura
tion is an increasing function of the number of "credit weeks" worked
in the base period (roughly, the year preceding the spell of unemploy
ment), up to the maximum 26 weeks. A credit week is a week in which
earnings equal or exceed some specified minimum, so that,
(1) DPOT = min {/(credit weeks), 26]
where DPOT denotes the potential duration of UI benefits and / is a
function increasing in credit weeks. For example, in Ohio, a credit
week is a week in which a worker earned at least 27.5 percent of the
average weekly wage in the state. A worker qualifies for the minimum
potential duration of 20 weeks of benefits by having 20 credit weeks in
the base period. Then, the worker's potential benefit duration increases
by 1 week for each additional credit week, up to the maximum of 26
weeks.
In thirty-eight states, the potential duration of benefits depends on
the ratio of a claimant's base-period earnings to high-quarter earnings,
up to the maximum 26 weeks. If we let BPE denote base-period earn
ings and HQE denote high-quarter earnings, then,
(2) DPOT = min (f(BPE/HQE), 26]
where / denotes a function increasing in BPE/HQE. Note that BPE/
HQE ranges from 1 for a worker whose entire base-period earnings
were earned in a single quarter (BPE = HQE for such a worker) to 4 for
a worker who had identical earnings in all four quarters (BPE =
4[HQE]). The idea is that a worker with stable earnings throughout the
base period will have a higher BPE/HQE and hence a higher potential
duration of UI benefits.
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In five states, the relationship between BPEIHQE and potential
duration is explicit. For example, in North Carolina, potential duration
is simply 8.67 times BPEIHQE (up to 26 weeks), so that a Ul-eligible
worker with BPEIHQE of 3 or greater is eligible for the maximum
potential duration of 26 weeks of benefits.
In 33 states, however, the relationship between BPEIHQE and
potential duration is masked by the formula used to calculate potential
duration. In these states, potential duration is calculated as some frac
tion, a, of base-period earnings divided by the weekly benefit amount
(WBA), up to the maximum:
(3) DPOT = min [a(BPE)/WBA; 26].
The parameter a limits the total UI benefits paid to a worker in the ben
efit year to some fraction of base-period earnings. In 18 states, a = 1/3,
and, in the other 15 states, a ranges between .25 and .6. What needs to
be noted is that in all of these states the weekly benefit amount is com
puted, in turn, as a fraction, b, of high-quarter earnings (or, in some
cases, average earnings in the two highest quarters of the base period)
up to some maximum:
(4) WBA = min [b(HQE), WBAMAX].
Typically, b is 1/25 (.04), so that the weekly benefit amount equals onehalf of average weekly earnings in the high quarter. (The parameter b
ranges from 1/26 [.038] to 1/20 [.05] in these 33 states.) Substituting
the WBA formula (4) into the potential duration function (3) yields
(5a) DPOT = a(BPE)/b(HQE), if WBA < WBAMAX
or
(5b) DPOT = a(BPE)/WBAMAX,

if WBA = WBAMAX.

It follows that for eligible claimants whose WBA is less than the state's
maximum,
(6)DPOT = g(BPEIHQE)
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so the dependence of potential duration on BPE/HQE is clear for
claimants whose WBA is below the maximum. For claimants whose
WBA is at the maximum, potential duration will still depend on the
relationship between base-period and high-quarter earnings. For exam
ple, a worker who obtains the maximum WBA as a result of high earn
ings in just one quarter may have potential duration below the
maximum 26 (or 30) weeks, since that worker's base-period earnings
will be low relative to his or her weekly benefit amount.
The parameter g can be usefully interpreted as an index of a state's
duration generosity. Specifically, it gives the increase in the number of
weeks of potential duration that result from a unit increase in BPEI
HQE. In table 6.1, we have computed g for all 53 "states" (that is, UI
jurisdictions). (For states that do not explicitly use the parameters a or
b in computing the potential duration of benefits, we have calculated an
implied g numerically.) Also in table 6.1, we have calculated the mini
mum base-period earnings and high-quarter earnings that an eligible
claimant would need in order to receive the state's maximum potential
duration of benefits.
An examination of g and of the minimum earnings required for
maximum potential duration in table 6. 1 shows that the variations in
states' duration provisions are significant. Claimants with similar baseperiod work experience qualify for quite different potential durations
depending on the state in which they reside, and the requirements for
26 weeks of regular benefits vary dramatically among the states. For
example, to qualify for 26 weeks of regular benefits requires as little as
$130 in the base period (with $32.50 to $105 in the high quarter) in
Hawaii to as much as $18,757 in the base period (with $4,800 in the
high quarter) in Indiana.
Variable duration reflects the notion that individuals "earn" their
right to benefits by working, and that each week of benefits is earned
by a given number of weeks of employment or earnings. The wide
spread use of variable duration also reflects two further concerns: first,
that uniform duration is more expensive than variable duration, and
second, that uniform duration can generate a high ratio of total benefits
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paid to base-period earnings, which could in turn lead to strong work
disincentives. 1 We return to these issues in the discussion of extended
benefits and again in the conclusion.
The Waiting Period

The waiting period has been debated since the beginning of the UI
system in the United States. In all but a dozen states, a claimant must
serve an uncompensated one-week period of unemployment before
receiving benefits. At the beginning of the program, 31 of the state laws
required a waiting period of two weeks, 17 required three weeks, and
three required four weeks (Haber and Murray 1966, p. 200).
The waiting period was included in the early laws for reasons of
both administration and financing. It allowed time for processing
claims manually and for making determinations and contesting them
before the end of the first compensable week. It also helped to conserve
funds by avoiding compensation for short periods of unemployment.
Over the years, however, experience showed that the waiting period
was unnecessary for effective administration. Also, although a waiting
period clearly increases fund solvency (other things being equal), the
fact that several states have eliminated the waiting period shows that it
is not essential for fund solvency.
Accordingly, some have argued that the waiting period should be
eliminated entirely. The main argument for dropping the requirement is
that it causes a delay in providing claimants with income in the early
stages of their spell of insured unemployment. Since payment of a
claimant's first benefit check usually occurs no earlier than three full
weeks following the filing of the first claim, the existence of a waiting
week means that the first check will represent compensation for only
one week of unemployment. Eliminating the waiting week would not
shorten the time it takes to deliver the first check, but that check would
cover two weeks of unemployment instead of just one. This would be
helpful if, as is often the case, a worker has delayed filing a claim until
after being unemployed for some time.
Eliminating the waiting week requirement would be a relatively
expensive step, however. In addition, an accumulating body of research
and evidence suggests that it would be good public policy to extend the
waiting period and to use the savings to finance a longer potential dura-
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tion of benefits. O'Leary's (forthcoming) findings, which are discussed
below, suggest that short spells of unemployment are overcompensated
by UI, whereas long spells are under-compensated. Jacobson,
LaLonde, and Sullivan (1993a, 1993b, 1993c) show clearly that dislo
cated workers suffer large losses of firm- and occupation-specific
human capital that no existing program—including UI—even begins to
address. This research provides a rationale for extending the waiting
period and providing a longer potential duration of benefits. 2
The number of states that impose a waiting week has been influ
enced strongly by a 1980 federal amendment to the federal-state
Extended Benefits (EB) law. That amendment was one of several
intended to reduce UI program costs by providing incentives for states
to reduce the generosity of their regular UI benefit provisions. 3 It elim
inated the federal 50 percent matching share for the first week of EB in
any state that has no waiting week for regular benefits. The amendment
also applies to states that have a waiting week for which the individual
is later reimbursed if still unemployed after a specified period, and to
states that waive a waiting week requirement if it would interrupt a
continuous spell of insured unemployment.
The prospect of losing the federal share of funding for the first week
of EB motivated some states to restore a waiting week and deterred
others from eliminating it. Before the federal change in 1980, there had
been a trend toward removing the waiting week, which peaked at
twelve states with no waiting week and nine states that paid it after a
specified number of weeks of unemployment. By 1984, the number
was down to nine and six states, respectively. However, mainly because
the EB program has become ineffective in recent years, the number of
states without waiting week provisions has risen to twelve, although
the number of states paying for the waiting week retroactively is now
down to four.
A few states provide two exceptions to the waiting week require
ment. The first exception applies when a claimant is unemployed and
receiving benefits at the end of a benefit year. If the period of unem
ployment extends into the new benefit year, the individual may serve a
waiting period for the new year either at the beginning or later in that
new benefit year. The second exception allows claimants to serve a
waiting period the week before beginning a new benefit year. This pro
vision is advantageous to claimants who are unemployed for some time
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before they are able to begin a new benefit year; examples include
claimants who exhaust benefits before the expiration of the first benefit
year and remain unemployed or claimants who incur a second spell of
unemployment before expiration of the first benefit year.4
As mentioned, a few states convert the waiting week into a compensable week after a specified period of unemployment. Since most
unemployment is short-term, these states frequently never pay for the
first week. However, such provisions could create an incentive to
remain unemployed long enough to be paid for that week. No state cur
rently provides for payment of the waiting week to individuals who
find suitable, stable employment within a minimum period, although
such a provision could create an incentive for quick reemployment,
along the lines of a reemployment bonus.
Other Interstate Variations
Increased Duration under Special Conditions
A few states extend regular benefit duration for workers whose
unemployment resulted from structural change such as shifts in
demand or changing technology. Structural change usually manifests
itself in plant closings or in the permanent shrinkage of an entire indus
try. Hence, these programs can be thought of as state-level dislocated
worker extensions.5
A Hawaii law separate from the regular UI law provides an addi
tional 13 weeks of benefits to individuals unemployed when a natural or
other disaster causes damage that results in widespread unemployment.
Puerto Rico provides up to 32 weeks of extended benefits to individuals
who are dislocated as a result of technological change, closure of a
plant or industry, or the elimination or reduction of sugar cane crops. 6
In Iowa, potential benefit duration is normally computed as 1/3 of
base-period earnings divided by the weekly benefit amount, up to a
maximum of 26 weeks. However, for workers laid off because their
employer went out of business, duration is computed as 1/2 of baseperiod earnings divided by the weekly benefit amount, up to a maxi
mum of 39 weeks. In other words, the parameter a in table 6.1
increases from 1/3 to 1/2 for dislocated workers. Minnesota provides
up to 6 weeks of extended benefits to workers affected by a mass lay
off—defined as a permanent work force reduction of at least 50 percent
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in a facility employing 100 or more workers—when the county unem
ployment rate is at least 10 percent.
Other states also extend regular duration to dislocated workers but
on a different basis. Massachusetts and Michigan have long provided
additional weeks of benefits to claimants attending vocational retrain
ing courses approved by the employment security agency. In both
states, benefits may be extended up to 18 weeks.
State-level extensions such as these reflect a view that, at least for
dislocated workers, regular benefits of 26 weeks are inadequate either
to compensate a worker for permanent job loss and for the loss of firmand occupation-specific human capital it implies, or to support a
worker through a period of retraining that may be needed after perma
nent job loss. Of course, the enactment of such state-level extensions
requires both a political consensus and favorable fiscal conditions, and
the existing state-level extensions fall short of the comprehensive com
mitment to retraining advocated by some.
Maximum Duration
In 1979, twelve states paid more than 26 weeks of regular benefits.
This represented the peak of a trend toward higher maximum durations
that characterized the UI system in the United States into the 1970s.
The trend was reversed in the 1980s, and, by 1989 (and still today),
only two states (Massachusetts and Washington) provided regular ben
efit duration maximums in excess of 26 weeks. As can be seen in table
6.1, all other states have a maximum potential duration of regular ben
efits of 26 weeks.
Particularly in the 1960s and 1970s, there were several federal and
other proposals to induce states to extend regular benefit duration
beyond 26 weeks. In 1963 and 1965, for example, the Kennedy and
Johnson administrations proposed a program of Federal Unemploy
ment Adjustment Benefits (FUAB), payable in both good and bad
times to those with long and substantial employment experience (Mur
ray 1974, pp. 30-32). Thirteen weeks of FUAB would have been made
available to individuals unemployed more than 26 weeks, provided
they had at least 26 weeks of work in the base period and 78 weeks of
work in the base period and the preceding two years. In that it would
have provided extended benefits to workers with strong employment
histories, the FUAB proposal resembled the types of dislocated worker
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programs that have been discussed recently (see, for example, Jacobson, LaLonde, and Sullivan 1993a, chapter 7), but no action was taken
by Congress on the proposal.
In 1972, a committee of the Interstate Conference of Employment
Security Agencies (ICESA) recommended to ICESA's Executive Com
mittee that the federal government give a 50 percent subsidy for any
week of regular benefits beyond the 26th week (up to 39) that any state
saw fit to provide, under whatever conditions the state considered nec
essary (Murray 1974, pp. 25-26). ICESA took no action on the recom
mendation.
In 1973, it was reported that the Nixon administration was consider
ing a proposal to require all states to set a maximum duration of at least
39 weeks (Murray 1974, pp. 26, 59). States would be reimbursed for
50 percent of the cost of benefits in excess of 26 weeks. Proportion
ately more work experience in the base period would be required for a
claimant to qualify for benefits beyond 26 weeks: for example, 39
weeks would require 50 percent more than was required for 26 weeks.
However, no proposal was actually introduced to Congress.
Thus, various proposals to extend regular benefit duration have been
put forward and rejected over the years. It seems highly unlikely that
proposals to increase regular state benefit durations would fare well
today. An approach that provided federal financing without federal
control would be more in keeping with the philosophy of the Republi
can Congress than an approach that dictated federal standards, but the
budgetary implications of any such subsidy make it extremely unlikely.
The reluctance of states to extend benefits beyond 26 weeks has
stemmed from at least three sources: first, the strains on state funds
during the high unemployment of the mid-1970s and early 1980s; sec
ond, the federal conditions adopted in the 1980s for state repayment of
federal advances; and third, enactment in 1970 of the federal-state EB
program.
Adoption of EB in 1970 is arguably the major reason for the decline
in the number of states with regular benefit durations in excess of 26
weeks. In brief, the EB program extends benefits in states where labor
market conditions have deteriorated during the preceding one to two
years. (We discuss EB in greater detail in the third section of this chap
ter.) EB extends potential duration by one-half of a claimant's regular
benefit duration, up to a maximum of 13 weeks. Hence, when EB is in
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effect in a state, claimants gain no advantage from the availability of
regular benefits beyond 26 weeks: the maximum weeks of combined
regular benefits and EB is 39. In other words, when EB is in effect,
claimants are eligible for the same 39-week potential duration whether
the duration of regular state benefits in their state is 26 weeks or 30
weeks (or any other potential duration of regular benefits between 26
and 39 weeks). Moreover, EB is funded half from state UI trust funds
and half from federal UI trust funds. Accordingly, EB results in a
smaller drain on state UI trust funds than do benefits in excess of 26
weeks provided by a regular state program.
For the same reasons, adoption of EB is clearly the main reason for
the decline in the number of states with their own extended benefit pro
grams. In the mid-1970s, ten states had such programs, activated on the
basis of particular state unemployment rates. By 1989, only three states
(Alaska, California, and Connecticut) had such programs.
In sum, adoption of EB seems to have produced the acceptance of
two ideas. The first is that unemployment beyond 26 weeks ceases to
be solely a state responsibility. The second is that UI benefits should
extend beyond 26 weeks only during periods of high unemployment.

Duration Adequacy and Optimality
The most obvious question in unemployment benefit duration is also
the most difficult: What should be the potential duration of benefits? It
is useful to think of the approaches to this question as either institutionalist or analytical, although the line between the two is not hard and
fast. The institutionalist approach relies on historical observation, prag
matic considerations, and informal examination of data to gain an
impression of whether benefit durations are adequate. The analytical
approach makes explicit use of economic reasoning and modeling. In
the first two parts of this section, we discuss the institutionalist
approaches to benefit duration, describing the historical rationale for
the existence of limited potential duration, and reviewing the literature
on UI exhaustion rates and the experience of exhaustees. In the last two
parts, we look at existing analytical work on the disincentive effects of
increases in potential duration on the optimal duration of benefits.
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We view the alternative approaches to duration adequacy as comple
mentary rather than as competing ways of gaining insight into whether
benefit durations are adequate. As will be seen, neither approach has
progressed to the point where unequivocal or wholly convincing
answers are supplied.
Historical Rationale for Limiting Potential Duration

Originally, financial concerns were the primary reason for limiting
the duration of benefits. When the program began in 1935, actuaries
argued that a 3 percent payroll tax could finance only 12 to 15 weeks of
benefits. The actuaries' estimates were based on the unemployment
experience of the 1930s, and, of course, such high rates of unemploy
ment have not recurred. Indeed, actual payroll tax rates are now well
below those originally contemplated (on average), yet the maximum
benefit durations provided are now well above those originally contem
plated.
In 1942, the Social Security Board acknowledged the importance of
funding considerations in limiting benefit duration but also urged states
to provide more weeks of benefits "unless fund conditions forbid."7 In
1950, the U.S. Department of Labor reaffirmed the concept of limited
potential duration, but for reasons that went beyond cost consider
ations. It concluded that potential duration should be limited mainly
because UI is "short-term" insurance, intended to provide protection
only to workers who are currently attached to the labor force and who
are unemployed between jobs. UI is not intended for long-term unem
ployed workers for whom job search assistance, retraining, or reloca
tion would be more appropriate.
Having reaffirmed the commitment to limited potential duration, the
Department defined the limits of potential duration with respect to pro
gram goals:
Whether the unemployment insurance program achieves its major
objective of covering the nondeferrable expenses of insured work
ers during periods of involuntary unemployment without dimin
ishing their savings appreciably or compelling them to draw on
other community resources depends on the duration of payments
as well as the amount of the weekly payments. To accomplish this
purpose, the duration of benefits should be sufficient to enable the
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great majority of insured workers to find suitable work before
exhausting their benefit rights, under normal or recession condi
tions. In statistical terms, the benefit period should be long enough
to ensure that no more than 25 percent of the beneficiaries exhaust
benefits under recession or better conditions [emphasis added]
(Manual of State Employment Security Legislation 1950, p. C-33).

By 1962, the Department of Labor's concept of limiting potential
duration had translated into recommendations to the states: first, "that
all eligible claimants be allowed a uniform potential duration of at least
26 weeks of benefits," and second, "that, if a State considers that it
must vary duration in relation to base-period employment or wages,
the variable potential duration should range from a minimum of 20
weeks to a maximum of at least 30 weeks" (Unemployment Insurance
Legislative Policy 1962, p. 37). Thus, although federal adherence to
the concept of limited duration remained constant over the years, the
limit changed from 15 weeks in 1935 to double that in 1962. It is tell
ing, perhaps, that there has been no comparable policy statement in the
last 35 years.
Although duration maximums have increased over the years, there
remains wide acceptance of the idea that the potential duration of ben
efits should be limited. This view seems to stem in part from the belief
that under reasonably good economic conditions workers should be
able to find reemployment reasonably quickly, and in part from con
cerns about moral hazard—that workers offered benefits of unlimited
duration would extend their spells of unemployment to unacceptable
lengths. Finite benefit extensions have been considered acceptable
when labor markets are slack, but UI has been eschewed as a standing
policy to assist long-term unemployed workers.
Two arguments have been made against extended benefits for longterm unemployed workers: first, such payments involve a drain on the
trust fund, and second, they undermine the insurance character of the
program (see Hansen and Byers 1990 for a cogent statement of the lat
ter argument). The second of these arguments is important enough to
deserve a brief restatement. When the UI system came into being in the
United States, political considerations connected with financing the
program dictated that it could cope only with brief spells of unemploy
ment. Large industrial employers were induced to support UI legisla
tion, with financing through an experience-rated payroll tax, by the
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promise that their workers on temporary layoff would receive benefits
and hence would be available for recall when demand improved. It fol
lowed that the program could insure only against short-term unemploy
ment. Dislocated workers and other long-term unemployed were not
the object of the UI system, so to finance programs for such workers—
such as retraining and income support during retraining—out of the UI
trust fund would undermine the finances of the program.
The irony is that the main problems of the Great Depression were
permanent job loss and long-term demand-deficient unemployment,
not short-term or temporary layoff unemployment. So it really cannot
be argued that UI, by insuring mainly against short-term spells of
unemployment, met the needs of the 1930s, except that it was better
than no system at all. There is also an element of ad hominem argu
ment here: once we define UI as a program that is intended to insure
workers against short spells of unemployment, then, by definition, pro
viding benefits for longer spells of unemployment undermines the
"integrity" and insurance character of the program. Unemployment
insurance was defined as a program for short-term unemployment out
of financial and political expediency, not after consideration of
whether permanent job loss or long-term unemployment are insurable
risks that demand some form of social insurance. Arguments that UI is
a program for short-term unemployment—and that it should keep
doing what it already does—do tell us what the program is, but they
beg the question of what the program ought to be.
Much criticism of the UI system during the early 1990s amounted to
a criticism of the failure of UI to assist dislocated and long-term unem
ployed workers. Indeed, the main change in the UI system that the
Clinton administration has initiated—UI "profiling"—is intended to
address this criticism and to assist workers who are likely to experience
long spells of unemployment. The purpose of profiling (which is dis
cussed further in the next section) is to speed reemployment of dislo
cated workers given that the political climate is so unfavorable to
offering extended benefits to such workers.
However, traditional defenders of the system believe that the recent
criticism of UI is based on a misunderstanding of its purpose; that is,
they argue that the system is intended only to alleviate the hardship of
short-term unemployment, particularly due to temporary layoffs.
Again, it is clear that the system would have been politically infeasible
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in the 1930s had it provided more generous or long-term benefits and
that the system has evolved so as to deal best with short-term unem
ployment. As the work discussed in the last part of this section sug
gests, on the other hand, it is unclear whether relatively generous
compensation of short-term unemployment, and virtual neglect of
long-term unemployment, is socially optimal. In other words, the goals
of the system have been defined largely by looking at what the system
has done and done well, rather than by examining what type of social
insurance system (financed by a payroll tax) would improve the wellbeing of risk averse workers. The aims, it seems, have been set by cir
cular reasoning—this is what the system does well; therefore, this must
be its goal—rather than by thinking through the problem of insuring
against the risk of job loss.
Exhaustion Rates and the Experience ofExhaustees

Past research has addressed whether the potential duration of UI
benefits is adequate mainly by examining UI exhaustion rates—that is,
the proportion of UI claimants who use up their entire regular state
benefit entitlement8—and the experience of UI exhaustees. This has
proven a useful approach, in that it has exposed the characteristics of
state UI systems that tend to yield high or low exhaustion rates. How
ever, in part because it lacks a normative framework, it has not led to a
consensus about the proper duration of benefits.
Unemployment Insurance Exhaustion Rates
Ready availability of data to calculate the UI exhaustion rate has
made it the most commonly used gauge of duration adequacy. In 1962,
the U.S. Department of Labor last expressed the objectives of regular
benefit duration:
The program is intended to provide benefits for a sufficiently long
period that, under reasonably normal business conditions and dur
ing short periods of recession, a high proportion of claimants can
continue to receive benefits until they are called back to work or
find other work (Unemployment Insurance Legislative Policy
1962, p. 35).

Although a "high proportion of claimants" has generally been consid
ered as 75 percent (see the quote in the previous section from the Man-
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ual of State Employment Security Legislation), it has never been
defined carefully. Moreover, the terms "reasonably normal" and "short
periods of recession" are quite vague. For example, "reasonably nor
mal" meant higher rates of unemployment between the mid-1970s and
late-1980s, when it was widely agreed that the natural rate of unem
ployment (that is, the rate of unemployment that is consistent with a
constant rate of inflation) was higher than in earlier decades. In recom
mending an increase in the unemployment rates that activate the EB
program, the Department of Labor argued in 1981 that "Structural
changes in the labor force have contributed to a generally higher level
of normal unemployment" (Rubin 1983, p. 125).
Table 6.2 displays the annual UI exhaustion rate (for the regular
state program) from 1940 through 1994, along with the number of
claimants who exhausted their regular UI benefits. The table also
shows the total unemployment rate (for 1940 through 1994) and the
average duration of unemployment in the economy (for 1948 through
1994).
Note that the regular exhaustion rate shown in table 6.2 is distinct
from the total exhaustion rate, which is the proportion of UI claimants
who use up both their regular state benefit entitlement and any
extended benefits for which they qualify. The total exhaustion rate can
never exceed the regular exhaustion rate and will be less than the regu
lar exhaustion rate when an extended benefit program is in effect.
Not surprisingly, both the regular exhaustion rate and the number of
exhaustees rise when aggregate economic conditions deteriorate—as
reflected by increases in the unemployment rate and in unemployment
duration. The main purpose of the extended benefit programs discussed
in the following section has been to provide additional assistance to
workers who exhaust their benefits under the regular UI program.
Indeed, one of the main proposed goals of extended benefit programs
has been to bring the total exhaustion rate (that is, the proportion of
workers exhausting both regular and extended benefits) down roughly
to the level of the regular exhaustion rate during nonrecessionary times
(Might 1975; Corson and Nicholson 1982). For example, Corson and
Nicholson have estimated that the emergency extended benefit pro
gram that was implemented during the mid-1970s (Federal Supple
mental Compensation) reduced the total exhaustion rate during the
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Table 6.2 Regular UI Exhaustion Rate, Number of Regular UI
Exhaustees, Total Unemployment Rate, and Unemployment
Duration, United States 1940-1994
Number of
Total
Exhaustion
regular UI
unemployment Average duration of
rate
exhaustees
rate
unemployment
(%)
(OOOs)
(%)
(weeks)
Year
(2)
(1)
(3)
(4)
1940
2,590
50.6
14.5
1941
45.6
1,544
9.7
-1942
1,078
34.9
4.4
-1943
25.5
194
1.7
1944
20.2
102
1.0
-1945
18.1
250
1.6
-1946
38.7
3.7
1,986
1947
1,272
30.7
3.5
1948
27.5
1,028
3.3
8.6
1949
29.1
1,935
5.3
10.0
1950
30.5
5.2
1,853
12.1
1951
20.4
811
3.2
9.7
1952
20.3
931
2.9
8.4
1953
764
20.8
2.8
8.0
1954
26.8
1,769
5.4
11.8
1955
26.1
1,272
4.3
13.0
1956
21.5
981
4.0
11.3
1957
22.7
1,139
4.2
10.5
1958
31.0
2,507
6.6
13.9
1959
29.6
1,676
5.3
14.4
1960
26.1
1,604
5.4
12.8
1961
30.4
2,366
6.5
15.6
1962
27.4
1,638
5.4
14.7
1963
25.3
1,872
5.5
14.0
1964
23.8
1,371
5.0
13.3
1965
21.5
1,087
4.4
11.8
1966
18.0
781
3.7
10.4
1967
19.3
867
3.7
8.7
1968
19.6
848
3.5
8.4
(continued)
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Table 6.2 (continued)

Year
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1974
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994

Exhaustion
rate
(%)
(1)
19.8
24.4
30.5
30.0

Tin

31.0
37.8
37.8
32.5
26.7
26.7
33.2
32.4
38.5
38.4
34.2
31.2
32.2
30.6
28.5
28.0
29.4
34.8
39.9
39.2
36.3

Number of
regular UI
exhaustees
(OOOs)
(2)
811
1,303
2,057
1,822
1,508
1,939
4,195
3,270
2,850
2,031
2,037
3,072
2,989
4,175
4,180
2,619
2,575
2,703
2,409
1,979
1,940
2,323
3,472
3,821
3,204
2,977

Total
unemployment Average duration of
unemployment
rate
(weeks)
(%)
(4)
(3)
7.8
3.4
4.8
8.6
11.3
5.8
12.0
5.5
4.8
10.0
9.8
5.5
14.2
8.3
15.8
7.6
14.3
6.9
11.9
6.0
10.8
5.8
11.9
7.0
13.7
7.5
15.3
9.5
20.0
9.5
7.4
18.2
15.6
7.1
15.0
6.9
14.5
6.1
13.5
5.4
11.9
53
12.1
5.5
6.7
13.8
7.4
17.9
18.1
6.8
18.4
61

SOURCE' Columns 1 and 2 from Unemployment Insurance Financial Data, ET Handbook 394;
columns 3 and 4 from Handbook of Labor Statistics, U S Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor
Statistics, August 1989, and Monthly Labor Review, various issues.
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1973-1975 recession to somewhat below the regular exhaustion rate
during nonrecessionary times (Corson and Nicholson 1982, pp. 72-76).
In addition to cyclical ups and downs, however, there has been a sec
ular rise in the regular exhaustion rate. For example, in 1994, which
was not a recession year, 36.3 percent of UI claimants exhausted their
regular benefits. This was only slightly below the exhaustion rates at
the peak of the mid-1970s recession (37.8 percent) and of the early
1980s recession (38.5 percent). The regular exhaustion rate during the
recession of the early-1990s, 39.9 percent, was a post-World War II
high.
The secular increase in the regular exhaustion rate can be attributed
partly to reductions over time in the generosity of state duration provi
sions and partly to the secular rise in unemployment spell durations.
Although we do not explore these changes in detail here, some insight
into the link between the generosity of state duration provisions and
the exhaustion rate can be obtained from table 6.3, which displays the
average potential duration of benefits (a proxy for duration generosity,
in column 2) and the exhaustion rate (column 3) for each state in 1992.
The most obvious point to note is that the nine states with uniform
duration provide higher average potential duration than do any of the
variable duration states.
The relationship between the generosity of state benefit formulas
and the UI exhaustion rate can be seen more clearly in table 6.4, where
we show the results of regressing the regular UI exhaustion rate on two
variables: the average potential duration (which serves as a proxy for
state duration generosity) and the total unemployment rate (as a proxy
for labor market conditions). The data used in the regressions in table
6.4 come from table 6.3. A literal interpretation of the results is that
states with greater average potential duration of benefits have lower
exhaustion rates, so that a one-week increase in the average potential
duration is linked to a 1.8 percentage point drop in the regular exhaus
tion rate. Also, states with higher total unemployment rates have higher
regular exhaustion rates, so that a 1 percentage point rise in the unem
ployment rate is linked to a 3 percentage point rise in the regular
exhaustion rate.
Table 6.3 (column 4) also shows the percentage of exhaustees eligi
ble for fewer than 26 weeks of benefits. This is an alternative measure
of duration adequacy, which Murray (1974) explored in some detail.

Table 6.3 Unemployment Rate, Average Potential Duration of UI, Exhaustion Rate, and Percentage of Exhaustees
Drawing Fewer Than 26 Weeks of Benefits, by State, 1992

State
Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
District of Columbia
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky

Total
unemployment rate
(%)
(1)
7.3
9.1
7.4
7.2
9.1
5.9
7.5
5.3
8.4
8.2
6.9
4.5
6.5
7.5
6.5
4.6
4.2
6.9

Average potential
duration of UI
(weeks)
(2)
24.1
20.8
23.0
22.8
24.2
22.3
26.0
25.6
23.3
21.0
21.5
26.0
19.5
26.0
22.7
22.4
22.7
26.0

UI exhaustion
rate
(%)
(3)
24.7
50.4
39.9
35.7
44.2
44.5
38.1
27.1
64.4
54.0
39.8
34.5
34.0
42.0
31.3
30.0
37.2
22.6

Percentage of
exhaustees drawing
fewer than 26 weeks
(4)
45.6
86.3
51.4
56.8
26.2
73.6
0.0
10.9
22.8
63.8
74.3
0.0
82.6
0.0
63.9
64.2
540
0.1

Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Puerto Rico
Rhode Island

8.1
7.1
6.6
8.5
8.8
5.1
8.1
5.7
6.7
3.0
6.6
7.5
8.4
6.8
8.5
5.9
4.9
7.2
5.7
7.5
7.5
-8.9

26.0
19.4
26.0
27.5
22.7
23.4
23.4
22.0
20.5
23.0
22.7
26.0
23.8
25.8
26.0
23.0
19.9
25.6
21.6
25.7
25.9
26.0
21.7

34.0
39.3
21.1
46.0
35.0
33.3
33.3
38.6
38.2
30.4
39.7
15.8
55.7
38.3
51.5
21.1
38.5
33.2
43.6
34.5
35.6
58.9
44.8

0.1
66.4
0.0
29.0
54.0
51.3
50.8
61.8
80.6
76.9
50.6
0.0
35.3
13.1
0.0
61.8
78.4
17.3
78.0
11.2
1.8
0.0
59.0
(continued)

Table 6.3 (continued)

State
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Virgin Islands
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming
Unweighted mean

Total
unemployment rate
(%)
(1)
6.2
3.1
6.4
7.5
4.9
6.6
6.4
-7.5
11.3
5.1
5.6

Average potential
duration of UI
(weeks)
(2)
23.1
24.7
21.8
20.9
20.6
26.0
20.7
23.6
26.2
26.0
24.5
22.4

UI exhaustion
rate
(%)
(3)
30.5
13.3
33.3
51.3
32.8
26.5
35.6
44.0
33.0
28.8
22.0
32.2

6.8

23.5

36.6

Percentage of
exhaustees drawing
fewer than 26 weeks
(4)
50.7
32.7
67.0
72.1
74.8
0.0
76.2
44.6
51.0
0.0
67.8
68.7
42.6

SOURCE: Column 1 from Employment and Earnings; columns 2 and 3 from Unemployment Insurance Financial Data, ET Handbook 394; column 4 pro
vided by Tom Stengel of Actuarial Services, U.S. Department of Labor, Employment and Training Administration, Unemployment Insurance Service.
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The percentage of exhaustees eligible for fewer than 26 weeks is zero
in the uniform duration states and is below 5 percent in three additional
states—Kentucky, Louisiana, and Pennsylvania. However, in thirty
states, over half of all regular exhaustees were eligible for fewer than
26 weeks of benefits, and in seven of these over three-quarters of all
regular exhaustees were eligible for fewer than 26 weeks of benefits.
Clearly, large proportions of regular UI exhaustees are eligible for
fewer than the "standard" 26 weeks of benefits.
Table 6.4 Impacts of the Potential Duration of UI and the Unemployment
Rate on the Exhaustion Rate and Percentage of Exhaustees
Drawing Fewer Than 26 Weeks of Benefits, 1992

Independent variable
Average potential duration of
UI benefits
Total unemployment rate
Constant
R2 (adjusted)
N

Dependent variable
Percentage of exhaustees
Exhaustion rate
drawing fewer than 26 weeks
-1.80
-11.81
(.56)
(0.92)
3.17
-2.52
(.76)
(1.24)
56.66
337.99
(13.28)
(21.69)
.299
.787
51
51

NOTES: OLS estimates using state-level data for 1992. Standard errors in parentheses. Data are
displayed m table 6 3.

The link between the proportion of regular exhaustees eligible for
fewer than 26 weeks of benefits and the generosity of state duration
provisions can be seen more clearly in the last column of table 6.4,
where we have regressed the proportion of exhaustees drawing fewer
than 26 weeks on the average potential duration of benefits and the
total unemployment rate, again using the state data in table 6.3. States
with higher average potential duration of benefits have a lower percent
age of regular exhaustees drawing fewer than 26 weeks; a one-week
increase in average potential duration is linked to a nearly 11 percent
age point drop in the percentage of regular exhaustees drawing fewer
than 26 weeks, controlling for the unemployment rate. States with
higher total unemployment rates have lower percentages of exhaustees
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drawing fewer than 26 weeks, which reflects the rise in long-term
unemployment (and hence in 26-week exhaustees) that accompanies
increases in the unemployment rate.
The regressions in table 6.4 illustrate the linkages between measures
of regular UI exhaustion and both the generosity of duration provisions
(represented by the average potential duration of benefits in a state) and
labor market factors (represented by the unemployment rate). The
average potential duration of benefits in a state plays a strong role in
explaining both the regular exhaustion rate and the percentage of
exhaustees who draw fewer than 26 weeks of benefits.
Based on this discussion, what are the pros and cons of using the
regular exhaustion rate as a criterion of the adequacy of the potential
duration of regular benefits? The main drawback of the regular exhaus
tion rate is its dependence on both labor market conditions and state
benefit duration formulas. This mutual dependence makes it difficult to
determine what an appropriate target for the regular exhaustion rate
should be. Although short-run changes in the exhaustion rate may
serve as an indicator of increasing or decreasing duration adequacy,
even these short-run changes may be contaminated by cyclical varia
tions in the UI take-up rate.
Also, as discussed in the first section of this chapter, there is a link
between weekly benefit amounts and the potential duration of benefits
that implies a trade-off between the two. For example, two states that
both limit total benefits to one-third of base-period earnings (that is, a
= 0.33 in table 6.1) will have much different average potential dura
tions—and hence exhaustion rates—if one provides low weekly benefit
amounts (and hence longer potential durations) whereas the other pro
vides high weekly benefit amounts (and hence shorter potential dura
tions). The regular exhaustion rate does not take account of the trade
off between the weekly benefit amount and the potential duration of
benefits.
Finally, there is considerable empirical evidence that unemployment
duration—and hence the exhaustion rate—can increase with increases
in either the potential duration of benefits or in the generosity of
weekly benefit amounts. However, if exhaustions rose due to greater
UI generosity, we would clearly not want to interpret that increase as
an indication that UI benefits had become less adequate.
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These drawbacks notwithstanding, the intuitive appeal of the
exhaustion rate is so strong that it will undoubtedly continue to be a
widely used indicator of duration adequacy. In particular, the secular
increase in the exhaustion rate, which has occurred during a period
when both weekly benefit amounts and potential durations were being
reigned in, is a rather clear indicator that the potential duration of regu
lar UI benefits has become less generous in the last 15 years.
Experience of Exhaustees
As already noted, the regular exhaustion rate itself may or may not
provide a meaningful measure of whether benefits are of adequate
duration. A high regular exhaustion rate could, of course, reflect diffi
culty in gaining reemployment due to slack demand, but it could also
reflect the disincentive effects of UI benefits on job search, among
other things. The experience of UI exhaustees has been used to gain
insight into which of these factors—supply or demand—is more
important in generating exhaustions.
The length of time between benefit exhaustion and reemployment is
a potentially useful gauge of the experience of UI exhaustees and dura
tion adequacy. Table 6.5 summarizes what is known about the reem
ployment experience of UI exhaustees, based on four studies that have
been conducted since the mid-1960s. Only one of these studies, the
Atlanta-Baltimore-Chicago-Seattle (or "four-city") study from the
mid-1970s, was performed during a time when labor markets were
slack (Nicholson and Corson 1976). The others were done during nonrecessionary times (Burgess and Kingston 1979; Corson and Dynarski
1990; Murray 1974).
In all four studies, one-half or more of the exhaustees remained job
less 12 weeks after exhausting their benefits. However, the main infer
ence to be drawn from these studies is that UI exhaustees are much less
likely to find reemployment during recessionary times than during
nonrecessionary times. That is, the percentages of workers reemployed
at 4, 8, and 12 weeks are similar in the Pennsylvania, Arizona, and
twenty-state studies but are much lower in the four-city study (the only
study that drew a sample of claimants who exhausted their benefits
during a recession).
Less is known about the experience of exhaustees more than 12
weeks after benefit exhaustion. Only the Pennsylvania and twenty-state

Table 6.5 Summary of Selected Studies of UI Exhaustees: Percentage of Exhaustees Reemployed after Benefit
Exhaustion
Pennsylvania, 1966-1967
Duration of
unemployment prior
to exhaustion
Weeks since
exhaustion
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
22
26
34
44
48
52
Sample size

All

Under
29 weeks

24.5

32.9

17.9

33.0

430

25.1

35.5

45.7

27.5

375

49.1

28.1

36.4
356
35.6

49.5
47.5
45.4

25.8
26.0
27.6

36.5
11,511

44.0
5,039

30.4
6,472

29 weeks
or more

Atlanta-Baltimore-Chicago-Seattle , 1974-1975
White

Nonwhite

Men
5.6
11.1
15.2
18.7
21.9
25.3
27.0

Women
5.3
9.8
12.5
15.3
189
20.8
23.7

Men
3.5
6.1
8.5
10.1
14.4
18.4
20.3

493

561

375

Women
2.3
5.3
7.9
9.9
11.9
13.5
15.5

303

Arizona,
1976-1977
11.5
18.3
24.4
30.2
37.0
40.0
42.1

235

Twenty-state
survey,
1987-1989
18
24
31
35
40
44
48
51
57
61
67
72
75
1,920

SOURCE Pennsylvania data from Murray (1974, table 5); Atlanta-Baltimore-Chicago-Seattle data from Nicholson and Corson (1976, tables V8 and
V.9), Arizona data from Burgess and Kingston (1979, table II.7), twenty-state data estimated from Corson and Dynarski (1990, figure III 6).
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studies give data on the status of longer-term exhaustees, and compar
ing the two gives very different impressions of the percentage of
exhaustees who remain jobless 6 months to one year after exhaustion.
In each case, however, the percentage still jobless 6 months to one year
after exhaustion is substantial.
The Pennsylvania study shows that there are variations in the reemployment experiences of exhaustees whose pre-exhaustion spells of
unemployment were relatively short or long. Also, the four-city study
shows differences in the reemployment experiences of white and nonwhite exhaustees and of men and women. The differences between
white and nonwhite exhaustees are less pronounced than those
between men and women.
Mainly because each has sampled a group of exhaustees at a single
point in time, the studies leave unanswered whether UI exhaustees'
difficulties in gaining reemployment are the result mainly of high
unemployment, structural changes in the economy, inadequate regular
benefit entitlement, or a combination of these. Further research, espe
cially on how the experience of exhaustees changes over the business
cycle, could be extremely useful. 9 Indeed, without such studies, the
appropriate remedies for the reemployment problems of UI exhaust
ees—or whether remedies are needed—will remain unclear.
One obvious approach, increasing the potential duration of benefits,
is actually more difficult than it appears on the surface, even if there
were agreement that it would be appropriate. There are two main ways
of lengthening the potential duration of benefits. The first is to change
the duration formula in a variable duration state so that more workers
are eligible for 26 weeks of benefits. This can be done by increasing
the parameter a in table 6.1 so that a higher fraction of base-period
earnings can be recovered during a benefit year with a given weekly
benefit amount. The second is to increase the maximum regular benefit
duration beyond the usual 26-week limit. This approach presents sev
eral issues: how far the maximum should extend beyond 26 weeks;
whether benefits past 26 weeks should be available to all or only to
those with substantial employment history; whether such benefits
should be offered at all times, or only during a recession; whether the
financing of benefits beyond 26 weeks should be a state, federal, or a
shared responsibility; and how regular benefits beyond 26 weeks
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should interrelate with the permanent federal-state system of extended
benefits. These issues are discussed further below.
The alternatives to increasing potential duration are retraining, relo
cation, or other (less costly, usually administrative) assistance to
improve reemployment prospects. Because retraining generally
requires income support during the period of training, it is extremely
costly. Accordingly, the U.S. Department of Labor has opted for "pro
filing," the attempt to identify workers who are likely to exhaust their
benefits and to refer them to relatively inexpensive reemployment ser
vices. Profiling with job search assistance can be viewed both as an
effort to assist workers in gaining reemployment and (equally) as an
effort to sort workers by their degree of commitment to gaining reem
ployment. 10 For example, evidence from at least two studies suggests
that requiring workers to obtain reemployment services as a condition
of continued UI benefit receipt induces some to drop out of the labor
force and others to find reemployment even before the required ser
vices are provided (Corson, Long, and Nicholson 1985; Johnson and
Klepinger 1991).
Profiling could change the character of exhaustees by weeding out
those who are weakly attached to the labor force and by helping many
of the rest to gain reemployment more quickly. Accordingly, profiling
could change the nature of the problems faced by those who do exhaust
their UI benefits. It follows that implementation of profiling will, if
anything, increase the need for further research into the problems faced
by exhaustees in gaining reemployment. Finally, for profiling to work,
the demand for labor must be strong enough to absorb the workers who
receive reemployment services. The need to discern whether exhaust
ees' troubles in gaining reemployment stem from slack demand or
other sources will remain.
Work Disincentives

UI has come to be viewed as a program of trade-offs and balances:
worker versus employer interests, federal versus state authority, and
benefit adequacy versus work disincentives. The program's goal of
providing adequate benefits may collide with the objective of preserv
ing work incentives if the benefits are so generous that they reduce
workers' motivation to gain reemployment.
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The effect of UI on the duration of insured unemployment has been
the subject of many studies in the last 25 years, although the impact of
increasing weekly benefit amounts has been analyzed more often than
has the impact of increasing the potential duration of benefits. Table
6.6 provides a summary of selected studies that have examined the
relationship between the potential duration of benefits and the duration
of various measures of unemployment. The table indicates the data
used in each study, the summary estimate (or range of estimates) of the
impact of an additional week of potential duration of UI benefits on the
duration of unemployment, and provides remarks on the estimating
technique.
It is ctear that the estimates vary widely, from 0 in three cases to 0.9
in one case. This range, taken literally, would suggest that a 13-week
benefit extension could have no impact on the expected duration of
unemployment of workers, or could increase the expected duration of
unemployment by nearly 12 weeks (13 weeks times 0.9). From the
viewpoint of policy, such a wide range is not especially helpful. What
factors can account for this dispersion of estimates?
First, as is almost always true in economic research, the data avail
able to study the impact of potential duration on the expected duration
of unemployment have limitations. Most of the studies summarized in
table 6.6 have used UI administrative records, which are an excellent
source of data on benefits and the duration of insured unemployment
but do not track workers beyond their spell of insured unemployment.
As a result, observed spells of unemployment are censored at the
potential duration of benefits.
There are econometric methods for dealing with such data, although
none is wholly satisfactory. A full treatment of these techniques and
their various strengths and weaknesses is beyond the scope of this dis
cussion, but it seems that studies that use UI exit rate models obtain
lower estimates of the impact of increases in the potential duration of
benefits than do studies that use maximum likelihood (including Tobit)
duration models. 11 Given that the UI exit rate models impose less oner
ous distributional assumptions, they should probably be given greater
weight than the other estimation methods. 12
Second, the relationship between potential duration and the proba
bility of reemployment (and hence the duration of unemployment) may
vary with the tightness of the labor market. Even if an additional week
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Table 6.6 Selected Estimates of the Impact of Increased Potential
Duration of UI Benefits

Study

Data

Change
in weeks of
unemployment
from 1 added
week of
potential UI

0-0.12

Newton and Rosen
(1979)

UI recipients in Georgia,
1974-1976

0.6

Katz and
Ochs (1980)

Current Population
Survey, individuals in 26
states, 1968-1970 and
1973-1977

Moffitt and
Nicholson (1982)
Moffitt (1985a)

Moffitt (1985b)

Solon(1985)

Recipients of EB and
FSC, 15 states,
1975-1977
Continuous Wage
Benefit History, 19781983
Continuous Wage and
benefit History,
1978-1983:
White men
White women
FSC and EB recipients in
15 states, 1975-1978:
Men
Women
UI recipients in Georgia,
1974-1976:
Men
Women
UI claimants in Georgia,
1978-1979

Remarks
Tobit duration
estimates

UI claimants in Arizona
and Pennsylvania,
1967-1969

Classen (1979)

Tobit duration
estimates
Maximum likelihood
duration esimates

0.17-0.23

0.1

Labor supply model,
maximum likelihood
estimates
UI exit rate estimates

0.15
UI exit rate estimates

0.17
010
Maximum likelihood
duration estimates
0.45
0.28
Maximum likelihood
duration estimates
0.17
0.37
0.36

Maximum likelihood
duration estimates
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Study
Ham and
Rea(1987)

Data
Canadian men,
1975-1980

Grossman(1989)

Continuous Wage and
Benefit History,
individuals in 3 states,
1981-1984

Katz and
Meyer(1990)
Davidson and
Woodbury (1995)

Continuous Wage and
Benefit History, men in
12 states, 1978-1983
UI recipients in:
Illinois 1984-1985
Pennsylvania
1988-1989
Washington
1988-1989

Change
in weeks of
unemployment
from 1 added
week of
potential UI
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Remarks
UI exit rate estimates

0.26 - 0.35
UI exit rate estimates
of FSC impacts on UI
exhaustees
0.9
UI exit rate estimates
0.16-0.20
0.2
0-0.2

Translation of
reemployment bonus
impacts using
equilibrium search
model

0-0.2

of benefits had the same effect on the intensity of a worker's job search
regardless of the state of the labor market, that given change in search
intensity would translate into a different reemployment probability
depending on the availability of job offers. There have been few
attempts to estimate how the impact of an additional week of potential
duration varies with labor market conditions (but see Wandner 1975).
There is a real need for further investigation of this issue.
Third, some studies have focused on the impact of increasing the
potential duration of regular benefits, others have focused on the
impact of EB, and still others have focused on the impacts of emer
gency extensions such as Federal Supplemental Benefits and Federal
Supplemental Compensation. There is some evidence that the impacts
of EB and emergency extensions are greater than the impacts of
increasing the potential duration of regular benefits, but further work
sorting out the various impacts and the reasons for them would clearly
be useful.
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Finally, there may simply be greater variation in the behavior of
workers than economists are accustomed to considering. This is sug
gested, for example, by results derived from the reemployment bonus
experiments, all of which were similarly designed, implemented, and
monitored, but which nevertheless yielded results that varied over a
substantial range (Davidson and Woodbury 1996).
If we eliminate the estimates that are obtained using duration mod
els, then we significantly reduce the variation in the estimates. The
exceptions are Grossman's study (1989), which differs from the others
because it examines the impact of increasing the potential duration of
benefits of workers who have already exhausted regular benefits, and
Ham and Rea's study (1987) of the Canadian UI system, which differs
in a variety of ways from the U.S. system. With these exceptions, all of
the UI exit rate estimates are in the range of 0.1 to 0.2. Similarly, Moffitt and Nicholson (1982) obtain an estimate of 0.1 week, and translat
ing the reemployment bonus impacts using an equilibrium search
model yields estimates in the range of 0 to 0.2 (Davidson and Woodbury 1996). On the whole, then, the evidence suggests that increasing
the potential duration of UI benefits by one week increases the
expected duration of unemployment by one day (0.2 week) or less.
Optimal Unemployment Insurance

Efforts to use economic and econometric methods to gauge the opti
mal duration of UI benefits are relatively few and recent. Although the
studies reviewed in this section have yet to point unambiguously
toward conclusions about the optimal duration of benefits, the
approach holds out hope of generating recommendations that are based
on clearly articulated assumptions and observed behavior. Since bene
fit adequacy is reviewed in chapter 5, we focus on recent analyses that
bear closely on the potential duration of benefits.
O'Leary's work on benefit adequacy (forthcoming) uses consumer
theory informed by econometric estimates of the trade-off between
income and leisure and concludes that short spells of unemployment
are overcompensated by UI, whereas long spells are undercompen
sated. O'Leary's result stems from the assumption that the marginal
utility of leisure diminishes. That is, an additional week of leisure (in
the form of unemployment) has a far higher value to someone who
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works 50 weeks in a year (and has just 2 weeks of leisure) than to
someone who works only 26 weeks in a year (and has 26 weeks of lei
sure). It follows that a much smaller weekly benefit amount is needed
to compensate a worker for the first few weeks of unemployment
(since the leisure implied by those first weeks is itself more valuable)
than is needed to compensate a worker for later weeks of unemploy
ment. However, since the weekly benefit amount is generally constant
over the spell of insured unemployment, early weeks of unemployment
(and short spells) are more fully compensated than are later weeks (and
long spells).
Although the logic of O'Leary's findings is clear, the implications
for policy are somewhat less so. Whenever there is moral hazard, as
with UI, full compensation for the occurrence of a risky event is unde
sirable, since it raises the probability of the event (or its continuation).
If the disincentive effect (that is, reduced job search intensity) of an
additional week of potential benefits increases with the length of a
spell of unemployment, then raising the weekly benefit amount as a
spell of unemployment lengthens might be unattractive. The implica
tions of raising the weekly benefit amount as a spell lengthens would
need to be examined in a model that takes account of both the benefits
and costs of doing so. An alternative way of correcting the overcompensation of short spells would be to extend the waiting period. This
has the additional attraction of freeing funds that could be used to
finance benefits beyond the usual limit of 26 weeks, in order to correct
the undercompensation of long-term unemployed workers. Again,
however, the implications of doing so need to be explored in a model
that takes account of the response of unemployed workers to the pro
posed change in the pattern of unemployment compensation.
Gruber (forthcoming) has pointed out that appraising benefit ade
quacy by comparing UI benefits with pre-unemployment income is
appropriate only if workers have no access to other sources of income,
such as savings, loans, or the labor supply of other household mem
bers. If alternative income sources exist, then UI may substitute for the
other ways of financing a spell of unemployment, crowd them out, and
have no real effect on consumption. This insight highlights the impor
tance of examining whether UI actually smoothes consumption, that is,
whether unemployed workers who are eligible for more generous UI
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benefits experience smaller drops in consumption than do workers who
are eligible for less generous UI benefits.
Gruber obtains conflicting results on whether UI smoothes con
sumption. Using data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, he
finds quite strong evidence of consumption smoothing, whereas using
data from the Survey of Consumer Expenditures, he finds far weaker
evidence of smoothing. The latter result suggests that UI does crowd
out other ways of financing a spell of unemployment, whereas the
former result suggests that it does not. Until this empirical issue is
resolved, it will be important to examine whether findings about bene
fit adequacy and optimal UI programs are sensitive to assumptions
about the ability of workers to save and borrow, and the willingness of
other members of the household to work more when the principal
earner is unemployed.
We turn next to work on optimal UI that takes an equilibrium
approach and incorporates both the benefits and costs (including those
resulting from induced changes in behavior) of the UI system. There
was a flurry of interest in this approach in the late 1970s—the contribu
tions of Baily (1978) and Flemming (1978) are considered the classic
treatments—although its complexity seems to have stalled further
development. From our perspective, it is especially important that both
Baily and Flemming assumed the potential duration of UI benefits to
be infinite and derived an optimal replacement rate based on that
assumption. Clearly, this assumes away the problem with which we are
most concerned: the optimal potential duration of benefits.
Recently, Davidson and Woodbury (forthcoming) have extended the
work of Baily and Flemming to examine the optimal potential duration
of UI. 13 Surprisingly, they find that the optimal UI program is charac
terized by an infinite potential duration of benefits. The argument is as
follows. Let WBA denote the weekly benefit amount and let T denote
the potential duration of benefits. Suppose that we compare two UI
programs (WBA^T^ and (WBA2,T2) with WBA l > WBA2 and T{ < T2 so
that the second program offers lower benefits but a longer potential
duration of benefits. Suppose further that these two programs cost the
same amount to fund so that employed workers earn the same after-tax
wage under the two programs. Then it can be shown that all risk-averse
workers prefer the second program even though weekly benefit
amounts are lower. The second program is preferred because the
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reduced probability that workers will exhaust their benefits more than
offsets the reduction in weekly benefits. In the terminology of decision
making under uncertainty, the second program is "less risky" than the
first program and is therefore preferred by all risk-averse agents. Alter
natively, to use the terminology that Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970)
introduced in their classic paper on increasing risk, the second UI pro
gram, with longer potential duration and lower benefit amount, is a
"mean-preserving spread," which reduces the risk associated with
unemployment. Since the optimal UI program offers benefits indefi
nitely, while most states offer benefits for only 26 weeks, the model's
results suggest that the potential durations in the U.S. system may not
be generous enough.
Three remarks on this potentially controversial result need to be
made. First, a likely objection to the finding that an infinite potential
duration of benefits is optimal is that, if benefits were inexhaustible,
workers would never return to work. It is true that lengthening the
potential duration of benefits would lead workers to remain unem
ployed longer and to a higher unemployment rate. Davidson and
Woodbury (forthcoming) show that increasing the potential duration of
UI benefits from 6 months to an unlimited period with a UI replace
ment rate of 0.5 would raise the unemployment rate from 7 percent to
10 percent. However, this is not a shut down of the economy: workers
would not collect UI benefits paying a replacement rate of 0.5 (or 0.75)
forever. Also, the increase in the unemployment rate would result from
voluntary behavior, not from economic hard times, and would connote
an improvement in workers' well-being.
A second, more serious, objection is that extending benefits and
lowering the benefit amount reduce the aggregate search effort of
unemployed workers, which in turn could reduce employment. Lower
employment would mean reduced tax revenues, so that the total
amount paid to the unemployed would drop. If this occurred, the costs
of the new program could outweigh its benefits (which stem mainly
from reduced risk). It turns out, however, that this chain of events
would not take place. The reason is that the reduction in aggregate
search effort is almost fully offset by a change in the distribution of
search effort across the spell of unemployment. That is, with a longer
potential duration of benefits, search effort becomes more evenly dis
tributed across the spell of unemployment, and this increases equilib-
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rium employment. Davidson and Woodbury provide a simulation
showing the net effects of the change in aggregate search effort and the
change in the distribution of search effort: as the potential duration of
UI benefits rises, unemployment rises by such a small amount that any
loss in tax revenue is dominated by society's savings in aggregate
search costs (the benefit of reduced aggregate search effort). Hence,
changes in search effort do not erase the result that the optimal poten
tial duration of benefits is infinite.
A third possible objection is that Davidson and Woodbury assume
Ul-eligible workers to be homogeneous; it is unclear whether the result
that the optimal potential duration of benefits is unlimited is sensitive
to this assumption. In future work, it will be important to consider that
some Ul-eligible workers may be weakly attached to the labor force,
that some workers have a high probability of layoff with a low
expected duration of unemployment (as do many blue-collar produc
tion workers), and that others face a low probability of layoff with a
longer expected duration of unemployment (for example, white-collar
nonproduction workers). It is an open question whether an unlimited
potential duration of benefits would remain optimal in a model that
accounts for these various types of workers.

Extended Benefit Programs
When unemployment rates rise in the wake of a recession, spells of
unemployment tend to lengthen and more workers exhaust their UI
benefits, that is, more workers experience spells of unemployment that
exceed their potential duration of UI benefits. Whether these length
ened spells of unemployment occur because job separation rates rise or
because reemployment rates fall is unimportant. As long as the length
ened spells result from slack demand and employer behavior (rather
than from voluntary worker behavior), there is a justification for
increasing the potential duration of UI benefits.
On six different occasions, beginning in 1958, Congress has reacted
to slack labor markets by providing a limited number of weeks of fed
erally financed "extended" benefits to workers who had exhausted their
regular state benefits. In addition to these six temporary or discretion-
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ary programs, Congress in 1970 established a permanent or "standby"
extended benefits program (under the Extended Unemployment Com
pensation Act), which in principle is activated automatically by condi
tions of high unemployment. The following discussion provides a brief
history of the six temporary programs and of the standby extended
benefits program. 14 We also discuss the three most controversial issues
surrounding extended benefits: how these benefits should be activated,
whether additional qualifying and eligibility conditions should be
required, and how such benefits should be financed. Finally, we recom
mend two changes in extended benefit policy based on the evidence
and discussion.
Federal Extended Benefit Programs: A Brief History

Currently, the maximum potential duration of unemployment bene
fits provided by regular state programs ("first-tier" programs) is 26
weeks in all states except Massachusetts and Washington, where the
maximum potential duration is 30 weeks (see table 6.1 and the accom
panying text). In ten states, the potential duration of benefits is 26
weeks for all claimants who qualify for any benefits (Illinois and New
York are the only large states that provide such "uniform potential
duration" of benefits). In every other state, the potential duration of
benefits varies with a claimant's work experience in the base period,
roughly the year preceding the claim for benefits (again, see the first
section of this chapter).
Table 6.7 provides a summary of the main features of the six federal
programs that have temporarily extended the potential duration of
unemployment benefits beyond the duration provided by state pro
grams. The permanent standby Extended Benefit program (EB) is also
summarized in the table. The standby EB program has come to be
called the "second tier" of the UI system, and temporary emergency
extensions have come to be called the "third tier" of the system.
The first two federal temporary benefit extensions, Temporary
Unemployment Compensation (TUC) and Temporary Extended
Unemployment Compensation (TEUC), were enacted in 1958 and
1961. They were similar in that each lasted slightly over a year and
extended the potential duration of benefits to workers who exhausted
their regular state benefits by 50 percent, up to a maximum of 13 extra

Table 6.7 Federal Extended Unemployment Benefit Programs, 1958 to 1995
Program and
enabling legislation
Temporary Unemployment
Compensation Act,
PL 85-441
Temporary Extended
Unemployment
Compensation Act (TEUC),
P.L. 87-6
Extended Unemployment
Compensation Act of 1970
(EB), P.L 91-373, with
major amendments in
P.L. 96-364, P.L. 96-499,
P.L 97-35, P.L 102-318

'
Potential duration
Effective dates
and extensions of extended benefits provided
Financing
50% of regular state duration, up Interest-free loans to 17
6/58 - 7/59
to 13 weeks
participating states
4/61 -6/62

50% of regular state duration,
up to 13 weeks

8/70 to present

50% of regular state duration,
up to 13 weeks

Temporary increases in
Federal Unemployment
Tax (.4% in 1962, .25%
in 1963)
One-half from Federal
Unemployment Tax
revenues paid to
Extended
Unemployment
Compensation Account
(EUC A); one-half from
state UI reserves

Notes
State participation voluntary

EB activated in a state by an
insured unemployment rate (IUR)
trigger, 8/70 to present; EB could
be activated in all states by a
national IUR trigger, 8/70 to 8/8 1 .
Effective 1981, EB denied to
claimants refusing to seek or
accept suitable work and to
claimants who had quit or been
discharged. State triggers were
made more restrictive 8/8 1 .
Eligibility for EB made more
restrictive, effective 9/82. States
permitted to adopt a total
unemployment rate (TUR) trigger,
6/93

Emergency Unemployment 1/72-9/72,
Compensation Act, P.L. 92- extended to
3/73
224 and P L. 92-329
1/75- 12/76,
Federal Supplemental
extended to
Benefits (FSB),
P.L. 93-572, PL. 94- 12, P.L 1/78
94-45, P.L. 95-19

Federal Supplemental
Compensation (FSC),
P.L 97-258, P.L. 97-424,
P.L. 98-21, P.L 98-135

9/82 - 3/83,
extended to
9/83 and 3/85

50% of regular state durations, up Extended
Unemployment
to 13 weeks
Compensation Account
(EUCA)
50% of regular state duration, up Repayable advances to
to 13 weeks (1/75-2/75 and 5/77- EUCA from general
1/78); additional 50% of regular revenues; general
revenues after 3/77
state duration, up to 13 weeks
provided 3/75-4/77 (that is, up to
26 weeks of FSB total)

FSC-I (9/82- 1/83): 50% of regular General revenues
state duration, up to 6 or 10 weeks
FSC-II( 1/83-3/83): 65% of
regular state duration, up to 8 or
16 weeks
FSC-IV (10/83-3/85)' same as
FSC-III, except entitlement did
not vary once established

State-level triggers (different from
EB triggers) used to activate
program
EB program was activated in all
states, so total potential benefit
duration was 65 for those
exhausting EB weeks between 3/
75 and 4/77 State-level triggers
applied starting 1/76. Uniform
federal eligibility and
disqualification standards
implemented 4/77 (P L. 95-19)
Potential duration varied with
state's EB status and separate FSC
triggers. Except in FSC-IV,
potential duration would vary
when state's EB or FSC status
changed FSC-I and FSC-II
exhaustees could collect FSC-III
benefits, but not FSC-IV benefits.
EB eligibility catena applied to
all phases of FSC. Available
regular state benefits and EB (if
activated) had to be exhausted to
receive FSC
(continued)

Table 6.7 (continued)
Effective dates
Program and
and extensions
enabling legislation
Emergency Unemployment 11/91-6/92,
Compensation Act of 1991 extended to
7/92, 3/93, 107
(EUQ.P.L 102-164,
P.L. 102-182,
93, and 2/94
P.L. 102-244,
P.L. 102-318,
P.L. 103-6,
P.L. 103-152

Potential duration
of extended benefits provided
EUC-I (1 1/91-2/92). lesser of
100% of regular benefits, or 13 or
20 weeks
EUC-II (2/92-7/92): lesser of
130% of regular benefits, or 26 or
33 weeks
EUC-III (7/92-3/93)- lesser of
100% of regular benefits, or 20 or
26 weeks
EUC-IV (3/93-10/93): lesser of
60% of regular benefits, or 10 or
15 weeks
EUC-V (10/93-2/94): lesser of
50% of regular benefits, or 7 or 1 3
weeks

Financing
EUC-I, EUC-II, and
EUC-III from Extended
Unemployment
Compensation Account
(EUCA), EUC-III and
EUC-IV from general
revenues

Notes
Potential duration determined at
time of filing for EUC and
depended on state's classification
as high- or low-unemployment
EUC entitlement could be
increased if state moved from low
to high status, or if program
became more generous, EUC
entitlement could not be
decreased. Claimants exhausting
benefits between 3/91 and 11/91
could receive benefits under
"reach-back" provisions (but no
retroactive benefits paid) EB
eligibility catena applied to all
phases of EUC. Once EUC was
exhausted, a claimant needed to
regain regular UI eligibility to
receive additional EUC
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weeks. They differed, however, in that TUC was a voluntary program
financed by interest-free loans to 17 participating states. TEUC, on the
other hand, was mandatory and was financed through increases in the
federal unemployment tax.
If one accepts the need for extending benefits in a recession, then
relying on temporary emergency extensions such as TUC and TEUC is
clearly suboptimal. Temporary extensions are discretionary rather than
triggered automatically. It takes time for Congress to recognize the
onset of a recession and to enact legislation in response, so there may
be a significant lag between the onset of slack labor markets and the
availability of extended benefits. Also, temporary extensions have
proven politically difficult to shut down, as we show below, so they are
both slow to turn on and slow to turn off. Finally, temporary emergency
extensions have usually been made effective on the date of enactment,
leaving UI administrators little or no time to implement the new pro
gram.
In recognition of these problems with temporary extensions, in 1965
and 1966 Congress considered a proposal to create a permanent (or
"standby") extended benefits program. The proposal was modeled on
earlier temporary programs, in that it extended the potential duration of
benefits by 50 percent, up to 13 weeks, for workers who exhausted
their regular state benefits. However, the extended benefits would have
been "triggered" automatically in a recession (rather than requiring
congressional discretion and action) and would have been financed
half-and-half by the states and the federal government. (Recall that
regular UI benefits are financed out of state UI trust funds, whereas
TEUC and most subsequent emergency extended benefits have been
financed out of the federal UI trust fund.)
Although the proposal for a permanent standby extended benefits
program failed in 1966, Congress enacted essentially the same pro
posal in 1970 as the Extended Unemployment Compensation Act, gen
erally known as the Extended Benefits program, or EB. The intent of
the permanent "standby" EB program was and is to extend automati
cally the potential duration of benefits when the economy slumps into
recession, rather than to rely on a reaction from Congress. EB extends
benefits to claimants who exhaust their regular state benefits by an
amount equal to one-half of their regular benefit duration, up to 13
weeks. The weekly benefit amount is the same as the weekly benefit
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amount under the regular state program. Originally, EB was activated
nationally whenever the national insured unemployment rate (IUR)
averaged at least 4 percent for 13 weeks. Also, it was activated in a
given state whenever the state's IUR averaged at least 4 percent for 13
weeks and was 20 percent above the state IUR of the corresponding
13-week period in either of the two previous years. The EB program is
financed half-and-half from the federal and state UI trust funds. In the
next part of this section, we discuss the activation (or "triggering") of
EB, special qualifying and eligibility requirements, and financing.
States were allowed to adopt EB as early as October 1970 and were
required to do so no later than January 1972. Even before EB became
available in all states, however, Congress enacted the third temporary
extension under the Emergency Unemployment Compensation Act
(sometimes called "Temporary Compensation" or "TC"), which pro
vided up to 13 weeks of extended benefits to claimants who either
exhausted EB or exhausted regular benefits in states where EB was not
available. Temporary Compensation was activated by special triggers
that differed from the standby EB triggers. It was financed from Fed
eral Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA) revenues. The program, which
originally was set to run from January 1972 until September 1972, was
extended through March 1973.
During the severe recession of the mid-1970s, the national trigger
activated EB in all states, permitting workers to receive up to 26 weeks
of regular unemployment benefits followed by up to 13 weeks of EB.
Nevertheless, the recession was so severe that Congress enacted the
fourth temporary emergency extension in January 1975, Federal Sup
plemental Benefits (FSB), which provided up to 13 additional weeks of
benefits to those who exhausted regular benefits and EB.
In March 1975, the FSB program was extended and made more gen
erous by providing yet another 13 weeks of benefits. As a result of this
and further extensions of FSB, a claimant could receive up to 65 weeks
of unemployment benefits for the period March 1975 through March
1977: 26 weeks of regular state benefits, 13 weeks of EB, and 26
weeks of FSB.
In April 1977, FSB was extended again (through January 1978), but
the potential duration of benefits was reduced to 13 weeks from May
1977 through the end of the program. This extension also added special
federal disqualifications for refusal of suitable work and for failure to
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actively seek work, defined suitable work for the FSB program, and
added special penalty and repayment provisions for fraudulent acts on
the part of both claimants and employers. This was the first time such
disqualifications had been imposed as part of a temporary emergency
extension.
In 1980 and 1981, Congress passed three changes that made it more
difficult for the EB program to activate. First, the trigger that had acti
vated EB nationally was eliminated. Second, the IUR needed to acti
vate EB on a state-specific basis was increased. Third, the definition of
insured unemployment was revised so as to omit EB claimants from
the computation, reducing the IUR in times when EB was activated. In
addition, more stringent eligibility and disqualifying conditions were
imposed on EB claimants. All of these changes reflected a changed
attitude toward extended benefits, one that reflected the intent of the
new Reagan administration and Congress to reduce domestic pro
grams. Corson and Nicholson's analysis (1985) concluded that the
1981-1982 changes in EB "had the effect of significantly reducing its
overall size" (p. vii). Subsequent events suggest a stronger conclu
sion—that the changes virtually disabled the program.
Nevertheless, the parade of emergency unemployment benefit exten
sions continued in response to later recessions. In 1982, Congress
enacted Federal Supplemental Compensation (FSC) as part of the Tax
Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982. FSC was different from
previous emergency extended benefit programs in that the number of
weeks payable in each state varied according to different criteria at dif
ferent times. In fact, FSC went through four "phases," each of which
provided different potential benefit durations for each state depending
on the state's labor market conditions (see table 6.7, under "potential
duration of extended benefits provided"). Under phase II, a UI claimant
in a high unemployment state could be eligible for up to 55 weeks of
benefits: 26 from the regular state program, 13 from EB (assuming the
state had triggered on), and 16 from FSC.
Potential durations were somewhat shorter under phases III and IV
of FSC, but the interstate differences in potential benefit durations
were retained. Under FSC, then, there was more tinkering (or, more
charitably, greater effort to fine-tune the program) than under previous
emergency extensions in two senses. First, the idea that emergency
extensions should provide different potential benefit durations to dif-
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ferent states was wholly new. Second, the various phases of FSC led to
frequent changes in potential benefit duration and created administra
tive difficulties for the states. Both of these aspects of FSC began to
call into question the role of emergency extensions and seemed to be
an admission that the standby EB program was already defunct.
The most recent emergency extension of unemployment benefits,
Emergency Unemployment Compensation (EUC), was enacted in
November 1991 after months of foot-dragging by the Bush administra
tion, which had vetoed several earlier emergency extensions. EUC was
the most complicated emergency benefit extension of all: it went
through five phases, provided different potential durations across states
at a given time, and had different potential durations within a state over
time (see table 6.7 and Storey and Falk 1993). The potential duration of
benefits within a state could change either because of congressional fiat
(that is, a movement from one phase to another), or because a state
changed its classification between high unemployment and low unem
ployment. By all accounts, EUC was a state UI administrator's night
mare. In Pennsylvania, for example, the potential duration of benefits
changed nine times between November 1991, when EUC became
effective, and February 1994, when phase V of EUC terminated. Five
of these changes resulted from enactment of EUC or a movement from
one phase to another, and four resulted because Pennsylvania was
reclassified from low unemployment to high unemployment or vice
versa. At one point, Congress let EUC lapse, but subsequently resusci
tated it, and during the hiatus, state administrators and UI claimants
were left hanging.
Activating Extended Benefits

We have already treated the rationale for limiting potential duration,
the experience of exhaustees, the work disincentives of extending the
potential duration of benefits, and the idea of optimal UI. These issues
are important to the potential duration of regular and extended benefits
alike. However, three issues are specific to extending benefits during a
recession: how extended benefits should be activated, whether addi
tional qualifying and eligibility conditions should be required for
extended benefits, and how extended benefits should be financed. We
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discuss extended benefit triggers first and then turn to the latter two
issues.
Activating Extended Benefits: National and State-Level Triggers
When the EB program began, extended benefits could be activated
either nationally or on a state-specific basis. The national "trigger"
activated the program in all states whenever the seasonally adjusted
national IUR reached 4.5 percent for 13 weeks. The state-specific trig
ger activated the program in a state whenever a state's IUR reached 4
percent for 13 consecutive weeks and was at least 20 percent above the
average state IUR of the corresponding 13-week period in either of the
two previous years.
As shown in table 6.7 (see notes to Extended Unemployment Com
pensation Act of 1970), in 1980 and 1981, the national trigger was
eliminated and the state-level trigger was raised from an IUR of 4 per
cent to 5 percent. In addition, the definition of the IUR was revised to
exclude workers receiving extended and supplemental benefits, lower
ing the IUR. These changes made it less likely that EB would be acti
vated in a recession. Combined with secularly falling insured
unemployment rates, resulting mainly from decreased participation in
UI, 15 the changes of 1981 led to a situation in which EB was nearly
defunct by the time of the recession of the early 1990s. In fact, EB was
activated in only 10 states during that recession and failed to be acti
vated in several states where many observers felt labor market condi
tions were bad enough to warrant it. 16
The decreasing availability of EB during recessions would seem to
have been exactly the outcome desired by Congress in the early 1980s.
However, in response to the failure of EB to be activated widely during
the early 1990s recession, a later Congress passed legislation in July
1992 (and effective June 1993) allowing states to adopt an alternative
trigger based on the total unemployment rate (TUR), that is, the con
ventionally defined unemployment rate estimated monthly by the Cur
rent Population Survey. The alternative trigger activates EB in a state if
the state's three-month average TUR exceeds 6.5 percent and is 10 per
cent above the three-month average TUR in either of the two preceding
years.
It is clear that, during the recession of the early 1990s, the alterna
tive TUR trigger would have activated EB in many more states than did
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the old IUR trigger (Advisory Council on Unemployment Compensa
tion 1994, chapter 6). The old trigger activated EB in ten states for an
average of 6.2 months, resulting in benefit payments of $.9 billion. If
the alternative TUR trigger had been in effect in all states throughout
the recession, EB would have been activated in forty-three states for an
average of 18.4 months, resulting in benefit payments of $11.8 bil
lion. 17 Hence, nationwide adoption of the alternative TUR trigger
would largely solve the problem of EB becoming defunct.
However, only seven states have adopted the alternative TUR trig
ger, and all did so shortly after the legislation was enacted. No addi
tional state has since switched to the new TUR trigger. This suggests
that the states are unwilling to take on the burden of funding even par
tially the second-tier or standby extended benefit program. Rather, they
would prefer to rely entirely on temporary emergency extensions,
wholly financed by the federal government.
During congressional debate on whether to extend the Emergency
Unemployment Compensation program in 1992 and 1993, Republi
cans in Congress argued that if Congress continued its pattern of enact
ing emergency extensions whenever the economy went into recession,
there would be no incentive for the states to switch to the new alterna
tive EB trigger (that is, the trigger that is based on the TUR). Indeed,
states have stalled in adopting the new TUR trigger because they do not
really want EB to be activated in a recession. The old IUR trigger has
become ineffective and rarely activates EB, whereas the alternative
TUR trigger would be more effective. States, however, naturally prefer
to have the federal government step in and provide emergency
extended benefits, since emergency benefits have been financed wholly
by the federal government. In contrast, only half of EB payments are
financed by the federal government; the other half is financed out of
states UI trust fund accounts. As long as the states can argue that EB is
not providing adequate benefit durations, they can reasonably urge
Congress to enact emergency extensions. Furthermore, as long as Con
gress accommodates the states with emergency extensions, the states
have no incentive to switch to the alternative TUR trigger, which would
be more effective but would also result in greater benefit payments
from state UI trust funds.
A cynic might argue that Congress really does not want the standby
EB program to work effectively, either—that members would prefer to
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step in and enact an emergency program whenever the economy
slumps. An emergency program shows that Congress has "done some
thing" in an economic downturn and offers the politicians a concrete
program to point to when they stand for reelection. Such a cynical view
may not be wholly unrealistic: the alternative TUR trigger would acti
vate extended benefits in a recession (unlike the IUR trigger), and Con
gress could require the states to switch to the alternative TUR trigger.
However, Congress has not done so. 18
Activating Extended Benefits: Substate Triggers
An additional issue that has been considered repeatedly in Congress
is substate triggers, that is, allowing EB to be activated in a depressed
local area within a state, rather than requiring that EB be activated
throughout a state when conditions in the entire state are severe
enough. The logic underlying this notion is that, from the standpoint of
labor markets, state boundaries may be quite arbitrary. There may be
large differences in labor market conditions between urban areas
within states (consider, for example, Philadelphia and Pittsburgh, or
Los Angeles and San Francisco) or between the urban and rural parts
of a state. Isn't it unfair to deny extended benefits to unemployed work
ers who live in a region that is experiencing high unemployment sim
ply because they happen to live in a state where—overall—the
unemployment rate is too low for the EB program to be activated?
Wouldn't substate triggers allow more effective targeting of benefits to
workers who are having real difficulty finding reemployment?
The arguments against adopting substate EB triggers are many and
include considerations of administration, equity, and unavailability of
appropriate data, as well as concerns about whether such a program
would meet its intended goals (Czajka, Long, and Nicholson 1989;
Advisory Council on Unemployment Compensation 1994, chapter 6).
A major administrative stumbling block would be defining appropriate
areas within states. Bills proposing the use of substate area triggers
have provided a variety of regional definitions, including areas desig
nated by the Secretary of Labor as contiguous population centers of at
least 250,000, of at least 50,000, any county or equivalent of a county,
any area designated as a Service Delivery Area under the Job Training
Partnership Act, and any area designated as an economic area by the
Bureau of Economic Analysis in the Department of Commerce. 19 As a
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geographical unit for activating EB, it is unclear whether any such
local area would be less arbitrary than the state. Also, it is unclear
whether individuals would be assigned to an area based on place of
work or on place of residence. Whatever definitions of substate regions
were adopted, it is clear that the potential for fraud would be greater
and that it would be more difficult and costly to determine eligibility
and process interstate (and interarea) claims. All of these issues raise
concerns about the equity of substate triggers, since triggering EB in
local areas could make it more likely that similar individuals facing
similar labor market conditions and living near each other would
receive different EB entitlements.
Another major problem in implementing substate triggers would be
obtaining data for the substate triggers themselves. Accurate indicators
of labor market conditions in each local area of the country are simply
unavailable at present. The accuracy of substate TUR estimates is
highly suspect. Data on employment levels are available only in 250
metropolitan areas and would need to be developed for places outside
those areas. Developing either the TUR or local area employment sta
tistics so that they could be used as an EB trigger would be difficult and
costly.
Finally, in the most complete study of substate triggers, Czajka,
Long, and Nicholson (1989) conclude that, although a substate pro
gram could be designed so as to improve the targeting of UI benefits to
workers in slack labor markets during nonrecessionary times, the
potential improvement in targeting during a recession is small. In other
words, most of the increased benefit payments under a program of substate triggers would be made during nonrecessionary times, and the
basic goal of a substate program, improved access to extended benefits
during a recession, would not be achieved.
State boundaries have long been accepted for triggering extended
benefit programs because the state has always been the basic opera
tional unit for UI. Serious unemployment in local areas is clearly an
appropriate concern of state and local governments, but it is more
appropriately addressed through local economic development pro
grams, or perhaps through individual state experiments with UI, than
by means of the EB program (which has a significant federal compo
nent). Also, as discussed, the existing standby EB program no longer
responds even to statewide unemployment problems because the old
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1UR trigger no longer activates the program and states have dragged
their feet in adopting the new TUR triggers. Fixing the existing EB
program is clearly a more urgent priority of federal UI policy than try
ing to fine-tune the program to deal with the problems of localities.
Conclusions on Extended Benefit Triggers
The future of the EB program and emergency extensions is quite
unclear at this time. Congress seems to pay attention to the UI system
only when there is a recession, so the role of politics would seem to be
more important than the role of economic (or any) analysis in deter
mining the future of extended benefits. It needs to be noted that rela
tively little effort has been devoted to understanding what is (or would
be) the socially optimal potential duration of benefits or to analyzing
the extent to which the optimal potential duration should change with
changing labor market conditions. These gaps, convincingly addressed,
could have an impact on policy and on the future direction of extended
unemployment benefits. Notwithstanding the gaps in our understand
ing of the optimal potential duration of benefits, we develop two sets of
recommendations for extended benefit policy in the last part of this
section.
Further Issues in Extended Benefits
Qualifying and Eligibility Requirements for Extended Benefits
In addition to making it more difficult for EB to trigger on, the 1980
and 1981 amendments to the standby EB program made eligibility for
EB more restrictive. Whereas originally, all UI exhaustees were eligi
ble for available extended benefits, the program now requires that
workers have at least 20 weeks of work (or the equivalent) in the base
period to qualify for EB.
The 1980 and 1981 amendments also require EB claimants to
actively search for work and require the disqualification of EB claim
ants who failed to accept or apply for suitable work or training to
which they were referred by the state Employment Service. This dis
qualification is for the duration of unemployment. 20
The prevailing motivation behind the amendments was to reduce the
size of the program, and the appeal for their enactment was made
largely on that basis. It was also argued that the claimants affected
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were long-term unemployed persons lacking in initiative and hence
less deserving of extended benefits (Rubin 1983, p. 115).
What are the merits of increasing the eligibility requirements for EB
and of requiring EB claimants to satisfy the work search test? The
research on benefit adequacy and optimal UI outlined in the second
section of this chapter offers support for providing EB to all workers
who exhaust regular UI when EB is in effect. Three arguments do favor
setting more stringent eligibility requirements for extended benefits
than for regular benefits, although their merits are debatable. The first
is that individuals who have worked longer (and whose employers have
contributed more) should have greater entitlement to benefits. Second,
setting more stringent eligibility requirements for EB than for regular
benefits reduces the financial cost of EB. Third, more stringent eligibil
ity requirements for EB may limit the moral hazard of EB. For this
third argument to be persuasive, there would need to be evidence that
the work disincentive of an additional week of EB is greater for some
workers—those who appear to be less strongly attached to the labor
force—than for others. We are unaware of any such evidence, however.
Requiring EB claimants to satisfy a more stringent (and uniform)
federal work search test makes little sense if indeed there are few job
vacancies during periods when EB is activated. State UI administrators
and employers alike would prefer to waive the work search test for EB
in regions where it is clear that job vacancies are scarce. Imposing the
work search test in such regions has little value and is costly to both
administrators (who are expected to enforce the requirement) and to
employers (who may get job inquiries from claimants who are merely
trying to satisfy the work test without any serious hope of gaining
reemployment). These findings are reflected in one of the recommen
dations of the Advisory Council on Unemployment Compensation,
which suggested that "Each state should be allowed to determine an
appropriate work search test, based on the conditions of its labor mar
ket" (Advisory Council on Unemployment Compensation 1994, p. 12).
Financing Extended Benefits21
There are three main issues in financing extended benefits: first,
whether extended benefits should be funded out of payroll taxes (as are
regular benefits) or from federal general revenues; second, whether
extended benefits should be financed by the states, by the federal gov-
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ernment, or by some combination of the two; and third, if EB is funded
from a payroll tax, whether that payroll tax should be experience rated
(as it is for regular benefits). A complete treatment of these issues
would require a more detailed discussion of UI financing than is appro
priate in this chapter. Briefly, though, regular benefits are funded fully
by the states through a payroll tax that is experience rated (that is,
dependent on each employer's past layoff experience) and collected on
a taxable payroll limited to less than $15,000 a year (per worker) in all
but eleven states.22 This method of financing UI benefits creates eco
nomic incentives for firms to behave in ways that they otherwise would
not. First, experience rating of the payroll tax reduces temporary lay
offs and limits the extent to which employers in seasonal and cyclically
sensitive industries are subsidized by employers in more stable indus
tries (see Brechling and Laurence 1995, Levine's chapter 8 in this vol
ume, and Topel 1990 for discussions and further references). Second,
the cap on taxable payroll skews employers' demand for labor away
from low-wage, less skilled workers and in favor of high-wage, more
skilled workers. Also, the payroll tax cap creates an incentive for
employers to assign extra hours of work (that is, overtime) to their
existing work force rather than to hire additional workers.
Whether extended benefits should be funded by a payroll tax or by
general revenues depends mainly on issues of tax equity. The available
evidence suggests that the UI payroll tax is shifted partly to workers in
the form of lower wages and partly to consumers in the form of higher
prices. The part that is shifted to workers can be viewed as regressive,
since low-wage workers bear a disproportionate share of the payroll
tax as a result of the low taxable wage base. (This regressiveness would
be blunted if low-wage workers received a disproportionate share of
the benefits, which seems likely.) The part that is shifted to consumers
can be viewed as proportionate if we assume that people with different
incomes consume a mix of goods and services on which average UI
taxes do not differ. On balance, then, the UI payroll tax is probably
somewhat regressive (Hamermesh 1977, pp. 10-15). Federal general
revenues, on the other hand, are somewhat progressive, given that
(apart from social security payroll taxes) over 70 percent of those reve
nues are generated by the federal personal income tax. Tax equity,
then, gives a slight edge to general revenues over payroll taxes as a
funding source for extended benefits.
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However, the overall question of tax equity ignores the issue of
state-federal sharing of extended benefit expenses: should extended
benefit payments that are made in a state be paid for by that state, by
the federal government, or by some combination of the two? Currently,
half the benefits under the EB program are paid out of the Extended
Unemployment Compensation Account, which is funded from FUTA
revenues (that is, the flat 0.8 percent of taxable payroll that the federal
government charges for administration, extended benefits, and repay
able advances). State UI trust fund reserves pay for the other half. Most
emergency extensions, however, have been financed entirely from fed
eral revenues, either from the EUCA or (increasingly) from general
revenues (see table 6.7).
The existing state-federal sharing of EB funding appears to have
wide acceptance and is based on the rationale that long-term unem
ployment is likely to be the result of macroeconomic conditions (both
national and international) over which individual employers have little
or no control (Murray 1974, chapter 5). Federal sharing of EB
expenses, then, is a way of providing some assistance to states that are
suffering disproportionately from long-term unemployment. 23 In addi
tion, federal sharing has been seen as a way of reducing the resistance
of states (and employers) to extended benefits. Although there appears
to be no comprehensive economic analysis of the costs and benefits of
federal sharing of EB funding, the arguments seem to favor the federal
government assuming more, rather than less, of the funding burden for
extended benefits.
There is no empirical evidence on whether experience rating of ben
efits paid under EB has the beneficial effects that have been estimated
for experience rating of the regular program.24 Obtaining such evidence
would be difficult, given that the EB tax is such a small percentage of
the overall UI tax. However, it seems likely that increasing the experi
ence rating of EB would be far less beneficial than would increasing
the experience rating of regular benefits. The main reason is that,
although employers do have considerable discretion over the timing
and incidence of temporary layoffs, they may have much less discre
tion over the incidence of permanent job losses, which often lead to
long-term unemployment. Also, it has been argued that spells of unem
ployment that last beyond 26 weeks result more from general macroeconomic conditions than from the actions of a specific employer. As a
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result, there seems to be less scope for experience rating to have a pos
itive effect in the case of EB than in the regular UI program, and less
justification for its use in financing EB.
The Advisory Council on Unemployment Compensation (1994, pp.
11-12) recommended that any expansion of extended benefits be
financed by raising the taxable wage base under the federal UI payroll
tax (FUTA) from $7,000 to $8,500.25 The Advisory Council believed
that the two most attractive funding sources for EB are federal general
revenues and FUTA, which is neither state-specific nor experience
rated. Because the taxes that produce federal general revenues may be
somewhat more progressive than the federal UI payroll tax, federal
general revenues may have an advantage. However, the Advisory
Council opted for reducing the regressiveness of the UI payroll tax by
recommending an increase in the taxable wage base.26 In any event, the
Advisory Council believed the case for funding extended benefits out
of an experience-rated payroll tax to be weak.27
Recommended Changes in the Extended Benefit Programs
The previous discussion suggests two recommendations for changes
in extended UI benefit policy. First, repair the EB triggers. It is impor
tant that the standby EB program be made effective, so that the poten
tial duration of benefits is lengthened in a timely manner when a
recession hits. The importance of repairing the standby EB program
follows from the available evidence that long spells of unemployment
are underinsured and that the potential duration of regular state benefits
may be suboptimal. Congress effectively disabled the triggers that acti
vate EB in the early 1980s. Since then the program has often failed to
be activated automatically in states that are experiencing slack labor
markets during a recession. As a result, Congress has stepped in with
increasingly complicated emergency programs that have significantly
lagged the onset of recession, have been ad hoc in design, and have
been difficult to administer. Compared with a well-designed standby
EB program, these emergency programs have been far less effective in
providing countercyclical stimulus and have been slower to provide
benefits to unemployed workers.
Several recommendations have been advanced for repairing the trig
gers that activate the standby EB program. For example, a majority of
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members of the Advisory Council on Unemployment Compensation
recommended that EB should be activated when a state's seasonally
adjusted TUR exceeds 6.5 percent (Advisory Council on Unemploy
ment Compensation 1994, p. 10). Similarly, as discussed, it is clear that
several Republican members of Congress see adoption of the alterna
tive TUR trigger by all states as the way to fix the problem. 28 Which of
these recommendations is adopted is less important than ensuring that
one of them is adopted. The EB program, which could be an effective,
efficient, and socially useful program, is now all but a dead letter. 29
Second, design a third-tier temporary emergency program in
advance of the next recession and have it ready to implement when and
if Congress perceives that the standby EB program is not providing
long-enough benefit durations. Creating a model third-tier emergency
program that can be put into effect at the discretion of Congress is
important as a practical matter, since Congress has shown repeatedly a
penchant for passing emergency extended benefit programs (at least
after a delay) when the economy sinks into a recession—and did so
even when the standby EB program was activated in most states that
were experiencing slack labor markets (that is, during the recessions of
the mid-1970s and early 1980s). Having an emergency program
designed in advance would give the states time to set up the computer
ized information systems that are needed to implement the program
quickly and to administer it effectively. Ultimately, the administrative
costs of a well-designed emergency program would be lower than the
costs of repeated ad hoc programs, and workers would be better served
because benefits would be received in a timely manner. In other words,
the net social benefits of a predesigned emergency extended benefit
program would be far greater than the benefits of a program that has an
ad hoc design and needs to be implemented on the fly. 30
How should a ready-to-implement third-tier program be designed?
We believe that there are three essential elements to such a program,
which might be called the Federal Emergency Extended Benefits pro
gram. First, provide federal emergency benefits only in states in which
the standby EB program has been activated, and only to workers who
have exhausted both their regular and standby extended benefits. There
are two main reasons for this feature of a federal emergency program.
First, it would direct extended benefits to workers who face the most
difficulty obtaining reemployment. Second, it would ensure that the
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standby EB program is taken seriously, that is, that effective EB trig
gers are established and maintained. Relatedly, it would create an
incentive for states to adopt the alternative TUR trigger for EB (if it
were not mandated by Congress), since federal funding for emergency
benefits would be received only if EB were in effect. By ensuring the
maintenance of an effective EB program, paying federal emergency
benefits only to EB exhaustees would eliminate the need to implement
"reach-backs" as part of emergency extensions. 31 If Congress preferred
to provide extended benefits to all states in a recession, it would be
appropriate first to reestablish the national trigger for the EB program.
Consideration could then be given to providing federal emergency ben
efits to all states based on a similar national trigger for the federal
emergency program.
Second, finance federal emergency benefits wholly out of federal
revenues, either from FUTA funds or from general revenues. Federal
funding of emergency extended benefits is in keeping with the widely
accepted notion that increasingly long spells of unemployment, espe
cially when induced by a recession, are more and more a federal
responsibility (Murray 1974). 32
Third, incorporate some bounded flexibility in the number of addi
tional weeks of benefits provided by the federal emergency extended
benefit program. Starting with the Federal Supplemental Benefits pro
gram (1975-1978), Congress has provided additional weeks of benefits
in relation to the unemployment rate in a state. For example, under the
Emergency Unemployment Compensation (EUC) program (19911994), each state was classified as either "high unemployment" or "low
unemployment" based on its total unemployment rate. The number of
weeks of emergency benefits provided in each state was then tied to the
state's classification as "low" or "high" unemployment. Similarly, a
ready-to-implement federal emergency program should provide for
longer benefit extensions in states where conditions are worse. How
ever, it is essential that there be flexibility in the number of weeks of
benefits provided and in the unemployment rate that triggers each
increment to extended benefits each time the program is enacted or
reenacted. This would allow Congress to take account of current condi
tions and of changes in the relationship between UI exhaustions and
the unemployment rate. Also, Congress would retain the sort of discre
tion it clearly prefers in fashioning extended benefit programs. 33
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Nevertheless, Congress should place two types of bounds on its flex
ibility in providing federal emergency benefits. First, for the purpose of
determining how many weeks of these benefits to offer, states should
be classified into at most two or three categories based on their total
(quarterly) unemployment rate. For example, under EUC, states were
classified as either high or low unemployment. Two or three categories
should be enough, particularly if emergency extended benefits are pro
vided in increments of eight or more weeks, as Corson, Grossman, and
Nicholson (1986) suggest in their study of Federal Supplemental Com
pensation. Second, a state's assignment to a high or low unemployment
classification should be on the basis of a calendar quarter, and Con
gress should not allow itself to change the number of weeks of emer
gency benefits provided to states in a given classification within a
calendar quarter. In other words, it should be impossible to change the
number of weeks of emergency benefits provided in a given state dur
ing a current calendar quarter. This recommendation is consistent with
the findings of Corson, Grossman, and Nicholson (1986), who consid
ered both administrative feasibility and program effectiveness in their
research.
A fourth issue, the requirements that a worker would have to satisfy
in order to be eligible for federal emergency extended benefits, would
also need to be settled. We have no recommendation on this point.
Since 1981, the eligibility requirements for standby EB have been set
at the national level. In about 15 states, the eligibility requirements for
EB are significantly more stringent than for regular state benefits, and,
as a result, significantly fewer workers are eligible for EB than for reg
ular state benefits. The available empirical evidence suggests that there
is only a weak relationship between the characteristics that determine
UI eligibility and a worker's expected duration of unemployment (Cor
son and Nicholson 1982, pp. 102-106; Pozo and Woodbury 1988). That
is, using tighter eligibility requirements for EB than for regular state
benefits reduces program expenses but does not screen out and deny
benefits to workers who are weakly attached to the labor force. This
supports dropping the uniform federal eligibility requirements for EB
(and for any ready-to-implement federal emergency program) and
allowing each state to set the eligibility requirements for all forms of
UI benefits, first-, second-, and third-tier. On the other hand, an argu
ment could be made that if federal revenues finance a program, the
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associated eligibility requirements should be set at the federal level.
These arguments for and against setting eligibility requirements for EB
and emergency benefits on a national basis would need to be weighed
in fashioning a Federal Emergency Extended Benefits program.
The preceding recommendations for a ready-to-implement emer
gency extended benefit program are not intended merely to make the
lives of UI administrators easier—although they would do that. Rather,
such a program would result in more timely payment of emergency
benefits to workers and would provide greater counter cyclical stimu
lus than past emergency extended benefit programs have done.

Some Provisional Conclusions
The adequacy of UI benefit duration has been debated since the
beginning of the system, and the accepted norm for the potential dura
tion of benefits, as expressed in policy, has changed significantly over
the decades. When the program began in 1935, most states provided a
maximum potential duration of 15 weeks of benefits. This norm gradu
ally rose, until by 1979, the maximum potential duration of benefits
was 26 weeks in most states and exceeded 26 weeks in twelve states.
Augmenting this upward trend were the standby EB program, which
came into existence in 1970, and a parade of temporary emergency
benefit extensions. Both EB and the emergency extensions provided
additional weeks of benefits during hard times. During the 1980s, the
trend reversed, so that today, the maximum potential duration of regu
lar state benefits is 26 weeks in all but two states. Also, in 1981 and
1982, Congress effectively scaled back the EB program. Whether this
trend will continue or again reverse itself is to be seen. Pushing toward
longer benefit durations are increasing concerns over dislocated work
ers and job insecurity; pushing toward shorter durations is the political
obsession with reducing government programs without regard to social
costs or benefits.
It seems fair to say that, as with other government programs,
research and analysis have played a regrettably limited role in setting
and changing the duration of UI benefits. There has, of course, been
significant work on the disincentive effects of extended benefits (see
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the summary in table 6.6), and the U.S. Department of Labor has com
missioned evaluations of the three most recent emergency extended
benefit programs (Corson and Nicholson 1982; Corson, Grossman, and
Nicholson 1986). However, it is also clear that the research thus far has
not fully addressed some of the major issues that need to be investi
gated in forming policy on the duration of benefits, such as the optimal
duration of benefits, how duration should change over the business
cycle, and the merits of EB triggers other than the IUR and TUR.
Whether further research along the lines described in the second sec
tion of this chapter will converge on a convincing and clear set of rec
ommendations is yet to be seen, but the work that has been completed
to date suggests that the current focus of the UI system on compensat
ing only relatively short spells of unemployment may be unnecessarily
narrow.
The findings that suggest this conclusion can be summarized as fol
lows. First, the UI program in the United States was defined as a pro
gram for short-term unemployment mainly out of financial and
political expediency, rather than after consideration of whether perma
nent job loss and long-term unemployment are insurable risks. The
financial argument against covering longer spells of unemployment is
not nearly as persuasive today as it was in the 1930s.
Second, existing studies suggest that increasing the potential dura
tion of UI benefits by one week increases the expected duration of
unemployment by one day (0.2 week) or less. This is a relatively small
behavioral effect that suggests that the average UI recipient is not abus
ing or taking advantage of the availability of benefits (although a siz
able minority of UI recipients could be doing so).
Third, work on consumption-smoothing and benefit adequacy sug
gests that short spells of unemployment are overcompensated by the UI
system, whereas long spells are undercompensated. Also, research on
optimal duration of benefits suggests that risk averse workers would
willingly accept lower benefits early in a spell of unemployment in
exchange for the promise of some nonzero level of benefits should
their spell of unemployment turn out to be very long. It follows that
reducing benefits to short-term unemployed workers (for example,
through increasing the waiting period) in order to finance benefits to
long-term unemployed workers would improve social welfare. Thus,
considerations of consumption smoothing, benefit adequacy, and opti-
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mal insurance all suggest that it would be reasonable public policy to
extend the potential duration of benefits beyond 26 weeks, perhaps
even during nonrecessionary times.
These three findings apply equally to regular and extended benefits,
in that they address the issue of potential duration in general. All three
considerations suggest that the existing UI system has focused too nar
rowly on short spells of unemployment and that policy should pay
greater attention to long-term unemployment. In fact, U.S. Department
of Labor policy has recently moved in this direction. The UI profiling
initiative is an attempt to identify new UI claimants who are likely to
experience a long spell of unemployment and to exhaust their benefits.
These claimants are then referred to intensive job search assistance. An
alternative response would be to extend the waiting period by one or
two weeks and to use the financial savings to fund a longer potential
duration of regular state benefits.
Apart from setting the maximum potential duration of benefits, per
haps the most important general issue in the duration of benefits is
whether potential duration should be the same for all workers who are
eligible for benefits, or whether potential duration should vary with a
worker's earnings prior to unemployment. This is a point that is
equally significant to the regular and extended benefit programs. In the
regular state program, the question is whether benefit duration should
be uniform (in which case all workers who qualify for any benefits are
eligible for the same potential duration) or variable (in which case
recipients with different work histories are eligible for different poten
tial durations). In extended benefit programs, the question is whether
eligibility requirements should be higher for extended benefits than for
regular benefits.
The research on benefit adequacy and optimal UI outlined in the
second section of this chapter provides a justification for uniform
potential duration of benefits to all eligible UI claimants and for provi
sion of extended benefits (when such a program is in effect) to all
workers who exhaust regular UI. In addition, it is clear that uniform
duration in regular state programs results in a significant increase in the
average potential duration of benefits in a state, which in turn reduces
the UI exhaustion rate. The evidence suggests that the decline in aver
age potential duration is at least partly responsible for the secular rise
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in UI exhaustions and that moves toward uniform duration would help
to reverse the trend.
However, there are at least three arguments for varying the potential
duration of benefits with a claimant's work history and, by implication,
for setting more stringent eligibility requirements for extended benefits
than for regular benefits. The first is that greater entitlement should be
afforded to those who have worked (and whose employers have con
tributed) the longest. The counterargument is that weekly benefit
amounts already reflect work history, so why should potential duration
do so as well? The second argument is that variable duration and more
stringent eligibility requirements for extended benefits result in lower
program costs. Since lower program costs would, in this case, mean
lower program benefits, this is hardly a persuasive argument. It begs
the question whether lowering benefits can be justified by efficiency or
equity criteria. A third argument in favor of variable potential duration
of benefits and more stringent eligibility requirements for extended
benefits is that they are ways of limiting the moral hazard of UI. In
general, of course, limiting the duration of benefits is an effort to limit
moral hazard. But variable duration and more stringent eligibility
requirements for extended benefits take the further step of assuming
that the work disincentive of an additional week of benefits is greater
for some workers, those who appear to be less strongly attached to the
labor force, than for others. The implicit argument is that it is possible
to discern which eligible UI claimants are weakly attached to the labor
force and hence are most likely to reduce their job search effort in
response to an additional week of benefits. However, we are unaware
of evidence that base-period earnings (or their pattern) provide an
accurate measure of a worker's labor force attachment or that the disin
centive effects of an additional week of benefits are greater for workers
with lower or more variable base-period earnings. It seems likely that
moral hazard can be handled more effectively by a work search
requirement or intensive job search assistance than by limiting the
potential duration of benefits.
Finally, the potential duration, triggering, and financing of extended
benefits have been among the most contentious issues in UI during
much of the program's history. The main rationale for extending UI
benefits during a recession is that, during a recession, spells of unem
ployment lengthen and the number of UI beneficiaries who exhaust
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their benefits rises. As long as the lengthened spells result from slack
demand and employer behavior (rather than being a result of voluntary
worker behavior), there is a justification for increasing the potential
duration of UI benefits. In fact, the evidence suggests that UI exhaustees are much less likely to find reemployment during recessionary
times than during nonrecessionary times (see table 6.5), which tends to
support the traditional rationale for extending benefits during a reces
sion.
Work on the adequacy of extended benefits has relied primarily on
the total UI exhaustion rate as a criterion for gauging duration ade
quacy. However, the exhaustion rate is an ad hoc criterion, since we
really do not know what the "right" exhaustion rate is. Similarly,
research on the merits of various "triggers" for extended benefits has
been limited to comparing the amounts of benefits that would be paid
under various triggers, without developing a normative framework that
would provide real guidance as to which triggering mechanism would
be optimal. In other words, although there has been much research on
extended benefits—useful and competently done—the work has been
developed without the sort of economic framework that would give
convincing answers to some of the most pressing policy questions on
extended benefits: What is the optimal potential duration of extended
benefits? To what extent should potential benefit duration vary with
changing labor market conditions? What are the best criteria for acti
vating (and de-activating) extended benefits? What are the appropriate
mechanisms for financing extended benefits?
Nevertheless, based on the existing research, as well as on prag
matic considerations, we offer two recommendations for extended ben
efit policy. First, we strongly recommend that the triggers for the
standby EB program be repaired, so that the program will again be
effective and the potential duration of benefits will be lengthened in a
timely manner when the next recession hits. Second, and equally
strongly, we recommend creation of a Federal Emergency Extended
Benefits program in advance of the next recession. Such a program
would be ready to implement when and if Congress perceived that the
standby EB program is not providing sufficient benefit durations. A
Federal Emergency Extended Benefits program would have three
essential characteristics: it would provide federal emergency benefits
only in states in which the standby EB program has been activated, and
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only to workers who have exhausted both their regular and standby
extended benefits; it would be financed out of federal revenues; and it
would give bounded flexibility in the number of additional weeks of
emergency benefits provided. Compared with past emergency
extended benefit programs, such a program would be easier and less
costly to administer, result in more timely payment of emergency ben
efits to workers, and offer greater countercyclical stimulus.
NOTES
For helpful discussions and comments on earlier drafts, we are grateful to Laune J Bassi, Carl
Davidson, Louis S Jacobson, Peter Kuhn, Robert Pavosevich, Wayne Vroman, and Stephen A
Wandner Rich Deibel, Ellen Maloney, and Claire Black assisted in preparing the manuscript.
1 See Advisory Council on Unemployment Compensation (1995, p 129) for a discussion of
replacement rates based on the administrative records of six states. Although the ACUC discus
sion is based on a different definition of the replacement rate (the ratio of weekly benefits to aver
age base-period earnings) than the one used in the text, it does suggest that benefit durations in
excess of base-period employment durations would imply strong work disincentives
2 In addition, the waiting period serves the same function as a deductible in a standard insur
ance contract Hence, it prevents very small claims (that is, short spells of unemployment) from
being compensated and provides a mechanism for risk-sharing See Davidson and Woodbury
(1997) and the literature cited there, especially Raviv (1979) and Shavell and Weiss (1979)
3 The amendments were part of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1980 (P L. 96499, approved December 5, 1980). See also Rubm (1983, pp 109-111)
4 See U S. Department of Labor (1995, Section 315)
5 The UI payroll tax has been used as a vehicle to finance innovative programs (such as work
place-based training) for workers affected by structural change For a review of these programs,
see Leigh (1990)
6. The source for this and the next two paragraphs is U.S Department of Labor (1995)
7. Manual of State Employment Security Legislation (1942), Employment Security Memoran
dum No 13,p 313
8. The regular exhaustion rate is measured as the number of exhaustees in a given month
divided by the number of initial claims for benefits that were filed six months before This is an
inexact measure of the exhaustion rate because not all initial claimants who exhaust their benefits
do so six months later Rather, some exhaust benefits in less than six months—for example, those
whose potential duration of benefits is less than 26 weeks and who exhaust their benefits after a
continuous spell of unemployment Other exhaustees take more than six months to exhaust their
benefits—for example, those who experience more than one spell of insured unemployment dur
ing the benefit year
9 Given that only one of the four existing studies was performed during a recession, an addi
tional study that sampled a group of exhaustees during a recession would be useful even if it did
not continuously sample over a period of time that is long enough to include both tight and slack
labor markets.
10 Profiling also reflects the view that most dislocated workers are job-ready
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11 Grossman's results (1989) are a glaring exception They differ from any of the other esti
mates, however, because they are estimates of the impact of an additional week of emergency ben
efits for workers who have already exhausted their regular benefits.
12 Solving the data problems head-on might prove more satisfactory than econometric solu
tions to the data problems, there are ways of mitigating the limitation of administrative data, but to
date these have not been pursued
13 The remainder of this section draws liberally from Davidson and Woodbury (forthcom
ing).
14. For a more extensive narrative account, see Blaustem (1993, pp. 200-206 and 228-241).
15 On the drop in UI participation rates, see Bassi and McMurrer (in this volume) as well as
Blank and Card (1991) and Vroman (1991)
16. EB was activated during 1990 in Alaska and Rhode Island During 1991, EB was activated
(in addition) in Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Oregon, Puerto Rico, Vermont, and West Vir
ginia. In the first quarter of 1992, EB was activated in Louisiana. Notably missing from the list are
California and northeastern states such as New York and Pennsylvania, all of which experienced a
severe recession in the early 1990s
17 These estimates are from Advisory Council on Unemployment Compensation (1994,
chapter 6) and are for the period January 1990 through August 1993 For comparison, during the
same time period the EUC program provided extended benefits in all states for 22 months, result
ing in benefit payments of $23 billion. Advisory Council on Unemployment Compensation (1994,
chapter 6) and Corson and Rangarajan (1994) provide estimated impacts of a variety of alternative
EB triggers
18 There is, however, a less cynical explanation of why Congress has not required the states
to adopt the alternative TUR trigger If the EB trigger were effective, EB would be activated in
some states even during times of low national unemployment, since labor market conditions vary
substantially across the states So an ineffective EB program yields budget savings for the federal
government
19 See US House of Representatives (1985), p. 91
20 Congress suspended the disqualification for failure to search for work during 1991 through
1995, however, the disqualification is now back in effect.
21 This discussion draws on Advisory Council on Unemployment Compensation (1994,
chapter 6)
22. Of the eleven states that have a payroll tax base exceeding $15,000, only one (New Jersey)
is among the ten largest states See Advisory Council on Unemployment Compensation (1996,
table5-l,p 67).
23. If some states specialize in industries that tend to generate long-term unemployment, such
interstate assistance could turn into interstate subsidies that have efficiency consequences.
24 In 1994, thirty-four states charged some percentage of benefits paid under EB back to the
employer (Advisory Council on Unemployment Compensation 1994, chapter 6)
25 In 1996, the Advisory Council on Unemployment Compensation recommended (with
some dissent) raising the payroll tax base to $9,000 and adjusting the base annually by the
Employment Cost Index (Advisory Council Unemployment Compensation 1996, p 19)
26. From a political standpoint, of course, the payroll tax has the distinct advantage that it is
dedicated to the payment of UI benefits.
27. In contrast to the reasoning of the Advisory Council on Unemployment Compensation,
Brechling and Laurence (1995) have recently offered a theoretical case for funding the costs of
permanent job loss by taxing employers who permanently reduce their employment. Brechling
and Laurence argue that a socially optimal rate of adjustment can be obtained by forcing the agent
who controls the rate of adjustment to pay for the adjustment costs This argument can be
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extended to suggest that EB should be funded by employers who contract and are responsible for
long-term unemployment. In other words, EB should be funded out of experience-rated payroll
taxes, not out of general revenues. The debatable point in this argument is whether employers in
contracting industries really are able to control the rate at which they contract
28. As discussed earlier in this section, the alternative TUR trigger activates EB in a state
when the state's three-month average TUR exceeds 6.5 percent and is 10 percent above the threemonth average TUR in either of the two preceding years
29 Once the triggers have been repaired in this basic way, attention could be paid to whether
greater potential duration of benefits should be activated if the unemployment rate rose signifi
cantly above 6 5 percent For example, Hight (1975) and Corson and Nicholson (1982, chapter 5)
investigated how the total UI exhaustion rate could be kept constant by triggering additional bene
fit extensions with increases in the insured unemployment rate They found that the exhaustion
rate is held constant by adding about 3.5 to 5.1 weeks to potential duration for each 1 percentage
point increase in the insured unemployment rate With a TUR trigger, the relationship between
exhaustion rates and the TUR would need to be investigated
30 See Corson, Grossman, and Nicholson (1986) for a discussion of the administrative diffi
culties encountered during the Federal Supplemental Compensation program
31. Reach-backs have provided emergency extended benefits to workers who exhausted their
benefits before adoption of the emergency extension program. For example, under the Emergency
Unemployment Compensation program (1991-1994), most individuals who received reach-back
EUC benefits had exhausted their regular state benefits between March and November 1991 but
had never received benefits under the standby EB program With an effective EB program, these
workers would already have received some weeks of extended benefits, and there would be no
need for a reach-back
32 However, Brechling and Laurence (1995) have offered quite a different set of recommen
dations. See note 27
33. Obviously, Congress would have the discretion to ignore any ready-to-implement thirdtier program and to fashion an entirely new one, as it has done (in effect) in the past However, the
purpose of creating such a third-tier program is to shorten the time needed to react to a recession
and to ease and rationalize administration of the program.
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CHAPTER

7

Work Incentives and Disincentives
Paul T. Decker
Mathematica Policy Research

The unemployment insurance (UI) system must address a funda
mental trade-off between two important factors: (1) the need to provide
unemployed workers with benefits that are "adequate," as discussed in
Chapter 5, and (2) the need to minimize the disincentive to rapid reemployment implicit in the provision of UI benefits. The intent to provide
adequate benefits tends to encourage more generous ones, which
would ensure that the economic needs of a larger proportion of claim
ants are met. However, more generous benefits tend to strengthen the
reernployment disincentive. Given this trade-off, states have been
urged to provide benefits high enough to replace a substantial portion
of lost wages, but not so high as to significantly dilute the incentive to
return to work. As a result, a "rule-of-thumb" that has guided UI policy
since the inception of the system is that weekly UI benefits should
replace roughly 50 percent of workers' weekly wages.
This chapter reviews the theory and empirical evidence on the
effects of UI policy on the behavior of unemployed workers in order to
investigate the following issues:
• Whether and the extent to which more generous benefits act as a
disincentive to reernployment, thus prolonging unemployment and
increasing the unemployment rate
• Whether prolonged unemployment can have a positive impact by
leading to higher-paying work if claimants use the period of unem
ployment to select the best possible job
• Whether the negative effects of UI on reernployment are offset by
effects of UI on labor market transitions other than the unemploy-
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ment-to-employment transition or by spillover effects of claim
ants' behavior on unemployed workers who do not receive UI
benefits
The discussion then turns to policy options that have evolved in
response to the reemployment disincentive that is inherent in UI and
concludes with a consideration of the task faced by policy makers in
light of the theoretical and empirical evidence on the effect of UI on
employment.

Direct Effects of Unemployment Insurance
on Claimants: Disincentives to Reemployment
Theoretical studies have demonstrated that more generous benefits
create an incentive for claimants to remain unemployed, and empirical
studies have shown that UI does indeed tend to lengthen unemploy
ment spells of claimants. Increases in either the amount of benefits or
in the potential duration of benefits induce longer spells, but the magni
tude of these effects is still uncertain. In this section, both the theory
and empirical findings related to this effect are reviewed.
Theory

The theory supporting the disincentive effect of UI is based on the
premise that UI tends to prolong unemployment spells because it low
ers the cost of unemployment. Unemployed workers who receive UI
benefits tend to consume more leisure, to reduce the intensity (and
therefore the cost) of their job search, or to be more selective in accept
ing a job offer than they would be in the absence of UI. All of these
tendencies will generate longer unemployment spells. Increasing the
two key parameters of the UI system—the amount and potential dura
tion of benefits—would tend to exacerbate this effect.
Two general theoretical models, the labor-supply model and the jobsearch model, have been used to describe the disincentive to reemploy
ment inherent in UI. Moffitt and Nicholson (1982) utilized a labor-sup
ply model to represent the effect of UI on the duration of
unemployment spells. In this model, a newly unemployed individual is
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assumed to plan his or her activities over a fixed period, deciding how
to divide his or her time between work and leisure in the form of unem
ployment. During the period, the individual may either consume the
maximum amount of leisure by remaining unemployed for the full
interval or accept a job that is to begin at a particular point, remaining
unemployed until that point.
In the labor-supply model that includes UI, the budget constraint rel
evant to individuals who are eligible for UI and are planning employ
ment-related activities over period T is represented by line ABC in
figure 7.1. For an unemployment spell that exceeds the point at which
UI benefits are exhausted, which is typically 26 weeks after the initial
claim, the cost of an additional week of unemployment is the foregone
earnings for that week. The individual worker is assumed to receive a
fixed weekly wage, w, when employed, and this fixed wage represents
the earnings foregone for a week of unemployment. For an unemploy
ment spell that is less than 26 weeks, the net cost of an additional week
of unemployment is w-b, where b is the weekly UI benefit received by
the claimant. The relatively lower cost of unemployment during peri
ods of benefit receipt represents the unemployment subsidy of UI.
The labor-supply model can be used to show that making UI bene
fits more generous (by increasing either the amount or potential dura
tion of benefits) will increase unemployment spells of claimants. An
increase in the weekly benefit amount tends to lengthen unemployment
spells because it lowers the net cost of unemployment. The effect of the
weekly benefit increase is represented in figure 7.1 by the shift of the
budget constraint out to line AB'C'. For claimants who would exhaust
benefits if the weekly benefit were not increased—that is, those
between B and C on the original line—the increase in the benefit
amount causes a pure income effect that raises consumption of leisure/
unemployment, as long as leisure is a normal good. For claimants who
would not exhaust benefits if the weekly benefit were not raised—
those located between A and B on the original line—the benefit expan
sion generates both substitution and income effects in the same direc
tion, thus increasing unemployment.
As is true for an increase in the amount of benefits, an increase in
potential duration of benefits tends to lengthen unemployment spells,
by extending the period in which the cost of unemployment is lowered
by the availability of benefits. If, for example, the potential duration of
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benefits were increased from 26 to 39 weeks, the budget constraint in
figure 7.1 would shift to line AB"C". The only claimants who would be
affected by the shift are those who would have exhausted benefits in
the absence of the shift. For these claimants, the income and substitu
tion effects of the shift are also in the same direction—toward greater
unemployment—so the impact of a longer potential benefit period is to
unambiguously increase unemployment.
Figure 7.1 Impact of Increases in UI Benefit Parameters on the Budget
Constraint for UI Claimants

Income
A *

26

39

J

Weeks of Unemployment

The labor-supply model further implies that many claimants will
return to work near the time that they exhaust their benefits. Reemployment is likely to occur at this point because of the sudden increase in
the cost to claimants of an additional week of unemployment when
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benefits are exhausted. This is represented by the kink in line ABC in
figure 7.1. Many claimants will respond to this increase in the cost of
unemployment by accepting a job or at least by searching more
actively.'
An alternative approach to modeling the effect of UI on unemploy
ment spells is based on the job-search model (Burdett 1979 and
Mortensen 1977). In this model, it is assumed that the search occurs in
an environment in which claimants are uncertain about the wage offers
they will receive from one week to the next. Given such uncertainty,
unemployed workers set their search intensity and their minimum
acceptable wage so as to maximize the present value of lifetime
income. It follows that claimants will end their unemployment spell
when they receive a wage offer that exceeds their minimum acceptable
wage.
In the job-search model, UI lowers the cost of unemployment and
therefore encourages claimants to reduce the intensity of their search
or to raise their minimum acceptable wage. Either response tends to
prolong unemployment spells. In addition, an increase in the amount or
potential duration of benefits will strengthen the reemployment disin
centive. The resulting impact on rates of reemployment is illustrated in
figure 7.2, which presents the time pattern of reemployment for UI
claimants. The top panel shows that an increase in the benefit level
tends to lower reemployment rates early in unemployment spells and to
increase reemployment rates near and beyond the point of benefit
exhaustion, P. The bottom panel shows that an increase in potential
duration of benefits from PQ to P\ also decreases reemployment rates
early in the unemployment spell and increases subsequent reemploy
ment rates. The overall impact of these changes in reemployment rates
would be to raise average unemployment spells.
Although both the labor-supply theory and the job-search theory
imply that UI is likely to prolong unemployment spells, the job-search
theory also suggests that prolonged unemployment spells can have a
positive impact. Because UI provides financial assistance to claimants,
they can presumably be more selective in taking a new job than they
would be in the absence of UI. That is, because of UI, claimants can
spend more time searching for the best possible job opening. If, as a
result, claimants obtain more stable or higher-paying jobs than they
would in the absence of UI, the prolonged unemployment spell has
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Figure 7.2 Impact of Increases in UI Benefit Parameters on
Reemployment Rates
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been productive. Hence, if the job-search model is valid, and UI consti
tutes a subsidy to job search rather than to leisure, a full evaluation of
UI must weigh the benefits of increased search against the costs of
increased unemployment.
The reemployment disincentives inherent in UI are intended to be
offset somewhat by partial benefit schedules that allow claimants to
accept part-time work and to still retain a portion of their UI benefits.
However, partial benefit schedules, which vary by state, have been crit
icized because they do not create clear incentives for partial benefit
claimants to work as much as possible. The effect of the typical partial
benefits schedule on the relationship between a worker's earnings and
income (earnings plus benefits) is shown in figure 7.3. Claimants with
zero earnings have income equal to their full weekly benefit amount
(WBA). A small amount of earnings, up to one-quarter of WBA in fig
ure 7.3, is disregarded in computing the partial benefit amount, so a
one-dollar increase in earnings generates a one-dollar increase in
income over this range. For earnings above the disregard, the benefit
payment is reduced by a dollar for each additional dollar of earnings;
the earnings-income function in figure 7.3 is flat over this section, as
earnings simply displace benefits. Benefits are eliminated altogether if
earnings exceed WBA. The effect of this elimination of benefits, com
bined with the earnings disregard, is to create a point where a marginal
increase in earnings causes a decline in income. This is reflected in the
discontinuity in the earnings-income function at the point where earn
ings equal WBA in figure 7.3.
Two aspects of the partial benefit schedule can be criticized for
impeding work incentives. First, workers on the flat section of the earn
ings-income function have no incentive to increase earnings at the mar
gin, since the gain in earnings has no effect on income. Second, the
discontinuity where earnings equal WBA creates a disincentive to raise
earnings at the margin, since that increment will generate a decrease in
income. Munts (1970) presents data from Wisconsin on benefit receipt
that suggest that claimants are responsive to the work disincentives cre
ated by partial benefits schedules.
The simplest way to maintain work incentives is to construct a par
tial benefits schedule without an earnings disregard that reduces bene
fits by a fraction of one dollar for every one-dollar increase in earnings.
A benefits schedule of this type will create a relatively smooth,
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up ward-sloping earnings-income function, ensuring that as earnings
increase income will also increase and benefits will be phased out
gradually. This type of benefits schedule is used in Kentucky, where
claimants lose 80 cents in benefits for every additional dollar of earn
ings.
Figure 7.3 Example of a Partial UI Benefits Schedule
Income
(Earnings
+ Benefits)

1.25x
WBA
WBA

0.25 x WBA

WBA
Earnings

WBA = Full weekly benefit amount

Empirical Evidence

Over the past twenty years, many researchers have studied empiri
cally the impact of UI benefits on unemployment spells. Danziger,
Haveman, and Plotnick (1981), Gustman (1982), Burtless (1990), and
Atkinson and Micklewright (1991) summarize the literature before the

Table 7.1 Estimated Impacts of UI Benefit Parameters
Study
Newton and Rosen
(1979)

Data used

Estimation
methods

UI records on Georgia Tobit
claimants (1974- 1976)

Moffitt and Nicholson
(1982)

Survey of FSB
Maximum likelihood
claimants (1974-1976) with kinked budget
constraint

Moffitt (1985a)

CWBH administrative Proportional hazards
model
records, men only
(1978-1983)

Moffitt (1985b)

CWBH (1978-1983),
JSARP survey data
(1979-1981),UI
records on Georgia
claimants (1974-1976)
CWBH-Georgia
(1978-1989)

Solon(1985)

Impact of weekly
benefit amount

Impact of potential
benefit duration

A one-week increase in potential
duration increases unemployment
spells by 0.4 - 0.5 weeks
A 10 percentage-point increase in A one-week increase in potential
the replacement rate increases
duration increases unemployment
unemployment spells by 0.98
spells by 0.1 weeks for men and
weeks for men and 0.84 weeks for women
A 10 percent increase in the
benefit amount increases
unemployment spells by half a
week

A one-week increase in potential
duration increases unemployment
spells by 0 15 weeks

Proportional hazards
model

A one-week increase in potential
duration increases unemployment
spells by 0.17 to 0.45 weeks for
men, 0.10 to 0 37 weeks for

Proportional hazards
model, based on
taxation of benefits
imposed in 1979

A 10 percentage-point increase in A one-week increase in potential
the replacement rate increases
duration increases unemployment
unemployment spells by between spells by 0.3 weeks
half a week and a full week
(continued)

Table 7.1 (continued)
Study

Data used

Impact of potential
benefit duration

Estimation
methods

Impact of weekly
benefit amount
A 9 percent increase in benefits
increases weeks of UI benefits by
one-and-a-half weeks

A one-week increase in potential
duration increases unemployment
spells by between 0 16 and 0.20
weeks
A 10 percentage-point increase in A one-week increase in potential
duration increases unemployment
the replacement rate increases
spells by 0.05 to 0.20 weeks
unemployment spells by 0.3 to
1.1 weeks

Meyer(1989)

CWBH (1979- 1984)

Meyer(1990)

CWBH, men only
(1978-1983)

OLS, based on
increases in state WB A
mimmums and
maximums
Proportional hazards
model

Katz and Meyer( 1990)

CWBH, men only
(1978-1983)

Proportional hazards
model

Davidson and
Woodbury(1995)

Estimates from UI
bonus experiments

Simulations based on
estimated impacts of
bonus experiments

A 10 percentage-point increase m
the replacement rate increases
unemployment spells by one-anda-half weeks

-

NOTE: FSB = Federal Supplemental Benefits CWBH = Continuous Wage and Benefit History These data were extracted from UI administrative records
in thirteen states. JS ARP = Job Search Assistance Research Project (also known as the Employment Opportunity Pilot Project). The project was conducted
in twenty sites. FSC = Federal Supplemental Compensation
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1980s. Therefore, the following discussion focuses primarily on esti
mates that have appeared in the literature over the past ten to fifteen
years, as summarized in table 7.1. The estimated impacts of the two
main UI parameters on unemployment spells will be considered, as
well as recent findings related to the timing of reemployment as associ
ated with the point of benefit exhaustion, and the research on the poten
tial impact of UI on reemployment wages.
Impact of Changes in the Benefit Amount
Studies of the effect of changes in the weekly benefit amount have
consistently demonstrated that there is a disincentive to reemployment
associated with UI. Almost uniformly, the research has generated esti
mates showing that higher weekly benefit amounts lengthen the dura
tion of unemployment spells. The magnitude of this effect, however, is
uncertain. Based on the studies completed as of 1977, Hamermesh
(1977) concludes that the best estimate is that a 10 percentage-point
increase in the wage replacement rate (the ratio of the weekly benefit
amount to the pre-UI after-tax weekly wage) raises the average unem
ployment spell by half a week. However, this conclusion is founded on
studies that present estimates ranging from zero to about 1.5 weeks.
Danziger, Haveman, and Plotnick (1981) report a similarly wide range
of estimates.
Recent research on the effect of increasing the two main parameters
of the UI system has attempted to refine estimates of these effects by
using new data or new methodologies. The Continuous Wage and Ben
efit History (CWBH), which combines administrative data from sev
eral states, has been used in many studies over the past 10 years. The
CWBH includes accurate administrative data on levels of UI benefits,
potential duration of benefits, and weeks of UI receipt, thereby pre
cluding the measurement errors associated with survey data on unem
ployment spells.2 Recent studies also tend to use hazard models to
control for the use of incomplete, or censored, measures of unemploy
ment spells. A measure of unemployment is said to be "censored" if the
unemployment spell is not completed at the point of observation. This
happens either because observed spells are measured by UI receipt,
which cannot account for unemployment beyond benefit exhaustion, or
because survey data measure unemployment as of the time of the sur
vey and cannot measure spells that continue beyond the time of the sur-
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vey. Since weeks of UI receipt are often used in recent studies,
censoring can be a major issue because the measure itself can intro
duce bias into the estimates—especially since substantial rates of bene
fit exhaustion imply that a large proportion of observed unemployment
spells are, in fact, incomplete. Hazard models allow researchers to con
trol for the biases introduced by censored measures of unemployment
by explicitly treating censored spells differently than completed spells
in the estimation procedure.
The recent studies that use new data and more appropriate methods
find that the estimated impact of increased benefit amounts on unem
ployment spells tends to be higher than the half-week response to a 10
percentage-point increase in the replacement rate cited by Hamermesh
(1977). Moffitt and Nicholson (1982) estimate that a 10 percentagepoint increase in the replacement rate extends unemployment spells by
slightly less than one week (table 7.1). Moffitt (1985a) reports that esti
mates based on the CWBH data imply that a 10 percent increase in the
weekly benefit amount (which represents an increase in the average
replacement rate of about 6 percentage points) raises unemployment
spells by half a week. In terms of replacement rate impacts, this sug
gests that a 10 percentage-point increase in the replacement rate would
raise unemployment spells by about 0.8 weeks. Meyer (1990), using
the same data as Moffitt but somewhat different estimation methods,
finds an even greater impact. His findings suggest that a 10 percentagepoint increase in the replacement rate lengthens unemployment spells
by one-and-a-half weeks.
Because the evidence shows that the benefit amount significantly
affects unemployment spells, it seems clear that disincentives to reemployment are inherent in the UI system and should not be ignored in
setting the benefit amount. If benefits are increased because of con
cerns about adequacy, the result will be longer unemployment spells
for claimants. Although the exact magnitude of the response is uncer
tain, the lengthening in average unemployment spells is likely to be in
the range of 0.5 weeks to 1.5 weeks for every 10 percentage-point
increase in replacement rates.
Impact of Changes in the Potential Duration of Benefits
Studies have generally shown that, as predicted, increases in the
potential duration of benefits lengthen unemployment spells, although

Unemployment Insurance in the United States

297

the magnitude of the impact is not clear. The recent estimates shown in
table 7.1 suggest that a one-week rise in potential duration extends
unemployment by between 0.1 and 0.5 weeks. This is a fairly wide
range of estimates, which suggests, for example, that increasing poten
tial duration from 26 weeks to 36 weeks would lengthen average
unemployment spells by between 1 week and 5 weeks. Even estimates
near the lower end of the range imply that the impact of an increase in
potential duration is important. Katz and Meyer (1990) show, for
example, that a given cut in UI expenditures achieved by reducing the
potential duration of benefits shortens unemployment spells by twice
as much as a similar cut achieved by reducing benefit levels. Regard
less, policy prescriptions based on estimates of such uncertain magni
tudes need to be evaluated with great care.
Research has also addressed the issue of the timing of reemployment relative to the timing of benefit exhaustion. Both the labor-supply
and job-search theories imply that the probability of reemployment
increases near the point of benefit exhaustion. These predictions are
confirmed by empirical research (Katz and Meyer 1990), which shows
that the rate at which claimants secure work increases substantially just
before they exhaust their benefits. Katz and Meyer conclude from these
findings that the potential duration of benefits has a strong effect on
either recall policies of firms or on job-search strategies of workers.
In a different study based on a nationally representative sample of
UI claimants, Corson and Dynarski (1990) also detect a jump in the
probability of reemployment near the point of benefit exhaustion, but,
contrary to Katz and Meyer, they argue that the magnitude of the effect
is modest.3 They emphasize that 75 percent of workers who exhausted
their benefits were still unemployed more than a month after receiving
their final UI payment, and that 60 percent were still unemployed 10
weeks after their final payment.
While the estimates from these studies apply to the UI claimant pop
ulation as a whole, researchers have recently emphasized the impor
tance of distinguishing between claimants who eventually return to
their previous job and claimants who accept a new job. Data drawn
from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID, 1980-1981) for a
sample of unemployed workers (both UI claimants and nonclaimants)
show that 52 percent of unemployment spells in that sample ended in a
return to the previous employer (Katz and Meyer 1990). Research has
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shown that at the time of their layoff, workers are generally able to
accurately predict whether or not they will be recalled. Among a
nationally representative sample of UI claimants from 1987 and 1988,
92 percent of those who were given definite recall dates returned to
work for their pre-UI employers. About 70 percent of claimants who
expected to be recalled but who were not given definite recall dates
returned to work for their pre-UI employers. In contrast, only 9 percent
of claimants who did not expect to be recalled returned to work for
their previous employers.
One would predict that claimants who expect to be recalled are
likely to differ in their job-search behavior from claimants who do not
expect to be recalled. The possibility of being recalled may prompt
claimants to invest less time and money in the search for a new job.
Claimants who anticipate recall may also respond differently to
changes in UI than do other claimants. The models presented in the
preceding section on theory may not apply to claimants who expect to
be recalled and who have little control over the timing of their recall.
Hence, the predicted effects of UI based on these models may apply
best to claimants who do not anticipate being recalled.
Recent estimates tend to support this prediction. Corson and Dynarski (1990) find that, as postulated, increases in the replacement rate and
in the potential duration of benefits lead to longer unemployment spells
for claimants who do not expect to be recalled. However, increases in
the replacement rate are associated with significant decreases in UI
receipt for claimants who expect to be recalled, and variations in
potential duration of benefits have a small and insignificant impact on
these claimants. Corson and Dynarski attribute the reduction in UI
spells of claimants who expect to be recalled to the layoff and recall
policies of firms.
Impact of Unemployment Insurance on Reemployment Wages
The preceding empirical studies suggest that the availability of UI
tends to prolong unemployment spells. Despite these findings, we can
not determine whether the additional periods of unemployment due to
UI represent leisure time or extra job-search time. Presumably, if UI
gives claimants extra time to search for a job, and the search is produc
tive, then reemployment outcomes should, on average, be more favor
able with UI than in the absence of UI.
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One important outcome that can be, used to test this hypothesis is the
wage at reemployment. UI may have a positive impact on reemployment wages by inducing claimants to be more selective in their accep
tance of wage offers. Several studies that have attempted to estimate
the impact of UI on reemployment wages provide only mixed evidence
that such an effect exists. In an early study of the relationship between
UI and reemployment wages, Ehrenberg and Oaxaca (1976) estimated
that a 10 percentage-point rise in the wage replacement rate increased
the reemployment wage by 7.0 percent for men and 1.5 percent for
women. These results suggest that the growth in unemployment associ
ated with increases in UI represents, to some extent, productive job
search. However, subsequent studies have failed to support this finding
(Classen 1977, 1979; Moffitt 1985b; and Meyer 1989). Most recently,
Meyer (1989) found no evidence that increases in state minimum and
maximum benefit levels have caused claimants to have higher reem
ployment earnings. His point estimates imply a decline in wages in
response to benefit increases, but the large standard errors of these esti
mates make it impossible to say anything conclusive about the actual
sign of the effect.
Several factors may complicate the potentially positive link between
UI and higher reemployment wages. First, claimants may use their UI
to search longer for jobs that have better benefits or other desirable
characteristics, but not necessarily higher pay. Second, claimants may
use their UI to search longer for jobs with better training opportunities
but with relatively low pay in the short run. Both of these factors imply
that even if claimants use UI to look for a better job, the effect on reem
ployment wages may still be ambiguous.
Institutional Factors Affecting the Job-Search Behavior of Claimants

To counteract the reemployment disincentives inherent in UI, state
UI systems refer claimants to the Employment Service (ES) and
impose various work-search requirements on them. 4 Most states
require all new claimants who are not employer-attached to register
with the state ES. These claimants can use job placement assistance
and other ES services, such as employment counseling. The ES may
also refer claimants to particular jobs if their skills match the require
ments of positions listed with the ES. In this case, state laws generally
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require individuals to accept the referral to "suitable work," or they
may be denied benefits. However, the ES does not have the resources
or the appropriate job listings to provide job referrals to the majority of
claimants.
Claimants are also expected to document their work search as part
of the UI claims process. In many states, they must provide UI with a
minimum number of names of potential employers contacted for each
claims week. Nevertheless, state agencies usually do not aggressively
validate the information provided, which leads one to question the
effectiveness of the current work-search requirements in offsetting the
reemployment disincentive of UI. On the other hand, evidence from a
recent demonstration of alternative work-search policies shows that
standard work-search requirements do reduce benefit receipt as com
pared with a system in which claimants do not have to document their
work-search efforts (Johnson and Klepinger 1994). New legislation
requires claimants identified as likely to exhaust UI benefits to partici
pate in mandatory job-search assistance services, which have the
potential to further offset the reemployment disincentive effects of UI.
These requirements are discussed later in this chapter.

Other Effects of Unemployment Insurance
Although it seems clear that UI tends to prolong the unemployment
spells of claimants, its impact on the unemployment rate or on the pro
portion of the population that is employed is unclear. UI prolongs
unemployment spells because it negatively affects the transition of UI
claimants into jobs. While this particular consequence would tend to
decrease employment at any given time, it could be offset by UI
impacts on other labor market transitions. Furthermore, UI may have
spillover effects on individuals who do not respond directly to UI but
are nonetheless affected by the behavior of UI claimants.
Effects on Labor Market Transitions

The effects of UI may extend to labor market transitions beyond that
from unemployment to employment, which has been the focus of most
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research on UI. Figure 7.4 shows the predicted impact of UI on transi
tions between three different situations: employment, unemployment,
and not being in the labor force. The effect discussed so far, the reemployment disincentive faced by benefit claimants, is represented by the
negative sign next to the arrow from unemployment to employment.
This shows that, given the reemployment disincentive inherent in UI,
one would predict that UI has a negative impact on the rate at which
workers move from unemployment to employment. However, the
existence of UI may also affect the flow of individuals in the opposite
direction. For example, UI may increase the transitions from employ
ment to unemployment because the protection it offers makes jobs with
a high risk of layoff more attractive than they would be in the absence
of UI. If workers are more likely to take high-risk jobs, the layoff rate
for the labor force in general should rise, expanding the flow from
employment to unemployment. Furthermore, UI may cause firms to
increase the use of temporary layoffs to manage their workforce, which
would also increase the rate at which individuals move from employ
ment to unemployment.5
In addition to the effect on the transitions between employment and
unemployment, UI may influence the transitions in and out of the labor
force. First, the existence of UI should decrease the flow of people out
of the labor force. Employed workers are less likely to leave the labor
force directly because they can receive UI benefits by moving to unem
ployment instead. Similarly, unemployed workers are reluctant to leave
the labor force because such a move would entail the loss of their ben
efits. Hence, both employed and unemployed individuals are less likely
to leave the labor force than they would be in the absence of UI.
The existence of UI should increase the flow of individuals from
outside the labor force into both employment and unemployment. The
insurance value of UI increases the movement of individuals into the
labor force because it makes work more attractive. 6 This effect tends to
increase the flow into both employment and unemployment because
some workers move directly into jobs while others begin searching for
work and are therefore classified as unemployed. Hamermesh (1979)
studied the effect of UI on flows into employment and found that, for
married women, the estimated rise in employment because of UI was
nearly large enough to fully compensate for the increase in unemploy
ment due to the Ul-related reemployment disincentive.
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Figure 7.4 Theoretical Effect of UI on Labor Market Transitions

Unemployment
(net effect. +)

Employment
(net effect ?)

Not in Labor Force
(net effect -)

Accounting for the effects of UI on all labor market transitions gen
erates some clear hypotheses on the net effects of UI on unemployment
and labor force participation. First, as shown in figure 7.4, UI is pre
dicted to generate a net increase in labor force participation because it
positively influences both of the flows into the labor force and nega
tively influences both of the flows out of the labor force. Similarly,
unemployment should rise because the existence of UI increases both
of the flows into unemployment and decreases both of the flows out of
unemployment. Only the net effect on employment is ambiguous given
the impacts shown in figure 7.4.
Clark and Summers (1982), who have conducted the only compre
hensive empirical study of the effects of UI on labor market transitions,
present findings that are largely consistent with figure 7.4. They esti
mate that UI has a positive and significant impact on the transition
from employment to unemployment, a strong negative effect on the
transition from employment out of the labor force, and a positive and
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significant effect on the transition to unemployment from outside the
labor force. However, they find that UI has a negative effect on the
transition to employment from outside the labor force, contrary to what
is shown in figure 7.4. In addition, the estimated effects on the transi
tions out of unemployment are small and insignificant.
Taken together, the estimated impacts of UI on all labor market tran
sitions imply that UI increases unemployment, but that it also raises
labor force participation and employment. Clark and Summers esti
mate that UI, as it existed in 1978, caused a net increase in the unem
ployment rate of 0.65 percentage points, a net increase in the
employment ratio of 0.62 percentage points, and a net decrease in the
labor force nonparticipation ratio of 1.11 percentage points. 7 These
estimates are consistent with the predicted net effects shown in figure
7.4.
These findings suggest that studies that focus solely on UI claimants
in evaluating the incentive effects of UI may overstate the impacts of
the program on net unemployment. However, so far, the issues
addressed by Clark and Summers have not been examined by other
empirical studies. More evidence is needed before we can declare that
UI increases employment.
Effects of UI on Nonrecipients
A majority of unemployed workers do not receive UI benefits either
because they are not eligible or because they do not choose to receive
them. In addition, the rate of benefit receipt among the unemployed has
declined in recent years.8 The ratio of claims to unemployment aver
aged 0.35 in the 1980s, compared with 0.41 in the 1970s (Corson and
Nicholson 1988).
Recent discussions of the disincentive impacts of UI have addressed
the possibility that the behavior of recipients has spillover effects on
unemployed workers not receiving UI. If UI recipients and other unem
ployed workers are competing for a limited number of job vacancies,
the ability of the other unemployed workers, or nonrecipients, to find a
job may be affected by the actions of the UI recipients. If UI reduces
the job-search intensity or the rate of job acceptance among recipients,
it may enhance the reemployment opportunities available to nonrecipi
ents, allowing the nonrecipients to return to work faster than they
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would have in the absence of UI. This would shorten the average
unemployment spells of nonrecipients. The size of this effect would
depend partly on the degree to which nonrecipients are substitutable
for recipients with regard to filling the existing job vacancies. Given
the potential for substitutability, a full analysis of the net effect of UI
on unemployment spells must address potential impacts on average
spells of nonrecipients as well as of recipients.
Initial empirical evidence suggests that these spillover effects are
important. Levine (1993) estimates that the effects are substantial: a 10
percentage-point increase in the replacement rate shortens unemploy
ment spells of nonrecipients by one week or more. Since the majority
of unemployed workers are nonrecipients, a spillover effect this large
would completely offset the increase in unemployment caused by the
rise in UI benefits, according to the estimates discussed earlier in this
chapter. In fact, the magnitude of the effect suggests that an increase in
UI benefits would probably generate a decrease in aggregate unem
ployment. Levine supports this conclusion by estimating that a 10 per
centage-point increase in the replacement rate would lead to a 0.4
percentage-point reduction in the unemployment rate, although the
estimate is not statistically significant. This finding appears to contra
dict Clark and Summers (1982), who showed that a rise in UI benefit
amounts would increase the unemployment rate; however, they did not
explicitly control for unemployed nonrecipients. Given that the Levine
study represents the first direct analysis of spillover effects, further
research will be required before we can draw firm conclusions on this
potentially important outcome.9

Potential Policy Responses to Reemployment Disincentives

The UI system has traditionally promoted rapid reemployment
through work-search requirements and referrals to the ES. However,
for many years, policy makers have discussed the possibility of chang
ing the program in such a way as to create new financial incentives for
reemployment or to provide additional job-search assistance or other
employment services that would expedite claimants' return to work.
The policy option related to financial incentives that has received the
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most attention is a reemployment bonus, a lump-sum paid to those who
become reemployed quickly. Several social field experiments were
conducted over the past decade to rigorously test this concept in an
operational UI environment. 10 Two other sets of field experiments eval
uated a more service-oriented approach to encouraging reemployment.
The first set tested different strategies for providing employment ser
vices, especially enhanced job-search assistance, to make claimants
more employable or to make their job search more effective. The sec
ond set offered services and benefits to claimants interested in starting
their own business. While these experiments focused primarily on pro
viding claimants more services, they also affected reemployment
incentives. Both the bonus experiments and the enhanced services
experiments were based on a random assignment design in which
claimants were part of a control group that received existing services or
were part of a treatment group that received the service package or the
bonus offer being tested.
This section presents a discussion of the bonus and enhanced-services experiments and of how they affect the reemployment incentives
faced by claimants. 11 Also included is a description of how legislation,
based on the findings from these experiments, has changed the UI sys
tem.
The Reemployment Bonus Experiments

Three bonus experiments were conducted between 1984 and 1989.
They were designed to counteract the reemployment disincentives
inherent in UI by offering a direct financial incentive for reemploy
ment. The first experiment, the Illinois UI Claimant Bonus Experi
ment, was conducted in 1984 by the Illinois Department of
Employment and Security. In this experiment, eligible UI claimants
were assigned randomly to the treatment group, which received a
bonus offer, or to the control group, which received no offer. A bonus
of $500 was paid to claimants in the treatment group who started work
at a full-time job within 11 weeks of filing their initial UI claim and
who remained employed for at least four months. The difference in
average UI receipt between the treatment and control groups implies
that the bonus offer reduced the average spell of UI benefit receipt by
more than one week. Furthermore, the bonus was cost effective from
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the perspective of the UI system: for every dollar spent on bonuses in
Illinois, UI benefit payments were reduced by more than two dollars
(Spiegelman and Woodbury 1987).
The Illinois findings led the U.S. Department of Labor to sponsor
additional field experiments to further test the hypothesis that a reemployment bonus offer could significantly shorten spells of insured
unemployment and save the UI system money. In 1988 and 1989, two
other experiments were conducted in Pennsylvania and Washington to
test a variety of reemployment bonus offers. The findings from these
experiments are similar. 12 Bonus offers in the two experiments tended
to reduce benefit payments, but the effect was more modest than that
found in Illinois. 13 Moreover, for nearly all of the bonus offers that
were tested, the amount of bonus payments plus the administrative
costs associated with making the offers exceeded the estimated savings
in UI payments generated by the offers (Decker and O'Leary 1995).
These results from Pennsylvania and Washington therefore contradict
those from Illinois and suggest that reemployment bonuses are
unlikely to be a cost-effective method for speeding reemployment, at
least from the standpoint of the UI system. 14
Overall, the outcomes from the bonus experiments clearly demon
strate that claimants respond to financial incentives for reemployment,
and that a reemployment bonus can at least partly counteract the reem
ployment disincentives in the UI system. However, the findings also
preclude us from being optimistic about the possibility of using reem
ployment bonuses to generate net savings for the UI system. The esti
mated impacts are generally not large enough to generate such net
savings.
Two other factors not reflected in the estimates of the bonus impacts
may cast further doubt on the potential for net savings from reemploy
ment bonuses. First, the behavior of claimants who are offered a bonus
may have displacement effects on other UI claimants and unemployed
workers who are not offered a bonus. Second, the availability of reem
ployment bonuses may increase entry into UI.
If all unemployed workers generally compete for a limited number
of job vacancies, claimants who find positions more quickly because
they receive a bonus offer may displace other unemployed workers
from these jobs. The increase in employment among the bonus claim
ants may therefore be partly or fully offset by decreased employment
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among other unemployed individuals. Consequently, the impact esti
mates cannot be used to determine the full effect of a bonus on the total
unemployment rate because they do not account for displacement. 15
In terms of how the availability of reemployment bonuses affects
entry into UI, unemployed workers who previously did not apply for
UI might be induced to do so once they know they can receive a special
payment upon reemployment. For example, individuals who expect to
be unemployed for a few weeks might not apply for UI under normal
circumstances. However, a reemployment bonus would make applying
for UI considerably more valuable to them, since they are likely to
receive that payment when they return to work. The potential for entry
effects would add to the net costs of offering a permanent reemploy
ment bonus, and entry effects are not accounted for in the estimated
impacts from the bonus experiments. 16 One way to address increased
entry would be to tie the bonus offer to an increase in the waiting
period for filing an initial benefit claim. The longer waiting period
would discourage the short-term unemployed from filing a claim that
establishes potential eligibility for the reemployment bonus.
An alternative to a bonus as an incentive for reemployment would
be a wage supplement for claimants who take a job. Wage supplements
may encourage some claimants to accept job offers that they otherwise
would not take, thus shortening average unemployment spells. The
impact of such a supplement would probably vary according to its size
and duration and how eligibility for it is defined. The displacement
effect of changing the incentives for reemployment is an issue for a
wage supplement as it is for reemployment bonuses. Claimants who
take jobs more readily in response to a wage supplement may displace
unemployed workers who are not offered a wage supplement. To date,
there have been no experiments to test the effect of wage supplements
on UI claimants, 17 but the findings from the bonus experiments suggest
that the effect would probably be modest.
Enhanced Services Experiments

Two types of services for unemployed workers, job-search assis
tance and self-employment assistance, have been tested in recent
experiments. This section presents the results from these experiments
and describes the UI legislation based on these findings. The discus-
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sion focuses particularly on the relationship between the tested ser
vices and the reemployment incentives faced by UI claimants.
The Job-Search Experiments
The UI system has traditionally encouraged reemployment of claim
ants through work-search requirements and referrals to the ES. Over
the past 15 years, there has been a trend toward relaxing work-search
requirements, and some states have eliminated them altogether. How
ever, federal policy makers have recently moved toward requiring
claimants to participate in employment services as a condition of UI
receipt. In the final extension of the federal Emergency Unemployment
Compensation program, 18 states are required to implement a system for
evaluating claimants as they enter the UI system and to provide perma
nently displaced claimants with mandatory job-search assistance or
other employment services. The states must use a set of characteristics
to create a "profile" of each claimant and to identify claimants who are
unlikely to become reemployed quickly. 19 These individuals are then
provided a set of mandatory services intended to help them prepare for
and find a new job. The mandatory nature of these services suggests
that, in addition to preparing claimants for a new job, they may
increase the perceived costs of collecting UI benefits and therefore
affect the reemployment incentives faced by claimants.
The impetus for the creation of a worker profiling and reemploy
ment services system is a set of findings from the New Jersey Unem
ployment Insurance Reemployment Demonstration. As with the bonus
experiments, the New Jersey demonstration was based on a classical
design in which claimants were assigned to the control group, which
received existing services, or to a treatment group, which was required
to participate in a set of job-search assistance activities. 20 The package
of job-search assistance offered to treatment group members was
intended to speed reemployment by encouraging claimants to search
more aggressively and more effectively for a new job. The findings
from this demonstration show that claimants who received mandatory
job-search assistance returned to work more quickly than claimants
who did not receive such help. Because claimants resumed work more
quickly, they also claimed one-half of one week less of UI benefits
over the year after their initial claim, and the decrease in UI payments
generated by mandatory job-search assistance was large enough to pay
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for the provision of the services (Corson et al. 1989). Job-search assis
tance therefore appears to be a cost-effective method for encouraging
reemployment. Two other random-assignment studies that tested the
effects of alternative job-search assistance policies, the Charleston
Claimant Placement and Work Test Demonstration (Corson, Long, and
Nicholson 1984) and the Washington Alternative Work Search Experi
ment (Johnson and Klepinger 1994), also show that mandatory jobsearch assistance can help expedite reemployment.
Most discussions about the impacts of mandatory job-search assis
tance focus on the magnitude of the impacts rather than on the process
through which they occur. We can consider at least three different ways
in which assistance can have an effect on reemployment. First, jobsearch assistance can make claimants more effective job searchers,
resulting in quicker reemployment. I refer to this influence as the skills
effect of mandatory job-search assistance because it occurs as claim
ants take the skills that they learn from the job-search workshop and
related services and apply them in looking for a new job.
Second, job-search assistance can lead to more rapid reemployment
by encouraging claimants to begin searching for work sooner than they
otherwise would. The help may give claimants a psychological boost
that inspires them to begin looking for work immediately. I refer to this
impact as the encouragement effect of mandatory job-search assis
tance. Like the skills effect, the encouragement effect is related to the
substance of services designed to help claimants cope with the psycho
logical aspects of unemployment and to stimulate claimants to search
aggressively for a new job.
Finally, mandatory job-search assistance may also affect the incen
tives for reemployment. As is true for the financial parameters of UI, its
nonfinancial aspects, such as administrative requirements or manda
tory services, have important influences on reemployment incentives.
Regarding mandatory job-search assistance, claimants may return to
work more quickly in order to avoid participating in job-search assis
tance services. Because this behavior is caused by the incentives cre
ated by the services rather than by the services themselves, I refer to
this impact as the incentive effect of mandatory job-search assistance.
Indirect evidence of the potential importance of these different
effects of mandatory job-search assistance can be obtained by examin
ing the impact of assistance on the rates at which claimants exit the UI
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system, focusing especially on the timing of these impacts. If the skills
effect is dominant, and claimants exit UI because the services make
their job search more effective, we would expect the impact on the exit
rate to occur either after the services are received, or possibly near the
end of services if claimants apply their new search skills immediately.
If the encouragement effect is important, we would expect the impact
on the exit rate to occur somewhat earlier than with the skills effect.
This is because the encouragement effect could occur as services are
beginning, such that claimants are inspired to immediately begin
searching for a new job. Of course, even if claimants begin looking
right away, it may take them some time to find a new job. Hence, the
encouragement effect may increase the exit rate both during and after
the services. The incentive effect would generate earlier impacts than
would either the skills effect or the encouragement effect. Claimants
who return to work and exit UI to avoid participating in services would
do so after being informed of the services, possibly before such assis
tance even begins. The incentive effect may continue as services are
being delivered if claimants want to avoid participating in additional
services. Thus, it is impossible to disentangle the incentive effect from
the encouragement effect because both impacts would increase the UI
exit rate throughout the period of service delivery.
Evidence from the UI demonstrations on the timing of exit from UI
suggests that the encouragement and incentive effects play important
roles in the impact of assistance on employment and on UI receipt.
Corson and Decker (1989) show that, in the New Jersey demonstration,
a significant part of the impact of mandatory job-search was due to an
increased UI exit rate in the first seven weeks after the initial claim.
The timing of this result corresponds to the periods in which claimants
were notified about services (generally in week four after the initial
claim) or were required to participate in services (generally weeks five
to seven after the initial claim). 21 Johnson and Klepinger (1994)
detected a similar effect of mandatory services in the Washington
Alternative Work Search Experiment. This early impact implies that
mandatory job-search assistance encouraged some claimants to return
to work quickly, before the services were completed or, in some cases,
even before services began.
Although the early impacts suggest that the incentive and encour
agement effects are important, we do not know whether they account
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for most of the impact of job-search assistance or whether the skills
effect is also key. In addition, regardless of the source of the impact of
job-search assistance, the service had important long-run benefits. In
an evaluation of the long-run impacts of the New Jersey demonstration,
Corson and Haimson (1996) find that job-search assistance reduced UI
benefit receipt not only in the initial benefit year but in subsequent
years as well. They conclude that claimants who were assigned to man
datory job-search assistance found employment that was more stable
than that found by control group members.
The Self-Employment Experiments

Self-employment assistance is another policy option that expands
the services available to UI claimants and expedites reemployment.
Under the traditional UI system, claimants must be available for work
and conduct an active job search. Therefore, an individual who
"works" full-time on starting a business is generally ineligible for UI.
This policy creates a disincentive to self-employment, but recent legis
lation gives states the option to change this policy. Title V of the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) Implementation Act (P.L.
103-182) allows states to offer self-employment assistance to help
speed the transition of dislocated workers into new employment. Under
this service option, eligible claimants who want to establish their own
business are paid a self-employment allowance that is equivalent to
their UI benefit. They are expected to work full-time on starting their
business, and they are exempted from UI work-search requirements. In
addition, they are allowed to retain any earnings from self-employ
ment. In effect, the new law removes the barrier to full-time selfemployment by allowing payments to self-employed claimants. States
are also required to provide self-employment assistance services to
claimants receiving self-employment allowances. 22 Participation in
these services, which is mandatory for recipients of the allowance, is
limited to no more than 5 percent of regular UI claimants. So far, four
states are operating self-employment programs for their UI claimants. 23
This legislation is a response to the relatively positive findings from
random-assignment self-employment demonstrations conducted in
Washington and Massachusetts. The results indicate that self-employ
ment is a viable reemployment option for a small proportion of UI
claimants. Both demonstrations provided self-employment allowances
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and additional assistance to claimants who completed a set of initial
intake activities. In Washington, the self-employment allowance was
offered as a lump-sum payment equal to the amount of the claimant's
remaining UI entitlement, while, in Massachusetts claimants were
offered weekly allowances equal to their UI benefit amount. Of tar
geted claimants, 4 percent in Washington and 2 percent in Massachu
setts completed the initial intake activities and were determined to be
eligible for participation in the program (Benus, Wood, and Grover
1994). In terms of the impact on economic outcomes, the availability
of self-employment assistance shortened unemployment spells among
claimants in both demonstrations and increased earnings in one of the
demonstrations (Washington). 24 Only in Massachusetts did the selfemployment program reduce total benefits (regular UI payments plus
self-employment allowances) paid during the benefit year, by about
$700 per eligible claimant. The program in Washington, which paid
lump-sum self-employment allowances, increased total benefits paid
by about $1,100 per eligible claimant. Self-employment assistance
may also decrease the probability that individuals file claims in the
future, which would generate savings in UI benefits in the long run. At
this time, the data to investigate this potential long-run impact on new
claims are not available.

Conclusion
Changes in the parameters of the UI system affect unemployment as
predicted by theory: increases in the amount and potential duration of
benefits tend to prolong unemployment spells. These effects should
therefore be considered in evaluating any proposals to alter UI parame
ters. In fact, work disincentives were an important consideration in the
move to apply the federal income tax to UI benefits beginning in 1979,
which reduced the after-tax benefit paid to claimants. 25
Despite evidence of the presence of disincentive effects, researchers
disagree on the importance of these effects. This dispute arises partly
because estimates of the impacts of changing UI parameters cover a
wide range, and partly because researchers describes similar estimates
in different ways. Where one researcher characterizes an effect as
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"substantial," another views it as "modest." Regardless, work disincen
tives of some magnitude are implicit in UI insofar as it pays claimants
for staying unemployed. The task of policy makers, therefore, is to bal
ance the need for adequate benefits with the need to limit the disincen
tive to work.
Other potential effects of UI beyond work disincentives should also
be considered in setting benefit parameters. Although higher benefits
prolong unemployment, they may generate better reemployment out
comes if the period of additional unemployment is spent finding the
best possible job. The most obvious implication of this argument is that
higher UI benefits should cause higher reemployment wages, but
empirical studies of this issue have thus far provided only mixed evi
dence that such an effect exists.
Even though UI benefits prolong unemployment spells of claimants,
they may not necessarily lead to lower aggregate employment or to
higher aggregate unemployment for the population. Individuals are
probably more likely to enter the labor force and less likely to leave it
because of the availability of UI. As the labor force expands, aggregate
employment would tend to increase. UI benefits may also have an indi
rect effect on those unemployed workers not receiving benefits. If all
unemployed individuals tend to compete for a limited number of job
vacancies, greater unemployment among claimants might be matched
by a drop in unemployment among other jobless persons who would
otherwise be crowded out of work opportunities by claimants. To date,
not enough empirical research has been conducted to fully assess the
impact of UI on all possible labor market transitions.
NOTES
I thank Ronald Oaxaca, Christopher O'Leary, Stephen Wandner, Walter Corson, Sheena
McConnell, and Daryl Hall for their comments on earlier drafts of this chapter
1 Another reason for an increase in the probability of reemployment near the point at which
benefits are exhausted is that firms who have temporarily laid off workers have an incentive to
recall them while they are still receiving benefits Otherwise, some portion of those laid off will
accept other jobs after benefits are exhausted This is expensive for the firm if the workers have
skills or training that are specific to that firm. See chapter 8 for a discussion of the effect of UI on
layoff and hiring incentives for firms
2. For example, Sider (1985) discusses errors in measuring unemployment spells using Cur
rent Population Survey data.
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3 Corson and Dynarski also note that the precision of the estimates does not allow them to
reject the hypothesis that the increase in reemployment probabilities in weeks near benefit exhaus
tion was due to chance.
4. Chapters 4 and 11 discuss the effect of UI work-search requirements.
5. See chapter 8 for a full discussion of employer behavior under UI.
6. The insurance value of UI that makes work more attractive may be somewhat offset by UI
taxes, depending on whether the incidence, or the true burden, of the tax falls on employees or
employers. If the incidence falls on employees, their net wage will be reduced, which will make
work somewhat less attractive
7. The employment ratio is the proportion of total employment to the total working-age popu
lation The nonparticipation ratio is the proportion of working-age individuals who are neither
employed nor unemployed to the total working-age population.
8. Corson and Nicholson (1988), Blank and Card (1991), and Vroman (1991) discuss this
trend and its causes.
9. Davidson and Woodbury (1995) present preliminary findings, based on a simulation model
calibrated using estimates from the UI bonus experiments (see the following section), which sug
gest a much smaller spillover effect than that found by Levine (1993) They estimate that a 10 per
centage-point increase in the benefit amount would shorten unemployment spells of nonrecipients
by one-half to one day, and that a one-week increase in the potential duration would shorten spells
by one-quarter of a day.
10 Laboratory experiments can also be used to investigate the factors that affect job search in
a setting with UI benefits. Cox and Oaxaca (1989) discuss how laboratory experiments can test
some of the principles that underlie the existing research on UI.
11. Meyer (1995) provides a detailed summary of many of the UI experiments discussed in
this chapter
12. O'Leary, Spiegelman, and Kline (1995) discuss the findings from the Washington experi
ment, and Corson et al (1992) discuss the findings from the Pennsylvania experiment.
13. A reemployment bonus was also tested as part of the New Jersey UI Reemployment Dem
onstration. Since the design of this bonus was different from that of the bonuses offered in Illinois,
Washington, and Pennsylvania, I exclude it from my discussion However, as is true for the results
from Pennsylvania and Washington, the findings from the New Jersey bonus experiment suggest
that a bonus has a smaller impact than that found in Illinois. See Decker (1994) for a detailed
comparison of the Illinois and New Jersey findings.
14. Davidson and Woodbury (1991) argue that the relatively larger impact in the Illinois
experiment was due to the inclusion of a subset of claimants who were eligible for an additional
12 weeks of UI benefits through Federal Supplemental Compensation. Analysis based on claim
ants eligible only for regular UI benefits generates impact estimates similar to those found in
Pennsylvania and Washington. These findings suggest that the potential savings from a reemploy
ment bonus increase when potential benefit durations are longer.
15. Corson et al. (1992) make an effort to account for displacement in their estimates of the
impacts of the Pennsylvania Reemployment Bonus Demonstration, but the imprecision of the esti
mated displacement effect renders the estimate essentially meaningless. Dynarski (1993)
describes the general problem in trying to detect displacement effects in a demonstration setting
Davidson and Woodbury (1993) present an alternative approach to investigating displacement
effects based on a simulation model.
16 A reemployment bonus could also tend to increase entry into the labor force by making UI
and therefore employment more valuable. This is in addition to the general effect of UI benefits on
labor force entry discussed in the previous section of this chapter
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17. Corson and Haimson (1994) review issues related to the design of a wage supplement The
use of wage supplements to encourage employment among low-income individuals is currently
being tested in two demonstrations: the Canada Self-Sufficiency Project (Myanovich, Gurr, and
Vernon, forthcoming) and the New Hope Project in Milwaukee (Kerksick 1993)
18. The relevant legislation is the Unemployment Compensation Amendments of 1993 (Public
Law 103-152), section 4 on worker profiling. U S Department of Labor (1994) provides a
description of the system requirements.
19. Chapter 11 discusses claimant profiling
20. Mandatory activities included orientation, vocational testing, a one-week job-search work
shop, an assessment interview, and follow-up contacts
21. The primary service, the job-search workshop, generally occurred in week six or seven
after the initial claim, depending on the individual.
22. The self-employment activities that must be offered include entrepreneurial training, busi
ness counseling, and technical assistance.
23. The four states operating UI self-employment programs are New York, Maine, Oregon,
and Delaware.
24. These measures include combined employment and earnings from either wage and salary
employment or self-employment.
25. In 1979, UI benefits were made taxable for single individuals whose income exceeded
$20,000 and for married taxpayers filing jointly whose incomes exceeded $25,000 Further legis
lation in 1982 lowered these income limits to $12,000 and $18,000, respectively. The Tax Reform
Act of 1986 made all UI benefits taxable
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Roughly thirty years ago, Haber and Murray (1966) published a vol
ume on the condition of the Unemployment Insurance (UI) system in
the United States. In terms of financing UI, the main controversies of
the day included the financial stability of the system and the nature of
the tax structure, called experience rating, that charged a higher tax rate
to firms with greater layoff experience. They wrote the following:
The recent indication of weaknesses in many state [UI trust] funds
has given new importance to the consideration of measures to pro
tect the adequacy of state unemployment insurance funds (Haber
and Murray 1966, p. 318)
In addition, they posed the question:
In what ways could experience rating systems be improved or
modified so as to contribute toward sounder financing? (p. 319).

Today, these issues continue to be some of the main controversies in
financing UI. Concern about the potential for financial problems in the
system was almost prophetic. The financial condition of the UI system
continued to deteriorate and, during the recessions of 1973-75 and the
back-to-back recessions of the early 1980s, many states had to borrow
funds from the federal government to cover their benefit payments. The
situation improved somewhat over the long economic expansion of the
middle and late 1980s. However, following this long expansion and a
relatively mild recession in 1990-1991, the financial condition of the
UI system in 1993 was considerably weaker than at virtually any time
since its inception in 1938.
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One potentially important contributor to the changing financial sta
tus of the UI system is the taxable wage base. Over the past thirty
years, the rapid rate of price increases considerably eroded the taxable
wage base, or the maximum amount of earnings upon which UI taxes
are levied. The relatively small growth in the nominal wage base has
been considerably more than offset by inflation. Tax rates were
required to rise correspondingly to finance higher and higher benefits.
The wisdom of this approach is certainly open to question today.
The issue of experience rating has also received considerable atten
tion over the past three decades, particularly in the academic literature.
Experience rating means that a firm's UI taxes are set so that its tax
burden increases as it lays off more workers. The focus of recent
research regarding experience rating is its potential effect on temporary
layoffs. Because the current financing system is only imperfectly expe
rience rated (i.e., additional layoffs do not always result in a higher tax
burden), some have argued that this provides firms with an incentive to
lay off workers. The financial condition of the UI system will be weak
ened if firms follow through on this incentive to a significant degree.
This chapter reviews the financial condition of the UI system, the
taxable wage base, and the effects of an experience-rated UI tax. To
begin, a brief discussion of the financial structure of the UI system will
be presented. This will be followed by a report on the results of an
analysis of over fifty years of financial data from the UI system, taking
into consideration some of the consequences of a low taxable wage
base. The experience-rated nature of the UI tax will then be analyzed.
Institutional features that create imperfections in experience rating and
the economics literature that has examined the effects of these imper
fections on temporary layoffs will be discussed. Finally, conclusions
and implications for policy will be drawn.

Financial Structure of the Unemployment Insurance System
The system of financing UI benefits in the United States is con
trolled at both the federal and state levels of government. Some aspects
of the system are dictated directly by the federal government, and some
are determined entirely by the states. This part of the chapter will
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briefly describe the role played by each level in financing the system.'
A flow chart displaying this information is presented as an appendix to
the chapter.
Financing Regular Benefits

To pay for regular UI benefits, all employers are subject to a federal
unemployment insurance tax equal to 6.2 percent of their federal tax
able payroll. A federal tax credit of 5.4 percent is available, however,
for firms in states that have met a series of federal guidelines. These
guidelines require that, among other things, states have in place their
own tax system with some form of experience rating, charging a lower
tax rate to firms who lay off fewer workers. Since all states meet these
guidelines, the de facto federal component of the UI tax is 0.8 percent
of federal taxable payroll.2 This federal component of the tax is prima
rily used for administrative expenses and to pay for the federal share of
extended benefits. Federal revenues collected in excess of these
expenses go into a trust fund used to finance loans to states whose trust
funds have become insolvent.
Although state tax systems are required to meet certain guidelines,
these standards are generally quite broad. For instance, the federal tax
credit is awarded to firms in states that have an experience-rated tax
system, but the type of system employed is chosen at each state's dis
cretion. In addition, the federal taxable wage base is currently set at
$7,000 per covered worker, but states have the option to set a higher
taxable wage base. As a result of the latitude allowed in the guidelines,
state tax systems often exhibit substantial differences. The variation
across states in taxable wage bases and in experience-rating systems, in
particular, is explored in greater detail later in this chapter.
Financing Extended Benefits

Extended benefits (EB), or benefits paid to unemployed workers
beyond the regular benefit exhaustion date during periods of recession,
are financed differently than are regular UI benefits. The cost of pro
viding benefits of this type is split equally by the federal and state gov
ernments. As indicated, part of the federal component of the UI payroll
tax contributes to a trust fund that accumulates during periods of pros-
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perity to pay for the federal component of extended benefit costs dur
ing an economic downturn. The state component of EB is paid for with
reserves in the state's UI trust fund.
This system of financing extended benefit payments became quite
important during the most recent recession in 1990-1991. Problems in
the methods that trigger EB prevented the system from making pay
ments to workers in many locations during the downturn, as described
in chapter 6 of this volume. As a result, a stopgap measure, the Emer
gency Unemployment Compensation Act (EUCA), temporarily pro
vided benefits with the same intent. In those locations where EB had
been triggered, states had the option to terminate these payments and
to replace them with EUC benefits. The program, however, was
financed entirely by the federal government, as opposed to being split
by the state and federal governments. As a result, state UI reserves
were depleted to a far lesser extent over this period than they had been
in previous recessions.
Loans to State Governments

The strain imposed during recessions has often led to insolvency in
state trust funds, particularly following the 1975 and 1982-1983 reces
sions. To provide assistance in such a crisis, the federal government
established a system of loans that can be made to the states to finance
these temporary shortages in reserves. When the system was instituted
in 1954, it was very generous to the states. States had up to four years
to repay the loan with no interest. If the loan were not repaid during
that period, payment would be made by reducing the credit allowed
against the federal UI payroll tax until the repayment took place. This
system amounted to a several year interest-free loan from the federal
government to the states. The incentive to borrow eventually became
apparent as loans became quite common by the late 1970s; by 1979, 25
states had borrowed over $5.6 billion (Blaustein 1993). As a result,
loan provisions have been restricted over time. The biggest change in
the system took place in 1981, when the federal government started
charging interest on funds borrowed.
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Trends in Funding and the Taxable Wage Base
The financial condition of the UI system has weakened considerably
over the past several decades. This section of the chapter will more
fully explore the financial difficulties experienced by the system and
then move on to address a potential cause of the problem, a low and
largely unindexed taxable wage base. For this purpose, financial statis
tics will be examined that are aggregated over all states between the
years 1938 and 1993.3 Although each state administers its own UI sys
tem and some generalizations may not be appropriate for all states, the
decision to use aggregated data is driven by the desire to draw conclu
sions regarding the UI system as a whole.
Financial Condition of the Unemployment Insurance System

Over the years, state UI trust funds have fallen dramatically and
have become increasingly likely to experience a deficit during a major
recession. Figure 8.1 represents this pattern. It depicts the ratio of the
balance in state UI trust funds (net reserves) to total annual wages paid
over roughly the past half century.4 This ratio provides an indicator of
the health of the UI trust fund, such that larger ratios indicate larger
reserves. As trust funds are depleted, the ratio will approach zero, and a
negative ratio indicates a deficit in the funds. A strong cyclical compo
nent is apparent in figure 8.1, with the ratio of net reserves to wages
paid increasing during expansions and falling during recessions. This
makes sense because, during an expansion, relatively high employment
leads to larger tax revenues and fewer UI recipients while, in a down
turn, relatively high unemployment leads to smaller tax revenues and
more UI recipients.
The overriding trend apparent in the figure, however, is towards
lower fund reserves. In fact, the relatively large recessions of 1975 and
1983 led many state funds to run deficits that required loans from the
federal government to pay for UI benefits. The extent of the problem
was so severe in 1983 that the aggregate of all state trust funds was in
deficit. Prior to this, state trust funds never came close to running out of
money.
Many changes were made over the last two decades in an attempt to
restore solvency to the system. In 1981, the federal government pro-

Figure 8.1 Ratio of Net Reserves to Taxable Payroll, 1938-1993
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vided a strong incentive to states to keep their individual UI trust funds
solvent by legislating that interest would be charged on future loans. To
reduce UI expenditures, some states restricted eligibility so that fewer
people could receive benefits. In addition, in the highly inflationary
period of the late 1970s and early 1980s, many states did not increase
UI benefits, leading to a benefit cut in inflation-adjusted dollars. In
New York State, for example, the ratio of average weekly benefits to
average weekly wages, sometimes referred to as the replacement ratio,
fell from 0.326 in 1979 to 0.279 in 1982.
The biggest change in the states, however, was observed in the tax
rates assigned to the payrolls of employers. The time series of the aver
age employer tax rate is depicted in figure 8.2. Again, a strong cyclical
pattern is observed in this figure. During and just after a recession, tax
rates rise to cover the additional liabilities accrued by the system dur
ing the downturn. Ignoring the cyclically, the trend is towards higher
tax rates since the early 1950s. For example, the average employer tax
rate (as a percentage of taxable payroll) following the economic expan
sion of the late 1960s and early 1970s was under 1.5 percent. In 1990,
after another long expansion, the average rate was about 2 percent.
The increase in average tax rates masks some of the variability
across firms. Those firms at the maximum tax rate have faced a large
rise in tax payments. This pattern in the data can be seen in figure 8.3,
which represents the average tax schedule for states employing the
reserve ratio method of financing over the period 1978-1987. The
beginning and end points of this time span follow the end of a major
recession by a few years and represent roughly comparable points in
the business cycle. The schedules show that there has been a secular
increase in tax rates for those firms who lay off a lot of workers, lead
ing to a negative reserve ratio. The maximum rate increased from about
4.5 percent in 1978 to almost 7 percent in 1987.5 There has been some
change in tax rates faced by firms with lower reserve ratios, but there is
no obvious pattern to these changes. The conclusion apparent from this
figure is that states have attempted to recoup some of their increased UI
expenditures from the firms with the greatest layoff history.
Although these changes have improved the financial picture of the
UI system over the past decade, its condition is still relatively weak by
historical standards. Referring back to figure 8.1, the economic expan
sion of the middle and late 1980s restored UI trust funds to a level not

Figure 8.2 Average Employer Tax Rates, 1938-1993
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seen since 1974. The mild recession of 1990-1991 led to a relatively
small reduction in the size of the fund.6 However, a severe recession
could again lead to insolvency in many states. Reductions in the trust
find equal to those encountered in either the 1973-1975 or 1981-1982
recession would once more exhaust aggregate reserves in state UI trust
funds.
The Taxable Wage Base

The taxable wage base is another component of the UI financing
system subject to federal regulation. The federal government sets a
minimum wage base, currently $7,000, which must be met by all
states. Thus, employers only pay UI taxes on the first $7,000 of each
worker's earnings. States have the option of setting a taxable wage base
above the federal minimum. In 1994, thirty-nine states and the District
of Columbia elected to set a higher taxable wage base, although it was
$11,000 or less in 24 of these states (the level of the tax base for each
state is presented in table 8.1). In addition, seventeen states have
indexed their wage base, usually as a fraction of the average earnings
level in the state. Most of the bigger states, however, have not done so.
For example, the wage base in New York, California, and Florida is
$7,000, while the wage base in Texas and Illinois is $9,000.
With the exception of the minority of states that have indexed their
taxable wage base, adjustments are generally made in an ad hoc man
ner; without legislation specifying an increase, the wage base remains
constant. Adjustments have only been made sporadically since it was
first established in 1939, and inflation has severely eroded its real
value. In 1940, the taxable wage base was set at $3,000, equal to aver
age annual earnings at that time. After adjusting for inflation, this base
would provide roughly $31,000 worth of buying power today, which is
about four and one-half times the current $7,000 wage base. Moreover,
this method of financing stands in stark contrast to that of the social
security system, where legislation was first passed in 1972 to automati
cally adjust its taxable wage base to keep pace with inflation. In 1940,
the base in the social security system also equaled $3,000. As of 1972,
the social security taxable wage base had climbed to $9,000, and the
UI taxable wage had risen to $4,200. Today, the comparable figures are
$53,400 and $7,000 for social security and UI, respectively.
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Table 8.1 The Taxable Wage Base in 1994, by State

State
Hawaii
Alaska
Idaho
Washington
Oregon
New Jersey
Rhode Island
Utah
Nevada
Minnesota
Montana
Iowa
North Carolina
New Mexico
North Dakota
Wyoming
Massachusetts
Oklahoma
Wisconsin
Colorado
District of Columbia
Michigan
Arkansas
Connecticut
Illinois
Texas

Taxable
wage
base
$25,000
$23,800
$20,400
$19,000
$19,000
$17,200
$16,400
$16,200
$15,900
$15,100
$15,000
$13,900
$13,200
$13,100
$13,000
$11,400
$10,800
$10,700
$10,500
$10,000
$9,500
$9,500
$9,000
$9,000
$9,000
$9,000

Indexed
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
No
No
No
No
No
'No
No
No

State
Ohio
Delaware
Georgia
Louisiana
Maryland
Missouri
Alabama
Kansas
Kentucky
New
Hampshire
Pennsylvania
Vermont
Virginia
West Virginia
Arizona
California
Florida
Indiana
Maine
Mississippi
Nebraska
New york
Sourth Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee

Taxable
wage
base
$8,750
$8,500
$8,500
$8,500
$8,500
$8,500
$8,000
$8,000
$8,000

Indexed
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No

$8,000
$8,000
$8,000
$8,000
$8,000
$7,000
$7,000
$7,000
$7,000
$7,000
$7,000
$7,000
$7,000
$7,000
$7,000
$7,000

No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
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These patterns are shown in figure 8.4, which presents the fraction
of covered earnings taxable by both the UI and social security sys
tems. Throughout the 1940s, both systems taxed the same proportion
of earnings. A series of ad hoc adjustments to the social security tax
able wage base in the 1950s and 1960s maintained the wage base at a
roughly constant level while the UI wage base continued to fall.
Indexation and other tax increases actually raised the relative size of
the Social Security taxable wage base while a few ad hoc increases
only temporarily slowed the continued decline in the 1970s and 1980s
in the UI system.
Problems with the Current System

A major deficiency in the current system of UI financing is that the
infrequent, ad hoc adjustments to the taxable wage base lead to a con
tinual erosion of its financial stability. The problem rests in a few sim
ple accounting identities:
1. revenues collected are equal to the product of the tax rate and tax
able wages paid in the state,
2. benefits paid out are equal to the product of the number of unem
ployed, insured workers and the amount of benefits they collect,
and
3. if the benefits paid out exceed the revenues collected, the balance
in the UI trust fund must fall.
Even in the absence of severe cyclical downturns, these basic relation
ships indicate that the current system of UI financing will drift towards
insolvency. This is because benefit levels, for the most part, rise to keep
pace with inflation, but taxable wages do not. As a result, benefit pay
ments will continually increase more than revenues do and the trust
fund will persistently decline. Short-term benefit reductions, penalties
imposed for borrowing, and short-term tax rate increases cannot solve
this problem in the long run. Moreover, this difficulty is unrelated to
the outcome of the debate regarding the merits of a "forward-funded"
UI system (i.e., a system that finances large benefit payments made
during recessions by accumulating large reserves during booms rather
than by borrowing), discussed in chapter 9 of this volume. Regardless

Figure 8.4 Fraction of Covered Earnings Taxable by UI and Social Security, 1938-1993
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of the level of trust fund reserves deemed adequate, the accounting
identities suggest that reserves will slip lower and lower and will even
tually fall below that level.
To illustrate these concepts, figure 8.5 displays one measure indicat
ing the generosity of UI benefits and one measure indicating the tax bur
den imposed on workers' wages, where both measures are aggregated
across states. The generosity gauge is the ratio of average weekly bene
fits to average weekly wages.7 It expresses the fraction of the average
worker's wage that would be replaced by the average weekly benefit and
is therefore sometimes called the replacement ratio. The tax burden
gauge is the ratio of taxable wages to total wages paid in the state. It indi
cates what fraction of wages earned are taxed by the UI system.
Figure 8.5 shows that the generosity of UI benefits has remained
fairly constant over the past fifty years. The average weekly benefit
would replace roughly one-third of the average worker's weekly wage.
This figure also indicates, however, that the fraction of wages taxed by
the UI system has fallen dramatically. While virtually all wages paid
were taxable fifty years ago, only around one-third are currently tax
able. The decline in this ratio is a result of the increase in total wages
paid at roughly the rate of inflation while taxable wage growth has
been restricted due to the small and infrequent increases in the taxable
wage base. The discrete rises in this ratio in 1972, 1978, and 1983 cor
respond exactly with federally mandated increases in the taxable wage
base. This pattern in the UI taxable wage base stands in stark contrast
to the experience of the Social Security system.
The evidence presented in the figure suggests that, while the real
generosity of the UI system has been largely constant over time, the tax
burden falls almost unabatedly. Therefore, the simple accounting rela
tionships clearly indicate that the system must move towards insol
vency unless changes are made. Increasing tax rates continually is one
approach to providing adequate funding for the system, even in the
presence of a taxable wage base that is relatively constant in nominal
dollars. Increasing tax rates can maintain the basic accounting identi
ties if rates are raised fast enough to keep pace with the inflation
adjustments made to UI benefits. In fact, a pattern like this has taken
place over the past two decades, as shown in figure 8.2 and 8.3, and as
discussed earlier in the chapter. This approach, however, creates differ
ent problems, which are explored in the following section.

Figure 8.5 The Ratio of Taxable to Total Wages and the Replacement Ratio, 1938-1993
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Tax Rates and Low-Wage Workers

A payroll tax that only applies to earnings up to a specific level
results in a greater proportion of earnings being taxed for low-wage
workers than for high-wage workers. Both social security and UI taxes
share this feature, whose effect depends upon the incidence of the pay
roll tax.8 If the tax is paid largely by firms, it provides a disincentive for
firms to hire relatively less skilled workers. If the tax is passed along to
workers in the form of lower wages, it is a form of regressive taxation.
Either way, low-wage workers are hurt disproportionally by this type
of tax.
The problem with the UI tax is that it has historically had a roughly
constant taxable wage base and an increasing tax rate. As the taxable
wage base is eroded by inflation, only lower- and lower-wage workers
remain taxed on all or most of their earnings. Similarly, the taxable
wage base becomes a very small part of a high-wage worker's earnings
as wages grow with inflation. Therefore, the additional burden of the
tax borne by low-wage workers is growing over time.
Again, historical characteristics of the UI system aggregated across
states will illustrate this point. Table 8.2 considers three hypothetical
workers: one is a low-wage earner (making $5,000 per year in current
dollars), one is a moderate-wage earner (making $25,000 per year in
current dollars), and the third is a high-wage earner (making $75,000
per year in current dollars). The Consumer Price Index is used to con
vert these dollar amounts to comparable levels of purchasing power in
1954, 1969, and 1989. These years are chosen because they all repre
sent low points in tax rates following an extended economic expansion.
Using the historical tax rates and the federally mandated taxable wage
base for those years, an estimate is obtained of the percentage of each
worker's income paid to UI taxes.9
The results presented in table 8.2 demonstrate quite clearly the
increasing tax burden faced by low-wage workers or by the firms that
employ them. In 1954, a firm employing a low-wage worker paid 1.12
percent of the individual's wage as UI taxes, about five times the per
centage (0.22) paid by a firm employing a high-wage earner. A firm
employing a moderate wage earner paid 0.65 percent. Regressiveness
in the system grew somewhat during the relatively low inflation years
between 1954 and 1969. In the latter year, the tax burden for a low-
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wage worker increased slightly to 1.38 percent, while the high-wage
worker's burden fell to 0.2 percent, one-seventh the rate for the lowwage worker. The middle-wage worker's tax burden stayed roughly
constant. By 1989, however, the inflation of the 1970s and early 1980s
led to vastly different tax burdens. The tax imposed upon a firm
employing a low-wage worker increased to 2.18 percent of his/her
earnings. This is about 20 times the percentage paid by a firm employ
ing a high-wage worker, which dropped to 0.09 percent. Between 1954
and 1989, the tax burden facing low-wage workers doubled, while the
burden facing high-wage workers was cut in half.
Table 8.2 UI Tax Payments as Percentage of Earnings for Representative
Workers, Selected Years
Percentage
Taxes
of nominal
due in
Taxable
Tax
Earnings Earnings in
Year in 1990 $s nominal $s
wage base nominal $s earnings
rate
Low-wage worker
1.12
11.52
1,12
1954
3,000
1,029
5,000
138
18.60
1969
3,000
1.38
1,348
5,000
2.18
109.00
7,000
2.18
5,000
1989
5,000
Middle-wage worker
0.65
33.6
1954
3,000
1.12
5,145
25,000
0.61
41.4
1.38
25,000
1969
3,000
6,738
061
152.6
7,000
2.18
25,000
1989
25,000
High-wage worker
0.22
33.6
1954
3,000
1.12
15,435
75,000
0.20
41.4
1.38
20.213
75,000
1969
3,000
65.4
0.09
1989
7,000
2.18
75,000
75,000

Thus, disproportionate costs may be borne by low-wage workers or
by the firms that employ them as a result of the historical pattern of
maintaining a relatively constant taxable wage base while increasing
tax rates to finance inflation-adjusted benefits. Low-wage workers
either become more and more expensive employees relative to highwage workers or are subject to an increasingly regressive tax, depend
ing upon the incidence of the tax. This effect will continue until the
taxable wage base is indexed.

338

Financing Benefit Payments

Experience Rating and Employment Fluctuations
Another area in which state financing systems differ is in the way
they implement experience rating. Recall that an experience-rated state
tax system is required for firms to take a credit against the federal UI
tax. The method by which taxes are experience rated, however, is left
to the discretion of the states and has led to differences across states.
This part of the chapter will explore the various types of systems used
and will then proceed to review the evidence regarding claims that the
current system provides firms with an incentive to lay off workers.
State Tax Systems

The two most common ways of computing the tax rate a firm will be
charged are the reserve ratio and benefit ratio methods. Financing sys
tems of these types are in place in thirty-three states and seventeen
states, respectively. The remaining states have systems that are less
common and will not be described here. 10
Under a reserve ratio financing system, a "bank account" is estab
lished for each firm, with tax payments added to the account and UI
benefits drawn from it. The reserve ratio is the ratio of the reserves in
the firm's account to the average taxable payroll of the firm over, typi
cally, the past three years. Firms with a high reserve ratio have contrib
uted considerably more in taxes than they have paid out in benefits. In
contrast, firms with a negative reserve ratio have paid out more in ben
efits than they have paid in taxes.
Tax rates are assigned according to a tax schedule that relates a
firm's reserve ratio to a specific tax rate. A simplified version of a tax
schedule is presented in figure 8.6. A firm's UI tax rate is a decreasing
function of its reserve ratio, subject to a minimum and a maximum
rate. When a firm lays off workers, the benefits paid to that worker are
charged to the firm's account. Its reserve ratio, therefore, falls. For a
firm with a "moderate" reserve ratio (i.e., those firms located on the
sloped portion of the tax schedule) laying off an additional worker will
increase its tax rate. This represents the experience-rating feature of the
UI tax system. On the other hand, if the firm lays off enough workers,
its reserve ratio will fall beyond the point where the tax rate rises above
the maximum rate. At this point, laying off more workers will not lead
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to an increase in the tax rate charged to the firm. Moreover, a firm that
lays off relatively few workers and has a high reserve ratio will still pay
the minimum tax rate if it lays off an additional worker. It is for these
reasons that the system is said to be imperfectly experience rated.
Tax rates in a benefit ratio system are more directly linked to the
level of benefits received by a firm's laid-off workers. This system ties
a firm's UI tax rate to the ratio of the benefits drawn by its employees,
typically over the past three years, to the size of its taxable payroll dur
ing those years. A tax schedule then relates the firm's benefit ratio to a
tax rate that it must pay. The tax schedule is similar in nature to that
presented in figure 8.6, with the obvious exception that the benefit ratio
rather than the reserve ratio belongs on the x-axis. Again, moderate
layoff firms face tax rates that increase with their layoff experience.
The existence of a minimum and maximum tax rate indicates that the
system is only imperfectly experience rated.
Across states, tax levels vary dramatically. Table 8.3 presents the
minimum, maximum, and average tax rates for all states in 1993. Max
imum tax rates range from 5.4 percent in several states (the minimum
allowed by federal law) to 10 percent in Michigan. Average tax rates
range from 0.5 percent in South Dakota to 4.8 percent in Pennsylvania
and New York.
Tax Systems and Experience Rating
In describing the reserve ratio and benefit ratio systems, the feature
of imperfect experience rating shows up quite clearly because of the
presence of the minimum and maximum tax rates. Imperfect experi
ence rating creeps into the system in more subtle ways as well. This
section will more fully explore this aspect of the tax system.
One method of assessing the degree of experience rating across
states is the Experience Rating Index (ERI). This measure takes into
account benefits paid out that do not increase the tax imposed upon
firms because (a) the firm is at the minimum or maximum tax rate
(ineffectively charged benefits), (b) the firm is no longer operating in
the state (inactive charges), or (c) the benefit payments are not charged
back to the employer's account for some other reason (noncharged
benefits). Noncharged benefits may result, for instance, if a state elects

Table 8.3 Minimum, Maximum, and Average Tax Rates as a Percentage of Taxable Wages in 1993, by State
State
Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
District of Columbia
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine

Maximum Minimum
tax rate
tax rate
0.4
6.0
5.4
1.0
6.4
0.1
0.1
6.0
1.1
5.4
5.4
0.0
6.4
1.5
1.0
9.5
2.0
7.5
6.4
0.2
0.1
8.6
0.0
5.4
5.4
0.5
7.7
0.6
0.2
5.5
0.0
7.5
6.4
0.1
0.3
9.0
6.0
0.3
2.4
7.5

Average
tax rate
1.6
2.0
1.5
3.0
3.6
1.3
3.4
2.6
4.0
1.8
1.6
10.
1.8
2.9
1.2
1.6
2.4
2.1
1.9
3.8

State
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont

Maximum Minimum
tax rate
tax rate
0.3
6.4
0.1
5.5
0.3
5.4
0.1
6.5
0.5
5.8
0.6
5.4
2.5
7.0
0.0
5.7
0.4
5.4
0.7
8.5
0.1
5.5
1.6
54
2.1
10.5
2.2
8.3
1.2
5.4
0.0
7.0
0.2
10.0
0.3
6.4
0.4
8.0
0.6
5.9

Average
tax rate
1.4
1.2
1.5
2.2
1.2
1.5
4.8
1.0
1.4
2.9
1.2
2.6
4.8
3.7
1.8
0.5
2.0
1.3
1.0
2.7
(continued)

Table 8.3 (continued)
State
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri

Maximum Minimum
tax rate
tax rate
1.8
8.1
2.2
8.1
1.0
10.0
0.6
9.1
1.2
5.4
0.0
7.8

Average
tax rate
2.9
3.9
4.1
1.8
2.1
2.3

State
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming

Maximum Minimum
tax rate
tax rate
0.2
6.3
5.4
0.5
1.5
8.5
0.0
9.8
0.3
8.8

Average
tax rate
1.2
2.3
3.0
2.2
2.1
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to make payments to workers who quit their job after a disqualification
period or if the payments represent extended benefits.
Formally, the ERI is computed as
ERI = 100 - %IEC + %IAC -I- %NNC
where %IEC represents the percentage of benefit payments that are
ineffectively charged benefits, %IAC indicates the percentage of bene
fit payments that are charged to inactive firms, and %NNC is the per
centage of payments that are not charged to firms. An ERI of 100
indicates that all benefits are charged to firms and that the degree of
experience rating is complete. An ERI of zero would show that no ben
efits are charged to firms and that there would be no experience rating.
Table 8.4 presents the ERI and its components for all states in 1994. A
significant degree of variation is present in these data. For example, the
ERI in North Carolina is only 31 percent compared to 84 percent in
New York.
Although the ERI is a comprehensive source of data regarding the
current status of experience rating, it does have some limitations, as
highlighted by Vroman (1986, 1994). First, the ERI is just a snapshot
of the relationship between benefit payments and tax liabilities. It does
not take into account the fact that benefits incurred today will lead to
higher future tax payments by experience-rated firms. Second, the lag
between benefit charges and tax increases leads to cyclically in the
ERI. When a recession begins, benefit charges increase, but taxes for
experience-rated firms do not rise until the following year. Therefore,
the fraction of benefits that are ineffectively charged will appear to
increase. At the end of the recession, this lag will lead tax payments to
grow more rapidly than benefit payments and will reduce the ERI. This
cyclical component has nothing to do with structural changes in the UI
financing system and may provide policy makers with misleading data.
Recent empirical research in the academic literature has utilized an
alternative indicator of the degree of experience rating a firm faces
through a concept called the marginal tax cost (MTC). The MTC is
designed to measure the additional tax burden for a firm if it lays off a
worker and that worker receives one dollar in UI benefits. For firms at
the minimum or maximum tax rate in either type of system, the MTC
is zero since tax rates would be unaffected.

Table 8.4 Components of the Experience Rating Index (ERI) in 1994, by State
Ineffectively Inactive
charged
charges
State
(%)
(%)
Alabama
27
7
Alaska
NA
NA
Arizona
4
1
Arkansas
NA
NA
California
26
15
Colorado
18
9
Connecticut
26
2
Delaware
0
17
District of Columbia
15
19
Florida
4
6
Georgia
9
10
Hawaii
23
5
Idaho
31
2
Illinois
16
2
Indiana
5
8
Iowa
13
8
Kansas
18
8
Kentucky
13
8
Louisiana
1
9

Noncharged
(%)
14
NA
14
NA
6
5
14
1
1
15
7
39
17
11
11
12
15
2
15

ERI
52
NA
81
NA
53
68
59
83
64
75
75
33
50
71
75
66
59
77
75

State
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah

Ineffectively Inactive
charged
charges
(%)
(%)
15
9
10
8
14
1
11
7
52
10
7
9
8
7
38
12
17
6
12
6
6
13
20
11
16
11
9
8
12
6
27
7
1
14
NA
13
4
8

Noncharged
(%)
13
27
13
5
0
17
2
19
12
9
15
22
10
7
23
19
12
18
22

ERI
63
55
72
77
38
67
84
31
64
73
66
48
64
75
58
47
73
NA
66

Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri

11
NA
21
12
17
17
10

3
NA
6
8
1
14
1

26
NA
15
2
12
19
19

60
NA
58
77
69
50
70

Vermont
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wicsonsm
Wyoming

21
5
10
20
14
NA

9

8
9
16
4

10

20
10
42
5
12
11

51
77
39
59
70
NA
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For firms between the minimum and maximum rates, however, the
MTC is probably not equal to unity (i.e., the firm's tax burden will not
increase by one dollar) in either the reserve ratio or benefit ratio financ
ing systems. Consider a firm in a reserve ratio state that has constant
employment. 11 If this firm is located along the sloped portion of the tax
schedule and it pays out a one-dollar UI benefit, its reserve ratio will
fall and its taxes will increase in the following year. If the additional
tax liability in the next year is less than one dollar, then the firm will
not have yet fully repaid the dollar in benefits. Its reserve ratio will still
be higher than it was before the benefit payout and it will again face a
somewhat higher tax rate in the following year. This pattern will repeat
itself until the full dollar is repaid.
Although full repayment would indicate perfect experience rating,
that repayment may have taken place over several years. Therefore, the
present discounted value (PDV) of the additional taxes paid will actu
ally be less than one dollar, indicating imperfect experience rating.
Since the "imperfection" rests in the PDV calculation, two factors that
influence the degree of experience rating become apparent. First, the
slope of the tax schedule will influence how quickly the dollar is
repaid. If the slope is steep, the dollar will be repaid more quickly and
the MTC will be closer to unity. 12 Second, the interest rate used in the
PDV calculation will influence the MTC. Higher interest rates will
reduce the degree of experience rating.
This approach to Calculating the MTC and incentives for firms is
based upon a small change in benefit payments that is, perhaps, appro
priate in examining temporary layoffs. A reduction in the size of a
firm's workforce through permanent layoffs, however, may similarly
be subsidized by the UI system. Brechling and Laurence (1995) point
out that large changes in employment not only alter the tax rate, but the
size of the payroll upon which that tax has to be paid. Because the total
tax burden decreases in response to such downsizing, they argue that
this type of system encourages firms to lay off workers in this context
as well. Limited empirical research has considered the response of
employers to this incentive, and the remaining discussion will focus on
the effect of experience rating on temporary layoffs.
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Experience Rating and Temporary Layoffs

The employment effects of imperfect experience rating have gener
ated a significant amount of research over the last two decades. The
approaches taken to examine this issue have developed considerably
over the period and will be summarized in this section of the chapter.
The survey provided here is not intended to be complete but is pre
sented as an overview of developments in the literature. Previous sur
veys can be found in Brechling (1977), Topel and Welch (1980), and
Hamermesh (1990).
Theoretical foundations for this research were laid by Feldstein
(1976), Baily (1976), and Brechling (1977). The effect of imperfect
experience rating on layoffs was addressed in the context of an implicit
contract model. In this type of model, there is some form of long-term
attachment between firms and workers. Imperfect experience rating
leads to layoffs because layoffs are subsidized. If a firm lays off a
worker, the UI benefits received by that worker are greater than the
additional tax costs faced by the firm. If firms and workers have a longterm attachment, both firms and workers can benefit from this subsidy
if the firm cycles workers through temporary spells of unemployment.
The firm will benefit because it can pay the workers a little less. Work
ers will benefit because their total compensation, equal to wages and
UI payments, will be higher. Therefore, firms will use temporary lay
offs to extract the subsidy regardless of demand conditions, but partic
ularly during periods of low demand.
Initial attempts to empirically test this proposition typically ana
lyzed the effects of differences in parameters of the UI system on lay
offs. Feldstein (1978) used microdata from the 1975 Current
Population Survey to examine the probability of being on temporary
layoff on the survey date as a function of the average weekly UI benefit
in the worker's state. Since the absolute size of the subsidy created by
imperfect experience rating grows with the benefit level, he hypothe
sized that benefits should be positively correlated with the probability
of temporary layoff. The results from Feldstein's analysis supported
this hypothesis and led to the conclusion that a large share of tempo
rary layoff unemployment is created by imperfect experience rating.
Brechling (1981) used aggregate industry level data by state for the
years 1962-1969 to examine the impact of parameters of the tax sched-
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ule itself, such as the maximum tax rate and the slope. As discussed
earlier, a higher maximum or a steeper slope will increase the degree of
experience rating and should reduce layoffs. Support for this relation
ship is observed, particularly in response to differences in the maxi
mum tax rate.
The next major advance in this literature came in a series of papers
by Topel (1983, 1984, 1985). A significant contribution made by Topel
was his parameterization of the degree of experience rating. Rather
than bringing specific components of the UI system into his empirical
work, Topel introduced the concept of the marginal tax cost, measuring
the amount of a one-dollar benefit that is repaid by the firm in the form
of higher taxes. This parameterization provided a convenient approach
to observing that experience rating is imperfect even for firms between
minimum and maximum tax rates. Moreover, it provided a useful way
to simulate what would be the effect on temporary layoffs if the experi
ence rating were complete. Changing the MTC from its current level to
unity would approximate the effects of instituting a UI system with
perfect experience rating.
Topel's research computed the degree of experience rating aggre
gated across firms in twenty-nine different industries for several states
and a few years. Using microdata from the Current Population Survey,
he estimated models of the probability of being on temporary layoff as
a function of the MTC. Findings from this research uniformly showed
that workers employed in states and industries with a lower degree of
experience rating were significantly more likely to be temporarily laid
off. Movement from the current system to one with complete experi
ence rating would lead to approximately a one-third to one-half reduc
tion in temporary layoff unemployment, according to Topel's
estimates.
A problem with the research completed to this point was that it
ignored the effects of imperfect experience rating on layoffs at differ
ent times in the business cycle. The theoretical literature based on
implicit contract models indicated that an effect should be observed in
all periods but that it should be stronger during cyclical downturns. The
next advance in this literature explicitly incorporated differences over
the business cycle in the analyses.
The theoretical basis for much of this work also changed from an
implicit contract model, stressing long-term attachments between firms
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and workers, to adjustment cost models that place importance on the
costs of changing the size of a firm's workforce (Anderson 1993; Card
and Levine 1994). An experience-rated UI tax is treated as an adjust
ment cost. Firms that want to reduce the size of their workforce will
have to incur a greater firing cost the greater the degree of experience
rating. Importantly, firms that want to hire workers must also take this
cost into consideration because they will face a higher cost should they
decide to lay off those workers sometime in the future. Therefore, not
only does a greater degree of experience rating reduce the incentive to
lay off workers during an economic downturn, it reduces the incentive
for firms to hire workers during an expansion. In other words, the
greater the degree of experience rating, the less the variability in
employment over the business cycle. This pattern is depicted in figure
8.7.
Depending upon the data set employed, there are significant differ
ences in the empirical tests of this proposition. Card and Levine (1994)
use 10 years of data from the Current Population Survey; estimate
MTC measures by state, industry, and year; and assign these measures
to each individual in the sample. Their approach is similar to the one
taken by Topel, except that they explicitly model the effect of the MTC
on temporary layoffs in each year over the 10-year span from 19781987, which included a severe recession and two periods of economic
growth. They find that imperfect experience rating may be linked to as
much as 50 percent of temporary layoffs during the recessionary years
of 1982-1983, but that there are considerably smaller effects at the
peak of the business cycle in 1979 and 1986-1987. Similar results are
observed for temporary layoffs over seasonal patterns of employment
demand throughout the year. The advantage of the approach employed
by Card and Levine is that it utilizes a largely nationally representative
source of data over a long time period.
An alternative approach, implemented by Anderson (1993) and
Anderson and Meyer (1994), is to use the information available in a
unique source, the Continuous Wage and Benefit History (CWBH)
data. The CWBH represents quarterly UI administrative records on
firms and individuals in eight states between 1978 and 1984. The
advantage of this data source is that an MTC measure can be created
for individual firms and can then be applied to the employees of that
firm. Although use of the CWBH data allows for firm-level analysis, it
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introduces other problems; results may only pertain to those states
included in the survey and may not be nationally representative, and
personal characteristics are not available in this data source and cannot
be controlled for in the empirical work.
Using a subsample of firms in the retail trade industry from the
CWBH data, Anderson (1993) examines the cyclical pattern of
employment over a quarterly demand cycle as a function of the indi
vidual MTCs of the firms. Consistent with an adjustment cost model,
she finds that the peak-to-trough change in employment levels is
smaller among firms that face a higher MTC (i.e. a greater degree of
experience rating). Over the entire cycle, employment is shown to be
slightly higher in firms facing a higher MTC.
Quite recently, Anderson and Meyer (1994) have used the CWBH
data to carefully examine two potential problems that may have
affected previous empirical work. First, they consider problems that
may be present in the work by Topel (1983, 1984, 1985) and Card and
Levine (1994), who utilize measures of the MTC evaluated at the state/
industry level. Previous research indicates that this approach masks a
considerable degree of variability occurring across firms within states
and industries (Anderson and Meyer 1993) and may result in biases in
the estimated impact of imperfect experience rating. The results pre
sented by Anderson and Meyer indicate that aggregation has only a
small impact on the estimated effect of imperfect experience rating on
temporary layoffs.
Possibly a more important problem addressed by Anderson and
Meyer (1994) is the potential endogeneity of the MTC cost measures
in models of temporary layoffs. 13 Since a firm's MTC is determined by
its past layoff history, previous empirical models have estimated how
temporary layoffs are affected by MTC, which is a function of lagged
temporary layoffs. Serial correlation in a firm's layoff history will
therefore lead to endogeneity bias. Moreover, in prior research estimat
ing MTC measures aggregated to the state level, state tax schedules
may have shown a response to the aggregate layoff behavior of firms in
the state. If firms lay off many workers, state tax schedules may adjust
to provide the necessary revenue to pay for the additional benefits. 14
Anderson and Meyer find that, even after controlling for this source of
bias, over 20 percent of temporary layoffs can be attributed to imper
fect experience rating.
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Summary and Conclusions
This chapter has addressed two major developments in UI financing
since Haber and Murray's 1966 volume. First, the financial condition
of the system has been examined, along with the role that the structure
of the taxable wage base has had on this condition. The system was
shown to be financially weak and subject to insolvency should a major
recession occur. Moreover, the low taxable wage base, which is mainly
constant in nominal dollars, will continue to threaten the financial sta
bility of the system unless continually rising tax rates provide an offset.
This alternative may produce the necessary funds but will require the
system to place a larger and larger tax burden on low-wage workers.
These factors highlight the need to index the taxable wage base. 15
Although an increase in the wage base before instituting indexation
may be desirable to help assure the solvency of the fund, it appears that
such a tax increment would be impossible in the current political envi
ronment. Indexation, on the other hand, is not a tax increase; it merely
prevents inflation from eroding the current tax base.
The second goal of this chapter was to examine the effects of imper
fect experience rating on temporary layoffs. The literature addressing
this issue has developed considerably over the period. Additional
econometric problems, more complicated statistical techniques, and
more detailed data have emerged. However, empirical results have
been remarkably consistent; a movement to a financing system with
perfect experience rating will eliminate 20-50 percent of all temporary
layoffs. Although there is relative consistency in these findings, recent
evidence indicates that increasing the degree of experience rating will
not come without a price. Treating the UI tax as an adjustment cost, it
becomes clear that fewer layoffs during a downturn in economic activ
ity may be matched by fewer new hires during periods of economic
expansion. Some empirical research has supported this view.
These results provide no clear policy recommendations regarding
experience rating. A system with a greater degree of experience rating
may lead to less variability in employment over the business cycle than
would a system with a lower degree of experience rating. An evaluation
of which approach is preferable should, therefore, depend upon the
average level of employment over the entire business cycle in the two
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systems. A higher level of employment, on average, in a system with
less experience rating may compensate for the greater employment
variability. Unfortunately, not enough research has been conducted to
date to fully inform a policy conclusion here.
NOTES
I would like to thank Patty Anderson, Rob Pavosevich, and Bruce Vavnchek for comments on
a draft of this chapter, Tara Gustafson for outstanding research assistance, and Mike Miller of the
Unemployment Insurance Service for his help in obtaining some of the data used in the analysis
1 For more thorough discussions of the institutional features of UI financing, see Blaustem,
Cohen and Haber (1993) or Vroman (1986, 1994).
2. Of this federal tax, 0.2 percent was originally imposed in 1977 as a temporary surcharge to
build up reserves in an extended benefit trust fund It has been in place ever since.
3 These statistics are obtained from the U.S Department of Labor, Employment and Training
Administration (1983 and more recent supplements)
4 An alternative measure of the UI system's financial status is the high cost multiple, which
expresses the fund reserves as a fraction of the highest 12-month benefit payout in the state's his
tory. Trends in this measure are similar to those shown in figure 8.1 and are discussed in chapter 9
of this volume.
5. Part of this increase may be explained by 1985 changes in federal guidelines that raised the
federal unemployment tax to 6 2 percent and the tax credit to 5 4 percent for those states whose
maximum tax rate was at least 5 4 percent This change came in response to the large number of
state systems that were insolvent, indicating that many states would have had to increase tax rates
anyway Therefore, a hypothetical illustration of changes in state tax schedules over this period
without the alteration in federal policy would have likely looked similar.
6 As noted earlier, this experience is partly attributable to short-term problems in the EB sys
tem that imposed the entire cost of benefits paid beyond the standard exhaustion period on the fed
eral government. In recent recessions, the cost was split by the state and federal governments,
imposing a far greater burden on state trust funds, this will probably also be true in the future.
7 Other measures of generosity, which are not explored in detail here, include the potential
duration of benefits and the percentage of unemployed workers receiving UI benefits. On these
scales, benefits have become less generous over time
8. Anderson and Meyer (1994) examine the incidence of the UI payroll tax and find that most
of the tax is borne by firms
9 Results would be somewhat different for states that have chosen to increase their taxable
wage base above the federally mandated level One can interpret the numbers provided here as
representing workers who live in states like California or New York that have maintained their tax
able wage base at this level
10. Details regarding other types of systems and an extended discussion of many issues in UI
financing can be found in Becker (1972).
11. A similar analysis could be reported for a firm in a benefit ratio state but is omitted in this
case for the purposes of brevity. See Card and Levine (1994) for a more formal treatment of the
material presented here.
12. In fact, if the slope is "steep enough," it is possible for the MTC to be greater than unity.
13. Card and Levine (1992) also present an analysis of this problem, although one which is not
as complete as that in Anderson and Meyer (1994)
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14. In fact, this effect is institutionalized in many states that have adopted a series of tax
schedules. The particular tax schedule in effect at a point in time is a function of the size of the UI
trust fund at that time. As the trust fund is drawn down during a recession, tax schedules increase.
15. The implications of increasing the federal taxable wage base have been addressed in detail
by Cook et al. (1995).

Appendix to Chapter 8
The Role of Federal Financing
in the Unemployment Insurance System
Mike Miller
U.S. Department of Labor

Although state unemployment insurance (UI) taxes pay the greater share of
the overall costs of the UI system (approximately 75 percent over the 19881995 period), there is also a key role for federal financing. The overall funding
flow of the system is summarized in appendix figure 8.1. Federal funding
sources include both payroll taxes and general revenues. The three areas of the
system that are federally funded are state and federal administration of employ
ment security programs, various federal and extended benefits, and loans to in
solvent States.
Federal Unemployment Tax Act
The Federal Unemployment Tax Act (PUTA) tax is a national payroll tax
collected by the Internal Revenue Service. The FUTA tax plays three different
roles in the UI system. The first one, as has been discussed, is to provide a pow
erful incentive for states to legislate a UI system that conforms to federal re
quirements. This is accomplished by giving a large tax credit to employers in
states with approved systems. The second role, which will be discussed further,
is to provide a repayment mechanism for loans to states.
The third role is to provide financing for certain costs of the system. The
items funded by the FUTA tax include UI administration, at both the federal
and state levels, most federal and state Employment Service costs, veterans
employment programs, labor market information programs, collection of the
FUTA tax, management of the Unemployment Trust Fund, the federal share of
federal-state Extended Benefits (EB), a portion of outlays under temporary re
cessionary benefit extensions, and loans to states.
The current FUTA tax rate is 6.2 percent, payable on the first $7,000 of a
worker's wages in a calendar year. Under normal conditions, employers re
ceive a 5.4 percent tax credit, leaving a net effective tax rate of 0.8 percent of
taxable wages. Appendix table 8.1 shows the history of the FUTA rate and tax
able wage base. The current rate includes a 0.2 percent surcharge first imple
mented in 1977 to repay a general fund debt caused by heavy outlays for EB
and Federal Supplemental Benefits (FSB). When the debt was repaid in 1987,
the surcharge was scheduled to trigger off. However, Congress has chosen to
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Appendix Figure 8A.1 Federal-State UI System Sources of Funds
100%
regular benefits

State
trust fund
Employer
taxes

State
taxes*
FUTA

50%
EB

FUA
EUCA

50%
EB

— _ j

Temporary
benefits
Federal
ESAA

Program
administration

FUBA
General
revenue

State
TAA
UCX

FECA
UCFE
*Includes employee contributions for three states
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extend this tax several times, usually for the purpose of federal deficit reduc
tion. Currently, the effective rate is scheduled to drop from 0.8 percent to 0.6
percent on January 1, 1999. No change has been made in either the effective
tax rate or the taxable wage base since 1983.
Appendix Table 8A.1 FUTA History
Calendar
years
1936-1939
1940-1960
1961
1962
1963
1964-1969
1970-1971
1972
1973
1974-1976
1977
1978-1982
1983-1987
1988-1990
1991-1992
1993-1996

Total
effective rate
0.3
0.3
0.4
0.8
0.65
0.4
05
0.5
0.58
0.5
0.7
0.7
0.8
0.8
0.8
0.8

Tax rates (percent)
EUCA
ESAA
share
share

0.45
0.45
0.45
0.45
0.45
0.45
0.48
0.52
0.72
0.64

005
0.05
0 13
0.05
0.25
0.25
0.32
018
0.08
0.16

FUA
share

0.10

Taxable wage
base ($)
All wages
3000
3000
3000
3000
3000
3000
4200
4200
4200
4200
6000
7000
7000
7000
7000

General Revenues
Although the UI system is basically an employer-financed program, federal
general revenues also play a role. In terms of size, one of the most important
items funded from general revenues is all or part of the cost of temporary ben
efit extensions, which are enacted by the Congress to provide additional bene
fits during economic downturns. These benefits, which are typically 100
percent federally funded, may be financed by either the FUTA tax or general
revenues or both. The deciding factor usually has been whether or not suffi
cient FUTA funds are available in the extended benefit account. General reve
nues are used indirectly to pay for benefits for ex-federal workers and exservicemen, via reimbursements by the affected agencies. General revenues are
used to pay for special programs that affect targeted groups, such as benefits
under the Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA) program. General revenues also
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come into play as a borrowing source when the federal accounts are insolvent.
In the past, general revenues were also used to pay for such temporary pro
grams as Special Unemployment Assistance (SUA) in the mid-1970s.
The Federal Accounts
There are four federal accounts in the Unemployment Trust Fund (UTF) that
are used to provide federal financing. Some funding is also done0 directly
through an appropriation.
Employment Security Administration Account
The Employment Security Administration Account (ESAA) account is used
to fund the administrative costs of the UI system and of other related employ
ment security programs. Virtually all of the income to this account is from the
FUTA tax. Items funded include all costs of UI administration at both federal
and state levels. At the state level, in addition to UI administration, this account
funds 97 percent of state Employment Service costs, two veterans employment
programs, and labor market information programs run by the states for the Bu
reau of Labor Statistics. At the federal level, this account pays for all Depart
ment of Labor activities related to employment security programs. In addition,
Treasury administrative costs related to collecting the FUTA tax and to man
aging and investing the UTF are charged to the ESAA account.
Extended Unemployment Compensation Account
The Extended Unemployment Compensation Account (EUCA) pays for the
federal share (50 percent) of benefit outlays under the permanent federal-state
EB program. FUTA receipts are used for this purpose. EUCA is also used to
fund temporary recessionary benefit programs, such as the recent Emergency
Unemployment Compensation (EUC) program. Whether FUTA or general
revenues are used to fund these programs, all funds flow through this account.
Federal Unemployment Account
The Federal Unemployment Account (FUA) provides loans to states under
Title XII of the Social Security Act. All state loan repayments, either voluntary
or through FUTA credit reductions, are deposited in this account, as are interest
payments.
Each of these first three accounts (ESAA, EUCA, and FUA) earns interest
at the same rate as is true for the state trust fund accounts. When any of these
three accounts becomes insolvent, it may borrow interest-free from one of the
other two. Interaccount borrowing first became effective in 1993. If the other
accounts do not have sufficient balances to allow this, funds may be borrowed
from general revenues, with interest.
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Federal Employees Compensation Account
The Federal Employees Compensation Account (FECA) acts as a revolving
fund to pay for two federal programs, Unemployment Compensation for Fed
eral Employees (UCFE) and Unemployment Compensation for ex-Servicemen
(UCX). States draw from this account to pay benefits, then provide information
to the U.S. Department of Labor, which in turn bills the appropriate agencies
on a quarterly basis. Reimbursements from the agencies then flow into the FE
CA. General revenue advances may be made to the account if it becomes insol
vent. These do not have to be repaid until the FECA balance is considered to
exceed future needs.
Federal Unemployment Benefits and Allowances
Federal Unemployment Benefits and Allowances (FUBA) is an appropria
tion, rather than a trust fund account. Currently, this appropriation is used to
fund benefits (after UI exhaustion) and training for import-impacted workers
under the Trade Act. This appropriation has in the past been used to pay for a
variety of federal benefit programs, including benefits for workers displaced by
Redwood Park expansion, and benefits to Public Service Employment partici
pants.
Account Flows and Ceilings
FUTA receipts currently flow into two accounts, ESAA and EUCA (appen
dix figure 8.2). FUA also took in a share of FUTA receipts for three years, cal
endar years 1988-1990, but currently gets only those receipts attributable to
reduced credits for loan repayment. Eighty percent of FUTA receipts are re
tained in ESAA, with the remaining 20 percent going to EUCA. The distribu
tion of FUTA receipts has been changed a number of times over the years.
Appendix table 8.1 shows the history of this distribution since EUCA was es
tablished in 1970.
At the end of each fiscal year, a ceiling is applied to every account, and ex
cess balances are transferred out (appendix figure 8.2). For ESAA, the ceiling
is 40 percent of the spending of the current year from the account. For EUCA
and FUA, the ceilings are percentages of total Ul-covered wages, one-half and
one-quarter of 1 percent, respectively. The procedure for transferring excess
balances is that first, EUCA and FUA balances are checked and any excesses
are transferred to ESAA. Then, if ESAA has an excess, that excess is trans
ferred to EUCA to the extent that account is below its ceiling. The remaining
excess, if any, is transferred to FUA to the extent that account is below its ceil
ing. In the event that all three accounts are at their ceilings at the end of a fis
cal year, the remaining excess is distributed to state trust fund accounts in
proportion to FUTA taxable wages by state. This is called a Reed Act distribu-

Appendix Figure 8A.2 Flow of FUTA Funds
0.8% employer tax*
Monthly transfers of all net collections
EMPLOYMENT SECURITY ADMINISTRATION ACCOUNT (ESAA)—finances administrative costs of employment
security programs: 0.64% of the 0.8% tax is retained in ESAA, while 0.16% is transferred to EUCA
Ceiling (retained in this account at the beginning of a fiscal year): 40% of the amount appropriated for the prior fiscal year
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If ESAA, EUCA, and FUA are over ceiling on October 1, the excess funds are distributed to state trust fund accounts.
*Effective tax rate, after 5 4% is offset against 6.2% federal unemployment tax. Effective rate will drop to 0 6% on January 1, 1999.
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tion. A Reed Act distribution has occurred only three times, all in the mid1950s. These funds, although residing in the state trust fund accounts, may be
used for UI program administration.
Title XII Loans
An important aspect of federal financing is the Title XII loan system. Loans
are available to states without any qualifying requirements other than insolven
cy. States apply to the U.S. Department of Labor and are approved for specific
amounts, but loans are made only to the extent a state's balance falls below zero
on any given day. Loan funds come from the FUA account. Since 1982, interest
has been charged on loans, except those that are repaid within the same fiscal
year. The interest rate is equal to the average rate earned by the UTF during the
last quarter of the prior year.
Repayments are made in one of two ways. The state may transfer monies
from its trust fund account to the FUA account. Alternatively, there is an auto
matic repayment mechanism that operates via the FUTA credit. In the third
year of a loan, the 5.4 percent tax credit is reduced by 0.3 percent, making the
effective FUTA tax rate 1.1 percent for employers in the affected state. The
amount of receipts attributable to the credit reduction goes to the FUA account
and reduces the state's outstanding loan balance. In subsequent years, as long
as there is a loan outstanding, the credit is reduced by greater and greater
amounts. The basic increment is 0.3 percent per year, but this can be varied us
ing a calculation involving the state's average tax rate and benefit cost rate. To
add further complexity, there are provisions for several types of tax relief. To
receive relief for its employers, the state must apply to the U.S. Department of
Labor and meet certain criteria related to solvency.
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State unemployment insurance (UI) programs in the middle of the
1990s have aggregate trust fund balances totaling more than $30 bil
lion. Most state UI programs passed through the 1990-1992 recession
ary period without needing to borrow from the U.S. Treasury. This
stands in sharp contrast to the recessions of 1973-1975, 1980, and
1981-1982, when borrowing was widespread and large-scale and
indebtedness extended over multi-year periods.
This chapter reviews the history of UI trust fund financing with par
ticular attention to recent developments. It is divided into six main sec
tions. The first provides a long-run overview of UI trust fund reserves
from the program's inception through the mid-1990s. The next section
reviews the history of borrowing and loan repayments with particular
attention to changes caused by revised debt repayment provisions of
the early 1980s. Without attempting to be definitive, this part also dis
cusses the question of trust fund adequacy and some common mea
sures of trust fund adequacy. The third section introduces the topic of
flexible financing as a benefit funding strategy. Individual elements of
flexible financing are identified and their growth and prevalence are
described. The fourth section undertakes several investigations of flexi
ble financing. These help in an assessment of its overall quantitative
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importance. The fifth section discusses policy implications of flexible
financing, and the final section provides a summary and conclusions.
The main conclusions of the chapter can be stated quite simply.
1. The state UI trust funds are now more healthy than at the end of
the 1970s and start of the early 1980s, but not so large that the
risks of insolvency and debt are merely matters of historical inter
est. The fact that borrowing during 1990-1994 was so modest is
partly attributable to the mild nature of the recession.
2. There is a continuing need for states to maintain reserves to avert
large-scale borrowing during a future recession. We note and
express concern for the comparatively modest pace of trust fund
rebuilding during 1993-1994. It appears likely that reserves avail
able for the next recession will be less adequate than they were
prior to the 1990-1992 recession.
3. While flexible financing provisions are now more prevalent in UI,
we were not able to demonstrate an increased quantitative impor
tance of such provisions compared to the situation, for example,
twenty years ago.
4. The speed and strength of automatic financing responses built into
current UI statutes appear inadequate to the needs that would
arise in a future downturn if its depth and severity equaled the
average of the eight post-World War II recessions.

Trends in Aggregate Unemployment Insurance Reserves
Following the establishment of state UI programs in 1937, the his
tory of aggregate trust fund reserves falls into three distinct periods.
Sustained and large accumulations occurred during the earliest years.
This was caused by two factors: lower benefit costs than originally
anticipated and the effects of full employment during World War II. As
a fraction of covered payrolls, aggregate reserves reached their all-time
peak at the end of 1945 (10.4 percent). Modest absolute growth in
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reserves continued through the end of 1948, when the $7.60 billion
total represented 7.91 percent of covered payrolls.
These years of trust fund accumulations clearly were helped by the
strong macroeconomic environment associated with World War II.
Aggregate benefit payments, which had averaged about 1.5 percent of
covered payrolls during 1938-1940, averaged only about 0.5 percent of
payrolls during 1941-1945, with payout rates especially low during
1943 and 1944. Despite large reductions in average tax rates (from
2.69 percent of payrolls in 1938 to 1.50 percent in 1945), tax revenues
exceeded benefits in every year through 1945.
The early years of the program also witnessed changes that effec
tively increased the average duration of benefits. In the initial years of
UI, nearly all states imposed a two- or three-week waiting period and
limited the maximum benefit duration to 15 or 16 weeks. 1 These limi
tations were premised on actuarial expectations that benefit payouts
would average 3 percent of payrolls. In fact, actual payout rates during
this period were much lower, especially during World War II. As expe
riences with low payout rates persisted, states modified their laws to
shorten the waiting period and to lengthen maximum duration. These
changes occurred mainly in the 1940s and 1950s.
During the thirty-two years from 1948 to 1979, growth in UI trust
fund reserves lagged substantially behind the growth in the economy.
Table 9.1 helps illustrate this situation, showing aggregate net reserves,
covered payrolls, and net reserves as a percentage of payrolls (com
monly termed the reserve ratio) for selected years.2 Of the nine individ
ual years displayed in the table the first eight represent prerecession
years for the individual post-World War II recessions, with the back-toback recessions of 1980-1983 and 1990-1992 treated as single epi
sodes. The most interesting feature of the 1948-1979 period is the con
tinuous decline in aggregate reserves measured as a percentage of
payrolls, from 7.91 percent in 1948 to 0.91 percent in 1979. Even dur
ing the long continuous expansion of the 1960s, when aggregate
reserves nearly doubled, growing from $6.67 billion to $12.64 billion,
there was a small decline in net reserves relative to total payrolls.
Since state trust funds were so large at the start of the 1948-1979
period, the decline in reserves did not present financing problems for
many states until the mid-1970s. Alaska, Michigan, and Pennsylvania
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were the only states that obtained loans to finance benefits during the
1950s and 1960s. All of these loans were fully repaid by the late 1960s.
Table 9.1 Aggregate UI Trust Fund Reserves for Selected Years,
1948 to 1994

Year
1948
1953
1957
1959
1969
1973
1979
1989
1994

End-of-year net
trust fund balance
7603
8.913
8.659
6.674
12.636
10.882
8.583
36.871
31.344

Annual covered
payrolls
96.1
139.2
173.6
186.9
365.7
510.0
938.4
1,918.0
2,368.5

Net reserves
as a percentage
of payrolls
7.91
6.41
4.99
3.57
3.46
2.13
0.91
1.92
1.32

SOURCE Data from the U S Department of Labor, Unemployment Insurance Service Data on
reserves measured in billions of dollars Data refer to all fifty-three programs. Payroll data for
1994 are preliminary

Substantial drawdowns of state trust funds occurred in the early
1970s. The first states to require loans were Connecticut, Vermont, and
Washington during 1972-1974, with reductions in defense-related pro
curement causing especially high unemployment in both Connecticut
and Washington during 1970-1972.
Large-scale borrowing from the U.S. Treasury first became wide
spread in 1975 as the 1974-1975 recession caused financing problems
for many states. Nearly half of all UI programs required loans during
1975-1978, and total borrowing exceeded $5.0 billion. Furthermore,
the post-1975 recovery was not sufficiently robust to fully restore trust
fund balances by the end of the 1970s. Note in table 9.1 that net
reserves at the end of 1979 totaled only $8.58 billion, about $2.3 bil
lion less than at the end of 1973. The reserve ratio at the end of 1979
was only 0.91 percent, roughly one-fourth of the reserve ratio at the
end of 1969, and the lowest prerecession reserve ratio shown in Table
9.1.
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Because state programs entered the 1980-1983 recessionary period
with historically low reserves, borrowing was even more widespread
and of larger scale during the early 1980s than in the previous decade.
Table 9.1 shows that substantial net trust fund accumulations occurred
between 1979 and 1989. This ten-year interval is appropriately divided
into an initial four years of recession (1980-1983) followed by six
years of substantial trust fund building. Net reserves were actually neg
ative at the end of 1983 (-$5.8 billion, not shown in table 9.1) so that
the 1984-1989 period had a total accumulation of more than $42 bil
lion.
Despite the reserve buildup of 1984-1989, note in table 9.1 that the
1989 net reserve balance of $36.87 billion represented only 1.92 per
cent of covered payrolls. As a fraction of covered payrolls this level
was only slightly more than half the levels of 1959 and 1969 and some
what smaller than the balance at the end of 1973. Despite net reserves
being relatively lower in 1989 than in 1973, state borrowing during the
most recent recession was much smaller than during the mid-1970s. A
discussion of the contrasting pattern of borrowing in the two periods is
reserved for the next section.
The final aspect of table 9.1 to note is the aggregate reserve position
of the states at the end of 1994. Net reserves of $31.34 billion repre
sented 1.32 percent of covered payrolls, roughly midway between the
reserve levels of 1979 and 1989 when measured as a percent of covered
payrolls. The $31.34 billion represents an increase of $5.50 billion in
net reserves from two years earlier, the low point of the most recent
recession. It should be noted that the $2.75 billion annual rate of trust
fund accumulations during 1993 and 1994 stands in contrast to an
annual accumulation rate that averaged $7.0 billion during 1984-1989.
If one were to speculate on the net reserve position of the states at the
start of the next recession, it would appear that reserves will be smaller
relative to covered payrolls than they were prior to the 1990-1992
recession.
To summarize, the history of aggregate net reserves since the incep
tion of unemployment insurance falls into three periods: (1) 19371948—substantial reserve accumulations; (2) 1948-1979—substantial
losses of reserve adequacy; and (3) 1979 to the present—trust fund
building, although the high point of the period (1989) did not reach the
level of 1973. Furthermore, based on data from 1993 and 1994, recent
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reserve accumulations have occurred at a substantially slower pace
than during the 1984-1989 period. This has obvious implications for
potential borrowing by the states during the next recession.

A Brief History of State Borrowing
Funding Concepts

Revenues that fund regular state UI programs are obtained mainly
from payroll taxes on covered employers. Tax receipts are deposited
into state UI trust fund accounts maintained at the U.S. Treasury. These
accounts are the so'urce for benefit payments to eligible claimants.
The funding strategy for regular UI is usually characterized as prefunding (or advance funding or forward funding). Trust fund balances
are built up prior to recessions, drawn down during recessions, and
then rebuilt during the subsequent recoveries. This funding arrange
ment means that the program acts as an automatic stabilizer of eco
nomic activity, i.e., it makes larger injections than withdrawals into the
spending streams during recessions and larger withdrawals than injec
tions during economic recoveries. The preceding characterization was
less accurate during the recessions of the mid-1970s and the early
1980s because the trust fund balances were not adequate to pay regular
UI benefits to all claimants. Large-scale and persistent state borrowing
took place.
During the most recent downturn, state UI trust funds were gener
ally adequate to meet demands for benefit payments. For the five full
years of 1990 to 1994, only seven states required loans from the Fed
eral Unemployment Account (FUA), the federal trust fund loan
account, and only two states (Connecticut and Massachusetts) engaged
in "large-scale" borrowing. 3 As noted, this recent situation stands in
sharp contrast to the recessions of 1974-1975 and 1980-1983. In both
earlier periods, borrowing was much more widespread and larger in
relative scale.
To place 1990-1994 trust fund borrowing experiences into more of a
historical perspective, table 9.2 provides summary data that extend
back over the 1970s and 1980s. The top panel in table 9.2 summarizes

Table 9.2 Number of States by High-Cost Multiple and Borrowing Activity
Negative
0
1
9
0

0.0 - 0.5
0
4
13
9

Initial HCMs
States with loans
States with "large" loans

1
1
1

4
4
4

Initial HCMs
States with loans
States with "large" loans

9
8
2

13
11
6

Initial HCMs
States with loans
States with "large" loans

0
0
0

9
4
2

End of year
1969
1973
1979
1989

High-cost multiples (HCMs)
1.5 - 2.0
1.0 - 1.5
0.5 - 1.0
15
16
1
12
12
14
2
12
16
18
3
22
State borrowing activities, 1979-1979
12
12
14
2
5
12
1
1
8
State borrowing activities, 1980-1987
2
12
16
2
0
10
1
0
5
State borrowing activities, 1990-1994
18
3
22
0
0
3
0
0
0

2.0+
20
9
0
0

Total
52
52
52
52

9
0
0

52
24
15

0
0
0

52
31
14

0
0
0

52
7
2

National
HCM
1.68
1.04
0.41
0.87

SOURCE Data from the U S. Department of Labor, Unemployment Insurance Service. Data exclude the Virgin Islands. Large loans are defined as total
borrowing over the indicated periods equal to 1 percent or more of total payrolls for a single year, 1975, 1984, and 1991, respectively
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state UI trust fund reserve balances at the end of four separate years:
1969,1973,1979, and 1989. These four dates were selected (as in table
9.1) because they precede the onset of recessions and recession-related
increases in the demand for UI benefit payments.
The information summarized in table 9.2 involves the concept of the
high-cost multiple (HCM), also known as the reserve ratio multiple.
This is a UI actuarial concept that assesses state reserve adequacy by
taking into consideration three important factors pertinent to the state:
the balance in its UI trust fund, the scale of its economy, and its own
past experiences in paying UI benefits. The denominator in the HCM is
the highest cost benefit payout period in the state's history. This is total
benefit payout over a twelve-month period expressed as a percentage
of covered wages for the same period. The interstate range of high-cost
percentages extends from a low of 1.04 percent (in South Dakota
between January and December 1964) to a high of 4.37 percent (in
Rhode Island between January and December 1975). The highest cost
period for the U.S. as a whole was 2.24 percent (between January and
December 1975).
The numerator of the HCM, the reserve ratio, is the end-of-year trust
fund balance divided by covered wages for the year and expressed as a
percentage.4 The ratio of these two ratios, the HCM, is thus a measure
whose numerator incorporates information on both the UI trust fund
balance and the on scale of the state's economy (as approximated by
covered wages) while the denominator is a measure of risk, the highest
previous twelve-month payout rate.
In the past, some have advocated that states build trust fund reserves
to levels that produce an HCM of 1.5. This level implies that the fund
balance would equal eighteen months of benefits if paid out at the his
torically highest payout rate. As a measure of trust fund adequacy, the
HCM has its critics. Many practitioners feel that the 1.5 HCM is too
conservative as a standard, i.e., that a prudent state could function with
a much lower trust fund balance with little or no risk of fund insol
vency.5
While trust fund financing has been practiced since the inception of
UI, there is no consensus over the appropriate measure of trust fund
adequacy. The recently disbanded Advisory Council on Unemploy
ment Compensation (ACUC) examined funding issues in its February
1995 Report.6 Chapter 5 of the report analyzed the funding situation of
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the states as of the end of 1993 under three alternative potential sol
vency standards. Table 5.3 in the report shows the number of states
meeting HCM solvency standards ranging from 0.25 to 1.75 using
seven measures of high costs: one involving the highest twelve-month
costs ever experienced, three involving the highest twelve-month cost
periods over the past ten years and three involving the highest twelve
month cost periods over the past twenty years.
The ACUC recommended that states meet an HCM standard of 1.0,
where the state's high cost rate is measured as the average of the three
highest-cost twelve-month periods over the past twenty years. The
ACUC also recommended that the federal partner provide four specific
financial incentives to the states to meet forward funding goals, e.g.,
preferential interest rates for achieving large balances and lower inter
est rates on recession-related borrowing if prerecession balances
equaled or exceeded solvency standards.7 The ACUC's financing rec
ommendations, if instituted, would improve the solvency of many state
UI programs.
Summary of State Borrowing

Because UI trust fund balances were so large during the initial postWorld War II decades, there was a very limited need for state borrow
ing from the U.S. Treasury. As noted, just three states, Alaska, Michi
gan and Pennsylvania, required loans before 1970, and only Alaska
actually used its loans to pay benefits. These loans were secured
mainly during 1958 and 1959, and repayments were completed during
1967 and 1968.
The post-1970 experiences have been much different. The top panel
of table 9.2 displays the distribution of HCMs prior to the four most
recent economic downturns. 8 Each row shows multiples for fifty-two
UI programs (all except the Virgin Islands). The final entry for each
row is the national HCM. From this last column as well as from the
distributions of state multiples, it is clear that reserves were most
ample at the end of 1969 and lowest at the end of 1979. Between 1979
and 1989, most states increased reserves substantially, and the national
high-cost multiple roughly doubled, increasing from 0.41 to 0.87.
The lower three panels in table 9.2 then summarize state borrowing
experiences in the three most recent downturns. Each panel shows how
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many states needed loans and how many needed "large" loans, i.e.,
loans that totaled 1.0 percent or more of covered payrolls. The twentyfour states that needed loans during 1974-1979 borrowed a total of
$5.5 billion. Between 1980 and 1987, a total of $24.0 billion was bor
rowed by thirty-one programs. In contrast, borrowing by seven states
during 1990-1994 totaled only $4.4 billion, less in absolute value than
during 1974-1979. The comparative scale of borrowing during the
three recessionary episodes is vividly illustrated when total loans are
expressed as a percentage of payrolls for one year during each period:
0.95 percent during 1974-1979, 1.75 percent during 1980-1987, but
only 0.21 percent during 1990-1994.9 Table 9.2 also shows the number
of states needing large loans during the three episodes. These respec
tive counts are fifteen, fourteen and two.
The purpose of prefunding (or advance funding) UI programs is to
have adequate reserves in the state trust funds to make benefit pay
ments during recessions without resorting to borrowing (or at least
large-scale borrowing). By ranking states according to their HCMs, the
bottom panels of table 9.2 provide a convenient summary of the preva
lence of borrowing according to an indicator of prerecession reserve
adequacy. In each episode, borrowing and large-scale borrowing were
most prevalent among states with low prerecession fund balances.
States with HCMs of 1.0 or larger generally have been successful at
avoiding borrowing. Conversely, those with multiples below 0.5 have
been most likely to need loans and to need large loans.
Table 9.2 also illustrates that the 1.5 HCM guideline is not a fool
proof indicator of reserve adequacy. There have been states that
entered recessions with multiples above 1.5 that subsequently needed
loans. Conversely, not all states with prerecession multiples below 0.5
have needed loans. However, for identifying states at risk of needing
loans and of needing large loans, the HCM is a useful indicator. 10
An interesting contrast emerges when borrowing during the 19801987 and 1990-1994 periods is compared. For HCMs in the 0.0 to 0.5
and 0.5 to 1.0 ranges, note that the proportions that borrowed were
much lower during 1990-1994 than during 1980-1987. In addition, the
proportions needing large loans were also much lower during 19901994." One important reason for reduced borrowing activity among
states with comparable prerecession HCMs was the relative mildness
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of the recent downturn when compared to the back-to-back recessions
of the early 1980s.
Borrowing Provisions

State UI programs are required to make timely payments to eligible
claimants regardless of current balances in their trust fund accounts
held at the U.S. Treasury. If state reserve balances are inadequate there
are statutory provisions for borrowing from the Treasury. These provi
sions, in Title XII of the Social Security Act, are important to review.
Treasury loans for purposes of making benefit payments are avail
able to states on essentially an as-needed basis. Interest charges accrue
if advances are still outstanding after certain mandatory repayment
dates. These are levied at the interest rate applicable to medium-term
U.S. debt but are capped at 10.0 percent. Interest accrues on the aver
age daily indebtedness. States that borrow after January 1 of a given
year can avoid interest charges altogether if loans are fully repaid by
September 30 of the same year. Loans taken and fully repaid in the
same fiscal year are commonly referred to as cash-flow loans. 12
The states also face debt repayment requirements under Title XII. If
debt has been outstanding on January 1st of two consecutive years and
has not been fully repaid by November 10th of the latter year, an auto
matic debt repayment process is activated. On January 1 of the follow
ing year, 0.3 percent is added to the federal part of each employer's UI
tax obligation under the Federal Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA) tax:
i.e., 1.1 percent is levied rather than 0.8 percent on the first $7,000 of
earnings for each employee. The proceeds of the 0.3 percent penalty
tax go toward repaying the oldest part of the state's debt. Higher pen
alty tax rates apply in later years.
Because FUTA penalty taxes are levied at a single flat rate, a state
may prefer to make voluntary repayments of experience- rated state UI
taxes. These must be levied as new tax obligations (not withdrawals
from the state's UI trust fund), and their yield must at least equal the
yield of the federal penalty tax. Voluntary repayment can also be
accomplished by a special assessment levied on top of regular
employer state UI taxes.
Prior to 1982, debt repayment provisions differed from current pro
visions in several ways. Two especially important contrasts should be
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noted: (1) loans did not carry interest charges, and (2) automatic debt
repayment through mandatory FUTA penalty taxes was suspended by
emergency federal legislation. In short, debt burdens before 1982 were
lighter.
The increase in the cost of indebtedness has affected state attitudes
towards debt, as shown by their debt repayment behavior. 13 Debts
incurred in the late 1970s were repaid slowly, whereas post-1982 debts
were repaid rapidly. Post-1982 debts have often been held for such
short periods that no interest has been due.
Tables 9.3A and 9.3B summarize national details on loans, debt and
debt repayments from 1972 to 1994. Interest-free and interest-bearing
debts are distinguished, with the changeover to interest-bearing
advances taking place on April 1, 1982. Note in table 9.3A that bor
rowing during the 1990s never exceeded $1.5 billion per year.
Probably the most interesting feature of table 9.3B is the contrast in
loan repayment patterns for the two types of loans. Of the $10.48 bil
lion of interest-free loans, $6.44 billion (over 60 percent of the total)
was repaid as FUTA penalty taxes (credit reductions). In contrast, the
fraction was only 1.2 percent ($0.29 billion) for the interest-bearing
advances repaid in this manner with the rest made as voluntary repay
ments. The vivid contrast in repayment patterns is also indicated by the
annual repayment rates for the two types of debt. The all-year weighted
averages of the two repayment rates are 14 percent for interest-free
debt and 56 percent for interest-bearing debt.
The fast pace of debt repayment, apparent from 1983, has also char
acterized the loans of the 1990s. Under current debt repayment provi
sions, debtor states have demonstrated strong sensitivity to interest
charges, and the prospect of these charges has led to faster corrective
actions by the states.
Changes in state-level patterns of borrowing and loan repayment
mean that debts are now held for shorter periods. 14 However, part of the
explanation for shorter periods of indebtedness is an increased willing
ness of states with financing problems to reduce UI benefits even
before the economy has recovered from a recession. 15 This greater
inclination dates from the early 1980s. Both macro and income distri
bution considerations suggest this timing of benefit reductions is not
appropriate.
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Table 9.3A Summary of State UI Debt and Debt Repayment Activities,
1972 to 1994 ($ billions)

Year
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
All years

State UI debt, December 31
Interest
Interest
free
Total
bearing
0.07
NA
0.07
0.09
NA
0.09
0.11
0.11
NA
1.59
1.59
NA
3.40
3.40
NA
4.58
458
NA
5.09
5.09
NA
3.83
3.83
NA
4.99
4.99
NA
6.27
NA
6.27
7.57
3.07
10.63
6.93
13.37
6.40
5.74
9.49
3.75
4.54
6.11
1.58
3.40
4.81
1.41
1.54
2.05
0.51
0.78
0.78
0.00
0.60
0.60
0.00
0.42
0.42
0.00
0.42
1.01
0.80
0.21
1.27
1.06
0.00
0.19
0.19
0.00
0.00
0.00

Total
0.07
0.03
0.02
1.49
1.85
1.29
0.84
0.05
1.47
1.61
5.18
6.63
3.01
2.55
229
1.23
0.23
0.00
0.00
0.77
148
1.37
0.80
34.26

Loans to states
Interest
Interest
bearing
free
NA
0.07
NA
0.03
NA
0.02
NA
1.49
NA
1.85
NA
1.29
NA
0.84
NA
0.05
NA
1.47
NA
161
1.76
342
6.63
NA
3.01
NA
NA
2.55
2.29
MA
1.23
NA
0.23
NA
0.00
NA
NA
0.00
0.77
NA
1.48
NA
1.37
NA
NA
0.80
10.48
23.78

SOURCE- Based on data from the U S Department of Labor, Unemployment Insurance Service.
NA = not applicable.
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Table 9.3B Summary of State UI Debt and Debt Repayment Activities,
1972 to 1994 ($ billions)

Year
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
All
years

Total
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.01
0.04
0.11
0.33
1.31
0.31
0.33
0.83
3.93
6.84
5.93
3.59
3.99
1.50
0.18
0.18
0.18
1.22
2.45
0.98
34.26

Loan repayments3
Interest free
Voluntary Interest
Credit
reductions repayments bearing
NA
0.00
0.00
NA
0.00
0.00
NA
0.00
0.00
NA
0.00
0.01
NA
0.04
0.00
NA
0.10
0.01
NA
0.33
0.00
NA
1.30
0.00
0.25
NA
0.06
NA
0.01
0.32
0.00
0.36
0.47
0.01
3.30
0.63
5.65
0.31
0.88
4.74
0.21
0.99
2.45
0.34
0.80
2.13
0.93
0.93
0.74
0.20
0.56
0.00
NA
0.18
NA
0.00
0.18
0.18
0.00
0.00
1.01
0.00
0.20
2.24
0.00
0.21
0.98
NA
NA
6.44

4.03

23.78

Loan repayment rateb

Total
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.01
0.01
0.02
0.06
0.25
0.06
0.05
0.07
0.23
0.42
0.49
0.43
0.66
0.66
0.23
0.30
0.15
0.49
0.93
1.00
0.30

Interest Interest
bearing
free
NA
0.00
NA
0.00
NA
0.00
NA
0.01
NA
0.01
NA
0.02
NA
0.06
NA
0.25
NA
0.06
NA
0.05
0.11
0.06
0.34
0.08
0.60
0.17
0.75
0.21
0.63
0.25
0.81
0.55
1.00
0.49
NA
0.23
NA
0.30
0.23
0.00
0.44
0.49
0.92
1.00
0.99
NA
0.14

0.56

SOURCE- See table 9 3A NA = not applicable
a Voluntary repayments accounted for all but $0.29 billion of interest-bearing loan repayments,
b Annual repayment rates measured as repayments divided by the sum of debt at the start of the
year plus loans received during the year. All-year averages are weighted averages of annual repay
ment rates, where weights are annual loans plus annual start-of-year debt.
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State Trust Funds, Borrowing, and Unemployment during 1990-1994

State-level information on UI trust fund reserves and unemployment
for 1990-1992 is displayed in table 9.4A. For each of the fifty-three UI
programs, the table shows reserves and HCMs at the end of 1989 and
1992 and three-year changes. Also included is a measure of recessionrelated unemployment growth, i.e., each state's 1990-1992 unemploy
ment rate is shown as a ratio to its 1987-1989 unemployment rate.
Note the national aggregates at the bottom of table 9.4A. Total net
reserves declined by about $11 billion over these three years, and the
national HCM decreased by about one-third, from 0.87 to 0.56. At the
end of 1992, however, only four states had negative net reserves.
Observe the large drawdowns of reserves in California and New
York, both exceeding $2.5 billion, and the losses in Massachusetts,
Connecticut and Pennsylvania. Combined, these five states accounted
for $8.6 billion of reserve losses or 78 percent of the national total. 16
One indicator of the comparative shallowness of the 1990-1992 down
turn is the national unemployment rate ratio of 1.156, i.e., the national
unemployment rate during 1990-1992 was only 15.6 percent higher
than the 1987-1989 prerecession average.
The state-level information can be organized in alternative ways to
illustrate different points about recent trust fund reserve losses. Table
9.4A arrays the states according to the level of their 1989 HCMs. Dur
ing 1991 and 1992, four UI programs borrowed from the FUA: Michi
gan, Connecticut, the District of Columbia and Massachusetts.
Arranging the 1989 state HCMs in ascending order as in table 9.4A,
these states ranked 1st, 2nd, 5th, and 8th, respectively. The three other
states needing loans during the 1991-1994 period (Missouri, New
York, and Maine) ranked 10th, 21st, and 29th, respectively, in table
9.4A. Thus, while borrowing was related to initial reserve balances, it
had other determinants as well. 17
One informative way to examine the loss of reserves during 19901992 is to note changes in state-level unemployment rates. Table 9.4B
rearranges the information from table 9.4A to emphasize recessionrelated increases in state unemployment. The largest proportional
increase in state-level unemployment occurred in New Hampshire,
where the 1990-1992 average rate was 6.80 percent while the 19871989 average was 2.83 percent, yielding a ratio of 2.400. States are

Table 9.4A Summary of Net Reserves by State, December 1989 and December 1992
(States Arrayed by 1989 High-Cost Multiples)
High-cost multiple

Net reserves ($ millions)

Michigan
Connecticut
Ohio
Arkansas
District of Columbia
West Virginia
Louisiana
Massachusetts
Illinois
Missouri
Minnesota
Pennsylvania
Montana
South Carolina
Kentucky
North Dakota
Wyoming
Texas

Dec. 1989
370
274
778
131
76
146
306
909
1,268
372
359
1,616
80
415
393
45
54
989

Dec. 1992
-72
-653
602
81
-19
141
601
-380
848
3
224
808
96
433
364
50
110
586

Change
-442
-927
-176
-50
-95
-5
295
-1,289
-421
-369
-135
-808
16
18
-29
5
56
-402

1989
0.13
0.22
030
0.40
0.40
0.41
0.43
0.45
0.47
0.50
0.52
0.55
0.63
0.66
0.69
0.70
0.71
0.73

1992
-0.02
-0.53
0.21
0.20
-0.09
0.35
0.72
-1.08
0.28
0.00
0.27
0.25
0.62
0.60
0.54
0.65
1.23
0.36

Change
-0.15
-0.75
-0.09
-0.20
-0.49
-0.06
0.29
-0.63
-0.19
-0.50
-0.25
-0.30
-0.01
-0.06
-0.15
-0.05
0.52
-0.37

Unemployment
rates
1990-19927
1987-1989
1.116
1.947
1.037
0934
1.405
1.019
0.693
2.236
1.035
1.028
1.093
1.297
0.970
1.154
0.877
0.909
0756
0.902

Maryland
Colorado
New York
Arizona
California
New Hampshire
Tennessee
Nebraska
Rhode Island
Alaska
Maine
Georgia
Washington
Indiana
New Jersey
Nevada
Wisconsin
Virginia
Delaware
North Carolina
Iowa
Alabama
Utah

598
239
3,181
493
5,419
204
657
127
304
180
206
1,018
1,364
770
2,795
321
1,041
718
207
1,471
518
623
239

146
339
214
372
2,787
130
603
161
104
232
35
966
1,766
942
2,440
234
1,195
507
219
1,387
615
550
342

-452
100
-2,967
-120
-2,633
-74
-54
34
-199
52
-171
-52
402
171
-355
-87
154
-212
11
-83
98
-72
104

0.75
0.75
0.76
0.84
0.89
0.89
0.90
0.92
0.92
0.93
0.94
0.96
0.97
1.04
1.06
1.12
1.17
1 17
1.19
1.20
1.20
1.21
1.25

0.17
0.87
0.05
0.55
0.42
0.55
0.69
0.97
0.32
1.06
0.15
0.79
0.99
1.11
0.85
0.65
1.13
0.74
1.13
0.98
1.21
0.90
1.40

-0.58
0.12
-0.71
-0.29
-0.47
-0.34
-0.21
0.05
-0.60
0.12
-0.79
-0.17
0.02
0.07
-0.21
-0.47
-0.04
-0.43
-0.06
-0.22
0.01
-0.31
0.15

1.387
0.796
1.476
1.037
1.380
2.400
1.041
0.671
2.227
1.005
1632
1.032
0.937
1.083
1.664
1047
1.007
1.366
1.685
1.362
0.943
0.965
0.885
(continued)

Table 9.4A (continued)
Net reserves ($ millions)

Florida
Oklahoma
Oregon
Kansas
Idaho
Hawaii
New Mexico
South Dakota
Vermont
Mississippi
Puerto Rico
Virgin Islands
U.S. total
NA = not applicable

Dec. 1989
2,041
323
804
472
220
340
174
45
197
388
564
28
36,871

Dec. 1992
1,444
419
1,055
606
240
362
239
50
181
345
749
47
25,847

High-cost multiple

Change
-597
96
251
134
20
22
65
5
-16
-43
186
19
-11,029

1989
1.30
1.34
1.35
1.35
1.37
1.40
1.48
1.49
1.59
1.67
1.82
1.92
0.87

1992
0.80
1.53
1.47
1.47
1.16
1.35
1.69
1.29
1.37
1.26
2.15
3.21
0.56

Change
-0.50
0.19
0.12
0.12
-0.21
-0.05
0.21
-0.20
-0.22
-0.41
0.33
1.29
-031

Unemployment
rates
1990-1992/
1987-1989
1.345
0.910
1.070
0.943
0.967
1.058
0.857
0.811
1.783
0.916
NA
NA
1.156
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arrayed in descending order of their unemployment rate ratios in table
9.4B.
A striking feature of the table is the geographic concentration of the
increases in unemployment. As noted, the national average increase for
1990-1992 relative to 1987-1989 was 15.6 percent or a ratio of 1.156.
There are sixteen states whose unemployment rate ratios exceed the
national average. Fifteen of these are located along the eastern sea
board of the United States, and the sixteenth is California. 18
The most dramatic increases in unemployment occurred in New
England, whose constituent states occupy the five top rows and the
eighth row in table 9.4B. All three Middle Atlantic states had aboveaverage increases, with ratios of 1.664, 1.476 and 1.297 in New Jersey,
New York and Pennsylvania, respectively. Of the nine states in the
South Atlantic division, six also experienced above-average increases,
while a seventh (South Carolina) roughly matched the national aver
age. Thus, Georgia and West Virginia were the only South Atlantic
states not to experience a major increase in unemployment during
1990-1992.
Note also in table 9.4B that nineteen states actually had lower aver
age unemployment rates during 1990-1992 than in 1987- 1989. An
additional twelve states with higher unemployment during 1990-1992
experienced increases that were less than half the national average
increase, i.e., their ratios lie between 1.000 and 1.078. Thus, for thirtyone of fifty-one states, unemployment rates either declined during
1990-1992 or increased only moderately. This "fact" provides much of
the explanation for the limited borrowing by state UI programs during
the 1990-1992 downturn.
Yet another perspective on trust fund reserve adequacy and reserve
losses during 1990-1992 is provided in table 9.4C. Here the state-level
information has been arranged to focus on reductions in HCMs
between 1989 and 1992. Maine led the nation with a reduction in its
multiple of 0.79. The multiples in thirteen states decreased by 0.40 or
more, and nine of the thirteen are located along the Atlantic coast. 19 As
with the increases in unemployment, the decreases in reserves were
concentrated mainly along the eastern seaboard.
Table 9.4C is also useful for showing the full range of reductions in
state HCMs during 1990-1992.20 Not one of the reductions equaled or
exceeded -1.0, and only five equaled or exceeded -0.60. The five states

Table 9.4B Summary of Net Reserves by State, December 1989 and December 1992
(States Arrayed by Unemployment Rate Ratios)
Net reserves ($ millions)

New Hampshire
Massachusetts
Rhode Island
Connecticut
Vermont
Delaware
New Jersey
Maine
New York
District of Columbia
Maryland
California
Virginia
North Carolina
Florida
Pennsylvania
South Carolina
Michigan

Dec. 1989
204
909
304
274
197
207
2,795
206
3,181
76
598
5,419
718
1,4712,041
1,616
415
370

Dec. 1992
130
-380
104
-653
181
219
2,440
35
214
-19
146
2,787
507
1,387
1,444
808
433
-72

Change
-74
-1,289
-199
-927
-16
11
-355
-171
-2,967
-95
-452
-2,633
-212
-83
-597
-808
18
-442

High-Cost Multiple
1989
0.89
0.45
0.92
0.22
1.59
1.19
1.06
0.94
0.76
0.40
0.75
0.89
1.17
1.20
1.30
0.55
0.66
0.13

1992
0.55
-0.18
0.32
-0.53
1.37
1.13
0.85
0.15
0.05
-0.09
0.17
0.42
0.74
0.98
0.80
0.25
0.60
-0.02

Change
-0.34
-0.63
-0.60
-0.75
-0.22
-0.06
-0.21
-0.79
-0.71
-0.49
-0.58
-0.47
-0.43
-0.22
-0.50
-0.30
-0.06
-0.15

Unemployment
rates
1990-19927
1987-1989
2.400
2.236
2.227
1.947
1.783
1.685
1.664
1.632
1.476
1.405
1.387
1.380
1.366
1.362
1.345
1.297
1.154
1.116

Minnelsota
Indiana
Oregon
Hawaii
Nevada
Tennessee
Ohio
Arizona
Illinois
Georgia
Missouri
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Alaska
Montana
Idaho
Alabama
Kansas
Iowa
Washington
Arkansas
Mississippi
Oklahoma

359
770
804
340
321
657
778
493
1,268
1,018
372
146
1,041
180
80
220
623
472
518
1,364
131
388
323

224
942
1,055
362
234
603
602
372
848
966
3
141
1,195
232
96
240
550
606
615
1,766
81
345
419

-135
171
251
22
-87
-54
-176
-120
-421
-52
-369
-5
154
52
16
20
-72
134
98
402
-50
-43
96

0.52
1.04
1.35
1.40
1.12
0.90
030
0.84
0.47
0.96
0.50
0.41
1.17
0.93
0.63
1.37
1.21
1.35
1.20
0.97
0.40
1.67
1.34

0.27
1.11
1.47
1.35
0.65
0.69
0.21
0.55
0.28
0.79
0.00
0.35
1.13
1.06
0.62
1.16
0.90
1.47
1.21
0.99
0.20
1.26
1.53

-0.25
0.07
0.12
-0.05
-0.47
-0.21
-0.09
-0.29
-0.19
-0.17
-0.50
-0.06
-0.04
0.12
-0.01
-0.21
-0.31
0.12
0.01
0.02
-020
-0.41
0.19

1.093
1.083
1.070
1.058
1.047
1.041
1.037
1.037
1.035
1.032
1.028
1.019
1.007
1.005
0.970
0.967
0.965
0.943
0.943
0.937
0.934
0.916
0.910
(continued)

Table 9.4B (continued)
High-Cost Multiple

Net reserves ($ millions)

North Dakota
Texas
Utah
Kentucky
New Mexico
South Dakota
Colorado
Wyoming
Louisiana
Nebraska
Puerto Rico
Virgin Islands
U.S. total
NA = not applicable

Dec. 1989
45
989
239
393
174
45
239
54
306
127
564
28
36,871

Dec. 1992
50
586
342
364
239
50
339
110
601
161
749
47
25,847

Change
5
-402
104
-29
65
5
100
56
295
34
186
19
-11,029

1989
0.70
0.73
1.25
0.69
1.48
1.49
0.75
0.71
0.43
0.92
1.82
1.92
0.87

1992
0.65
0.36
1.40
0.54
1.69
1.29
0.87
1.23
0.72
0.97
2.15
3.21
0.56

Change
-0.05
-0.37
0.15
-0.15
0.21
-0.20
0.12
0.52
0.29
0.05
0.33
1.29
-0.31

Unemployment
rates
1990-19927
1987-1989
0.909
0.902
0.885
0.877
0.857
0.811
0.796
0.756
0.693
0.671
NA
NA
1.156

Table 9.4C Summary of Net Reserves by State, December 1989 and December 1992
(States Arrayed by Changes in High-Cost Multiples)
Net reserves ($ millions)

Maine
Connecticut
New York
Massachusetts
Rhode Island
Maryland
Florida
Missouri
District of Columbia
Califormia
Nevada
Virginia
Mississippi
Texas
New Hampshire
Alabama
Pennsylvania

Dec. 1989
206
274
3,181
909
304
598
2,041
372
76
5,419
321
718
388
989
204
623
1,616

Dec. 1992
35
-653

Change
-171
-927

214
-380
104
146
1,444
3
-19

2,967
1,289
-199
-452
-597
-369
-95

2,787
234
507
345
586
130
550
808

-2,633
-87
-212
-43
-402
-74
-72
-808

High-Cost Multiple
1989
0.94
0.22
0.76
0.45
0.92
0.75
1.30
0.50
0.40
0.89
1.12
1.17
1.67
0.73
0.89
1.21
0.55

992
0.15
-0.53
0.05
-0.18
0.32
0.17
0.80
0.00
-0.09
0.42
0.65
0.74
1.26
0.36
0.55
0.90
0.25

Change
-0.79
-0.75
-0.71
-0.63
-0.60
-0.58
-0.50
-0.50
-0.49
-0.47
-0.47
-0.43
-0.41
-0.37
-0.34
-0.31
-0.30

Unemployment
rates
1990-19927
1987-1989
1.632
1.947
1.476
2.236
2.227
1.387
1.345
1.028
1.405
1.380
1.047
1.366
0.916
0.902
2.400
0.965
1.297
(continued)

Table 9AC (continued)
High-Cost Multiple

Net reserves ($ millions)

Arizona
Minnesota
Vermont
North Carolina
New Jersey
Idaho
Tennessee
Arkansas
South Dakota
Illinois
Georgia
Michigan
Kentucky
Ohio
West Virginia
South Carolina
Delaware
North Dakota
Hawaii

Dec. 1989
493
359
197
1,471
2,795
220
657
131
45
1,268
1,018
370
393
778
146
415
207
45
340

Dec. 1992
372
224
181
1,387
2,440
240
603
81
50
848
966
-72
364
602
141
433
219
50
362

Change
-120
-135
-16
-83
-355
20
-54
-50
5
-421
-52
-442
-29
-176
-5
18
11
5
22

1989
0.84
0.52
1.59
1.20
1.06
1.37
0.90
0.40
1.49
0.47
0.96
0.13
0.69
0.30
0.41
0.66
1.19
0.70
1.40

992
0.55
0.27
1.37
0.98
0.85
1.16
0.69
0.20
1.29
0.28
0.79
-0.02
0.54
0.21
0.35
0.60
1.13
0.65
1.35

Change
-0.29
-0.25
-0.22
-0.22
-0.21
-0.21
-0.21
-0.20
-0.20
-0.19
-0.17
-0.15
-0.15
-0.09
-0.06
-0.06
-0.06
-0.05
-0.05

Unemployment
rates
1990-19927
1987-1989
1.037
1.093
1.783
1.362
1.664
0.967
1.041
0.934
0.811
1.035
1.032
1.116
0.877
1.037
1.019
1.154
1.685
0.909
1.058

Wisconsin
Montana
Iowa
Washington
Nebraska
Indiana
Colorado
Kansas
Oregon
Alaska
Utah
Oklahoma
New Mexico
Louisiana
Puerto Rico
Wyoming
Virgin Islands
U.S. total
NA = not applicable

1,041
80
518
1,364
127
770
239
472
804
180
239
323
174
306
564
54
28
36,871

1,195
96
615
1,766
161
942
339
606
1,055
232
342
419
239
601
749
110
47
25,847

154
16
98
402
34
171
100
134
251
52
104
96
65
295
186
56
19
-11,029

1.17
0.63
1.20
0.97
0.92
1.04
0.75
1.35
1.35
0.93
1.25
1.34
1.48
0.43
1.82
0.71
1.92
0.87

1.13
0.62
1.21
0.99
0.97
1 11
0.87
147
147
1.06
1.40
1.53
1.69
0.72
215
1.23
3.21
0.56

-0.04
-0.01
0.01
0.02
005
0.07
012
0.12
0.12
0.12
0.15
0.19
0.21
0.29
033
0.52
1.29
-0.31

1.007
0.970
0.943
0.937
0.671
1.083
0.796
0.943
1.070
1.005
0.885
0.910
0.857
0.693
NA
0.756
NA
1.156
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at the top of table 9.4C are particularly relevant because each state
experienced a major increase in unemployment. The lowest unemploy
ment rate ratio for these five states was 1.476 for New York. Observe
that fifteen programs actually had HCMs at the end of 1992 than at the
end of 1989, a unique development during a recessionary period and
largely attributable to the shallowness of the recession.
To help place the 1990-1992 downturn into a greater perspective,
table 9.5 displays state-level summary information for the four most
recent recessions. The top half of the table focuses on increases in
unemployment while the bottom half summarizes reductions in HCMs.
The most important inference to be drawn from the table is very
simple: the 1990-1992 downturn was mild relative to the previous three
downturns. Consider first the increases in state unemployment rates. Of
the fifty states and the District of Columbia, the number with ratios of
1.25 or larger were as follows: 1971-1973 (thirty-seven), 1974-1976
(thirty-two), 1981-1983 (thirty-six), and 1990-1992 (sixteen). Both
summary measures at the end of each line (the state median and the
U.S. total) convey the same message: the 1990-1992 downturn was
comparatively mild in terms of the increase in the average unemploy
ment rate.
Turning to the reductions in HCMs shown at the bottom of table 9.5,
the same point emerges. The numbers of states whose multiples
decreased by 0.5 or more were as follows: 1969-1973 (thirty-four),
1973-1976 (forty-four), 1979-1983 (twenty-five), and 1989-1992
(eight). Finally, the state medians and U.S. totals at the ends of these
four bottom lines reemphasize the small reductions in HCMs during
1989-1992.21
From the information in table 9.5, one main conclusion emerges: the
increases in unemployment and losses of trust fund reserves were
unusually small during the most recent recession. Also contributing to
the modest amount of state borrowing during 1990-1994 were the
comparatively high levels of reserves present in many states prior to
the downturn.
One additional factor linked to emergency UI benefits contributed to
the low level of state borrowing during 1990-1994. The Emergency
Unemployment Compensation (EUC) program paid benefits to large
numbers of claimants from late 1991 through early 1994. 22 This pro
gram compensating regular UI exhaustees was fully federally financed.

Table 9.5 Recession-Related Changes in Unemployment and UI Trust Fund Reserves
Ratios of average state unemployment rates for indicated periods
Annual averages
1971-1973 over
1967-1969
1974-1976 over
1971-1973
1981-1983 over
1977-1979
1990- 1992 over
1987-1989

End-of-year
changes
1969 to 1973
1973 to 1976
1979 to 1983
1989 to 1992

Less than
0.75 - 0.99
0.75

1.0 - 1.24

1.25 - 1.49

1.5 -1.74

1.75 - 1.99

2.0+

State
median

U.S. total

0

2

12

15

12

3

7

1.45

1.51

0

6

13

21

8

3

0

1.33

1.33

0

2

13

12

12

11

1

1.52

1.42

2

17

16

3

1.11

1.16

Increase
1
1
10
13

0.0 - 0.24
4
4
6
19

0.25 - 0.49
12
2
10
11

1.5+
2
9
3
0

State
median
-0.66
-0.92
-0.49
-0.20

2
8
3
Changes in state UI high-cost multiples
Decreases
0.5 - 0.74
13
10
9
6

0.75 -0.99
9
12
3
2

1.0 - 1.49
10
13
10
0

U.S. total
-0.65
-0.98
-0.62
-0.31

SOURCE: Calculations performed at the Urban Institute using data from the U.S Department of Labor State unemployment rate estimates prior to 1976
for several small states made at the Urban Institute Calculations are shown for the fifty states and the District of Columbia.
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However, after August 1992 there was a feature of EUC, known as
optional EUC, which allowed claimants to utilize their EUC base
period if it yielded a larger weekly benefit than the base period preced
ing their more current spell of unemployment. Thus, new claimants for
state- financed regular UI were able to collect added weeks of feder
ally-financed EUC even though they experienced substantial interven
ing periods of employment. Furthermore, the utilization of these EUC
benefits did not preclude receipt of any regular UI benefits (based on
the later base period) after exhausting EUC. In effect, the U.S. Trea
sury paid some weeks of what otherwise would have been statefinanced regular UI benefits.
While EUC was operating it paid total benefits of $27.9 billion.
State reporting of EUC captured only one element of optional EUC,
the number of initial claims, which totaled 12.6 percent of all EUC ini
tial claims. It is almost certain that optional EUC benefits were
received for shorter periods than other EUC benefits. To estimate the
savings to state UI trust funds, an algorithm was developed to project
weeks compensated and benefits for optional EUC claims at the
national level. The algorithm was then applied to state-level data on
optional EUC initial claims to estimate state-level payouts. Because
identical durations for the two groups of EUC claimants were assumed,
the algorithm probably exaggerates payouts under optional EUC.
Nationwide, optional EUC was estimated to total $3.12 billion. How
ever, assuming these amounts reduced state reserves dollar for dollar
and assuming no response of experience-rated taxes, only $0.475 bil
lion in added state borrowing was projected during 1992-1994 had
optional EUC not been available. Interestingly, all of the added bor
rowing estimated by the model was concentrated in the seven states
that did borrow from the U.S. Treasury, i.e., no other states would have
borrowed in the absence of optional EUC benefits.
Thus, without optional EUC, we estimate that seven states would
have borrowed a total of $4.89 billion (rather than $4.42 billion) and
that the aggregate state UI trust fund balances at the end of 1994 would
have been $28.21 billion (rather than $31.34 billion). As a factor
explaining the low level of state borrowing during 1990-1994, optional
EUC was not important.
A final detail regarding loan repayments during 1991-1994 should
be noted. In August-September 1993 Connecticut repaid $0.818 billion
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of Title XII advances using the proceeds of state-issued bonds, the
major part of a bond issuance that totaled $1.0 billion. These bonds are
scheduled to be fully repaid by 2002. The first of fourteen scheduled
semiannual repayments occurred in February 1995, so that very little
of this state-issued debt has been repaid.23 Thus, for Connecticut, most
of the state UI debt might be appropriately counted as still outstanding.
To summarize, the low amount of state borrowing during 19901994 can be attributed to two major factors: (1) more adequate trust
fund balances at the end of 1989 compared to 1979, and (2) the mild
nature of the recession across most of the country. Optional EUC was
not an important factor explaining the low level of borrowing.
One other concluding observation from this section is to note the
low annual rates of trust fund rebuilding during 1993 and 1994. It
appears that states will have less adequate reserves (as suggested by
solvency indicators such as HCMs) when they enter the next recession
than they did prior to the 1990-1992 downturn.
Perhaps states currently require fewer reserves than in the past
because their financing systems are now much more responsive to trust
fund drawdowns. The historical descriptions from this section did not
try to assess the quantitative importance of so-called flexible financing
features or their growth in recent years. The next two sections address
this important topic.

Flexible Financing Provisions

The key factors that make UI benefit financing a complex and
important issue are that benefit outlays are highly sensitive to the busi
ness cycle and that the timing and severity of cyclical downturns are
difficult to predict. Each state must develop a funding strategy to deal
with these elements. In the early years of the UI program, as demon
strated in the first section, the focus of financing strategy was on build
ing up sufficient reserves to handle a worst-case recession, using the
HCM or similar measure as a benchmark. However, over the years it
has been increasingly recognized that determining the appropriate level
of reserves is more complex than just looking at potential future out
lays. A state must also assess the responsiveness of its tax system to
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changes in benefit outlays and fund balance, as well as take into
account the level of borrowing risk that is deemed acceptable. The
more responsive the tax system, the lower the reserve level required for
a state's needs. Likewise, the greater the acceptable risk of borrowing,
the lower the adequate reserve level. From a pure fund adequacy per
spective, as opposed to other goals of the UI system, it is recognized
that having a low fund balance coupled with a responsive tax system is
a legitimate strategy.
Tax responsiveness refers to the level and speed of the automatic
response to benefit increases built into state UI tax systems. This auto
matic response occurs in two ways. First, experience-rating systems
assign tax rates to individual employers based on some measure of
experience with unemployment, usually related to the amount of UI
benefits paid. As benefit costs rise, average tax rates also rise. Second,
every state has some triggering mechanism whereby a declining fund
balance leads to higher tax rates for all firms, either through multiple
rate schedules or surcharges or both. Beyond taxes, some states also
have mechanisms that tie benefit restrictions to low threshold levels of
trust fund balances. The combination of tax and benefit features auto
matically triggered by the condition of the trust fund is sometimes
referred to as flexible financing.
The origins and evolution of flexible financing in the individual
states reflect varied historical developments. In some states, ad hoc
arrangements were created during periods of trust fund inadequacy and
were intended as temporary fixes. Others have implemented flexible
financing as permanent changes. At least two states, Illinois and Penn
sylvania, overhauled their tax and benefit statutes in the late 1980s with
the intention of reducing the average trust fund balance over the busi
ness cycle and adding flexibility features. Recession-related draw
downs would be countered by automatic tax increases and benefit
reductions as the fund balance descended past certain thresholds
towards zero. We have not attempted to follow the individual motiva
tions leading to state actions but have tried to document the changing
prevalence of flexibility features.
Despite the awareness of flexible financing as a component of a
funding strategy, little has been written about the determinants of flexi
ble financing and there has been even less quantitative analysis. These
topics are the focus here and in the following sections.
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There is a general perception that states have increased their reliance
on flexible financing over time, especially since 1980. Several events
occurred in the early 1980s that may have caused this. First, during the
back-to-back recessions of 1980-1983, thirty-one states borrowed from
the federal loan account to pay benefits. Second, federal loan policy
became significantly tighter, as previously discussed. Deferrals of
FUTA credit reductions (for loan repayment) were eliminated in 1980
and the interest-free feature (except on a very short-term basis) of the
loan system was eliminated in 1982. At the same time that borrowing
has become a less attractive option for states, there has been a growing
recognition that carrying large trust fund balances may have undesir
able effects. As a result, states have an incentive to make their tax sys
tems more responsive.
This section discusses features that make a system more responsive
and examines changes made by states since 1980. We also compare
and contrast a responsive and a nonresponsive state. The next section
undertakes some quantitative analysis of responsiveness and tries to
determine whether or not responsiveness has increased in the last
decade or so. Also, the results of a simulation analysis of the flexible
financing system in Pennsylvania are reported. The subsequent discus
sion addresses some pros and cons and policy issues associated with
flexible financing.
Flexibility Features and Trends

Since 1980, although they have often acted hesitantly, many state
legislatures faced with problems of insolvency in their UI trust fund
accounts have moved to increase the responsiveness of their UI sys
tems. They have enacted legislation meant to increase UI taxes and to
lower UI benefits during recessionary periods. These states are, in
effect, making up for the lack of forward funding in their systems by
working to avoid insolvency at low levels of trust fund reserves. States
have done this primarily by:
• making tax table triggers more sensitive,
• adding or strengthening existing solvency taxes, and
linking changes and/or levels of benefits to trust fund reserves
The most significant revisions in these features have come from states
with relatively severe solvency problems. Tables 9.6A and 9.6B dis-
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play the changes since 1980 in selected tax features for fifty-one pro
grams.
In the past fifteen years, eleven states have raised the fund balance
triggers that activate the highest tax rate schedule, while either holding
constant or raising tax rates for the top schedule. This change alone
means that the state will respond with higher rates on employers at an
earlier time for a given benefit drawdown. For example, in 1991, Indi
ana raised the fund balance required to trigger on its highest employer
tax rate schedule from 0.85 percent of wages to 1.5 percent, making it
easier to activate that schedule when the balance falls.
Table 9.6A 1996 Flexible Tax Features (Part 1)
Highest Lowest
tax
tax
schedule schedule
Change
Change Responsi Change trigger trigger
since
Array
(Change since
Solvency since ve social since
method 1980
1980)
1980
tax
1980
tax

Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
District of
Columbia
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts

x

x

x
x

x
x

-

-

x

x
-

XX

-

+

X

X

+

X
X

+

X

X

+
X

X

X
X

XXX
X
XX
X

X

+

-
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Highest Lowest
tax
tax
schedule schedule
Change Responsi Change trigger trigger
Change
since
Solvency since ve social since
(Change since
Array
tax
1980
tax
1980
1980)
method 1980
X
X
Michigan
XX
+
+
Minnesota
X
X
Mississippi
X
+
+
Missouri
+
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New
X
Hampshire
XX
New Jersey
New Mexico
X
New York
X
North Carolina
X
+
X
North Dakota
X
X
Ohio
X
Oklahoma
Oregon
XX
+
Pennsylvania
X
X
+
Rhode Island
X
South Carolina
XX
+
South Dakota
+
Tennessee
XXX
+
Texas
X
Utah
Vermont
+
X
XXX
Virginia
X
X
Washington
West Virginia
X
Wisconsin
X
+
+
Wyoming
2
Total
28
11
13
3
13+/11- 8+/87
SOURCE U.S. Department of Labor, Unemployment Insurance Service.
NOTE: For trigger change columns, "+" indicates a move to more responsiveness and "-" means
the opposite. The responsive social tax is an explicit recoupment of noncharges and ineffective
charges. The array method assigns tax rates to employers ranked by experience factor, such that
each tax rate applies to an equal amount of taxable wages
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Table 9.6B 1996 Flexible Tax Features (Part 2)
Indexed
_________tax base

Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
District of
Columbia
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New
Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma

Change Flexible Change
Change
Change
since Flexible since Benefit since employee since
1980
tax
1980
ratio
1980 tax base 1980

x
x

x
x

x

x
x

x
x

x
x
x

x

xx

x

x

x

x

x

x

x
x
x
x

x

x
x

x
x
x
x

x
x

x

x
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Indexed
tax base

Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming
Total

Change
Change
Change Flexible Change
since Flexible since Benefit since employee since
1980 tax base 1980
ratio
1980
tax
1980

x

x

X

x
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XX

x

X

x

X

X

X

x

x

x
17

x
9

X

X

X

X

X

2
2
17
6
3
1
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Labor, Unemployment Insurance Service
NOTE A flexible tax base is one that increases or decreases with solvency conditions. An indexed
tax base is one that increases with average wages.

The addition or strengthening of an existing solvency tax can have
the same effect as increasing the sensitivity of a tax table trigger.
Though states have various names for these taxes, they are primarily
meant to increase revenues at low levels of trust fund reserves.
As of 1995, twenty-eight states had a solvency tax. Since 1980,
eleven states added a solvency tax specifically triggered by low trust
fund levels and designed solely to boost contributions. Most solvency
tax rates range from 0.1 to 1.0 percent and are levied as additions to
existing experience-rated tax rates.
Many of the solvency taxes were added as part of more comprehen
sive law reforms to deal with incidents of insolvency but now remain in
place and contribute to the eroding degree of countercyclicality of the
UI system. As an illustration, after having severe solvency problems in
the early 1980s, Minnesota, in 1988, raised the trigger on its highest
tax schedule from $80 million to $200 million, effectively activating
the top schedule sooner in the face of a trust fund drawdown. Further
more, the state removed a rate limiter that had been in place to prevent
an employer's rate from increasing or decreasing by more than 2.5 per
centage points in one year.
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Also added to the Minnesota system was an unusual feature that
contributes significantly to responsiveness. This is a solvency tax,
which can change on a quarterly basis, adding 10 percent to scheduled
tax rates when the trust fund falls below $150 million and 15 percent
when the fund falls below $75 million.
In addition to solvency taxes, many states add a "social tax" to the
basic tax rate. These social taxes can have a significant effect on the
degree of tax responsiveness. During the 1980s, three states joined the
existing thirteen that had social taxes constructed to specifically recoup
the dollar amount of the previous year's uncollectible benefit charges,
i.e., ineffective charges and noncharges. Other states either account for
social charges indirectly in their tax rate schedules or through solvency
taxes based on the fund balance. By attempting to account for each dol
lar of the previous year's total benefits, these sixteen states increase the
responsiveness of taxes to current outlays. Without this accounting, the
fluctuating number of employers at the maximum and minimum tax
rates, which determines a large share of social charges, can cause
noticeable differences between total benefits paid out and tax revenues.
In particular, the volume of social charges may cause the tax system to
respond inadequately during periods of trust fund drawdowns.
Massachusetts has perhaps the most comprehensive computation of
social charges. The state accounts for each dollar of unattributed bene
fit costs by adding together noncharged benefits, benefits charged to
inactive firms, ineffective charges, and dependents' benefits, and then
subtracting interest earned and the balances of minimum-rated
employers. A portion of the resulting amount is assigned to each
employer as a deduction from each one's reserve ratio. In effect,
employers are credited with lower reserves, resulting in higher taxes.
Part of this trend has also included making levels of benefit pay
ments to UI claimants contingent on the size of the trust fund. Table 9.7
provides additional details on this feature and on the trigger mecha
nism that activates flexible benefits.
Twelve states enacted some form of flexible benefit provision
between 1983 and 1991, and these features are still present in nine
states as of 1995. Eleven of the twelve states provided for benefit
freezes or benefit reductions. 24 All states but Delaware target these
automatic features on high-wage claimants. Ten states have done this
through automatic limits on the annual growth in the maximum weekly
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benefit amount (WBA) and/or reductions in the maximum. Three states
provide for variation in the wage replacement rate, but two of the three
(Pennsylvania and Wyoming) hold low-wage beneficiaries harmless
when the reductions are in effect.
Table 9.7 Flexible Benefit Features
Flexible
Flexible
First Last replacement maximum Fund Reserve Employer All
year year
rate
WBA balance ratio
taxes other

Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
District of
Columbia
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New
Hampshire
New Jersey

1988

x

x

x

1989 1991

x

x

1991

xx

xx

1987

x

x

x

1983

x

x

(continued)
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Table 9.7 (continued)
Flexible
Flexible
First Last replacement maximum Fund Reserve Employer All
_________year year___rate____WBA
balance ratio
taxes other

New Mexico
New York
North Carolina 1984 1987
x
x
North Dakota 1991
x
x
x
Ohio
Oklahoma
1984
x
x
Oregon
Pennsylvania 1990
x
x
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
1987
x
x
Virginia
Washington
1985 1993
x
x
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming
1984
x
x
Total_________________3______10____7____3_____4
2
SOURCE Data taken from U S. Department of Labor, Unemployment Insurance Service publi
cations such as "Significant Provisions of State Unemployment Insurance Laws" and from Com
merce Clearing House summaries of state UI laws

In ten of the twelve states, the trigger for the automatic benefit fea
ture has been either the absolute level of the state trust fund or the trust
fund balance measured as a ratio of covered wages (as a ratio of benefit
payouts in Pennsylvania). Other components of the triggers have been
almost always related to financing variables, e.g., employer tax rates
(four states) or outstanding Title XII loans (Vermont). The trigger
mechanism in three states involves more than a single indicator, with
the Illinois trigger having three separate components.25
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Additional Flexibility Features

There exist several other important tax provisions that also act to
quicken the response of UI taxes and that have increased in number in
the last fifteen years. Tables 9.6A and 9.6B provide an overview of
these features. The following elements tend to contribute to the faster
response of systems:
• Benefit ratio experience rating,
• Indexed taxable wage base, and
• Array method of assigning tax rates
Experience-rating formulas—reserve ratio, benefit ratio, benefit
wage ratio, and payroll decline—are designed to assess the amount of
benefit payments attributable to an individual firm and to recoup a por
tion through the assignment of a yearly tax rate. 26 Several factors in the
way experience-rating mechanisms have been constructed lead to
greater responsiveness in some states than in others.
The benefit ratio and benefit wage ratio formulas are considered as
responding faster because of their shorter memory27 and lack of reserve
accounting. The crediting of contributions to employer accounts in a
reserve ratio system actually creates a drag on responsiveness after the
first year. How much faster benefit ratio systems respond is difficult to
measure because of the different intervals within tax schedules and the
varying employer mix in each state. However, taking just a sample of
states that incurred similar benefit payouts during the last recession, a
general comparison can be made in the amount of movement by
employers into and out of the minimum and maximum tax rates for the
different formulas. The following table helps to illustrate the contrasting
behavior.
Table 9.8 Comparison of Movement in Distributions of Wages by Tax Rate
Percentage at each tax category
1990 percentage of wages taxed at minimum rate
1993 percentage of wages taxed at minimum rate
1990 percentage of wages taxed at maximum rate
1993 percentage of wages taxed at maximum rate

Reserve ratio Benefit ratio
states
states
10.3
38.6
7.8
25.1
4.6
5.5
6.0
6.4

SOURCE. Based on U S. Department of Labor, Employment and Training Administration, ES204 reports, section C. Data refer to three reserve ratio states (Arizona, Hawaii, and Rhode Island)
and three benefit ratio states (Alabama, Maryland, and Virginia)
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In this sample of states, the greatest difference was in the number of
employers moving away from the minimum rate under the benefit ratio
as opposed to under the reserve ratio system. Reserve ratio states went
from an average of 10.3 percent of wages being taxed at the minimum
rate to 7.8 percent, while the benefit ratio states went from 38.6 percent
of wages to 25.1 percent. Thus, a much larger share of wages moved to
higher tax rates in the benefit ratio states than in the reserve ratio states.
The number of employers at the minimum and maximum tax rates is
an important determinant of the responsiveness of any state system.
The more firms there are at the minimum and maximum tax rates the
less responsive the tax system is to benefit shocks, because those
employers will exhibit less movement in their tax rates. Maximumrated employers will be bounded by the highest tax rate, and minimumrated employers often have large previous balances or low previous
benefit levels.
In a review of all state tax schedules for rate year 1993, there was an
average of 4 percent of employers located at the maximum tax rate.
This ranged from a high of 14 percent in California to a low of less
than 1 percent in New Hampshire. There was an average of 16 percent
of employers located at the minimum rate, ranging from a high of 58
percent in Nevada to less than 1 percent in New Jersey.
In order to avoid the congregation of employers at the minimum and
maximum tax rates, a few states actually fix the number of employers
that will receive each rate by ranking employers against each other,
rather than by setting rates in preassigned intervals. In 1987, North
Dakota joined six other states in using this type of so-called "array"
allocation system for employer tax rate determinations.28 Array alloca
tion rate setting, which is independent of the type of experience rating
formula, places a specific percentage of aggregate taxable wages in
each tax rate interval. This not only allows states to determine total
contributions more precisely, since the percentage of wages at each tax
rate is predetermined, but also can be more effective in responding to
changes in benefit levels.
Possibly the most significant change in state financing laws that
affects responsiveness in experience rating is a rise in the state taxable
wage base or indexing the base. Note in table 9.6B that since the 1982
increase in the federal taxable wage base to $7,000, nine states have
passed laws to index their wage bases to a proportion of total wages,
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bringing the sum to seventeen indexed states (plus the Virgin Islands).
Another seventeen states increased their taxable wage base somewhere
between $500 and $3,800 during this period.
In a benefit ratio state, increasing the taxable wage base extends the
range of effective experience rating to high-unemployment firms, as
compared to a state that maintains a much lower base. In a reserve ratio
state, however, the immediate effect is not as clear and will depend
more on the distribution of employers along a given state tax schedule.
For a much higher base, reserve ratio employers will have a tendency
to move away from the maximum and minimum rates and towards the
experienced-rated portion of the tax table. However, the higher contri
butions will also help some employers build up significant balances,
allowing them to remain in the more unresponsive portions of the tax
schedule.29
Additionally, six states have had a provision that varies the wage
base according to the trust fund balance. Of these, two states (see table
9.6B) currently have such a provision. Since 1985, Missouri has auto
matically raised its taxable wage base by $500 per year whenever the
trust fund balance has fallen below $100 million and lowered it by
$500 per year (but not below $7,000) whenever the balance has
exceeded $250 million. Between 1992 and 1995, Ohio provided for
$250 annual increments in its tax base ($8,000 in 1991), but the base
would have automatically increased to $9,000 if the trust fund had
fallen below a predetermined threshold. Iowa implemented special
additions to its indexed tax base in the three years of 1984 to 1986.
Montana had a similar provision between 1975 and 1977. Hawaii
experimented with a trigger-activated flexible tax base in the single
year 1988. The District of Columbia instituted a trigger-activated tax
base provision in 1995.
All of these provisions, together with several others that are perhaps
quantitatively less significant,30 have been adopted during periods of
insolvency and now remain as features contributing to the faster
response of UI taxes.
A Comparison of Texas and New York
To better assess how particular features of state laws affect responsiveness, two states were chosen for closer examination. As the follow-
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ing table illustrates, tax revenues in Texas were clearly more
responsive to benefit increases than were tax revenues in New York
during and after the 1990-1991 recession.
Table 9.9 Annual Trust Fund Data for Texas and New York ($ billions)
Year

1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994

Balance
$0.27B
0.99
1.29
0.94
0.59
0.45
0.48

Texas
Benefits
$0.75B
0.71
0.74
0.96
1.12
1.04
0.98

Taxes
$1.49B
1.36
0.93
0.52
0.71
0.84
0.99

Balance
$3.26B
3.18
2.55
1.19
0.21
0.13
0.19

New York
Benefits
$1.03B
1.32
1.76
2.46
2.44
1.99
2.00

Taxes
$1.34B
0.94
0.89
0.98
1.37
1.97
2.06

SOURCE U.S. Department of Labor (1992).

Although the recession was mild in Texas, contributions responded
strongly to the growth in benefits. The first large benefit increase did
not occur until 1991, when benefits rose by 30 percent, followed by a
further 17 percent increase in 1992, before declining slightly in 1993.
Contributions, which had reached a low point in 1991, responded
quickly, with an increase of 37 percent the first year and 18 percent in
each of the next two years. The fund balance dropped three years in a
row but in 1994 started to rise again.
New York, on the other hand, experienced a very large growth in
benefit outlays during this recession, with the first significant increase
occurring in 1989. Benefits rose by 28 percent in 1989, 33 percent in
1990, and 40 percent in 1991. Contributions, however, went down in
1990. The first significant increase occurred in 1992, three years after
the beginning of the recession. New York eventually exhausted its
once-large fund balance and needed cash-flow loans in both 1992 and
1993.
We compared and contrasted the laws of these two states to see if we
could identify factors that made their tax systems more or less respon
sive. Although Texas and New York cannot be compared directly on all
dimensions of their legislation, three key differences stand out.
First, Texas has a benefit ratio system, and New York has a reserve
ratio system. A benefit ratio system reflects benefit increases quickly,
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because the employer's experience factor is not affected by current and
past contributions. Changes in employer experience factors accounted
for approximately the same average tax rate change in both states dur
ing this time period, even though the recession was much more severe
in New York.
Second, Texas explicitly and immediately covers its nonchargeable
and ineffective charges by reflecting them in the following year's tax
rates through its "replenishment ratio" and "replenishment tax rate."
New York has no analogous mechanism.
Third, Texas makes a direct link between the level of its solvency
surcharge and the amount of contributions needed to restore the fund
balance to the desired level. New York, in contrast, has a single sol
vency rate no matter how low the fund balance drops.

Quantitative Analysis of Flexible Financing

This section summarizes our empirical analyses of the quantitative
importance of flexible financing. Measures of the response of contribu
tions to increased benefit outflows are derived. One-, two-, and threeyear response measures are calculated, and changes dating back to the
early 1950s are documented. Tax responsiveness in 1970 and 1990 is
then examined for a subset of states that had recessions centered on
both dates. Regressions also are fitted to estimate possible changes in
tax responsiveness. Finally, a simulation analysis of flexible financing
in Pennsylvania is reviewed.
Empirical Tax Responsiveness Measures

Since the preceding section shows that many states have added flex
ible financing features in recent years, we attempted to test empirically
whether tax responsiveness has increased quantitatively, particularly in
the years following the loan policy changes of the early 1980s. An
important practical difficulty is that the economy has experienced only
one, fairly mild, recession since 1980-1983 from which to make infer
ences.
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Using annual data from 1950 through 1994, we first constructed
empirical measures of tax responsiveness. Recessions were identified
on a state-by-state basis rather than nationally to account for differen
tial timing of business cycles across states as well as localized eco
nomic downturns. Recessionary periods were defined as those in which
the increase in the benefit cost rate (benefits as a percentage of total
wages) from the base year to the peak year was 35 percent or greater.
The beginning year of the recessionary period was identified as the first
year with a 20 percent increase over the prior year (which then became
the base year). An additional criterion was to eliminate recessions that
started within three years of the previous recession, to avoid overlap
ping of the response measures. The total number of periods meeting
these criteria was 303, or about 6 per state, with 47 occurring since
1982.
We then computed one-year, two-year, and three-year tax responses
for each recessionary period, as follows:

-Q)

one-year response = ——————

two-year response =

three-year response =
((Bt - Bt_i) + (Bt+l - £M ) + (Bt+2 - Bt. } ))
where
C = contributions
B = benefits, and
t = first year of recessionary period
There appear to be several difficulties in measuring responsiveness
accurately. First, benefit cost rates exhibit frequent fluctuations, even in
nonrecessionary periods; thus, tax rates are never in equilibrium. Sec
ond, the pattern of benefit increases, e.g., slow buildup versus steep
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increase, has an impact on the measured response, except for the oneyear measure. For example, for a given cumulative rise in benefits, the
three-year measure would be higher for a recessionary period in which
the first year had the largest gain than for a period in which the
increases started modestly and then gradually became greater. Third,
using annual data obscures the precise timing of benefit increases.
Probably as a direct result of these assessment problems, the mea
sured responses exhibited a wide spectrum of values, including many
outside the expected range of 0.0 to 1.0. In particular, there were many
negative responses. Assuming that these values were due to the mea
surement problems that have been discussed, rather than representing
true responses, the extreme values were eliminated before any analysis
was done. We included only those recessionary periods for which all
three measures fell within the range of acceptable values (including
some negatives for the one-year and two-year measures). This reduced
the number of recessionary periods to 236, of which 33 occurred since
1982.
The first analysis examined simple averages of the measures across
states, without regard to state size or other factors, for three different
time periods. These averages are shown below.
Beginning year
1952-1968
1969-1981
1982-1991

Number of
periods
88
115
33

One-year
response
0.11
0.14
0.15

Two-year
response
0.31
0.36
0.34

Three-year
response
0.43
0.54
0.62

Several observations can be made about these averages. First, the
1952-1968 period has the lowest average responsiveness for all three
measures. Second, the 1982-1991 period has a clear edge over the
1969-1981 period only for the three-year measure, even falling slightly
below it for the two-year measure. Third, the differences in responsiveness are the clearest between the first two time periods, indicating that
most of the increase in responsiveness over the years occurred in the
1970s rather than in the 1980s. Finally, the biggest gains in responsiveness over time are in the three-year measure.
The second analysis of the response measures compared the 1990
recession to the 1970 recession. This comparison was made because
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the 1990 downturn was closer in size to that in 1970 than to the more
recent recessions. A key difference between the 1970 and 1990 reces
sions, however, was that aggregate reserves as a percentage of total
payroll were almost twice as large in 1969 as in 1989 (table 9.1).
Twenty-three states met the various criteria for inclusion in both
time periods. Responsiveness measures for the two recessions were
compared for each of those states. Among states for which all three
response measures were higher in one time period than in the other,
nine states were more responsive in 1970 than in 1990, and only seven
states were more responsive in 1990 than in 1970.
An interesting point to note is that the two recessions varied signifi
cantly in size for many states, which may affect the responsiveness
comparison. Of the twelve states where there was both a clear differ
ence in the severity of the two recessions and a clear variation in
responsiveness, eight states were more responsive in the milder of the
two recessions.
A third analysis was done by fitting regressions to the data to control
for factors that might affect the measured responsiveness. The results
are shown in table 9.10. Three regressions are displayed, using the oneyear, two-year, and three-year response measures, respectively, as
dependent variables. The explanatory variables include the reserve
ratio at the beginning of the recessionary period, the change in the ben
efit cost rate for each of the recessionary years, and binary variables for
unmeasured state differences. Time effects were measured with two
binary variables, one for the period 1969-1992 and one for the period
1982-1992.
One observation based on the results in table 9.10 is that responsiveness is clearly related to reserve levels, with greater responsiveness at
lower reserve ratios. The magnitude of the reserve effect does not
appear to be very large, however, with the impact of a 1 percentagepoint decline in the reserve ratio ranging from a 3 percentage-point
increase in the one-year response to a 5 percentage-point increase in
the three- year response.
A more important observation is that none of the time effects are
significant. The largest coefficients are, in fact, negative, possibly indi
cating a reduction in tax responsiveness over time after controlling for
reserve levels. The conclusion to be drawn from these regressions and
the other analyses of response measures is that we have been unable to
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show empirically that tax responsiveness has increased since the early
1980s.
Table 9.10 Regressions on Responsiveness Measures
1952-1992

Intercept
Reserve ratio
1969- 1992 dummy
1982-1992 dummy

One-year
response
.495
-.034**
(.010)
-.079
(.047)
.008
(.048)

Two-year
response
.789
-.035**
(.011)
-0.47
(.053)
-.083
(.053)

First-year BCR increase
-.00043**
(00015)

Second-year BCR increase
Third-year BCR increase
R2
Mean of dependent variable

Three-year
response
1.054
-.053**
(.014)
.006
(.067)
-.003
(.067)
.00097*
(.00050)

.338
.13

.458
.33

-.00140*
(.00026)
.476
.51

NOTE. All regressions include state dummies. Standard errors are in parentheses. Sample size is
236
BCR = benefit cost rate
*Significant at the .05 level.
** Significant at the 01 level

Flexible Financing in Pennsylvania

A second type of quantitative analysis was to simulate the impact of
flexible financing features for a specific state. Pennsylvania enacted UI
legislation in 1988 designed to increase the automatic responsiveness
of taxes and benefits, thus reducing the potential need for borrowing
during recessions. The 1988 law followed earlier solvency legislation
of 1980 and 1983 and a history of large-scale borrowing from the U.S.
Treasury. Of the thirty-seven state UI programs that borrowed some
time during the 1970s and 1980s, Pennsylvania's $5.5 billion total was
the largest.
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Pennsylvania's 1988 solvency measures provide for additional
employer taxes, variable employee taxes, and benefit reductions. All
adjustments to taxes and benefits are activated by a single trigger. The
trigger is calculated as the ratio of the fund balance at the end of the
current fiscal year (June 30) to the average benefit outlay for the cur
rent and the two previous fiscal years, and the ratio is expressed as a
percentage. Thus a trigger value of 100 indicates that the fund balance
is equal to one year's worth of benefits.
There are two flexible employer taxes. An employer surcharge is
imposed as a flat amount that can assume seven different values. Trig
ger ratios of 150 or larger cause a tax reduction while the largest sur
charge is levied when the trigger falls below 50. Employers are also
subject to graduated "additional contributions" when the trigger falls
below 95. The trigger-activated employee surcharge has a range of pos
sible values from 0.0 to 0.2 percent of total covered wages. Finally,
weekly benefits (for claimants paid more than half of the maximum
WBA) are reduced by 5 percent whenever the trigger ratio falls below
50. Many of these flexible financing provisions have effects specified
as fixed dollar amounts. Thus as economic growth occurs, their size
automatically declines relative to macroeconomic variables such as
covered employment and total wages.
The impacts of these automatic provisions were studied using a sim
ulation model that included detailed equations for the determination of
UI taxes and UI benefits. 31 Model simulations were conducted for the
years 1991 to 1999. The analysis specified a series of unemploymentinflation scenarios and simulated benefits, taxes, and trust fund bal
ances with the automatic provisions first "off" and then "on." The time
paths of unemployment reproduced state unemployment from earlier
periods as well as specifying successively higher unemployment rates.
Differing inflation rates were also simulated.
Perhaps the most interesting results were yielded by a series of sim
ulations that successively raised the average total unemployment rate
by 0.5 percentage point increments. The simulations showed that total
benefit outlays grew consistently for successive increments but that
additional taxes reached upper limits, causing the fund balance to
decline further and cumulative borrowing to increase, despite the pres
ence of the flexible financing provisions. Even when all provisions

Unemployment Insurance in the United States 413

were fully turned "on," benefit outflows exceeded taxes by wide mar
gins.
The distribution of worker and employer sacrifices was found to be
sensitive to the assumed rate of inflation. 32 At low inflation rates, the
burden of the flexible financing provisions was roughly 50-50, with
most of the employee burden arising from employee taxes. At higher
inflation rates, the employee share rose to more than half, with the
employee taxes accounting for most of the increased employee share.
This results from the combination of an unlimited tax base for employ
ees and a limitation on employer taxes caused by the fixed tax base.
Additional simulations suggested that indexing both the employer tax
base and the solvency features (rather than using fixed absolute dollar
amounts) would substantially enhance the effectiveness of flexible
financing in preventing indebtedness and reducing the scale of insol
vency.
Three of the principal findings were straightforward. First, the pres
ence of flexible financing provisions in Pennsylvania reduces the scale
of borrowing but does not prevent insolvency. Second, the flexible
financing features were more effective in small downturns than in more
serious recessions (measured in terms of the increase in the average
total unemployment rate for 1991-1999). Finally, inflation weakened
the effectiveness of the flexible financing features in the later years of
the simulation period.

Implications of Flexible Financing
State Choices

In choosing whether or not to implement a funding strategy that
relies on a strong element of flexible financing, it is important for a
state to look at the trade-offs involved. The chief argument in favor of
flexible financing is that trust fund reserves can be kept low and, at the
same time, the risk of borrowing can be minimized. The negative
aspects of large balances have become more widely recognized in
recent years. First, states may perceive that the opportunity cost of
holding balances exceeds the interest earnings on reserves. For any
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given level of benefit payouts, a state may prefer to hold smaller trust
fund balances now than in the past on the argument that the rate of
return is higher for funds held by employers. 33 Second, large trust fund
balances may increase pressures for benefit liberalization or for diver
sions of UI taxes to other purposes. Either use of the trust fund is easier
to do politically if the fund balance is perceived to be larger than neces
sary.34
It is clear that, in the aggregate, states now have smaller desired trust
fund levels than in the past. Although prerecession balances in 1989
were high relative to those of the preceding decade, as a percent of
payroll they were only about half of 1969 balances (table 9.1). This is
an appropriate comparison because 1969 and 1989 were both at the
end of long periods of economic growth, presumably allowing reserves
to be accumulated to desired levels.
A second impetus towards flexible financing is that, even if a state
chooses to have a low trust fund balance, there are incentives to avoid
or minimize borrowing. Since 1982, interest has been charged on loans
(except those repaid the same year they are made). This interest must
be paid from sources outside the trust fund, either through a separate
tax or from state general revenues. A further disincentive is the auto
matic repayment feature of the FUTA tax, which is activated after two
years of borrowing. This tax repays the loan via a flat surcharge on the
low federal tax base, rather than through the experience-rated state UI
tax.
The chief argument against flexible financing is that the timing of
benefit decreases and tax increases hurts both claimants and employ
ers. Claimants are faced with reduced benefits at a time when their
need is the greatest. Businesses are faced with tax increases before they
have fully recovered from the recession.
Two additional arguments against relying on flexible financing can
also be noted. First, a state may implement flexible financing features,
but the provisions may not act with enough strength to prevent insol
vency. Flexible tax features, for example, simply may not generate suf
ficient added revenues in a timely manner to counteract the effects of a
serious recession. Second, there is a question of the presence of enough
political will to let strong flexible features operate as intended. When
the time comes, the state executive and/or legislature may decide to
nullify the automatic response to satisfy preferences of the claimant
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and/or business community. Absent a large trust fund reserve, the result
could be that the state needs large-scale loans.
National Perspective

While flexible financing may be an attractive option for some states,
widespread use of flexible financing would be a cause for concern from
a national economic perspective. The main problem with flexible
financing from this viewpoint is that it reduces the countercyclical per
formance of the UI system. One of the original objectives of the UI
system was to act as an automatic stabilizer of the macro economy, pri
marily through maintenance of consumer purchasing power. Flexible
benefit provisions directly reduce this stabilization effect. Taxes that
respond too quickly also may curtail business spending at the wrong
time and adversely affect the recovery. The stabilization role of UI is
already diminished because of the long-term decline in the proportion
of the unemployed who receive benefits. Increased use of flexible
financing would further erode this position.
During the 1950s, when UI trust fund balances were much greater,
there was a good deal of debate and experimentation on ways to make
tax rates more countercyclical. In the past ten or fifteen years, with rel
atively low trust fund balances, there has been considerable state legis
lative movement in the opposite direction, towards quicker recovery of
benefit costs in the form of flexible financing features. It appears, how
ever, that the shift towards flexible financing has not been of sufficient
quantitative importance to have had a significant effect.

Summary and Conclusions

This chapter has reviewed the history of state UI reserves and bor
rowing as well as recent trends. A key finding is that states have been
slow to rebuild their trust funds since the recessionary trough of 1992.
At the observed fund-building rates of 1993 and 1994, it appears that
states will enter the next recession with less adequate reserves than
they had prior to the 1990-1992 recession.
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We have examined flexible financing. As documented, many states
have added flexible financing features to their UI laws in recent years,
consistent with the common perception that pay-as-you-go financing
has increased. We estimated the quantitative effect of flexible financing
provisions and found that, in the aggregate, the impact of these provi
sions is rather small.
One finding was common to two separate investigations of flexible
financing. First, for the twelve states for which responsiveness in both
the 1970 and 1990 recessions could be compared, eight showed greater
responsiveness in the milder of the two downturns. Second, in the sim
ulation analysis of Pennsylvania's 1988 law, its flexible financing fea
tures were found to be more effective in countering the effects of mild
recessions. Thus, as currently structured, flexible financing qualities
may be more effective during mild as opposed to severe downturns. If
this finding is corroborated by other research, it may point to a need to
enact solvency taxes and other flexible features that have more "bite"
than those presently in place. Otherwise, the inadequacy of such mech
anisms for maintaining solvency would be discovered at the most inap
propriate time, i.e., during a major recession.
Several conclusions can be drawn from the analysis. First, state UI
trust funds are now more healthy than at the end of the 1970s and start
of the early 1980s, but they are not so large that the risks of insolvency
and debt are merely matters of historical interest. The fact that the bor
rowing during 1990- 1994 was so modest is partly attributable to the
mild nature of the recession. Second, there is a continuing need for
states to maintain reserves to avert large-scale borrowing during a
future slowdown. We note and express concern for the comparatively
modest pace of trust fund rebuilding during 1993-1994. It appears
likely that reserves available for the next recession will be less ade
quate than they were prior to the 1990-1992 recession. Third, while
flexible financing provisions are now more prevalent and possibly of
greater significance than they were twenty years ago, our empirical
results did not suggest that the change has been of large quantitative
importance. Fourth, the speed and strength of automatic financing
responses appear inadequate to the needs that would arise in a future
downturn if its depth and severity equaled the average of the eight postWorld War II recessions.
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NOTES
Any opinions expressed in this chapter are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily
reflect the positions of the U.S. Department of Labor or the Urban Institute
1 See chapter 12 in Haber and Murray (1966).
2 The term "net reserves" refers to total state reserves less outstanding loans from the U.S.
Treasury at the end of the indicated years. The term "aggregate payrolls" refers to taxable employets only and does not reflect employers who finance benefit payments on a reimbursable basis.
3 Connecticut and New York also borrowed small amounts during the first six months of
1995 The definition of a "large" loan, as the term is used in this chapter, is given shortly.
4 Thus, table 9.1 shows reserve ratios for the entire United States for nine individual years
5. Two criticisms are frequently made First, the highest cost period is often so far in the past,
e g., January-December 1964 for South Dakota, that it may no longer be relevant as an indicator
of risk Second, because the multiple is a static concept, it does not adequately recognize the
dynamic response of taxes when trust funds are being depleted A fast response of taxes can allow
a state to function successfully with a lower trust fund reserve. The validity of the second argu
ment motivates this chapter.
6. See chapters 2 and 5 and appendix E in Advisory Council on Unemployment Compensation
(1995)
7. The recommendations are numbers 2-6 in chapter 2 of the Advisory Council on Unemploy
ment Compensation report Several of the ACUC recommendations for providing financial
rewards to states that build large reserves previously appeared in a book by one of the authors. See
chapter 6, pages 145-146, in Vroman (1990)
8 Table 9.2 displays similar information to that previously displayed in table 9.1, but for a
shorter time period and with attention to state-level as well as to aggregate detail
9 The single years within each period used as the numerieres for the borrowing totals were
respectively 1975, 1984, and 1991
10 Regression analysis of the probability of a state needing a loan during a recession consis
tently shows a negative and highly significant coefficient on the prerecession HCM
11 Clearly, the passage of a longer period of time can affect cumulative measures of borrow
ing activities. However, of the 31 programs that needed loans between 1980 and 1987, twentynine borrowed between 1980 and 1983 Because the 1980-1987 borrowing was heavily concen
trated early in that time span, the 1980-1987 and 1990-1994 periods are more comparable than
might initially be imagined
12 There are other conditions for interest avoidance, e.g , no borrowing between October 1
and December 31 Also, if a states does owe interest, repayment of these financing charges can be
deferred for up to 15 months following the September 30 due date, with additional interest accru
ing on the unpaid balance.
13 Debt repayment behavior also changed as a result of the Social Security Amendments of
1983 that gave debtor states strong financial incentives to improve solvency and repay debt
through a combination of benefit reductions and tax increases Three distinct financial incentives
were offered deferred payment of interest, lower interest rates, and reduced FUTA penalty taxes.
14. One summary of the changes in state repayment patterns dunng the 1980s is given in
chapter 1, tables 1.5 and 1.6, of Vroman (1990)
15 Specific details of the benefit reductions enacted by states with the biggest financing prob
lems in the early 1980s are provided in chapter 2 of Vroman (1986)
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16. The concentration of reserve losses among a few big states is not unique to the 1990-1992
downturn During the recession of the early 1980s, four large industrial states (illmois, Michigan,
Ohio, and Pennsylvania) accounted for about 80 percent of total borrowing.
17. A partial list would include. (1) state legislative actions to improve solvency, (2) automatic
changes in taxes and benefit payments activated by reductions in trust fund balances, and (3) the
size and persistence of the increase in unemployment (a proxy for the depth of the recession in the
state).
18. The recession might be characterized as bicoastal simply because California is so large
relative to other states on the West Coast Note in table 9.4B that for the other four states in the
Pacific division the ratio of unemployment rates ranges from low to high as follows- Washington
(0.937), Alaska (1,005), Hawaii (1.058), and Oregon (1 070) None of these four states had its
unemployment rate ratio increase by even half of the national average increase.
19 The other four are California, Mississippi, Missoun, and Nevada.
20 Because the recent recession was comparatively mild, it should be kept in mind that larger
reductions in HCMs would take place during a more serious downturn.
21. Note in the bottom panel of table 9.5 that ten states increased their HCMs during the 19791983 period. While we have not attempted to explain this pattern, it should be observed that sev
eral states with low and negative balances enacted solvency legislation during 1982 and 1983 with
the specific objective of reducing indebtedness State-level legislation contributed to these
increases in reserves.
22. EUC benefits exceeded $250 million in every month between December 1991 and April
1994 Payments exceeded $1.0 billion in eighteen of these twenty-nine months. During 1992 and
1993, annual EUC benefits totaled more than half of regular UI benefits.
23 Connecticut was the only state to finance its 1991-1994 borrowing with state-issued
bonds. The state's motivation was to save on interest costs since state debt is tax-free ,and interest
rates are lower than for U S Treasury debt. During the mid-1980s, Louisiana and West Virginia
also used this method to repay Title XII debts. See Vroman (1993) for an analysis of state bond
issuance and a comparison with traditional borrowing from the U.S. Treasury
24. Minnesota provides for a higher maximum benefit amount when the trust fund balance
falls. Thus, its flexible benefit provision is not a flexible financing provision -in the sense that it
does not contribute to trust fund solvency.
25. The three elements of the Illinois trigger mechanism are the level of the trust fund, average
employer tax rates, and the growth in first payments.
26. Experience-rating systems are of two general types, stock-based and flow-based Stockbased systems (reserve ratio systems) use the employer's account balance (measured relative to
either total or taxable payrolls) to gauge experience and to set individual employer tax rates.
Flow-based systems 9benefit ratio, benefit wage ratio, and payroll decline systems) use measures
of benefit payouts and/or payrolls of liable employers to set individual employer tax rates In both
types of systems, the indicator of experience causes taxes to increase following recession-related
benefit payouts.
27 Reserve ratio calculations take into account the entire experience (contributions minus
benefits charged) since the employer was in existence, while benefit ratio formulation uses only
the last three years of benefits.
28. The other states are Alaska, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Vermont, and Washington.
29. How much the size of the tax base affects responsiveness depends also on the number of
payroll years that reserve ratio and benefit ratio states use to measure their experience rate. Inter
estingly, adding years to the denominator of the reserve ratio will increase responsiveness, while
the opposite is true for a benefit ratio calculation. During recessions, taxable payroll for some
employers decreases quickly, pushing the reserve ratio up and thus causing a lowering of the tax
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rate. In a benefit ratio calculation, the declining wages tend to increase the tax rate on employers
Previously, six states used only the last year of taxable wages in the denominator of the reserve
ratio calculation This number had declined to three states in 1995: Massachusetts, South Caro
lina, and Wisconsin
30. Among these are a short lag between computation date and effective date of new tax rates,
narrow intervals between tax schedule triggers and between tax rate triggers within schedules,
trust-fund-activated employee taxes, not crediting solvency taxes to employer reserve accounts,
and not limiting year-to-year rate or schedule changes.
31 See Worden and Vroman (1991). Appendix A of their paper shows the model's equations.
32 Worker sacrifices have two components: increased employee taxes and reduced benefits to
claimants
33. We do not-know of research to formalize the rates of return calculations that support argu
ments for maintaining funds with employers as opposed to holding reserves in trust funds. Cer
tainly, arguments to lower taxes on employers would be weakened if trust fund reserves were
invested in assets with higher rates of return than U.S. government debt
34 Again, rhetoric and casual observation provide much of the basis for this assertion It
would be useful to investigate the issue within a formal statistical (regression) framework
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Fraud, Abuse, and Errors in the
Unemployment Insurance System
Extent, Measurement, and Correction
Burman Skrable

UI Service, U.S. Department of Labor

This chapter examines the extent of financial losses or leakages in
the federal-state system of unemployment insurance (UI) in the United
States. "Leakages" or "losses" will be used interchangeably to refer to
funds due the UI system that it failed to receive, benefits wrongly paid
out, and other resources lost. Where possible, the chapter attempts to
distinguish losses resulting from intentional (fraudulent) actions by
claimants, employers and UI agency staff from those occurring for
nonfraudulent reasons.
The UI system is a major social insurance program in the United
States. In fiscal year (FY) 1995, a year of relatively low unemploy
ment, total UI program benefit payments amounted to $21 billion, state
tax collections (contributions) were $23 billion, federal collections for
various federal and federal-state extended benefit programs and admin
istration were $5.5 billion, and allocations to state employment secu
rity agencies (SESAs) for administration were $3.6 billion. Due to the
size and complexity of the system, the incentives facing claimants and
employers, and the limited administrative funding available to enforce
compliance, the UI system contains many areas of opportunity for the
inappropriate use of funds. Policy makers, as well as other stakeholders
in the system, want to know the causes of errors and misuses as well as
the scale of fraud and abuse, so that these problems can be minimized.
In a discussion of the loss of funds from a social insurance system
due to error or fraud, the legal and economic views are related but not

423

424 Fraud, Abuse, and Errors in the Unemployment Insurance System

identical, and both are of interest. The law's main concern is whether
the losses are fraudulent or erroneous. Legally, the question is the fol
lowing: did the person willfully or intentionally misrepresent facts
affecting benefit eligibility or tax liability? Although state laws vary
considerably in whether any given action involving the UI system
involves fraud, all states have much more severe penalties and can
exercise a greater variety of recovery options in the case of fraud. The
range of state fraud laws must be kept in mind whenever a national
estimate of "UI fraud" is offered.
The economic view is broader and concerned more with knowing
why payment errors occur so that they can be prevented. Economists
also want to know the size of errors, so that the costs and benefits of
prevention or recovery strategies can be determined. Economists tend
toward a threefold classification of overpayments. First, there are small
random mistakes due to inadvertence by both UI staff and claimants or
employers. Second, in complex programs such as UI, characterized by
many involved provisions for benefit eligibility and tax liability, the
range of errors due to lack of knowledge or the time to make thorough
determinations is considerable. Such errors would be systematically
related to the complexity of the program but can be reduced by better
training of staff, systematizing procedures, and educating claimants
and employers. Third, some claimants and employers will intentionally
cheat. Economists go beyond merely calling this "fraud" to analyzing
the extent to which the system provides incentives and disincentives
for such behavior. They reason that certain individuals weigh the bene
fits of cheating against its "cost" in terms of the likelihood of being
detected and the penalty they face if caught and act accordingly to
maximize their incomes. In the case of UI, the balance of incentives
certainly appears to favor fraudulent behavior. The rules are complex.
Claimants and employers provide crucial information that is expensive
to verify. Administrative budgets to process tax and benefit actions are
spare. Because of the desire to ensure customer service and to meet
promptness standards, timeliness has been emphasized over accuracy.
Thus, the chance of detection is low. Penalties are relatively light in
most cases. 1
This chapter is organized around a description of the major UI
resource flows, since these constitute the potential sources for misuse
through errors and fraud. At each critical point in the review, the size of
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the basic funding flow is identified, and the potential for leakage at the
point is explained. If leakages at that point are regularly measured by
the current system of monitoring, current practice is described, and a
brief historical sketch is provided of the development of the present
measurement or assessment approach. The most recent estimate of
leakages at that point will also be given, along with what has been done
or is being done to stanch the outflows, recover overpayments, or col
lect outstanding debts.
The chapter concludes with a discussion of some technical issues
and measurement gaps. The main ones involve measuring: (1) the
extent to which current estimates from the Benefits Quality Control
(BQC)2 program of dollar overpayments actually represent true dollar
losses to the UI system, (2) the accuracy of claims denial decisions,
and (3) the degree to which employers comply with contributions (pay
roll tax) laws.

Major Financial and Information Flows
in the Unemployment Insurance System
Figure 10.1 outlines the principal financial and information flows
that characterize the UI system. In nearly all cases, each financial flow
is accompanied by a counterflowing stream of information from claim
ants and employers. Very often, the information is essential to deter
mining the proper size of the corresponding financial flow. In fact, the
opportunity for fraud or other abuse often arises from the fact that the
beneficiary or taxpayer controls the information. This is the essential
moral hazard problem in principal-agent relations. The six important
flows depicted in figure 10.1 are each described in the following sub
sections.
The Benefits Flow

In the UI process, the state employment security agency (SESA)
obtains information from individuals when they file an initial or contin
ued claim for benefits. This is combined with data from employers on
the person's base-period earnings and/or weeks of work and reason for
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Figure 10.1 Major Financial and Information Flows in the United States
Unemployment Insurance System
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separation. Together, this material allows the SESA to determine initial
monetary and nonmonetary eligibility for UI benefits and subsequently
to make benefit payments. In fourteen of the past twenty-five years,
benefit payments were the largest financial flow in the UI system. In
calendar year (CY) 1994, the UI benefit payment outflow was approxi
mately $22.6 billion. Benefit payments included the following main
components:
• Regular state UI
$21.657 billion
• Federal-state extended
0.220
• Ex-Federal Employees UCFE)
0.275
• Ex-Servicemembers (UCX)
0.347
• Disaster Unemployment Assistance
0.114
»Trade Readjustment Allowances
0.130
Total
$22.743 billion

State Contributions and Reimbursements

Over 98 percent of the 6 million employing units covered by the
system are subject to UI payroll tax contributions and are referred to as
"contributory employers." They make quarterly contributions (tax pay
ments) to the UI trust fund based on their taxable quarterly wages and
their SESA-determined tax rate. Most employer tax rates are experi
ence rated: after a lag of one to three years, depending on the state, the
UI tax rates of employers reflect the benefits paid to their former
employees. For purposes of UI financing, the remaining 2 percent of
Ul-covered employers are referred to as reimbursing employers. This
group includes mostly state and local governmental units and nonprofit
agencies. From the standpoint of UI, these employers are self-insured;
they repay benefit charges dollar-for-dollar and are not subject to a
state experience-rating tax scheme.
In CY 1994, the sources of funds were as follows:
• State Contributions
• State Reimbursements
Total

$21.975 billion
1.140
$23.115 billion
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Federal Unemployment Tax Act Revenues

In addition to making state UI tax payments, contributory employers
remit a flat federal tax on wages paid to each employee. This tax, paid
to the IRS, is 0.8 percent of annual wages up to the maximum of the
federal taxable wage base, presently set at $7,000 per calendar year.
These collections were approximately $5.5 billion in FY 1995. The
revenue is apportioned by formula among the Employment Security
Administration Account (ESAA), the Extended Unemployment Com
pensation Account (EUCA), and the Federal Unemployment Account
(FUA). (See the appendix to chapter 8.) In FY 1995, 85 percent of Fed
eral Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA) revenue went to the ESAA.
Administrative Grants

From the ESSA, the federal government provides grants to states to
administer the state and federal unemployment compensation pro
grams, the Employment Service (ES), and the Veterans Employment
and Training Service (VETS). The UI administrative grants are tied to
the UI workload—benefit payment and tax collection activities. Each
quarter, states receive a formula-driven base amount to fund their con
tinuing program level. If their workload exceeds a certain amount, they
may also claim additional contingency funding. In FY 1995, these
costs amounted to $3.6 billion:
• State UI
• Federal programs
•ES, VETS

$2.3 billion
0.2
1.1

UI Administration

As listed, in FY 1995 SESAs received $2.3 billion to administer
their state UI programs and another $200 million to administer federal
unemployment compensation programs. There is potential for fraudu
lent state use of funds allocated to pay for administration.
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Trust Fund Operations

As noted, in FY 1995 the federal-state UI system collected some
$23 billion from employers and paid out roughly the same amount in
benefits to claimants. Money deposited to and withdrawn from the
Unemployment Trust Fund (UTF) accounts at the U.S. Treasury passes
through state bank accounts called the UI Clearing Account on the way
to the Treasury and the UI Benefit Payment Account on the way from
the Treasury. Although states are legally required to deposit employer
contributions and other monies for the unemployment fund (e.g., bene
fit overpayment recoveries) and any interest earnings on those funds
into the UTF, state treasurers and banks have an obvious financial
motive for leaving unemployment funds in state bank accounts as long
as possible, to defray bank charges through earnings on compensating
balances.
The following sections describe the main risks of financial loss that
may be encountered because of fraud or errors at each of the six points
that have been summarized. Also reviewed is how the federal-state UI
system now attempts to assess the risks and to measure the losses. A
brief history of the development of the assessment approach is given,
together with recent estimates of losses. The summary and conclusions
section reviews how data have been used to prevent future losses and
suggests further steps that might be taken.

Types of Benefit Payment Errors
UI provides temporary, partial wage replacement as a matter of right
to involuntarily unemployed workers with substantial attachment to the
labor force. States evaluate labor force attachment by reviewing the
extent of work and/or earnings in a twelve-month base period preced
ing the application for unemployment benefits. Furthermore, states
closely scrutinize reasons for separation from work, as well as the
claimant's continuing ability, availability, and degree of active worksearch to ensure that the claimant is truly unemployed and not actually
out of the labor force.
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Determining UI eligibility thus involves tests at three levels: (1)
monetary, (2) separation, and (3) continuing eligibility. Risks for
wrong payments or payments to ineligible persons exist at all stages.
The common thread linking these risks is that of moral hazard: poten
tial beneficiaries supply some of the information needed to determine
benefit eligibility and therefore have the ability to withhold critical
facts. Realities of time and cost force the UI system to accept informa
tion provided by claimants and employers as valid, especially in the
short term. This leaves the system open to many risks of improper pay
ment. The following reviews the main risks at each eligibility level.
Losses Based on Monetary Eligibility

In all but two states, monetary eligibility is determined through
examining computerized agency wage record data. These data are also
used to set the weekly benefit amount for claimants deemed monetarily
eligible. There are two main kinds of risks.
• A fictitious employer is an imaginary enterprise that establishes an
employer account with the SESA. It submits bogus wage records
for imaginary employees on whom it initially pays UI taxes. The
ostensibly laid-off workers then file claims based on those ficti
tious wage payments. This practice is clear and intentional fraud.
•Routine monetary errors due to inaccurately maintained and/or
submitted payroll data by employers are numerous. Most cause
small dollar mistakes in claimants' weekly benefit amounts, but
when added together they are important sources of error, and both
underpayments and overpayments from this source probably
exceed fictitious employer losses. In the aggregate, base-period
wage errors tend to result in just about the same dollars overpaid as
underpaid.
Losses Due to Separation Violations

Claimants must have been separated from work through no fault of
their own. Such separations include various categories of quits for
good cause and discharges without cause. In six states, even claimants
who quit or were discharged for disqualifying reasons become eligible
for UI benefits if they remain unemployed long enough. The main type
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of fraud under this category occurs when claimants who quit or were
legitimately discharged for improper workplace behavior file for bene
fits alleging "lack of work" and their claims go unchallenged by their
separating employer.
Leakages Due to Continuing Eligibility Violations
Claimants must be able, available, and actively seeking work, and
may not refuse an offer of suitable work during each period of unem
ployment claimed (usually one week). States consider refusal of suit
able work to be the most serious of these violations and typically
penalize it by stopping benefits for the remainder of the benefit year
and canceling wage credits. In practice, this seems to happen infre
quently. Most continuing eligibility violations occur because claimants
are unable to work or are unavailable for the week claimed, fail to
make a proper search for work, or fail to meet the test of being unem
ployed because of excess earnings or other income. The claimants then
either fail to inform the agency that they have not met the eligibility
conditions or consciously give wrong information. In the broadest
sense, the latter is fraudulent behavior, although, depending on the
state, much of it may not be considered fraud.

Measurement and Detection of Benefit Payment Errors
The UI program has two principal kinds of systems for identifying,
estimating, and/or detecting improper benefit payments. These are: (1)
Benefit Payment Control (BPC) activities and systems, designed to
detect and deter fictitious employers and individuals who have disqual
ifying income while in claims status and, where feasible, to recover
overpaid amounts; and (2) the Benefits Quality Control (BQC) pro
gram, a sample-based system for estimating the extent and nature of
improper payments so that deficient processes may be improved.
Benefit Payment Control
All detection and recovery systems come under the common rubric
of BPC. The systems attempt to detect specific instances of error and
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abuse, and, where the dollar amount involved is large enough to justify
the cost of pursuit, to initiate recovery procedures. SESAs are encour
aged to publicize prosecutions for fraud widely to discourage others
from engaging in such practices.
Systems for Fictitious Employers
For some twenty years, there has been continuing concern about
detecting—and, more importantly, preventing—the various kinds of
fictitious employer schemes that could defraud the UI system of mas
sive sums. The mainstay is the Fictitious Employer Detection System
(FEDS). It comprises two subsystems. The New Employer/Employee
Tracking System (NETS) uses data in SESA records to determine
within 15 weeks of a claim being filed against a new account whether
that account is legitimate. The Legitimate Employer Claims Analysis
System (LECAS) identifies for review employers engaging in certain
suspicious claims patterns, e.g., both the employer and claimant
addresses were post office boxes.
Because of the age of the FEDS systems, administrators in some
states believe that sophisticated thieves have identified ways of avoid
ing detection. Other techniques to spot fictitious employers and similar,
fictitious claims include monitoring and following up on frequent
claimant address changes, looking for multiple UI benefit checks
mailed to a single address, verifying that claimants are not ineligible
illegal aliens through the Systematic Alien Verification for Entitlement
(SAVE) program, and using the Enumeration Verification System
(EVS) to identify persons filing claims with other than their own social
security numbers.
Systems for Detecting Disqualifying Income
The BPC system also includes mechanisms designed to detect dis
qualifying income. A person with more than a certain amount of
income in a week, whether from earnings or most other sources, is inel
igible for a UI benefit that week. The most significant type of tool used
for detection is the crossmatch and postaudit. To find claimants with
disqualifying earnings within their states, most SESAs use the Model
Crossmatch system, a computer match of the prior six months of claim
ant records with employer wage records. Five states use the more exten
sive Benefit Audit, Reporting, and Tracking System (BARTS), which

Unemployment Insurance in the United States 433

allows a full one-year match. Nearly all states use a similar crossmatch,
called the Interstate Crossmatch/Claimant Locator, each quarter to
detect individuals making claims in one state while working in another.
It also allows them to locate persons with outstanding overpayment bal
ances who have left the state. Because they rely on wage records, these
crossmatches can detect only private sector work. Depending on their
laws and economies, some states use similar crossmatches to detect
ineligible workers in government jobs, including federal, state, county,
municipal, National Guard, and the military reserves.
All crossmatching systems first detect potential violators, then apply
variable dollar screens to indicate those with the greatest recovery
potential. BPC staff verify week-by-week earnings of the indicated
claimants with employers. The last step is to audit claimants and to set
up overpayments for recovery as warranted.
Other Crossmatches
States have at their disposal a variety of other systems that use
crossmatching to detect specific types of disqualifying income or dis
qualifying conditions. There are social security, workers' compensa
tion, and Railroad Retirement crossmatch systems for disqualifying
income. Some states also review or match prison data, death records,
Job Service hires, and special employer new-hire reports to detect
other disqualifying conditions.
Less Systematic Approaches
BPC also relies on tips, referrals, and border checks to obtain allega
tions of fraud and abuse. Staff follow up with audits or investigations.
Estimating the Extent of Improper Payments: The Benefits Quality
Control Program

The Benefits Quality Control (BQC) program is a system in place
since 1987 to estimate the extent, kind, causes and responsibilities of
dollars overpaid by the federal-state UI system. BQC also provides
estimates of the dollar value of underpayments. Its design evolved in
three main stages.
In the late 1970s, the UI Service developed measures of initial and
continued claims accuracy as part of the Performance Standards
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Project. Between 200 and 300 randomly sampled claimants were inter
viewed about both initial and continued claims activities in a review
"designed to establish that the SESA made proper payments with the
information that was available or which could have been obtained by
utilizing proper interviewing techniques" (U.S. Department of Labor
1976-1977, p. II-8). Measures of initial and continued claims perfor
mance became part of the UI Quality Appraisal system for assessing
program performance but were not used to estimate dollars overpaid or
underpaid.
In 1979, the National Commission on Unemployment Compensa
tion (NCUC) funded a pilot test in six cities of a new approach to
determining payment accuracy. Randomly selected samples of UI ben
efits were thoroughly analyzed for accuracy to estimate the "true" level
of improper payments. The examination included in-person contacts
with the claimant, employers, and third parties to verify pertinent
information. The investigation also involved a postaudit, similar to the
current BPC crossmatch, to detect earnings during the claim period.
This study estimated overpayments at several times the rate BPC
detected.3 The U.S. Department of Labor then funded a replication of
this random audit (RA) study in five states. When statewide findings
confirmed the results obtained in the pilot study conducted in cities, the
Department of Labor began extending RA to other states. By 1984,
forty-six states were conducting random audit investigations, each on a
minimum of 400 sampled cases per year. Estimated overpayments
averaged about 12 percent of benefits, implying some $1.5 billion
overpaid for the system at the time.
In 1983, in response to overpayment issues raised by the U.S.
Department of Labor Inspector General in connection with RA find
ings, the department convened an interagency Benefit Payment Over
sight Committee. The committee recommended that the department
establish a formal BQC system. The BQC program was phased in vol
untarily and became mandatory in 1987. Its methodology was adapted
from RA experience. However, BQC sample sizes were larger and var
ied by size of state to enable more precise estimates of error types and
causes. BQC also adopted an explicit commitment to using the data for
program improvement and compiled a more extensive record on each
case sampled for this purpose.
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Since 1987, all SESAs except the Virgin Islands have been required
by regulation to operate BQC programs to assess the accuracy of their
UI benefit payments. The BQC programs operate as follows: each state
draws a weekly sample of payments. Annual samples presently aver
age slightly over 800 cases per state, with a range of 480 to 1,800. A
specially trained staff reviews SESA records and contacts the claimant,
employers, and third parties to verify all the information pertinent to
the benefit amount for the sampled week. Initially, all verifications
were done in person. Since July 1993, after a pilot test showed that cer
tain aspects of claims could be verified more efficiently with little loss
of thoroughness by telephone, investigators have been allowed to use a
mix of in-person and telephone/fax contacts. Using the verified infor
mation, investigators determine what the benefit payment should have
been to accord fully with state law and policy. Any differences between
the actual and reconstructed amount are underpayment or overpayment
errors and are recorded in a specially provided computer along with
their types, causes, and responsibilities. This information is used to
estimate the extent of improper payments in the state to guide possible
future program improvements. In FY 1995, states received approxi
mately $26 million to operate the BQC program.
Estimated and Detected Overpayments

Table 10.1 presents data on estimated and detected benefit overpay
ments during CY 1994. The BQC estimate covered a $21.2 billion uni
verse—some 93 percent of all benefit payments, with interstate
benefits the main area outside its review. In the aggregate, approxi
mately $1.82 billion, or 8.6 percent, was overpaid. State overpayment
rates ranged from 1.9 percent to 17.7 percent. About 11 percent of
BQC-detected overpayments occurred at the monetary determination
level, 16 percent resulted from separation decisions, and the remaining
73 percent were due to various continuing eligibility violations. Of the
eligibility violations, excess earnings during the benefit period and
other failures to maintain eligibility, principally neglecting to register
with the Job Service, were most important. Overpayments classified as
fraud totaled an estimated $390 million (not shown in table).
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Table 10.1 Fiscal year and Calendar Year 1994 Estimated and Detected
Leakages by Source ($millions)
Estimated
A. Benefit payments
1 . Monetary eligibility
a. Fictitious employers
2. Separation

Recovered

$1,820

$543

$257

201
—

NA

NA

6

NA

294

10

NA

NA

NA

321

NA

NA

3. Continuing eligibility
a. Work search

Detected

b. Other (fail to register)

431

NA

NA

c. Benefit yr. earnings

437

173

NA

d. Other disqualifying income

137

NA

NA

4. Not attributable to stage of
eligibility determination

—

354

257

B. Contributions and reimbursements

935

311

53

1 . Tax rate errors

NA

NA

NA

2. Underreported contributions

935

53

53

3. Hidden employers

NA

NA

NA

4. Uncollected receivables

NA

258

NA

NA

NA

NA

NA

NA

NA

0.7

1.0

NA

C. FUTA tax payments
D. Administrative fund allocations
1 . Overstated workload
E. Agency administrative operations
UI staff losses involving:
1. Benefits

0.3

0.1

2. Contributions

0.3

0.4

3. Administrative funds

0.1

0.5

4.6

NA

1 . Clearing account

4.6

NA

2. Benefit payment account

NA

NA

$2,760

$855

F. Trust tund operations

G. Total—all sources
NOTE NA = not available

NA

$310
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For the same time period, BPC activities identified $543 million in
actual overpayments potentially subject to recovery, of which $220
million constituted fraud. Since BQC and BPC report data in some
what different formats, and the methods used to detect 58 percent of
overpayments ($312 million) were not specified, it is not possible to
provide the same breakdowns of data on estimated, detected, and
recovered overpayments. It may be presumed that most of BPC detec
tions involve excess earnings and other income during the benefit year,
the aggregate of which BQC estimated at $574 million in 1994.4 Ficti
tious employer detections were $6 million, and overpayments identi
fied through employer protests (mostly involving reason for
separation) were only $10 million.

Types of Errors in Employer Contributions
UI contributing employers pay a quarterly tax on the wages (up to
the state's annual maximum wage base) of their covered employees.
Typically, they receive a quarterly form containing their tax rate from
the SESA. Employers report total and taxable wages of employees paid
during the quarter on this form, and return it with the tax payment due.
Annual earnings exceed the taxable wage base for most workers. In
1994, earnings taxable for UI amounted to only 36.2 percent of all
wages paid to workers covered by the UI system. For these taxable
wages, the main sources of losses in contributions have been (1) errors
in the tax rate, (2) underreported employees or wages per employee,
(3) hidden employers, and (4) unpaid or uncollected contributions due.
Errors in the Tax Rate

The fifty-three UI jurisdictions each use one of four basic experi
ence-rating approaches. The actual rate formulas can be very involved.
Complexities increase when firms merge or hire workers through
employee-leasing companies. The U.S. Department of Labor presently
has no data on the extent of errors in experience-rated taxes or on the
degree to which such mistakes might cancel one another out in the
aggregate. A recent internal security panel did, however, identify tax
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rate errors as a major UI risk area. 5 Procedures implemented in 1996 to
assess the quality of tax operations will judge tax rate accuracy. The
approach adopted involves evaluating the SESA's controls designed to
ensure tax rate accuracy and determining whether these are operative
by drawing a small (60 accounts) acceptance sample. However, the
acceptance sample is not designed to yield an estimate of tax rate
errors.
Underreported Employees and Wages

Since early in the history of the federal-state UI program, SESAs
have been required to audit covered employers. The Quality Appraisal
system set a Desired Level of Achievement (DLA) for the fraction of
employers audited each year. Remaining at 4 percent for many years, it
was recently reduced to 2 percent when audit quality standards were
tightened. Similar to BPC operations, these audits were principally
designed as an efficient means of ensuring compliance with UI laws
and timely collection of taxes. During CY 1994, SESAs audited
129,000 firms, identifying $53 million in underreported contributions
and $8 million in overreported contributions.
Although existing field audits tend to be cost-effective, SESAs
select firms for audit in many ways; none of them permit states to esti
mate the extent of underreporting as BQC does for benefit overpay
ments. Estimating underreporting has, however, been considered by the
U.S. Department of Labor and remains under consideration. A model
for this approach has been tried. In 1989, Illinois estimated 1987
employer compliance by carefully auditing 875 randomly selected
firms. Nearly 45 percent of firms had some underreporting error; 13.6
percent of employees were unreported, with most of them having been
misclassified as independent contractors. The researchers who con
ducted the project estimated that covered wages were underreported by
$1.18 billion (4.2 percent) and contributions by $45 million. Although
it.was a one-time sample and included only firms headquartered in Illi
nois, the authors nevertheless concluded that "since reporting require
ments as well as noncompliance detection probabilities and penalties
in Illinois are typical of those in other states" the findings may have
national applicability. 6 An underreporting rate of 4.2 percent for tax-

Unemployment Insurance in the United States 439

able wages, at the 2.6 percent U.S. average tax rate in 1994, implies
leakages of about $935 million.
Hidden Employers

SESAs routinely pursue many avenues to identify firms that choose
not to register. These include scanning yellow page listings, reviewing
business license lists and other tax filings, and conducting additional
forms of outreach. Many employers are only spotted when claimants
file for benefits and the agency has no wage records: these are called
blocked claims. There are no estimates of the potential number of hid
den employers.
Unpaid Tax Liabilities

Each quarter, about 11 percent of employers provide late wage
reports and tax payments or fail to report at all. At the end of CY 1994,
the states had about $1.8 billion in due but uncollected UI taxes. As a
rule of thumb, most amounts not collected within 15 months will not
be obtained. At the end of 1994, uncollected taxes of $1.37 billion were
at least 15 months old. The bulk of receivables remains in SESA
accounts due to state laws that prohibit removal regardless of age.
(Some indebtedness can be as much as fifty years old.) In 1994, states
accrued $2.264 billion in new accounts determined receivable (ADR),
and collected (liquidated) $2.007 billion, a difference of $257 million.
Also during that year, they wrote off $239 million as uncollectible, so
total amounts due grew by only $18 million. It must be noted that
ADRs, write-offs and liquidations relate to different time periods. Most
ADRs are terminated within a quarter or two, but some liquidations
and most write-offs pertain to receivables established years earlier.

Federal Taxes
How well the conclusions of the previous section apply to FUTA
payments is not known. The two taxes have one major difference: the
FUTA tax is not experience rated, and thus fewer rate errors should be
involved. Most employers pay a net FUTA tax rate of 0.8 percent of
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each employee's first $7,000 in annual wages. 7 It should also be noted
that the FUTA tax base of $7,000 applies to the earnings of all workers.
By contrast, in 1994, thirty-nine states had higher taxable wage bases
for determining their state UI tax, ranging up to $25,500 in Hawaii.

Administrative Grants
The U.S. Department of Labor provides SESAs with funds for UI
administration based on forecasts of workload (benefit payment and
tax collection activities). After a completed quarter, states determine
whether their workload was high enough to have earned their projected
funds. If the workload exceeded the amount needed to fund the base
allocation, states may be entitled to additional contingency funds. Fund
claims are based on a series of key "workload items," such as initial
and continued claims taken, nonmonetary determinations made, num
ber of subject employers, and lower authority appeals. The risk of
funding misuse arises mostly from inaccurate workload reports. For
many years, these data have been validated against federal definitions
through the Workload Validation program to minimize losses through
overreporting; data from the program are not amenable for use in
assessing potential leakages from this source.

SESA Administrative Operations
Within SESAs, the bulk of UI administrative effort is directed
toward accomplishing the primary mission of paying benefits and col
lecting taxes. The remaining effort is spent on the various housekeep
ing or overhead functions supporting that mission: personnel activities,
computer operations, procurement, research and analysis, and evalua
tion. The major vehicle for examining all of these operations is called
Internal Security, which comprises a variety of "risk assessments" of
all SESA functions, including those involving its chief mission. As
such, Internal Security often overlaps with other assessment or quality
assurance activities, including BPC, Revenue Quality Control, investi-
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gations or studies spawned by the findings of BQC and various audit
efforts. Internal Security assessments often lead to internal investiga
tions and/or audits.
The U.S. Department of Labor recently funded a risk-assessment
project. In it, Internal Security experts from fifteen states identified and
ranked internal risks of various sources. Principal risks to benefit pay
ment integrity involved centralized check-printing and the possibility
for SESA employees to process UI benefit claims for friends and fam
ily members. In the tax area, the experts noted numerous weaknesses
in current centralized cashiering processes, lack of audit trails, lack of
intact deposits in the field, and poor physical security for staff and
buildings in the field. In other aspects of agency operations, the report
noted numerous risks to computer systems: lack of passwords and
identification numbers or infrequent changes to them, lack of backups
of key systems and files, ability of dial-up users to change the state UI
data bases or to obtain information without identifying themselves and
a general lack of computer controls.
In FY 1995, states reported detecting approximately $1 million in
UI employee fraud through their internal security operations. Half
involved SESA administrative funds, most of this lost through embez
zlement. A total of about $150,000 in misappropriated UI benefits was
detected, mostly involving improper claims for others. The remainder
involved contributions, of which misappropriated refunds was the larg
est source. In addition, SESA staff estimated undetected losses of
$650,000 and that their controls prevented another $1.7 million from
being lost.

Trust Fund Operations
The Secretary of the Treasury is trustee for the Unemployment Trust
Fund (UTF) established under section 904 of the Social Security Act
(SSA). The UTF contains a separate subaccount for each state. These
accounts increase with the deposit of UI tax collections from employ
ers and from interest accruals, and they decrease as states withdraw
funds to make benefit payments. To avoid having to borrow or to delay
benefits in recession years when UI payments are high, states are
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encouraged to build up reserve balances in years of low unemploy
ment. Ideally, reserves would be accumulated by drawing contributions
from employers when the economy is expanding, and reserves would
be drawn down by increasing benefit payments that maintain aggregate
spending during recessions. In chapter 9, the macroeconomic stabiliz
ing aspect of ideal UI financing is examined.
Funds going into and out of the UTF pass through operational
accounts for each state: the Clearing Account for tax receipts and Ben
efit Payment Account for payments. The main risk of losses to or leak
ages from the trust fund, and therefore to the UI system, comes from
states that retain balances in operational accounts longer than permit
ted under applicable federal law (SSA, FUTA, Cash Management
Improvement Act [CMIA]). In doing this, states are tempted to use
interest accruals for purposes other than paying benefits or refunding
employers, proscribed by the so-called "withdrawal standard." Actual
diversion of funds is always a theoretical risk but in practice is fairly
easy to detect and would occasion an immediate conformity action.
Inflows into the trust fund through the Clearing Account are subject
to the "immediate deposit" requirement (FUTA section 3304[a][3] and
SSA section 303[a][4]). In practice, the U.S. Department of Labor has
interpreted this by establishing a DLA of two days for transfers from
the Clearing Account to the trust fund. In FY 1994, thirty-six states met
or exceeded this DLA: eight typically made transfers within one day.
Data show that fourteen states failed to meet the DLA (Virgin Islands
data are unavailable). Their deposits, totaling nearly $7.0 billion, took
an average of 5.6 days to be deposited in the UTF. This is almost four
days longer than the standard. At the average interest rate the funds
would have earned (6.76 percent), this implies losses of $4.6 million to
the UTF.8
Until the CMIA of 1990 became effective in 1993, the U.S. Depart
ment of Labor monitored a DLA for withdrawals from the Benefit Pay
ment Account, similar to the one for Clearing Account transfers. Since
1993, payment account withdrawals have been managed according to
individual draw-down agreements between the states and the U.S.
Treasury. These allow many states to retain cash balances amounting to
a few days of UI benefit payments in order to defray bank charges.
Nevertheless, balances for thirteen states averaged only 0.5 days worth
of payments or less: six states had zero balances. Among the fifty-one
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states that reported, the median balance was 1.6 days of UI benefit pay
ments, with the maximum being 12 days.

Some Qualification and Measurement Issues
The decision environment of the federal-state UI system is ever
changing. The general tightness of government budgets has affected
the availability of UI administrative funding. States have been forced to
reexamine priorities and to seek less expensive means of paying bene
fits and collecting taxes. At the same time, technology seems to be
offering simpler, more convenient, and less costly ways for states to
make benefit payments. Following the lead of Colorado, several states
have begun to take UI benefit claims over the telephone. Other states
have experimented with different alternatives to paying by check. The
effect of these changes on program integrity and on the willingness and
ability of states to assess risk is unknown. In the short run, tighter bud
gets are inducing states to emphasize their basic mission at the expense
of monitoring integrity. Under the newly proposed comprehensive
improvement system called UI Performs, the U.S. Department of
Labor has suggested reducing the benefit payment accuracy sample to
about half the size used by the BQC program, and allowing states com
plete flexibility to verify information for sampled units by telephone,
mail, and fax instead of in person.
The previous sections of this chapter have reviewed the comprehen
sive range of efforts taken to identify and correct financial leakages
from the UI system. To identify or measure actual or potential losses,
states use detection and recovery systems such as BPC and employer
field audits, as well as estimation systems such as BQC. Nonetheless,
some gaps and measurement issues remain. Four of these principal
issues are discussed in the following subsections: (1) the meaning of
overpayments as measured by the BQC system, (2) the effect of inac
curately denied claims, (3) the estimation of noncompliance with con
tribution reporting requirements, and (4) the size of interest losses due
to excess state cash balances.
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The Meaning of Benefits Quality Control-Estimated Overpayments

The Random Audit BQC methodology estimates proper, under- and
overpaid continued weeks claimed by extrapolating from estimates
based on samples of individual weeks paid. The samples are drawn so
as to provide an accurate cross-sectional picture of payments made in
every state in every week. Each payment sampled is painstakingly
reconstructed in accordance with written state law and policy. For
1994, BQC estimated that, if all payments had been made correctly, UI
outlays would have been $19.58 billion. That is, actual outlays of
$21.21 would have been reduced by $1.85 billion of overpayments and
increased by $0.19 billion of underpayments.
The $1.85 billion estimate of overpayments produced by the quality
control group needs to be qualified. On the one hand, as a measurement
vehicle it probably understates overpayments. Over the past three
years, BQC was unable to verify half of worksearch contacts; accord
ing to BQC procedures, these are counted as proper. Also, as indicated
in note 4, the BQC methodology is not as well suited as that of the
BPC crossmatch and post audit to detecting concealed or underreported claimant earnings. Conceptually, on the other hand, BQC esti
mates tend to exaggerate overpayments. Maintaining continuing UI
eligibility involves the joint fulfillment of two requirements: remaining
unemployed and satisfying various eligibility conditions imposed by
state UI law. Although the two conditions coincide closely, the fit is not
perfect. BQC estimates the numbers of weeks and dollars that should
not have been paid because eligibility conditions were not fulfilled.
Many of those claims involving continuing eligibility violations would,
however, have been paid eventually for individuals with long unem
ployment terms.
The BQC methodology estimates overpayments by applying state
UI eligibility provisions and the applicable state penalty structure. This
approach implies that if claimants, employers, and SESA staff fulfilled
all program requirements, overpayments and underpayments would be
eliminated and trust fund outlays would be reduced by the difference
between the two—which amounted to $1.6 billion in 1994. While this
assumption is valid for certain kinds of overpayment mistakes, e.g.,
monetary and most separation errors, it is not true for some other
types.9 Prime examples are failure to register with the Job Service and

Unemployment Insurance in the United States

445

failure to make work search contacts. As an illustration, the typical
penalty for neglecting to register with the Job Service for a particular
week is loss of benefit eligibility for the week in question. Following
state rules, BQC methodology assigns such an improperly paid week
as an overpayment. However, this penalty typically does not reduce the
total benefits payable on a claim; it simply delays payment. Further,
available evidence is clear that relatively few UI claimants become
reemployed through the Job Service, so the expected reduction in
length of unemployment from one week's registration with the Job
Service is much less than one week. The BQC method therefore over
estimates the savings to the UI Trust Fund if the spell of unemploy
ment continues beyond the improperly paid week. The case of
worksearch violations is a similar example, although not as extreme.
Other, analogous situations could be cited.
The Accuracy of Benefit Denials

The UI system does not assess the accuracy of decisions to deny
claims with the same intensity as benefit payments are investigated. In
part, this is because denials are relatively infrequent: in 1994, only one
in ten initial claims was denied for monetary reasons, one in eight
monetarily eligible claims was denied for separation reasons, and one
in sixty-one continued claims was denied for continuing eligibility rea
sons. Using data in claims files, each year the Quality Performance
Index (QPI) rates adherence to procedures and application of law and
policy for separation and continuing nonmonetary eligibility determi
nations. No field checking is done nor is accuracy per se determined.
Claims denied for failing monetary eligibility conditions are not
assessed at all. Thus, BQC's estimate of underpayments remains
incomplete.
In 1987, the U.S. Department of Labor conducted a five-state pilot
test of measuring denied claim accuracy using the BQC methodology.
Initial errors in monetary denials averaged 23 percent and in nonmone
tary denials about 15 percent before correction through redetermination or appeal. No dollar estimates could be attached to these findings.
As part of the redesign of benefit and tax performance measures to be
implemented through UI Performs, the accuracy of denial decisions
will be assessed. In all probability, this will be done using the BQC
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field-verification approach. Pilot testing, due to start in 1997, will pre
cede nationwide implementation.
Estimating Compliance with Contribution Reporting Requirements

As noted, the accuracy of contribution reports could be estimated by
a general application of the Illinois model, in which a random sample
of firms in each state is drawn and audited. An inference could then be
made about overall compliance. Furthermore, noncompliance profiles
developed in the process could be used to guide sample selection for
future audits. Unfortunately, to achieve what is considered reasonably
satisfactory precision, large audit samples would be needed because of
the large firm-to-firm variation inherent in audit findings.
Design work by Abt Associates has suggested that stratified random
samples of approximately 1,600 subject employers should be drawn in
most states. 10 In the Illinois employer compliance pilot conducted in
1988, nearly 900 firms were sampled. Taking these as the range for a
nationwide measurement effort, somewhere between 49,000 and
85,000 employers would have to be audited. This is a significant share
of the 129,000 audits actually performed in 1994. The benefits and
costs of mounting such a measurement effort are still being considered
within the U.S. Department of Labor.
The Measurement of Foregone Interest from Unemployment Trust
Fund Transfers

In the section on trust fund operations, an estimate of $4.6 million
was given as the amount of funds lost by the UTF for fourteen states in
1994 that failed to meet the DLA of allowing at most two days for
funds to reside in the clearing account before their transfer into the
UTF. As noted, there is no comparable DLA for the maximum number
of days payments should be retained in the Benefit Payment Account.
A glance at U.S. Department of Labor data shows, however, wide vari
ation across states in both series. Two states are able to transfer funds
to the Clearing Account within 0.1 day, and seven states performed this
task in 1 day or less, but one state took nearly 49 days. In the case of
the Benefit Payment Account, six states held zero balances and the
median was 1.6 days, but eight states exceeded 4.5 days with the high-
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est being 12.1 days. Current banking technology permits both swifter
transfer into the trust fund and much smaller balances in the Benefit
Payment Account. In light of present technology—as shown by perfor
mance in many states—foregone interest would seem to be much
greater than the estimate presented.

Summary and Conclusions
The estimates reported in this chapter suggest that losses to the UI
system during CY 1994 were approximately $3 billion. This total
amounted to about 7 percent of total system financial flows in 1994.
Leakages from benefits were $1.9 billion, over 8 percent of benefit out
lays. Leakages from the tax stream were composed primarily of esti
mated underreported contributions ($935 million) and known but
uncollected contributions ($258 million). These leakages totaled
approximately $1.2 billion, or 5 percent of state tax collections. For
reasons outlined earlier in the chapter, estimates of leakages from both
streams are probably somewhat low.
Despite some underestimates and missing data, the figures for UI
system financial leakages given in this chapter seem to be in the right
ballpark. The two largest missing components are underreported FUTA
taxes and underreported state and FUTA taxes by "hidden" employers.
A total of some $5.5 billion in FUTA taxes was actually paid in 1994.
The fixed taxable wage base and tax rate for FUTA suggest that the rate
of underreporting might be lower than for state UI taxes. If FUTA
underreporting is of the same magnitude as state contributions, losses
to the federal Treasury (not UI trust funds) could be on the order of
$200 million. Hazarding a guess at how large the "hidden employer"
problem might be is difficult, but for several reasons it might be
assumed to be rather small. States routinely use many devices to iden
tify subject employers—various checks with taxing and licensing
agencies, reviewing classified ads, and the like. Blocked claims investi
gations turn up others as former employees claim benefits only to find
their wages not on file with the UI agency. No estimates of these or of
two other sources—misreporting due to improperly set state tax rates,
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or overpayments in administrative allocations due to overstated work
load data—have been attempted. Both can be expected to be small.
The UI system's partners tend to have different degrees of concern
about leakages, with the federal partner, particularly the U.S. Depart
ment of Labor, tending to have a higher level. It is vested with over
sight responsibilities, more detached from operational involvement,
and more subject to concerns about fraud and abuse in the national
political arena. It has thus tended to push or induce states to put more
effort into performance measurement and other forms of integrity
activities than they would generally select on their own.
Each state sees its response as involving a weighing of responsibili
ties, benefits, and costs. The first balance the state must strike is
between operating the basic program and attempting to ensure its
integrity. The typical SESA sees its primary duty as serving its custom
ers by paying benefits and collecting taxes. The numerous opportuni
ties and incentives for leakages created by the interaction of complex
UI laws and policies and sparse administrative funding levels were
noted earlier.
In this environment, integrity must be pursued by balancing various
activities. The first involves integrity or performance measurement.
The UI agency must have reliable assessments of the extent of undercollected or underpaid taxes and of over- and underpaid benefits to
know how serious are its losses, where they occur, and why. Under
standing the seriousness of its problem allows it to decide on the rela
tive balance between operations and integrity activities. It must then
assess how much energy to devote to further measurement and balance
initiatives to change its legal framework, improve operational pro
cesses within a given legal framework, conduct activities designed to
detect and deter leakages, and recover outstanding balances. At all lev
els, the U.S. Department of Labor has tried to increase states integrity
efforts.
In the short run, UI agencies can often do little to change "the sys
tem"—the complex rules affecting benefit eligibility and tax liability—
within which they work. For a number of historical reasons, most state
UI systems have accrued a variety of subtle distinctions defining equi
table treatment. Students of UI integrity, chief among them Kingston
and Burgess, have pointed out that program complexity is quite costly,
especially in terms of administrative effort, inequities among similarly
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situated claimants and employers, and incentives for fraud. They have
urged states to consider simplifying their UI programs where possi
ble. 11
Despite the difficulties of altering the system, the results of perfor
mance measurements have led to changes in this environment. Both the
Random Audit and BQC programs identified worksearch violations as
a prime cause of benefit overpayments. (In the early years of Random
Audit, worksearch issues accounted for an about half of measured
overpayments.) In response, many states changed their worksearch
requirements, generally to make them more liberal or to require claim
ants to receive a formal warning before a worksearch disqualification
could be assessed. In 1994, work search accounted for only 17 percent
of national average dollars overpaid, and the decline in work search
overpayments represented most of the decrease in average overpay
ments. Changes in law accounted for much of the reduction in errors
due to work search.
Changes in worksearch laws and policies have reduced worksearchrelated errors, but the basic structure of incentives and disincentives
making noncompliance attractive for many claimants and employers
remains. BQC attributed half of its 1994 estimated overpayments
solely to intentional or accidental claimant actions. This amounts to
over $900 million. Adding in joint responsibilities with the UI agency
or employers raises the figure to $1.2 billion. Employers are responsi
ble for underreported taxes ($935 million). In addition, over $250 mil
lion of unpaid taxes could not be collected in 1994. Even though these
losses largely reflect behavior UI agencies cannot affect directly, their
size challenges the states and the U.S. Department of Labor to continue
to address their causes.
Within a given system, states must next decide how much effort is
warranted to prevent leakages by improving the efficiency of various
processes. These decisions are generally guided by estimates of the
size and causes of leakages and should be shaped by considerations of
cost versus probable effectiveness. Performance measurements have
played a noticeable role in process change. A salient example comes
from Random Audit experience. Random Audit findings showed con
vincingly that states using computerized wage records made more
accurate monetary determinations than those who requested monetary
data from employers at the time of initial claims. Partly as a result, the
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number of wage-request states has gone from about a dozen in the
early 1980s to two at present. Under the Quality Control program,
states have conducted nearly 150 program improvement studies,
funded either with grants or supported with BQC staff temporarily
released from verification duties. They have implemented over 40 of
the recommended improvements.
State efforts notwithstanding, BQC data suggest a slowing pace of
improvement in accuracy. When states were first implementing Ran
dom Audit in the early 1980s, the national average overpayment rate
was on the order of 12 to 15 percent. The first BQC report was for CY
1988; overpayments averaged 10.1 percent for the country. They have
since fallen to about 8.6 percent, as of 1994. If Michigan is excluded,
however, the decline is from 9 percent in 1988-1989 to 8.1 percent in
1990-1994. 12 The drop in overpayments due to worksearch violations
has accounted for the entire decrease in BQC overpayments between
1988-1989 and 1992-1994, as it seems to have for the decline in Ran
dom Audit days as well.
Still, BQC data suggest a fertile area for further improvements in
accuracy does lie within the agencies' direct control. Of the $1.82 bil
lion overpayments estimated for 1994, SESAs were totally responsible
for over $400 million. They shared accountability with others, mostly
claimants, for another $290 million. The extent to which these "costs
of complexity" can be reduced by process improvements is a direct
challenge for the future. Many errors involve failure to register claim
ants with the Job Service. Even perfect registration of claimants would
have only limited value in shortening unemployment durations for
claimants.
Again using the calculus of costs versus expected benefits, states
must decide how much effort should go into detecting and recovering
overpaid benefits and underpaid taxes. As with many performance
measurement systems, U.S. Department of Labor assistance, require
ments, and funding have exerted an important influence on this integ
rity activity. Although such efforts "clean up" after leakages occur,
making the system aware of them and their effectiveness is also
intended to deter claimants and employers from committing fraudulent
actions in the future. In 1994, BPC activities detected some $540 mil
lion in actual overpayments, about 30 percent of what BQC estimated
in total. Of this, some $260 million was recovered. Field audits are the
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main tax equivalent to BPC activities. In 1994, field staff audited about
130,000 subject employers and identified and recovered $53 million in
underreported contributions. This is about 6 percent of our rough esti
mate of the total. Recent experience shows the effect of federal targets
on this process. In 1990, with a DLA to audit 4 percent of subject
employers (versus the 1994 DLA of 2 percent, reduced to phase in
more stringent auditing standards), states conducted 177,000 audits
and detected $84 million of underreported contributions.
As noted, most estimated overpayments and underreported taxes
involve evasive behavior by claimants and employers. Massive efforts
to restructure the UI system's incentives are unlikely. Narrowly defined
process improvements, at least to improve benefit payment administra
tion, have had, overall, slight effects on payment accuracy. The most
productive avenue remaining might thus be more, and more intelligent,
detection and recovery efforts. Students of UI integrity have concluded
that much evasive behavior is systematic, and thus liable to detection
and deterrence by computerized profiling. They have urged this for
increasing employer compliance with tax reporting laws and for
screening claimants to focus scrutiny on those persons statistically
more likely than average to violate various UI eligibility provisions
(Blakemore et al. 1996; Burgess 1992; Burgess and Kingston 1987, p.
256). Such work could build on the profiling systems developed to
identify laid-off individuals who are prone to need extensive reemployment assistance and implemented in the past two years. Benefits profil
ing could use the extensive BQC records. Employer profiling would
require each state to mount one-time, if not continuing, random audit
programs of employers as was done in Illinois. The targeted selections
of workers would help SESAs focus enforcement efforts, information,
and job search assistance on workers most likely to need them. Tar
geted employer audits would increase yield. Both should also provide
more effective deterrence if the activity and results are publicized
(Kingston, Burgess, and St. Louis 1986, p. 334; Blakemore et al. 1996,
p. 22).
In the fall of 1995, a joint state-U.S. Department of Labor work
group proposed a new approach to performance management called UI
Performs. It is intended to address all dimensions of quality and to
improve the system's balance between measuring performance and
taking actions to raise it. UI Performs is built around more federal-state
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cooperation, an explicit commitment to continuous improvement, and
stronger joint performance planning. When fully implemented in 1998,
it should provide the system with improved performance measures,
including an indicator of the accuracy of decisions to deny benefits. It
also incorporates initiatives nearing completion to improve benefits
timeliness, quality measures, and tax performance. The incentive to
analyze experience and make program improvements will be strength
ened by a more comprehensive planning process. By inducing the U.S.
Department of Labor and states to look more broadly and in a balanced
way at total performance, UI Performs has the potential to help stanch
leakages at all levels, possibly through such innovative approaches as
greater targeting of compliance efforts.
NOTES
The author would like to express his appreciation to reviewer Paul Burgess for his helpful
comments on earlier drafts of the chapter He is also grateful to Steve Wandner and Chris O'Leary
for their extensive editorial assistance.
1 For a concise, thorough statement of the incentives and disincentives for compliance with
benefit eligibility provisions, see Burgess (1992) A more complete treatment is Burgess and
Kingston (1987), especially chapter 6. A review of incentives for employers to comply with con
tribution reporting requirements is given in Blakemore et al. (1996)
2 In 1996, the BQC was renamed the Benefit Accuracy Measurement (BAM) program
3. See Kingston and Burgess (1981), especially table 15.
4 Conceptually, the BPC wage record crossmatch is a more thorough mechanism for detect
ing benefit-year earnings than BQC. BQC identifies earnings directly through the claimant inter
view (and so depends on claimant honesty) and indirectly through various employer verifications.
The BPC crossmatch obtains positive matches on all work reflected in wage record data. In prac
tice, however, crossmatch programs screen out instances where abuse is likely to involve small
dollar amounts; additionally, agency staff cannot afford to investigate many other low-potential
"hits " The 1979 pilot that developed Random Audit included a crossmatch and postaudit. Based
on one quarter's crossmatch, these raised detected overpayments by 0 to 20 percent (average: 7
percent). Because of the small average effect, and the large delay it occasioned in case comple
tions, this feature was not included in either Random Audit or BQC
5. See California Employment Development Department (1995)
6. See Blakemore et al (1996) The authors note that the Illinois study could not help but
underestimate the rate of underreporting Illinois could not audit firms headquartered out of state,
and this knowledge may have affected their compliance. Of course, the study also included only
registered employers, so noncomphance by "hidden" employers could not be estimated.
7. The actual FUTA tax rate is 6 2 percent. Employers pay 0.8 percent if they remit the correct
amount of state taxes in a timely manner and the state is eligible for the offset credit of 5.4 per
cent
8. The U.S. Department of Labor is now investigating an additional avenue by which interest
may be lost by the UTF In some states, additional accounts may be maintained by non-UI agen
cies that collect UI taxes. These accounts can be the repository of UI funds before they are trans-
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ferred to the standard clearing account. Such accounts can therefore both delay the deposit of
monies into the fund and affect how accurately the timeliness of transfer from the Clearing
Account can be measured
9. This general issue was first raised by Burgess, Kingston, and St. Louis (1982, pp. 37-39) in
the context of how much tighter UI administration might reduce trust fund outlays.
10. See Marcus and Battaglia (1990) and subsequent analyses.
11. See Burgess and Kingston (1987), especially chapters 3 and 8.
12. Michigan data, although questionable, were published in 1988, publication was suspended
in 1989-1992 and only resumed in 1993 when the state achieved adequate BQC quality. The bulk
of Michigan overpayments involve "other eligibility" failures, mostly failure to register claimants
with the Job Service
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I had told [President Roosevelt] that the Employment
Service was practically nonexistent although its name was
still on a letterhead.. . He said, "Resurrect the Employment
Service right away...."
Frances Perkins describing Employment
Service revitalization in 1933

The U.S. Employment Service, U.S. Department of Labor, is the
agency responsible for establishing and maintaining a federal-state
system of local public employment offices. There are nearly 1,800
offices of the Employment Service (ES), also referred to as the Job Ser
vice, located in fifty-four states and territories of the United States,
which provide a free public labor exchange to assist individuals seek
ing employment and employers seeking workers. 1 The ES is at a cross
roads in its Labor Department history, both in terms of its relationship
to the unemployment insurance (UI) program and its role in the formu
lation of a new workforce development system that can better meet the
needs of job seekers and employers in a dynamic global economy. 2
Devised in the midst of the Great Depression, the federal-state ES sys
tem was established to address the recruitment requirements of New
Deal public works programs. With the creation of the UI program, the
ES system was subsequently organized as part of the employment
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security system, which includes both ES and UI programs, to mitigate
the vagaries of cyclical unemployment that characterized the U.S.
labor market. 3 This model of the ES as a free public labor exchange
worked well for about a half-century, until the nature of work began to
change rapidly. The structural shift in America's economic engine that
began in the late 1970s has caused more workers to be permanently
laid off, as the jobs they held disappeared, leaving them without the
skills needed to obtain their next job. Moreover, the new "information
economy" of the 1990s is continuing to transform the nature of work
and will most likely lead to more frequent job changes, many of which
will also involve significant career moves, for new and experienced
workers. This heightened and increasing problem of structural unem
ployment requires new public and private reemployment solutions and
an examination of the relationship between the ES and the UI program.
The attitudes of policy makers towards the ES, and the roles it
should play in a new workforce development system, have been largely
influenced by anecdotal evidence, as well as by the findings from more
formal evaluations. In its early years, the ES received praise for its key
role in aiding economic recovery from the Great Depression and for its
postwar efforts to help in the transition from a wartime to a civilian
economy. In contrast, over the last 30 years, the ES has been criticized
as being ineffective and antediluvian. Much of this perspective is based
largely on anecdotal information and (mis)perceptions, rather than on
the evidence from more formal evaluations of its effectiveness. For
example, the ES is often criticized because employers generally seem
to list only relatively low-skill, low-wage jobs with the service, and
only as a last resort after they are unable to find workers through other
mechanisms. Similarly, in some circles, the ES has developed the
image of an "unemployment office" due to its formal "business" rela
tionship with the UI program and because it is often co-located with
the UI office. The ES has also been criticized for serving relatively disadvantaged workers and others who only use the ES after other jobfinding methods have failed. Finally, critics have pointed to relatively
low and declining ES placement rates, and to even lower placement
rates for UI claimants, as evidence of ineffectiveness. In contrast, as
will be described, the results of formal evaluations of the ES paint a
very different picture of its effectiveness, recognize the potentially
valuable role the ES can play as a last resort, and note that the decline
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in placement rates must be adjusted for factors outside ES control and
viewed in the broader context of its changing mission and the target
groups it serves, the level of funding provided, and shifts in labor mar
ket conditions.
In this chapter, we examine the past, present, and future role of the
ES in the reemployment process, including the historical and projected
linkages between the ES and the UI program. Understanding the future
role of the ES in a new workforce system requires a knowledge of the
formal ties between the ES and the UI programs, as well as a historical
perspective on the evolving mission of the ES over more than sixty
years. Also, in understanding how effectively the ES has operated in
the past, how it works today, and how it is likely to function in the
future, it is important not to rely on anecdotes and perceptions but, as
much as possible, to draw on reliable quantitative research that mea
sures the outcomes achieved compared to what would have happened if
the program or particular service had not been available.
The remainder of this chapter is organized into four sections. In the
next section, we describe the key linkages between the ES and the UI
program, including the "work test" and the different types of reem
ployment services that the ES has provided UI claimants over the
years. This is followed by a discussion of the major changes in the mis
sion of the ES, including alterations in programs and policies, target
groups (including UI claimants), and resources. For the most part, we
briefly describe the early years and focus on major shifts during the
past ten years. The third section summarizes the available research evi
dence on the effectiveness of the work test and of various ES services
provided to job seekers. The final section offers our view as to how the
ES is likely to function in the near term as part of a new workforce
development system, with a particular focus on the relationship to the
UI program and the services that will be provided to UI claimants. We
draw inferences about the probable effectiveness of the labor exchange
system in the future. We also identify the major gaps in our knowledge
of the effectiveness of certain aspects of the likely future system,
which, if filled, could help shape labor exchange policies and services.
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Linkages between the Employment Service
and the Unemployment Insurance Program
The ES has played an integral part in the UI program since the
inception of the federal-state UI program in the Social Security Act
(SSA) of 1935. In the two years between the passage of the WagnerPeyser Act of 1933, which established the federal-state ES, and the cre
ation of the UI program, the primary mission of the ES was to function
as a labor exchange by obtaining information on the skills and qualifi
cations of unemployed workers and referring qualified applicants to
appropriate job openings that were listed by employers. With the cre
ation of the UI program, the functions of the ES were expanded to add
work registration of UI claimants to the original job-matching goal.
Although the mission of the ES has spread far beyond labor exchange
activities over the last sixty years, the relationship of the ES with the
UI program has historically focused on two fundamental roles: the
work test and reemployment services.
Work Test

A leading role played by the ES system in the UI program is to
administer the work test requirement as a condition for continuing UI
benefits eligibility to ensure that UI claimants are actively seeking
jobs. To offset the disincentive to search for work resulting from the
availability of UI benefits and to guarantee that claimants are exposed
to the job market, the UI program imposes various administrative stan
dards to encourage claimants to seek work. In particular, all federally
approved state UI programs must include able-to-work and availablefor-work eligibility requirements that claimants must satisfy on a con
tinuing basis in order to receive UI benefits.4 For example, in most
states, UI claimants who are not job-attached (i.e., are not on tempo
rary layoff and expect to be recalled by their former employer, or do
not obtain employment through a union hiring hall) are usually
required to register for work with the ES, which affirms their labor
force attachment and availability for work, and are required to accept a
suitable job referral or an offer of suitable work.5 In addition, UI claim
ants who are not job-attached are required to search actively for work
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and, in many states, to document the employers they contact as part of
the continuing claims process.
The ES assists the UI program in its efforts to monitor compliance
with the able-to-work and available-for-work requirements, and this
function is commonly referred to as the work test for continuing UI
benefits eligibility. Typically, in most states, the ES administers the
work test requirement by identifying claimants who neglect to register
with the ES, fail to accept suitable job referrals, or refuse offers of suit
able employment. In such cases, it then refers these issues to the UI
program for a determination as to whether UI benefits should be
denied. Although the enforcement of the work test has varied consider
ably over time, as well as across states, the underlying concept of the
work test has remained relatively constant throughout the sixty years
that the ES has been performing this function for the UI program. The
new UI requirement relating to worker profiling, for claimants likely to
experience long unemployment spells to participate in reemployment
services, imposes additional work test responsibilities upon the ES. In
certain cases, new work test responsibilities are also put upon Eco
nomic Dislocation and Worker Adjustment Assistance (EDWAA) ser
vice providers.
Reemployment Services

The other fundamental role of the ES in the UI program is to provide
UI claimants with exposure to job openings and employment services.
In fact, during its first forty years of operation, ES was the only public
agency that offered labor exchange and employment services to the
unemployed and others seeking new jobs. The role of the ES in assist
ing UI claimants to find jobs has primarily involved job-matching ser
vices. Historically, the four major job-matching services provided by
the ES to unemployed workers have been job referral, counseling, test
ing, and job development. Despite the many revisions in mission and
focus over its first sixty years, the changes in the provision of such ser
vices have been primarily in terms of which individuals have been tar
geted to receive them. Each of these services will be described briefly.
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Job Referral
The original mission of the ES was to provide basic labor exchange
services through referrals of registrants to job openings listed with the
service. This is still one of its current roles and involves matching the
skill requirements listed by the employer with the qualifications of
applicants. Traditionally, this has occurred through a combination of
activities: sometimes individuals identify potential job openings of
interest and discuss them with an ES placement interviewer, or ES
interviewers, using manual or computerized search methods, identify a
job opening that may be appropriate for an applicant. In most offices
today, this may involve review of available openings through individ
ual state job banks or throughout the United States by way of a com
puter search of a national job listings data base, which is called
America's Job Bank (AJB). More recently, in response to the job-seek
ing needs of customers and to reduced staff resources, many states are
streamlining their placement assistance process and adopting a "selfservice" philosophy for the mainstream job seeker. This approach
allows those who are job-ready to find their own work of interest, free
ing up staff resources to focus on unemployed job seekers who face
employment barriers and need more intensive services.
Available evidence indicates that a minority of all ES registrants, 30
to 40 percent, receive at least one job referral, and the rate is usually
considerably lower for UI claimants. 6 A "successful" referral that
results in a job placement requires several additional steps: the appli
cant must contact the employer, be offered the job, and accept the job
offer. Among those individuals who receive a job referral, approxi
mately 30 to 40 percent are placed in a job.7 Hence, only about 10 to 15
percent of all ES registrants are placed in a job by the ES and the rate
for UI claimants is lower.8
Counseling

Over the last sixty years, the ES has placed varying levels of empha
sis on the provision of employment counseling services, such as assis
tance to individuals in making occupational choices, changes, or
adjustments. Employment counselors help people make these deci
sions by providing access to employment information; by interpreting
the results of aptitude, interest, and skills tests; and by providing other
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employment or training assistance. For the most part, counseling has
been traditionally given to individuals facing various types of employ
ment barriers, who are not currently job ready, whereas work referrals
are provided to job-ready applicants. During the middle-to-late 1960s,
when the ES began focusing on serving the disadvantaged, roughly 20
percent (or more) of all new applicants received at least one employ
ment counseling interview. More recently, the proportion of registrants
receiving counseling has been falling steadily as the number of ES
counselors has declined, and, in the 1990s, only 3 to 4 percent of ES
registrants receive employment counseling.
Testing
Aptitude and interest tests have historically been an important part
of the services provided by the ES and, in particular, by ES counselors.
Various tests have been used in different ES offices, including the Gen
eral Aptitude Test Battery (GATE),9 the Specific Aptitude Test Batter
ies (SATB), the Interest Check List, and the Basic Occupational
Literacy Test, among others. ES counselors use these tests to help
youth make career decisions. In addition, test results are used to assess
specific job qualifications and to screen out applicants who are not
qualified for a particular job opening.
The trends in the extent of test administration over time have, for the
most part, mirrored trends in counseling services. In the middle 1960s,
roughly 20 to 25 percent of all applicants received testing. This com
pares to less than 5 percent of all applicants by 1980, with the majority
of tests given to women or used primarily for skills evaluation for cler
ical positions (Johnson et al. 1983). Currently, approximately 2 to 3
percent of all ES applicants receive testing services, and it appears that
the likelihood that UI claimants receive testing services is even lower. 10
Job Development
Job developments are similar to job referrals except that there are no
existing openings listed with the ES. In an effort to help individuals
find jobs, ES interviewers, recognizing that an applicant has specific
work skills, may contact employers who hire individuals with similar
skills, even though a vacancy has not been listed with the ES. Through
this process, the ES interviewer may arrange an appointment for the
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applicant with an employer, and some of these job development inter
views result in job placements.
There is relatively little information on the extent of job develop
ment services and trends over time. Available evidence (Johnson et al.
1983) that relates to the operation of the ES around 1980 indicates that
approximately one out of ten registrants received a job development.
However, the use of job developments is highly cyclical and likely to
depend on the availability of staff resources.
Other Job Search Assistance Services
In addition to these basic labor exchange services, some ES offices
offer more intensive ways to help unemployed workers find jobs. These
services include job finding clubs or job search assistance workshops
that are usually offered on a periodic basis (e.g., weekly, monthly) and
may be designed for specific groups. There is, however, considerable
variation across sites in the intensity of the service and in the groups
targeted to receive assistance. For example, the service can range from
a single, brief (one to three hour) meeting/workshop, to a week-long
intensive program of job finding, skill development and resume prepa
ration. Some workshops are targeted to UI claimants or to specific sub
sets of claimants (e.g., dislocated workers), while others are targeted to
occupational groups (e.g., white-collar workers, blue-collar workers).
Job-finding clubs originated in the late 1960s. Many of the early
clubs were developed for white-collar or professional workers who
tended to experience particular difficulties in finding new employment.
The clubs are essentially peer-support groups of unemployed individu
als, who meet to share their experiences and lessons learned in looking
for work.Usually the meetings are facilitated by an ES staff member,
often the local employment counselor. We are aware of no job-finding
clubs, prior to the Worker Profiling and Reemployment Services
(WPRS) initiative, that required claimants to participate in order to
receive UI benefits.
The goal of job-search workshops is generally to ensure that each
unemployed worker can define his or her job search objectives and can
develop an employability or job search plan. Workshops vary in the
time devoted to specific subjects, but most job-search workshops
include such topics as how to effectively handle losing your job, selfassessment, developing realistic employment goals, organizing a job-
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search strategy, preparing a resume, filling out a job application, and
job interview techniques. Job search workshops tend to combine a
classroom lecture style with extensive group discussion. Several differ
ent types of job-search assistance workshops have been tested as part
of federal or state demonstration programs. In some cases, attendance
at the workshops has been mandatory; in these instances, this service
also introduces a work test feature because failure to report to the
workshop as directed could lead to denial of UI benefits.
Summary

As indicated, the primary linkages between the ES and UI programs
concern the administration of the work test and the provision of labor
exchange and reemployment services to claimants. In contrast to the
relative stability of the work-test function of the ES, job matching has
shifted focus several times. To understand the reasons behind these
shifts, it is essential to have a more in-depth knowledge of the history
of the ES. As will be described in more detail, the functional shifts are
due to changes in the central mission of the ES, in the target groups to
be served, and in administrative structure and program resources.
Moreover, these shifts in the mission of the ES, as they relate to provid
ing reemployment services, have intensified in the last decade. A sig
nificant part of the next section is devoted to understanding the role of
the ES in the creation of a new workforce development system that can
effectively serve Americans in the emerging "information economy" of
the 1990s and beyond.

The Employment Service: The First Sixty Years
To fully understand how the ES functions today and to provide a
context for interpreting ES evaluation results, it is important to know
how the mission and corresponding focus of the job-matching services
of the ES have evolved over time. Because of the host of changes that
have occurred in ES operations over the years, it is not feasible to doc
ument them all in detail. Instead, we summarize what we consider to
be the major modifications in policy, program emphasis, and program
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resources. This section draws from previous books, reports, and papers
concerned with the ES, including Adams (1969), Johnson et al. (1983),
and Kulik (1994).
In 1933, the Wagner-Peyser Act established the federal-state ES
with the mission of coordinating state employment agencies that pro
vide free services to "men, women and juniors who are legally quali
fied to engage in gainful occupations." 11 During the Great Depression,
the ES primarily functioned as a placement agency to refer applicants
to newly created jobs in public works programs and work relief
projects; the scarcity of private sector jobs limited the role the ES ini
tially played in that part of the labor market. Title III of the Social
Security Act of 1935 created the UI program and directed that benefits
be paid through public employment offices or other agencies as
approved by the Social Security Board (now the Secretary of Labor). 12
Throughout the UI program's sixty-year history, public employment
offices have been the only agency authorized to administer the pay
ment of UI benefits. Under federally approved state UI laws, states
have also been required to pay UI benefits only to claimants who were
able to work and available for work and who met state-specific worksearch requirements.
The ES registered claimants for work, referred qualified claimants
(and other applicants) to suitable job openings, and informed the UI
program when claimants did not meet the registration requirements,
refused a referral to suitable employment, or refused a job offer. This
role of performing the work test formed the cornerstone of the initial
relationship between the ES and UI programs and, at the same time,
introduced a new dimension to ES responsibilities. Specifically, it
marked the first time that the ES was faced with serving individuals
who were required to register for work. 13 As such, it put the same ES
staff members who were referring applicants to jobs in the potentially
awkward position of also being responsible for reporting on the work
test.
Although the ES and UI programs had been operated as federalstate partnerships, 14 state ES agencies were put under direct federal
control during World War II and served as a local labor market for
workers in the war industries. After World War II, the operations of the
ES were returned to the states, and priority was placed on providing
services to returning veterans and to those workers who were dislo-
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cated through the process of shifting from a war economy to a civilian
economy. The postwar period also created two new responsibilities for
the ES in the areas of compliance and special services to additional tar
get groups. First, the ES provided certification of foreign labor and was
required to show that employment opportunities and wages for U.S.
workers would not be harmed if foreign workers were admitted. Sec
ond, in addition to offering preferential counseling and placement
opportunities for veterans, by the mid-1950s, the target groups for spe
cial assistance had expanded to include youth, older workers, and the
disabled.
The linkages between the ES and the UI program were strengthened
during the late 1950s. During this period, the UI trust fund—the pri
mary source of funding for local ES offices—exceeded the legal maxi
mum, and these excess monies were distributed to individual state
accounts. Under special conditions known as "Reed Act" provisions,
these monies could be used by states to obtain, among other things,
new buildings to administer employment security programs. As new
offices were acquired, many state UI claims offices were located "in
the same building as the employment offices" (Haber and Murray
1966, p. 426). At that time, critics charged that co-locating unemploy
ment and employment offices would damage the image of the ES. They
contended that good jobs and high-quality job seekers would not be
attracted to co-located employment offices, and that physical separa
tion of ES and UI would also encourage formal communication
between the two agencies (Haber and Murray 1966). At one level, they
may have been correct, as many American job seekers view the local
employment office as a place to go when they are out of work—that is,
as the "unemployment office"—not a place to look for a job. However,
this co-location of ES and UI offices in post-World War II America has
resulted in UI claims filing and work registration being available at a
single location in many states and has spurred a number of policy initi
atives centered around the development of one-stop services.
The 1960s brought a host of new responsibilities for the ES. In
1961, the Area Redevelopment Act required the ES to help establish
training programs in depressed areas and called for a large expansion
of its efforts in collecting labor market information. For example, it
directed the ES to collect information on unemployment levels by
labor market area to determine whether disadvantaged areas qualified
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for federal assistance. It also established a role for the ES to work with
state and local educational programs to provide data on occupational
trends that would be useful in curriculum development and career
counseling.
A new era for the ES was initiated with the passage of the Man
power Development and Training Act in 1962 and the Economic
Opportunity Act of 1964, which increased the involvement of the ES in
training programs and human resource development activities. Taken
together, these pieces of legislation greatly de-emphasized the job
matching and labor exchange role of the ES and resulted in the ES
becoming the lead public agency in the design and delivery of job
training and human resource development programs. The ES provided
outreach, screening, and referral services for various training programs
and other social programs established through the Great Society legis
lation; many of these programs were targeted to disadvantaged groups
(e.g., Job Corps, Neighborhood Youth Corps). The ES also offered job
readiness services for new labor force entrants and placed individuals
who completed training programs in jobs. By 1965, these changes had
shifted the major mission of the ES to serving low-income and disad
vantaged workers through human resource development services; con
sequently, the ES grew considerably during this period as additional
resources were allocated to meet the challenge of providing needed
services to the disadvantaged. In addition, this shift in the mission of
the ES resulted in a 1967 Labor Department initiative to facilitate a
dialogue around the development of an integrated delivery system for
human services at central locations (U.S. Department of Labor 1967, p.
3), which is surprisingly similar to the current one-stop services con
cept described below.
The ES reached a program zenith in the 1960s as substantial funding
increases were provided to meet the needs of the disadvantaged. How
ever, the era where the ES was the sole public provider of reemployment services ended in the early 1970s, with the passage of the
Comprehensive Employment and Training Act (CETA) of 1973. CETA
fundamentally changed the institutional infrastructure for employment
and training assistance by fragmenting the delivery of employment and
training services to economically disadvantaged and permanently laidoff job seekers. Under the CETA, the institutional infrastructure
emphasized local design and delivery of employment and training pro-
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grams, 15 and the primary mission of the ES returned to its focus on the
basic labor exchange functions of referral to job openings and job
placement. As a result of this return to its original mission, funding for
the ES remained relatively constant over the 1970s in real dollars.
Although the ES was expected to conduct assessment activities and to
provide placement services for local employment and training pro
grams, CETA did not give the ES a clear-cut role in the employment
and training system, and conflicts over "turf issues" appear to have lim
ited the integration of service delivery between the two agencies (Levitan and Taggart 1976).
The gradual decline in the role of the ES continued through the
1980s with the next two shifts in national employment and training
policy: the replacement of CETA with the Job Training Partnership Act
(JTPA) in 1982, and the replacement of the JTPA dislocated worker
program with the EDWAA Act in 1988. 16 Both JTPA and EDWAA,
which amended JTPA Title III, continued the movement toward local
control of the delivery of employment and training services to unem
ployed workers. In an effort to refocus the ES on its basic labor
exchange mission, and to foster cooperation and linkages between ES
and JTPA programs, the 1982 JTPA legislation amended the WagnerPeyser Act to give states expanded authority to reshape state labor
exchange programs through federal special purpose block grants.
Moreover, although EDWAA specified that the ES should have a role
in the provision of services to dislocated workers, states were allowed
considerable discretion in the structure of the service delivery process.
In addition to devolving much authority for the ES from the federal
level to the states, the amendments also altered the ES grants funding
formula by allocating resources to states based on need, as measured
by various indicators of unemployment. 17
Although modifications in the reporting requirements that accompa
nied the 1982 Wagner-Peyser Amendments make it difficult to accu
rately measure the change in overall ES program funding, Kulik (1994)
estimates that the level of resources (in real dollar terms) for the basic
labor exchange activities declined by about 20 percent from 1984 to
1992. As a result, some states augmented federal ES funding through
manipulation of their UI tax laws or special assessments to maintain or
enhance labor exchange activities for special target groups. For exam
ple, in 1982, Montana assessed a separate surcharge on top of
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employer UI taxes to shore up ES operations. Since then, other states
have taken steps to buttress their labor exchange systems through the
collection of special taxes that are used to provide ES services to job
seekers. 18 Still other states have combined local office ES and UI job
descriptions and have cross-trained staff to perform claims taking and
labor exchange functions; these actions were taken to cut costs or prod
more "case-managed" services and, in some cases, have complicated
the work test role of the ES.
The new federalism of the last three decades achieved its objective
of strengthening local control of reemployment services. However, the
lengthy stepwise progression of this process has often resulted in frag
mented, and sometimes in contradictory, local delivery of employment
and training programs to unemployed workers, including UI recipients.
Moreover, during the same period, the rapid pace of global competi
tion, the downsizing of old-line American industries, and the emer
gence of the information economy have created a need to revamp the
employment security system and the delivery of employment and train
ing services to job seekers. In 1991, the U.S. General Accounting
Office (GAO) reported:
While ES programs in some states have flourished without
Labor's technical assistance, wide variations in local office perfor
mance indicate that active assistance from Labor may help to
improve the effectiveness of their programs....GAO recommends
that the Secretary of Labor work with the states to identify and
solve problems affecting ES program quality and performance. 19

During the last few years, federal and state policy makers have per
ceived the need to design new workforce development systems to
improve services to incumbent and potential workers and have intro
duced a number of alternative legislative proposals that have important
implications for the future of the employment and training system and
for the role of the ES in that process. Several such state proposals have
been implemented. For example, Indiana, Iowa, and New Jersey each
enacted legislation to revamp their employment and training systems.
In large measure, these early state workforce development system
changes were achieved with little federal assistance.
After a year of development, in March 1994, President Clinton
announced the administration's workforce development proposal,
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called the Reemployment Act, to overhaul the country's fragmented
employment and training system. The bill was designed to "reinvent"
America's splintered job-finding system using an approach based upon
service provider collaboration and competition. Under the bill's provi
sions, state and local governments, community colleges, and private
service providers could be designated as operators, as long as they met
"chartering" service criteria of the ES and other employment and train
ing programs.
Throughout the Reemployment Act's development and short legisla
tive life, three fundamental policy issues emerged: customer service,
choice, and competition. The issue of enabling both public and private
labor exchange operators to compete for customers divided the bill's
natural allies and dominated every discussion of the bill's worth. As the
103rd Congress ended, the Clinton administration could not even
obtain waiver authority to experiment with state employment and train
ing programs, and the bill died. Nevertheless, the Labor Department
began to press forward with its vision of building a comprehensive
workforce development system.
There are four common themes that appear to be widely recognized
as essential components of an effective workforce development system:
1. a reemphasis on meeting the job-finding needs of the system's
customers, which the ES has dubbed "ES Revitalization";
2. the early identification of individuals who are likely to be out of
work for long periods and the provision to them of job-search
assistance services, often referred to as "Worker Profiling and
Reemployment Services";
3. the provision of information needed by job seekers to make
informed labor market choices, which is embodied in the concept
of "America's Labor Market Information System"; and
4. the implementation of a seamless delivery system for all employ
ment and training services, such as nationwide "One-Stop Career
Centers."
ES Revitalization

An essential element of an effective workforce development system
is a focus, and concern, on the part of ES staff that the program is meet-
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ing the needs of the people who seek out employment services, that is,
its customers. Recognizing the necessity to improve the ES customer
focus, states, the Labor Department, and others developed an "ES Revitalization Work Plan" designed to strengthen the capacity of the ES to
deliver quality information and services to its customers. 20 The goal of
ES revitalization is to transform the traditional labor exchange model
characterized by bureaucratic rules, standardized services, and dispas
sionate staff into a new vision of the labor exchange process that pro
motes universal access, permits consumer choice, provides customized
services, and enables staff to either facilitate customer self-service or
provide more intensive employment interventions.
To achieve this goal, the ES developed a long-term agenda and iden
tified short-term improvements, including steps to be taken within the
existing resources to enhance ES customer service. The long-term
agenda envisions three tiers of ES service levels, each focusing on
meeting individual customer needs, and would provide employers the
ability to select job seekers from any tier. Specifically, the plan catego
rizes the services into the following tiers:
• Tier I: Self-Help (resource center and automated self-help system
containing information on jobs, and job search assistance);
• Tier II: Basic Intervention (basic assessment and services, such as
referral to jobs, job search assistance, and training);
• Tier III: Intensive Services (job seekers could be served by ES or
referred to other workforce development programs).
In the short term, the United States Employment Service established
cooperative agreements with six states to develop and share the latest
knowledge and practices in areas that will enhance ES customer ser
vice: staff capacity building (Iowa), best practices clearinghouse (West
Virginia), customer satisfaction (Rhode Island), job matching (Ohio),
leadership exchange (Texas) and local office redesign (Maryland). 21 A
description of several key products includes the following:
• Clearinghouse. Gives SESAs an on-line computer resource,
called The Workforce ATM, that contains federal and state work
force development information. The Internet address for Workforce
ATM is http://www.icesa.org.
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• Customer Satisfaction. Provides SESAs with customer satisfac
tion measurement tools for employers, job seekers/claimants, and
staff, and staff training to utilize customer feedback. Customer sat
isfaction is increasingly viewed as a leading gauge of success in
workforce development programs and a main source of guidance
for labor exchange service improvements.
•Job Matching. Offers SESAs technical information about effec
tive methods to match job seekers with employers by identifying
and documenting SESA automated job-matching systems and by
identifying alternative systems (e.g., resume-based, skill-based,
text-retrieval). Intelligent job matching technology is likely to play
an increasing role in future labor exchange systems.
Worker Profiling and Reemployment Services

Based on findings from Labor Department-sponsored demonstration
programs, it is widely believed that the early identification of, and pro
vision of reemployment services to, individuals who are likely to be
long-term unemployed should be a key component of any effective
workforce development system. Thus, in March 1993, an amendment
to the Social Security Act directed the Labor Department to establish
and encourage state participation in a profiling screening program to
identify likely UI exhaustees needing reemployment services. 22 In
November 1993, additional amendments to the Act made state partici
pation in the profiling screening program mandatory and required UI
claimants identified by the profiling program to participate in reem
ployment services or risk being disqualified from receiving UI bene
fits.23
Although the profiling screening process and the identification of
targeted claimants are the responsibility of the UI program, the WPRS
system increases the work test responsibilities of the ES and EDWAA
service providers. Specifically, the WPRS system contains four basic
components: (1) early identification, (2) selection and referral,
(3) reemployment services, and (4) feedback to the UI program. The
UI program is responsible for the first two components, while ES and
EDWAA substate grantees share responsibilities for the other two com
ponents. For example, in most states, claimants selected by the state
profiling screening program are referred to ES or EDWAA substate
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grantee service providers by their fifth week of unemployment for ori
entation and assessment. The assessment process is designed to iden
tify the reemployment needs of each claimant, through vocational
testing, interest inventories, and counseling, and to result in the devel
opment of an individualized service plan. 24 Claimants who have the
skills and experience to fill openings that are currently available
receive job referrals, while others are required to participate in a pro
gram of reemployment services customized to suit the claimant's
reemployment situation. The potential reemployment services that
meet the requirements include job search workshops, interview or
resume preparation classes, or other job search assistance services. 25
Claimants who do not have marketable skills are referred to occupa
tional training providers through the EDWAA program or through
other training programs.
The WPRS system not only strengthens the mission of the ES to
provide reemployment services to UI claimants, it further expands the
work-test responsibilities that are performed by the ES or the EDWAA
service provider, depending on state referral arrangements. These
expanded work-test responsibilities include feedback to the UI system
relating to the claimant's week-to-week participation status, comple
tion of reemployment services, or failure to participate in reemploy
ment services.
To ensure that there was sufficient capacity within the states to pro
vide reemployment services and feedback information to UI, approxi
mately $20 million in program years (PYs) 1994-1995 EDWAA
supplemental funds was made available to support the capacity build
ing and implementation efforts of states. These EDWAA supplemental
funds were distributed through the existing substate grantee structure
to local EDWAA service providers and the ES. In states where the ES
is the WPRS service provider, supplemental funds were used to revital
ize assessment, counseling, and job search programs for dislocated
workers and feedback systems to UI, which helped to build ES staff
capacity and to partially offset the declining resources received in
recent years.
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America's Labor Market Information System
Labor market information is a critical element of any new workforce
development system designed to meet the needs of workers and
employers in an information economy, including workers and employ
ers who must adapt to the educational and training requirements of this
different economy. A comprehensive and easily accessible national
labor market information system will provide the data necessary to
make informed choices about jobs and to maintain U.S. global compet
itiveness. For example, such a system will enable workers to adjust
more rapidly to structural changes in the economy and help them make
informed career choices minimizing the amount of structural unem
ployment. This type of system is also needed to support the develop
ment of One-Stop Career Centers, which will facilitate job seeker and
employer access to employment, training, and income support pro
grams.
A network of this sort has been included in most proposed work
force development programs, including the Clinton administration's
vision of a truly comprehensive labor market information system,
which has been dubbed America's Labor Market Information System
(ALMIS). The purpose of ALMIS is to help labor markets function
more efficiently. Reflecting a philosophy similar to that underlying the
concept of One-Stop Career Centers, ALMIS will offer one-stop access
to information. As such, it will give anyone—job seekers, students,
employers—direct access to a wide range of labor market information
from a variety of sources. ALMIS will also include valuable program
evaluation data, such as on customer satisfaction, and information
about the performance of education and training providers.
A companion of ALMIS is AJB, a nationwide electronic labor
exchange of job orders shared by states and operated by the AJB Ser
vice Center in Albany, New York, which currently lists over 600,000
job openings daily. In the past, access to individual state job banks was
limited, and available only to those who used ES offices. To address
this issue, in 1995, the job listings in AJB and affiliated state job banks
were made available to the Internet, and in a way so that employer list
ings can be easily reviewed and searched electronically. 26 To further
support an enhanced electronic labor exchange, federal-state ES coop
eration has made it possible for employers to enter job orders directly
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into the AJB system, and a nationwide ALMIS talent bank network of
job seekers is being tested, which can be easily searched by employ
ers.27 These technological advances will provide employers and job
seekers with new nontraditional ways to tap into the labor market.
One-Stop Career Centers

A central feature of the Clinton administration's efforts to replace
the splintered employment and unemployment structure with a com
prehensive workforce development system is in the formation of OneStop Career Centers.28 The vision of such centers is to transform the
fragmented employment and training system and afford all job seekers
easy access to reliable, up-to-date information on jobs, skills in
demand, performance records of training institutions, and UI benefits,
as well as to provide employers access to the talent and skills they need
to successfully manage their businesses. The four tenets that underpin
the goals of these centers are as follows:
• Universality. To integrate the delivery of services from existing
unemployment, employment and job training programs and to pro
vide customers with an array of job finding and employment devel
opment assistance
• Customer Choice. To provide customers with options and choices
of where to get the services that best meet their needs
•Integrated System. To offer a comprehensive and accessible
"one-stop shop" for employment and educational with integrated
programs, services, and governance structures including access to
Labor Department-funded employment and training programs
•Performance-Driven/Outcomes-Based. To measure system per
formance and to determine if it actually achieved outcomes,
including a strong connection to whether the customer is satisfied
with the services received (U.S. Department of Labor 1994a).
In 1994, the Labor Department provided grants to implement OneStop Career Centers to six states29 and gave planning grants to nineteen
other states totaling $34 million. In 1995, an additional ten states
received $40.5 million to implement One-Stop Career Center sys
tems.30 Finally, in early 1996, all remaining states received grants total
ing approximately $4 million to develop One-Stop systems. 31 Further
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Labor Department investments are planned. 32 Each state will offer state
and federally funded employment and training services to customers at
single points of delivery, and performance measures will be linked to
customer satisfaction, cross-program indicators, and continuous
improvement. Thus far, most of the states that are implementing OneStop Career Centers are using the ES as the centerpiece of their new
systems.
Summary

As has been indicated, the roles and responsibilities of the ES during
its first sixty years have changed considerably. Although the initial
charter to match unemployed workers to job openings listed by
employers was complicated by the addition of numerous responsibili
ties and by multiple target groups with different needs, by the mid1970s, the focus had returned to providing basic labor exchange ser
vices for applicants. In addition, the role of the ES as a player in the
employment and training arena changed, as other programs were intro
duced that were responsible for a broad range of employment and
training functions, and as federal authority for operating the program
was replaced by state authority. Consequently, the emphasis placed on
the administration of the work test tended to vary depending on unem
ployment conditions. Also, as more disadvantaged target groups were
added to the list of ES responsibilities, services to claimants—who
were required to register for work at the ES—were not a priority.
In contrast, over the last several years, the ES has become involved
in a major initiative to respond to structural changes in the workplace
and to utilize advanced information systems. Both the structural
change and advanced technologies require innovative ways to organize
and provide services and are leading to a different role for the ES in
serving structurally unemployed customers, mostly UI claimants, who
are likely to need more intensive assistance. This new way to organize
and provide services should lead to a new labor exchange system
"without walls" where job seekers obtain services and find jobs, and
employers find high-qualify workers through a variety of computerassisted tools and integrated delivery systems.
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Evidence of the Effectiveness of the Employment Service
in Assisting Unemployed Workers
As described, the two main roles of the ES in serving UI claimants
involve (1) helping in the administration of the work test, and (2) pro
viding basic labor exchange and job search assistance to UI claimants.
In this section, we summarize evidence concerning the impacts and
cost-effectiveness of the ES in performing the work test and in helping
unemployed workers to find jobs. Whenever possible, we focus on the
evidence as it pertains specifically to UI claimants.
The evidence on the effectiveness of the ES and of specific ES ser
vices varies considerably in terms of validity. Here, we distinguish
between two types of validity: internal and external. Internal validity
refers to obtaining unbiased estimates of the effects of ES services on
employment and earnings outcomes. External validity refers to the
ability to generalize the findings to a broader population.
In some cases, the evidence is based on carefully designed and
implemented field experiments, which randomly assigned individuals
to groups that were offered specific services or to a control group that
was not. In these instances, differences in the outcomes between the
groups have high internal validity and provide very strong and con
vincing evidence of the effects of the services in question, at the sites
where the field experiments are conducted. If the sites are representa
tive, and meet the external validity criterion, then the findings can be
generalized to a broader population.
In other cases, the evidence is based on statistical comparison group
designs, where outcomes for individuals who receive the service are
compared to outcomes for individuals who do not, using multivariate
methods that (whenever possible) control for demographic and other
personal characteristics and labor market conditions. In these situa
tions, the internal validity of the evidence depends critically on the
degree of similarity between the groups being compared, and on the
effectiveness of the statistical procedures in adjusting for potential sys
tematic differences between the two groups.
Still other cases have evidence that consists simply of information
bits, and inferences are drawn without a real benchmark for compari
son purposes. Finally, in certain cases, the effectiveness of the service
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is for all practical purposes completely unknown, as it has never been
evaluated.
Effects of the Work Test

Individuals receiving UI benefits must demonstrate that they are
able to work and available for work. In most states, claimants who are
not job-attached are required to actively search for work, to register for
work with the ES, to participate in assigned work-search activities, and
to accept suitable job referrals. Claimants who are found not to comply
with this requirement are disqualified from receiving UI benefits for
the period they are out of compliance, or possibly longer.
The administration of the ES work-test requirement involves ES
staff effort (and hence incurs costs) and provides potentially important
benefits to society.33 These benefits arise from the potential reductions
in UI payments, as claimants leave the unemployment rolls sooner than
they would have done in the absence of the work test. Reduced weeks
of UI payments could occur because claimants return to work more
quickly or because even though they continue to claim additional
weeks of benefits, some of their claims are denied for not meeting the
work test. Reductions in UI payments could also occur if, because of
the perceived higher costs of collecting UI payments due to the work
test, claimants choose to no longer receive benefits but do not immedi
ately return to work. Since these outcomes generate different benefits
from the social perspective, in order to fully assess the overall impact
of the work test it is important to understand whether it affects the sub
sequent wage rates or earnings of claimants.
There is considerable evidence concerning the administration and
effects of the work test requirements for UI claimants. This includes
descriptive information reported in Johnson et al. (1981b) of how the
work test operated in a national sample of thirty ES offices in 1980;
evidence based on an analysis of time series of cross sections of 19641981 state data concerning variation in UI nonmonetary eligibility
determination rates, as reported in Corson et al. (1984a); and descrip
tive information from a national survey of recipients of unemployment
benefits and exhaustees reported in Corson and Dynarski (1990). It
also includes findings from two demonstration programs. We will first
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highlight the evidence from the nonexperimental studies, which are all
based on nationally representative data:
• There are extensive differences across UI/ES offices in the require
ments claimants must meet to be viewed as able to work and avail
able for work; as to whether claimants are required to register with
the ES; and in the degree of enforcement of the work test. Office
managers and ES staff consistently reported that staff spent modest
amounts of time in activities related to the work test for UI claim
ants, and that such time did not generally detract from their ability
to provide labor exchange services to other registrants. The large
majority of ES staff also did not consider their role in the work test
as "monitoring" or "policing," but simply as a provider of informa
tion to the UI program that was obtained through the normal part
of the ES process of following up with employers on the status of
job openings.
• Nonmonetary determination rates vary considerably from UI office
to UI office and depend on differences in agency practices and
behaviors, as well as on differences in eligibility regulations and
criteria across states. States with formal requirements that claim
ants search for work, and with detailed instructions regarding the
documentation necessary to meet the requirements, have higher
nonmonetary determination rates, and states with more severe dis
qualification penalties have fewer denials. It also appears that
higher sanctions reduce the number of individuals seeking unem
ployment benefits.
• Results from a national survey reveal that most job-attached claim
ants who expect to be recalled by their previous employer are
recalled, indicating that the limited work-search requirements
imposed for job-attached claimants by most states are appropriate.
In contrast, 16 percent of individuals receiving UI benefits who did
not expect to be recalled reported that they did not look for work
while receiving UI benefits, and 18 percent of exhaustees found a
job within two weeks of receiving their last payment.
This nonexperimental evidence, which suggests that the costs of
conducting the work test are not large and that strict work-search
requirements could be effective in reducing UI outlays, is strongly sup
ported by the experimental evidence obtained from two demonstration
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programs conducted in the 1980s. These two projects—the Charleston
Claimant Placement and Work Test Demonstration, and the Washing
ton Alternative Work Search Experiment—provide a good contrast, in
that the Charleston demonstration evaluated an approach that strength
ened the work test, and the Washington demonstration assessed an
approach that streamlined (or weakened) the work test. The work test
component of the Charleston demonstration implemented in three ES
offices involved a comparison of two groups of claimants who received
a first UI payment: claimants randomly assigned to a control group that
had their work registration requirement waived (which essentially for
malized the policy that was previously in effect), and claimants ran
domly assigned to a treatment group that was instructed to register
with the ES no later than the end of the week following the week in
which they received their first check. Based on a cross-matching of ES
and UI data files, claimants who did not comply with the strengthened
work test were called in by the UI program for a fact-finding interview
to determine whether a disqualification should be imposed until the
requirement was met.
In contrast, the Washington demonstration, which was conducted in
a single large urban ES office, examined the effectiveness of the work
test by comparing the outcomes of two groups of monetarily and nonmonetarily eligible claimants that were randomly assigned to different
work test approaches. One group was assigned to the standard work
search policy, traditionally used in most states, of requiring claimants
to make at least three employer contacts each week and to report those
contacts on their continued claim form. The other group was randomly
assigned to a streamlined work search approach that did not require
claimants to report work search contacts and had UI payments auto
matically sent to claimants in a sum equal to the weekly benefit
amount, unless the claimant called the local office to report changes in
circumstances that affected the benefit amount. The following brief
summary of highlights from these two experimental evaluations of the
impacts and cost-effectiveness of the work test is based on the results
reported in Corson, Long, and Nicholson (1984) and in Johnson and
Klepinger (1994):
The experimental evidence from the demonstration projects is
consistent and clearly indicates that strong work test requirements
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are effective in reducing UI payments and that weak work search
and work test policies have large and adverse consequences for
the UI trust fund. For example, evidence from the Charleston
demonstration indicates that a strengthened work test requirement
that claimants must register with the ES or else will be denied
benefits, coupled with rigorous enforcement, reduces UI payments
by 0.5 weeks per claimant, and does not affect claimants' likeli
hood of working or average earnings. Moreover, evidence from
the Washington demonstration indicates that a weak work search
policy has very large and adverse consequences for the UI trust
fund. Specifically, relative to the standard approach to work
search, the weaker policy resulted in longer durations of unem
ployment benefit receipt of over 3 weeks and increased total UI
payments by over $250 per claimant, but did not significantly
affect claimants' subsequent earnings.34

The consistency of results from these two demonstration projects,
each with high internal validity, indicates that the role of the ES in per
forming the work test for UI claimants is very significant. In particular,
the findings suggest that UI/ES offices that require claimants to search
for work and to register with the ES and that have an effective mecha
nism to follow-up and enforce this requirement, can bring about signif
icant savings to the UI trust fund, without adversely affecting other
outcomes for claimants. However, there appears to be wide variation in
work test policies and practices across offices, which limits the overall
effectiveness of the ES in this role nationwide.
Effectiveness of Services

The second major role the ES plays for UI claimants (and for other
registrants) involves the provision of basic labor exchange services or
services to assist in the matching of qualified applicants with job open
ings. This includes the fundamental services such as job referrals,
employment counseling, testing, and job development. It also includes
other, more intensive, services, such as job search workshops, which
are offered periodically in some offices. In this section, we summarize
the available evidence on the effectiveness of ES services, with particu
lar attention, whenever possible, on the evidence as it pertains to serv
ing claimants.
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Because the ES is mandated to serve all individuals who request
assistance, attempts to use experimental methods of random assign
ment to evaluate the ES have previously been rejected by the Labor
Department as inappropriate or infeasible.35 As a result, the evidence of
the overall effectiveness on the main ES labor exchange services is
based on comparison group methodologies that statistically control for
potential differences between the groups of applicants who receive ser
vices and those who do not. Because comparison group designs,
regardless of the rigorous statistical methods used, have less internal
validity and provide inherently less convincing results on program
effectiveness, there are no studies that provide incontrovertible evi
dence on the overall effectiveness of the main ES labor exchange ser
vices. Moreover, most of the available evidence corresponds to how the
ES program was operating in the late 1970s to the mid 1980s. Despite
these potential limitations, we will summarize the lessons learned from
the most rigorous of these studies.
There is, however, extensive and quite convincing evidence concern
ing the impacts of job search workshops on the labor market outcomes
of unemployed workers and, in particular, of UI claimants. This is pri
marily because of several demonstration projects undertaken by the
U.S. Department of Labor at a variety of sites, in which claimants were
randomly assigned to a treatment group that included a mandatory job
search workshop, or to a control group that was not eligible for the
workshop. Classical experimental evaluation methods were viewed as
appropriate in these instances, as the workshop was considered to be
something "extra, and in addition to" the basic labor exchange activi
ties, and in most instances, was not part of the regular set of ES ser
vices offered prior to the demonstration. 36 The findings from these
studies will also be summarized.
Primary Labor Exchange Services
Of the various labor exchange and job-matching services provided
by the ES—job referral, counseling, testing, job development—there is
no reliable research evidence on the impacts of testing or of job devel
opment. Moreover, there is no reliable evidence on the effects of the
labor market information services provided by the ES. In contrast,
there has been one comprehensive national evaluation (Johnson et al.
1983) that examined the impacts of ES labor exchange services, prima-
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rily job referrals, on the short-term labor market outcomes of ES appli
cants in a representative sample of ES offices. In addition, research by
Katz (1978), Romero, Cox, and Katz (1991), and work in progress by
Katz and Jacobson examine the job search outcomes of individuals
who use the ES versus the outcomes of those who do not, using a rich
data base for unemployed workers in a single state, Pennsylvania.
There has also been one (pilot) experimental evaluation of the effec
tiveness of counseling in the ES (Benus et al. 1977), and there has been
a national survey of the counseling program (Johnson et al. 1981). The
main highlights from these studies are as follows:
•Women who receive ES job referrals are estimated to return to
work more quickly (about three weeks sooner) and to obtain higher
earnings (by nearly 25 percent) in the short term than otherwise
similar individuals who did not receive referrals. Because the wage
rates of women who received referrals and those who did not are
very similar, the earnings gains are due to women with referrals
spending more time in employment; however, they do not trade
earlier employment for lower wage rates.
• The positive effects of ES job referrals for women are widespread
and are not concentrated on specific subgroups. In particular, the
effects of ES referrals for women are similar for both mandatory
and nonmandatory registrants.
• In part because the cost of serving ES registrants is so low, the ben
efits that accrue to women in the short term are sufficiently large to
conclude that the ES is an efficient use of public resources, even
without considering long term outcomes or other potential benefits
oftheES.
•Many unemployed workers (and particularly dislocated workers)
use the ES as a "last resort" or as a "backstop," and turn to the ES
only after other job- finding methods have failed. After controlling
for when dislocated workers choose to use the ES, results indicate
that ES services (placements and referrals that do not lead to place
ments) significantly reduce the remaining unemployment duration.
Although the effects are significant for both men and women, the
effects are larger for women who were dislocated, and for those
who wait longer to use the ES.
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• A pilot study of the impacts of ES counseling concluded that it had
no significant impact on duration of unemployment, earnings, or
job satisfaction.37 This is consistent with findings from a national
survey of the counseling program, in which counseling supervisors
reported that counselors were primarily evaluated on the quality of
the counseling records kept, the size of their caseload, and their
communication and relationship skills; many fewer indicated that
counselors were evaluated on ES services provided to job seekers
or on the results of those services.
Although these results indicate that job referral services provided by
the ES to unemployed workers may be cost-effective, the conclusions
apply primarily to how the ES operated 15-20 years ago. Moreover, a
recent national survey of UI recipients and exhaustees (Corson and
Dynarski 1990) reported that only 4 percent of all recipients and
exhaustees found their jobs through the ES. New information is needed
to assess the effectiveness of the ES overall and in providing jobmatching services to claimants.
Job Search Assistance Services
In addition to these analyses of the basic labor exchange services,
there have been a number of demonstrations in recent years designed to
test the effects of enhanced job search assistance services (and other
services) in improving the labor market outcomes of UI claimants.
These efforts include three demonstration projects completed in the
1980s—the Charleston Claimant Placement and Work Test Demonstra
tion, the New Jersey UI Reemployment Demonstration, and the Wash
ington Alternative Work Search Experiment—all of which were
rigorously conducted using random assignment to treatment or control
status. In addition, the success of these projects and the need to better
understand the behavioral response to different service delivery pack
ages have spawned other ongoing, rigorous demonstrations testing var
ious packages of enhanced job search services in Maryland,38 Florida,
and the District of Columbia. We will briefly describe the key features
of these programs and highlight the lessons learned from the demon
strations completed to date.
The Charleston, New Jersey, and Washington demonstrations shared
several key design features. For example, all three programs adopted
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an "early intervention" philosophy and offered enhanced ES job search
assistance services relatively early in the unemployment spell (i.e.,
generally four-to-six weeks). Moreover, the additional services pro
vided were all considered "mandatory," and claimants who did not
report could be denied benefits. Finally, the enhanced services all
included a job search workshop that was conducted by ES staff.
Despite these common elements, there were also important differences
in the population of claimants targeted for assistance, and in the inten
sity and content of the specific services offered: 39
• In Charleston, the job search workshop lasted only approximately
three hours and was offered to all claimants (except those with
mass layoff claims) who had been collecting UI benefits for four
weeks. Moreover, the claimants randomly assigned to take the
workshop also received strengthened work test services and a
detailed ES interview along with a job referral or job development
attempt.
• The New Jersey demonstration was designed to serve the subset of
claimants who were likely to be dislocated workers.40 Further, all
treatment group members assigned to take the workshop were first
interviewed and tested (in about the fifth week after filing the
claim), and they were also required to make follow-up periodic
contacts with the ES office. The workshop was designed to last
three hours each morning for a week.
• The demonstration in Washington tested a "pure" job search work
shop treatment that involved a two-day intensive workshop about
five-to-six weeks after filing the claim. Workshop participation was
required except for union members and employer-attached claim
ants.
Despite the differences in design and target groups, the results from
the three demonstrations, reported in Corson et al. (1984b), Corson et
al. (1989), and Johnson and Klepinger (1991, 1994), are quite consis
tent. Highlights from these demonstrations indicate the following:
• There is strong and statistically significant evidence on the effec
tiveness of enhanced job search assistance services in reducing the
duration of UI benefits. On average, claimants in the group
directed to the job search workshop received about one-half week
less of UI payments during the benefit year than those assigned to
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the control group. This corresponds to about $50-$70 per claimant
on average.
•There is no evidence that the relatively rapid reemployment of
claimants in the enhanced services group occurs at the cost of
lower earnings or hourly wage rates. That is, the wage rates and
earnings of the treatment and control groups are similar.
• Extensive benefit-cost analysis indicates that the enhanced services
approach in each demonstration was very cost-effective.
• It appears that the shorter durations of receipt of UI payments for
the workshop groups are primarily due to the effect of being
required to attend the workshop, which raises the costs to the
claimant of remaining on UI, and are not due to the enhanced job
search abilities derived from participating in the workshop.
The consistency of the findings across sites from these experimental
evaluations, each with internal validity, provides strong evidence that
mandatory job search assistance workshops for claimants early in their
unemployment spell are a cost-effective method of reducing the dura
tion of unemployment and of promoting more rapid reemployment,
without compromising the level of pay.41 These findings lead Meyer
(1995) to conclude that policy makers "should consider making
enhanced job search assistance services universal." However, because
of the difficulty of isolating the effects of the job search assistance
workshop from the effects of other changes that were made, it is
unclear how the best combination of enhanced services should be
designed.

The Current and Future Role of the Employment Service
in a New Workforce Development System
The ES has undergone numerous changes in recent years and is at a
crossroads in its history, both its relationship with the UI program and
in its role in a new workforce development system. Moreover, although
the preceding discussion has identified valuable information concern
ing the impacts and cost-effectiveness of the ES in general and in its
roles in serving UI claimants, much of this information is becoming
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somewhat dated, and there are many gaps in our understanding of the
effectiveness of certain ES services. Some of the knowledge gaps will
be filled by evidence from recently completed or ongoing research
demonstration programs; in other areas, there is much to learn, and
there are no research efforts we are aware of to address those issues.
In this concluding section, we first offer our view as to how the ES
will probably function in the near future as part of a new workforce
development system. Then, based on the available research evidence,
we discuss how effective the new system is likely to be, particularly as
it relates to the work test and reemployment services. As part of this
discussion, we identify the major knowledge gaps, describe what infor
mation is anticipated to be obtained from recent/current demonstra
tions to fill these gaps, and outline potential areas that should be
considered for research that could be used to help shape future ES pol
icies and services.
Writing in 1966, Haber and Murray concluded that it was premature
to indicate how far the process of separation between the UI and ES
components would or should be. In the thirty years since they reached
this conclusion, there has been an unprecedented amount of structural
change in the U.S. and world economies. In today's information econ
omy, the proposition of separate UI, ES, and training systems is incom
patible with the speed and methods with which information is
conveyed and work is performed. Twenty-first century job seekers will
need integrated—not fragmented—programs and systems to manage
their work lives. They also will need easy access to comprehensive
information concerning occupations, labor market trends, and avail
ability of education, employment and training services.
The role of the ES in the information age will be quite different from
its past missions. Computerization has allowed several states, such as
Colorado, Wisconsin, and North Carolina, to permit unemployed
workers to file for benefits over the telephone, to use voice response
units to provide weekly claims and job information, and to capitalize
on artificial intelligence software to determine benefit eligibility. The
future UI program will rely more and more on automated claims pro
cesses that will require fewer staff resources. This may allow the ES to
devote increased staff efforts to providing quality reemployment ser
vices for dislocated UI claimants in a more "case-managed" environ
ment.
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The information age is also reshaping the labor exchange functions
of the ES. Currently, numerous individuals search for job openings
through ES automated job banks linked to the AJB through local ES
offices or from personal computers in their own homes. Many states
are converting local office areas where UI claimants once stood in lines
for services into "resource centers" where job seekers sit to browse
computer job listings, prepare resumes, or access a variety of labor
market and training "consumer reports." By the end of the century, the
expansion of ALMIS and AJB will likely enable all job seekers to pro
vide information about their talents and to obtain data about job open
ings, reemployment services, and training through full-service career
centers and a network of self-access systems via telephones, personal
computers, and kiosks. By providing mainstream unemployed workers
with an unbounded labor exchange system, easy access to critical
information to help them find their own jobs should be commonplace.
Thus, more ES staff resources should be available to focus on structur
ally unemployed workers who face more severe employment barriers
and who require more intensive services.
Future full-service labor exchange offices may replicate features of
the prototype one-stop Plymouth Career Center in Plymouth, Massa
chusetts,42 or Employment Service Center in Tampa, Florida. The Ply
mouth office stations all local workforce development partners in a
one-stop Career Center, where customers receive job information
through an advanced computer resource library and a comprehensive
menu of services. Located in the former Plymouth Job Center office,
the Career Center was completely remodeled to meet the needs of new
workforce development partners and customers. The design and imple
mentation of the Plymouth Career Center resulted from a partnership
between local area employers, the community college, and employ
ment and training providers.
The Tampa center is located in a former shopping mall where all
Florida employment and training programs, as well as other commu
nity agencies, are housed to serve area customers. The Tampa Employ
ment Service Center includes eight employment and training
organizations, formerly located at thirteen different public employment
and training office locations. All job seekers who enter the facility are
greeted by a knowledgeable Service Center staff member, as UI and ES
staff are cross-trained. Center staff members think of themselves as

490 The Role of the Employment Service

"old UI claims takers" or "old ES interviewers," and they provide job
seekers with all the assistance needed at a single service point.
It is likely that the workforce development system of the next
decade will include one-stop services that are tailored to customer
needs and are provided in such a way that both the employer and the
job seeker have access to the information necessary to make better
employment and reemployment choices. Instead of the archaic "one
size fits all" approach of providing similar services to all unemployed
workers, the future system will offer multiple levels of assistance that
range from access to valuable self-service tools to more intensive ser
vices. Within this system, individuals with certain requirements will
receive what they need, not a service designed for the average unem
ployed worker. In addition, the job-matching function will continue to
become more automated, with new information systems giving indi
vidual job seekers and employers the opportunity to increase their
involvement in the process. Finally, the WPRS initiative mandates the
participation in designated reemployment services of claimants identi
fied through a profiling screening program as likely UI exhaustees.
This will ensure that the ES expands its work test function.
The preceding discussion briefly summarizes a widely held view of
the direction the workforce development system is headed, including
its likely key features, and the labor exchange functions that will be
performed. Despite this perspective, a key question still remains to be
answered. How effective will such a system be in meeting the needs of
unemployed workers in the rapidly changing global economy? We will
address this question based on the available research evidence and will
highlight the major issues that need to be addressed in future research.
The increase in the use of automated and remote processes for filing
initial and continuing UI claims will result in more efficiency in that
fewer staff resources will be required to conduct these functions. At the
same time, however, the use of more automated claims filing processes
is also likely to lead to less contact between the average claimant and
the ES system, which may focus the work test role of the ES on an
exclusive subset of the population of UI recipients—dislocated work
ers—who are referred to the ES as a result of a profiling screening sys
tem. Moreover, many states seem to be reducing the work search
requirements for claimants, and some are considering eliminating the
requirement that claimants register for work at the ES. 43 However,
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there is no indication that states are modifying their availability for
work requirements for refusing a suitable job referral or an offer of
suitable work. The research evidence strongly indicates that UI pro
grams that require claimants to search for work and to register with the
ES and that follow through and enforce these standards produce signif
icant savings to the UI trust fund through reduced UI payments. More
over, there is good evidence that streamlined registration and work
search policies have adverse consequences for the UI trust fund. As
such, to the extent that the future workforce development system
includes a UI program that relies more heavily on automated and dis
tant processes and streamlined registration and work search require
ments, the value of the ES will be limited in performing the work test,
contributing to higher UI outlays.
There is also reasonably strong evidence on the likely effects of the
WPRS initiative. Specifically, results from the New Jersey UI Reemployment Demonstration indicate that identifying individuals early in
their unemployment spell who are likely to be displaced and who will
experience difficulty in becoming employed, and providing intensive
(mandatory) services to those individuals, is a cost-effective way to
reduce UI payments and facilitate reemployment. Although the pro
gram tested in New Jersey has been the model on which many states
are designing their early intervention program, it is also clear that there
are potentially important differences between the New Jersey model
and how WPRS may be implemented that could affect the effectiveness
of the WRPS initiative. For example, the New Jersey model used a
highly structured and standardized approach for claimants who were
referred to services (e.g., orientation, testing, job-search workshop,
assessment interview), as opposed to the new focus on customized ser
vice that is likely to prevail as these programs develop. Moreover, the
New Jersey model required that claimants report to the ES office at
several specific points following the assessment interview; it is too
early to tell whether many states are adopting the same feature in their
profiling and reemployment services programs. The ongoing Labor
Department-sponsored Job Search Assistance Demonstration in Flor
ida and the District of Columbia and an evaluation of the WPRS sys
tems in Delaware, Florida, Kentucky, Maryland, New Jersey, and
Oregon will provide evidence on the effects of a standardized versus a
customized service-delivering strategy for claimants who are profiled
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and referred to reemployment services. However, it is difficult to esti
mate how much difference changes to the New Jersey model will make
in the likely benefits from the WPRS process.
Perhaps the two most important changes in the workforce develop
ment system concern the movement to integrated one-stop services and
the expansion of labor market information. Although the evaluation of
the New Jersey demonstration concluded that the success of the project
was in no small part due to the well-developed linkages between UI,
ES, and JTPA and the coordinated efforts of their staff, this belief was
based on qualitative judgments and not on formal quantitative evi
dence. The New Jersey demonstration did not test a one-stop service
approach, and we are aware of no other research projects underway
that will provide valid evidence on the effectiveness of one-stop ser
vices. This is an important research gap. Specifically, it is important to
understand the overall effectiveness of the one-stop approach and
whether this success varies depending on the service mix/levels offered
(e.g., information broker, job matching service, job search assistance,
training).
Moreover, there is no research evidence on the cost-effectiveness of
providing labor market information; it is assumed that improvements
in the access to and quality of information will lead individuals to use
the data and to make better employment and career decisions.
Although it is often thought to be difficult to experimentally test the
effects of increased information, the Departments of Labor and Educa
tion are currently implementing a demonstration project that uses
experimental techniques to assess the effects of providing information
to experienced workers on investment in lifelong learning. Similar
efforts should be considered to test the effects of improved labor mar
ket information on reemployment decisions of unemployed workers.
In spite of the lack of concrete evidence, one-stop systems are likely
to serve as the organizing vehicle for providing access to a wide range
of customized employment services. In the end, one-stop services may
provide only street-level consolidation of local offices, rather than of
programs. At this juncture, it is not clear whether the bundling of ser
vices in many states at physical sites in each labor market area will
provide job seekers with more than co-located programs. Without fed
eral legislative changes, current employment and training programs
retain separate eligibility and funding streams that limit consolidation.
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Beyond program consolidation, a one-stop delivery system is still no
pie-in-the-sky job seeker panacea. Unless state one-stop systems are
built upon integrated computer structures, their value in today's infor
mation economy will be short term. The road to a unified one-stop ser
vices system is a long one. Ultimately, the issue for federal and state
ES policy makers may be what role the state ES is to play in one-stop
system development.
As the Labor Department and its state partners shape a long-term
strategy for the ES based upon the needs of employers and job seekers,
it may be that future Wagner-Peyser resources of states will fund work
force development systems and not an old-line institution—the ES.
Irrespective of what moniker is used to describe state labor exchange
functions, a new look at performance standards is sorely needed to
ensure state-to-state program quality and expansion of unmediated job
listing and seeking technologies. Before the end of the century, a Labor
Department goal should be to examine national labor exchange perfor
mance standards that improve access, increase job listings, promote
service satisfaction, and reduce job transition time. An examination of
labor exchange performance standards for UI claimant services should
include the degree of early intervention, the receipt of quality reemployment services, the analysis of job transition time standards for
claimants who are experiencing different (i.e., frictional, cyclical,
structural) unemployment circumstances, and the resultant UI trust
funds' savings.
Each chamber of the 104th Congress has passed legislation that
could have dramatically altered the entire employment and training
system as it has evolved since the days of the New Deal. The Consoli
dated and Reform Education, Employment, and Rehabilitation Sys
tems Act (CAREERS Act, H.R. 1617), which was passed in the House
of Representatives on September 19, 1995, and the Senate version of
H.R. 1617, called the Workforce Development Act (passed October 10,
1995), consolidated a large number of education, and employment and
training programs into a limited number of block grants to states. The
House bill would have fused about 100 programs into three block
grants to states. The Senate bill would have consolidated about 80 pro
grams into a single block grant to states. Both bills created a one-stop
delivery system for the provision of employment and training services;
amended the Wagner-Peyser Act to establish a more "state-led" labor
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exchange system; and required the ES to integrate its programs into the
one-stop system.
In the House bill, the federal ES functions would have been admin
istered by the Secretary of Labor. Under the Senate bill, the federal ES
functions would have been administered by a Workforce Development
Partnership under the joint control of the Secretary of Labor and the
Secretary of Education. There are other areas of the Senate bill which,
if enacted into law, would have produced marked change to the exist
ing federal-state labor exchange system. Section 1 of the current Wagner-Peyser Act reads, in part, "to promote the establishment and
maintenance of a national system of public employment offices...." In
the Senate bill, the word "public" modifying "employment offices"
was deleted. This change could have resulted in the privatization of
labor exchange services, which in turn would have raised a host of
accountability and continuity-of-service issues. In addition, the Senate
bill would have apportioned to states 25 percent of the single block
grants (including Wagner-Peyser funds) for workplace employment
activities or Wagner-Peyser activities. The issue of separate FUTA
funding to provide for the administration of ES programs counting
toward the 25 percent workforce employment apportionment could
have sharply limited state resources for occupational training. Further,
the House bill promoted private sector labor exchange services and
authorized federal incentive grants through which one-stop centers and
labor market information implementation would have been accom
plished. The Senate bill provided for no similar federal incentive fund
ing to states.
In summary, both bills promoted the development of one-stop deliv
ery systems, folded employment services into them, created options for
public and private operators, ensured customer choice, and drastically
shifted government control to the states. As such, they contained sev
eral key features of the failed 1994 Reemployment Act and its policy
successor, the proposed G.I. Bill for America's Workers. 44 In July
1996, a House-Senate conference committee voted out along party
lines the Workforce and Career Development Act, but Congress failed
to take further action.
The ES system in the United States is likely to experience manifold
changes in the next few years. As the federal ES role diminishes, state
ES agencies may be catapulted to leadership positions that they may
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not have expected. At what may be the most decisive crossroads in its
history, ES finds itself headed in several new directions:
• U.S. Employment Service. Its title may still be listed on a federal
"letterhead," but its partnership role is likely to be more "consulta
tive."
• State Employment Services. They are likely to continue merging
their labor exchange programs into broader workforce develop
ment systems. Federal block grants to states for employment, train
ing, education and welfare programs may be more flexible and also
increase the demand for the ES to serve welfare customers.
• Local Employment Services. They may be operating in a more
deregulated environment, where the lines between public and pri
vate labor exchange service providers are increasingly blurred.
• Employers and Job Seekers. They are likely to be provided with
job and training services and with "consumer reports" about labor
markets at multiple service points using distant and self-accessed
technologies—in an electronic labor exchange "without walls."
Those who need them are likely to receive comprehensive and
mediated services that are customized to their requirements.
Throughout this century, despite sometimes conflicting public pol
icy directions, the ES has provided vital labor exchange services to the
American workforce. As we enter the next century, the signposts of the
new directions point to likely shifts in the federal-state ES partnership
and in the ES public charter. However, the fate of a national electronic
labor exchange system may be tied as much to its popularity and
growth as to any legislative reform.
NOTES
The authors wish to thank Louis Jacobson for his helpful comments in preparation of this
chapter.
1. There are offices in fifty states, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto
Rico, Guam, and the Virgin Islands.
2. On January 3, 1918, the Division of Information in the Labor Department was renamed the
U S Employment Service and reorganized to facilitate war production. The economic prosperity
that followed World War I left little policy sentiment for retaining a national ES system until the
tumult of the Great Depression In 1933, the ES was at a similar crossroads, and President
Roosevelt decided to revitalize it
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3 The employment security system is a national network of state agencies, called state
employment security agencies (SESA), that today operates a public ES, a UI system, a foreign
labor certification program, labor market information programs, including the collection of
employment and unemployment statistics carried out under cooperative agreements with the
Bureau of Labor Statistics, and may also include other employment and wage loss programs, such
as temporary disability insurance.
4 Although it is a federal requirement that approved UI programs include "able-to-work and
available-for-work" continuing eligibility criteria, states have substantial latitude in setting the
specific standards to meet this requirement. For example, when a claimant is unable to work
because he or she is ill or otherwise incapacitated, benefits are not payable, albeit state laws vary
on what constitutes incapacity. Further, in some states, claimants who are not job-attached are
required to contact at least three potential employers during each week they claim benefits, while
other states require fewer contacts per week, or do not require the contacts to be listed when
claiming benefits In addition, the work search requirements placed on claimants who expect to be
recalled differ, depending on whether there is a known recall date.
5 Availability for suitable work means work "which is ordinarily performed in (the claim
ant's) chosen locality in sufficient amount to constitute a substantial labor market for his services"
(U S. Department of Labor, 1962, p. 57)
6 Johnson et al (1983) find that UI claimants are much less likely to obtain a job referral than
are other ES registrants Specifically, after adjusting for other characteristics, they estimate that
regular ES registrants are roughly 50 percent more likely to obtain a job referral than are UI
claimants More recent data confirm that regular ES registrants are considerably more likely to
obtain a job referral than UI claimants However, ES services to UI claimants have increased to
claimants over the last few years. Specifically, national program data for the three-year period of
program year (PY) 1992-1994 indicate that the proportion of all UI claimants who registered with
the ES who received at least one referral increased from 23 4 to 29.0 percent.
7 Over PY 1992-1994, the proportion of individuals who received ES referrals who were
placed ranged from 32.6 to 33.8 percent
8 In PY 1994, the proportion of all ES registrants who were placed in a job was 14 3 percent.
This compares to 7 5 percent for all UI claimants who registered with the ES
9 In the early 1990s, based upon a National Academy of Sciences report, Fairness in Employ
ment Testing (May 1989), the Labor Department advised states to terminate the use of withingroup conversion scoring or other race- or ethnicity-based adjustments to GATE scores in making
selection and referral decisions States are permitted to use the GATE and its variants, as one of a
variety of criteria, for referring customers to job vacancies (U.S. Department of Labor, 1991)
10 For example, from PY 1992 to 1994, the proportion of all eligible claimants who were
tested ranged from 1 4 to 2 1 percent.
11. Section 3(a) of the Wagner-Peyser Act of June 6, 1933, 29 U S.C 49 et seq.
12. Section 303(a)(2) of the SSA, 42 U.S.C., and section 3304 (a)(l) of the Federal Unem
ployment Tax Act (FUTA), 26 U.S.C
13 Many years later, in 1971, the ES took on a similar function for certain recipients of food
stamps and Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC)
14 In these partnerships, the federal government has traditionally been responsible for estab
lishing broad policy and program guidelines, for payroll taxes to finance the administration of
programs, and for allocating operating budgets to the states, who were in turn responsible for the
day-to-day operations of the programs
15 This relationship was characterized as a federal-local partnership and labeled "New Feder
alism " Under this federal-local governance structure, the Nixon administration and subsequent
administrations initiated federal block grants to states and local areas
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16 We believe that the SESA should have been designated to administer the EDWAA pro
gram Dislocated workers are, in large measure, a subset of SESA UI and ES customers.
17.Originally, administrative funds to operate state ES programs were based upon a federalstate match Since 1938, the principal revenue source for funding state ES programs is employer
contributions under FUTA, 26 U S.C The amount of ES funds derived from FUTA revenues has
varied, and, currently, is 97 percent from FUTA and 3 percent from federal general revenue.
Administrative grants to operate state ES programs are allocated under a mandated formula (sec
tion 6 of the Wagner-Peyser Act) that distributes 97 percent of the available ES funds to states
according to relative shares of the civilian labor force and number of unemployed. The Secretary
of Labor distributes 3 percent of the total available ES funds to assure that all states maintain a
statewide ES.
18. Twenty states utilize employer surtaxes to fund administrative and program costs of
employment and training programs (U.S Department of Labor 1995, pp. 2-39 to 2-44).
19. U S General Accounting Office (1991, p 5) In the report, GAO also recommended that
the Labor Department develop performance standards for the ES labor exchange system While
some federal-state ES steps to develop standards were taken, no ES performance standards have
been implemented.
20 ES Revitahzation partners include the Labor Department, State Employment Security
Agencies (SESAs), organized labor, Interstate Conference of Employment Security Agencies
(ICESA), and the International Association of Personnel in Employment Security
21 The cooperative agreements are operated in conjunction with the Center for Employment
Security Education and Research, an affiliate of ICESA
22. Public Law (P.L ) 103-6, section 4, Profiling New Claimants (March 4, 1993).
23. P.L. 103-152, section 4, Worker Profiling (November 24, 1993).
24. The service plan contains a description of the specific set of services that will be provided
and for which participation is required as a condition of continuing UI eligibility It is to serve as a
reemployment compact between the claimant, service provider, and the UI program, and may
form the basis for feedback to the UI component. In many states, ES staff prepare the service plan
and provide reemployment services in cooperation with other service providers
25. Some of the states that received Labor Department assistance to implement early WPRS
systems are providing a broader range of reemployment services For example, Delaware includes
money management in the assessment process, and New Jersey places emphasis on direct place
ment referrals for job-ready claimants and provides in-depth assessment and job clubs as followup to a job-search workshop
26 As of this writing, twenty-nine states have voluntarily placed their state job banks on the
Internet The Internet address is http://www ajb.dm us
27. A twenty-state Talent Bank Consortium, led by Michigan and Missouri, was formed to
pilot test an electronic on-line resume system.
28 Over the years, various proposals to provide one-stop services have been introduced. In
April 1992, the Bush administration sponsored the Job Training 2000 Act (S 2633), which
included creation of a local Skill Center network to provide "one-stop shopping' for vocational
and job training services. The bill received scant congressional attention.
29. Connecticut, Iowa, Maryland, Massachusetts, Texas, and Wisconsin. Under the Massachu
setts proposal, One-Stop Career Center development is based upon market competition, which is
unique among One-Stop implementation states. Massachusetts One-Stop operators are selected
through a competitive process open to public and private service providers
30 Arizona, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Minnesota, Missouri, New Jersey, North
Carolina, and Ohio.
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31 In fiscal year (FY) 1994, Congress appropriated $50 million for ALMIS and One-Stop
Career Centers under existing Wagner-Peyser Act authority In FY 1995, Congress approved the
Labor Department's request to expand ALMIS and One-Stop systems and appropriated $100 mil
lion
32 After a lengthy debate, in April 1996, the administration and Congress reached an overall
FY 1996 budget agreement that included $110 million for ALMIS and One-Stop systems The
president's FY 1997 budget requests $150 million toward the continued growth of ALMIS and
One-Stop systems.
33. As indicated earlier, the ES plays a role in administering the work test requirements for
other income support programs, as well as for UI. In this chapter, we focus on the evidence con
cerning the UI program.
34 If such a weak work test were implemented nationwide, the results suggest that the
adverse consequences for the UI trust fund could exceed $2 billion. In interpreting this evidence,
it is important to note that the specific streamlined policy tested in Washington differed from nor
mal services both in that the work search requirements were reduced and the UI payment process
was altered, as claimants were automatically sent a check for their full benefit amount unless they
contacted the office to report a change in circumstances that affected their benefit payments. As
such, it is likely that a significant part of the overall impact is due to the changes in the payment
process, and that only part is due to the streamlined work search requirements. A recently com
pleted demonstration in Maryland was designed to overcome this problem and to provide direct
evidence on the efficacy of work search requirements per se.
35 The only exception of which we are aware is a pilot study of the effects of ES counseling,
in which individuals in need of counseling were randomly assigned to receive it or not; both
groups received normal placement services, as appropriate. The results of that study, reported in
Benus et al (1977), are summarized in the follbwing text.
36. As job search workshops become more entrenched as part of the basic set of reemployment services offered, it will be interesting to see whether this limits the ability of researchers to
use classical experimental evaluation methods to test the effectiveness of such services.
37 Although the sample sizes of ES registrants in need of counseling and included in the pilot
study were relatively small, the estimated impacts were also consistently small and did not
approach conventional levels of statistical significance.
38 The demonstration in Maryland is also testing the effects of alternative work search
requirements, including increases in the number of employer contacts, as well as testing the
effects of verifying the reported contacts
39. As a result of these design differences, it is difficult to separate the effects of the manda
tory job search workshop from the effects of the other job search assistance and requirements pro
vided in some of these demonstrations
40. A series of eligibility screens was used to target the services to likely dislocated workers.
The most important screen was a tenure requirement, which excluded all claimants who had not
worked for their previous employer for at least three years In addition, individuals younger than
age 25 and those with a definite recall date were excluded Only about one-quarter of all UI claim
ants who received a first payment were eligible for the demonstration.
41 Very preliminary results from the Job Search Assistance Demonstration, currently being
tested in Florida and the District of Columbia, appear to be consistent with the results reported
from the earlier demonstrations and indicate that enhanced job search assistance services reduce
UI benefit payments.
42 The Plymouth Career Center was awarded the 1995 National Awards Pyramid Prize spon
sored by the U.S. Department of Labor and the ICESA, for collaboration in improved customer
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service. Inaugurated m 1994, the SESA National Awards program was based upon recommenda
tions from ICESA and other ES Revitalization partners
43 While we know of no quantitative evidence that identifies the causes for relaxation of reg
istration and work search requirements by states, we suggest one reason may be that federal
implementation in the 1980s of a nationwide UI quality control program influenced states to relax
formal registration and work search policies to improve measured payment accuracy rates
44 In December 1994, President Clinton proposed a Middle Class Bill of Rights designed to
help Americans meet the challenges of the new economy. One of its elements, a G.I. Bill for
America's Workers, would restructure federal job training programs by giving the resources
directly to workers to learn new skills, and would provide information, advice, and job search
assistance.
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CHAPTER

12

Intersection of Unemployment
Insurance with Other Programs
and Policies
Walter S. Corson
Mathematica Policy Research, Inc.

A primary objective of the unemployment insurance (UI) system is
to insure experienced workers against the risk of unemployment by
providing limited replacement of lost wages to those who become
unemployed through no fault of their own. Earlier chapters have
addressed the question of whether the UI system achieves this objec
tive adequately, and these chapters have identified some deficiencies in
the degree to which UI provides income support to the unemployed.
Chapter 2, which focuses on the coverage of jobs and the unemployed,
points to the recent decrease in the proportion of the unemployed
receiving UI, despite increased coverage of jobs, as evidence of a
decline in the insurance value of the system. The chapter also points
out that low-wage workers are least likely to qualify for UI despite the
fact that they work in jobs that are included in the system. Chapter 5,
which looks at the adequacy of the weekly benefit amount, concludes
that, while weekly benefits satisfy the short-term needs of most claim
ants, benefit levels may be less adequate for low-wage workers and
those with dependents. Finally, chapter 6, which examines the duration
of benefits, concludes that short spells of unemployment may be overcompensated and that an optimal system would have longer benefit
durations.
These conclusions about the adequacy of the income support pro
vided by the UI system are reexamined in this chapter in light of the
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fact that this system, while the primary source of income support for
unemployed workers, is not their only source. UI is one piece of a
larger public and private social insurance and welfare system that also
provides some income support to unemployed workers. For example,
jobless individuals may, depending on their age, disability status, or
family income, receive income from public programs, such as social
security, workers' compensation, and the welfare system. Similarly,
they may receive termination pay from their employers or other types
of payments from private sources as a result of their job loss.
More specifically, this chapter analyzes whether the gaps in UI cov
erage identified in earlier chapters are addressed by other social insur
ance and welfare programs. That is, does the existing social insurance
and welfare system as a whole provide adequate income support to
unemployed workers, or are there gaps in coverage that the UI system
or other programs should address? In particular, are the gaps in cover
age of long-term unemployed and low-wage unemployed workers
addressed by other programs? This question raises the issue of whether
there is adequate coordination between UI and other public and private
social insurance and welfare programs. Are there, in fact, extensive
overlaps in recipient populations among income support programs?
Should UI benefits or benefits from other programs be adjusted to con
sider such overlaps or other sources of income support?
UI's focus on income support also gives rise to questions about
whether reemployment services for UI claimants should receive more
emphasis. Historically, the UI system has relied on the labor exchange
function of the Employment Service (ES) to help claimants become
reemployed. Evidence that increasing numbers of claimants suffer per
manent job separations and long spells of unemployment, however,
suggests that it might be useful to provide more reemployment ser
vices, particularly to dislocated workers. Furthermore, findings from
recent demonstrations suggest that providing reemployment services or
other assistance to these claimants can lead to more rapid reemploy
ment, and the UI system has moved in this direction. The Unemploy
ment Compensation Amendments of 1993 require state UI programs to
profile claimants as they enter the system, to identify dislocated work
ers and refer them to reemployment services. States have recently com
pleted implementing programs to support this requirement.
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Two other relatively recent changes in the UI system that restructure
benefits or provide additional services to claimants are also designed to
promote their employment. First, beginning in 1978, a number of states
introduced short-time compensation schemes that restructure the UI
benefit calculation to permit payment of UI to groups of workers for
partial weeks of unemployment. The idea is to encourage firms to
respond to business fluctuations by shortening the work week for a
larger group of workers than would otherwise have been laid off, thus
promoting the continued employment of workers. Second, based on the
results of two demonstrations, states are now permitted to provide UI
claimants with self-employment allowances and services as a way of
promoting self-employment as a reemployment option.
This chapter addresses these issues. It reviews the way in which the
UI system intersects with other income support programs, to identify
gaps in the social safety net and to examine how these programs are
coordinated. It then discusses recent changes in the UI system to pro
mote reemployment services to claimants and the rationale behind
these changes. Finally, it reviews two recent initiatives—short-time
compensation and self-employment assistance—that also attempt to
promote claimant employment.

Unemployment Insurance and Income Support Programs
Benefit Trends
Social insurance and public assistance programs have grown tre
mendously in the last forty years. As shown in table 12.1, social insur
ance programs—that is, programs designed to maintain incomes for
individuals who can no longer work because they are elderly, disabled,
or unemployed—grew fivefold between 1950 and 1990 as a percentage
of GDP (from 1.85 percent to over 9 percent). Public programs that
provide assistance to low-income individuals and families also grew
during this period although not by as large an amount. In 1950, expen
ditures for these programs equaled .94 percent of GDP, and, in 1990,
they equaled 2.67 percent.

Table 12.1 Social Welfare Expenditures, Selected Fiscal Years 1950-1990 ($ millions)

Social insurance3
OASDI
Medicare
UI/ESb
Disability/workers' compensation
Cash benefits
Medical benefits
Public aidc
Cash and in-kind benefits
Medical benefits
As percentage of GDP
Social insurance
OASDI
Medicare
UI/ES
Disability/workers' compensation
Cash benefits
Medical benefits

1950
$4,946
784
0
2,310
697
502
195
2,496
2,445
51

1960
$19,307
11,032
0
3,045
1,656
1,196
460
4,101
3,608
493

1970
$54,691
29,686
7,149
3,858
3,669
2,621
1,048
16,488
11,275
5,213

1.85
0.29
0.00
0.87
0.26
0.19
0.07

3.81
2.18
0.00
0.60
0.33
0.24
009

5.55
3.01
0.73
0.39
0.38
0.27
0.11

Fiscal year
1975
$123,013
63,649
14,781
13,878
7,469
4,926
2,543
41,447
27,896
13,551
8.14
4.21
0.98
0.92
050
0.33
0.17

1980
$229,754
117,119
34,992
18,482
14,835
10,960
3,875
72,703
45,133
27,570

1985
$369,595
186,151
71,384
18,482
24,207
17,072
7,135
98,356
54,497
43,860

1990
$510,616
245,556
106,806
20,036
41,583
26,191
14,392
145,642
70,275
75,367

8.69
4.43
1.32
0.70
0.56
0.41
0.15

9.31
4.69
1.80
0.47
0.61
0.43
0.18

9.35
4.50
1.96
0.37
0.74
0.48
0.26

Public aid
0.94
0.81
1.67
2.74
2.75
2.48
2.67
Cash and in-kind benefits
0.92
0.71
1.14
1.85
1.71
1.37
1.29
Medical benefits_______________0.02_____0.10_____0.53_____0.90_____1.04_____1.11_____138
SOURCE- Bixby (1993, pp 70-76).
NOTE Numbers include expenditures from federal, state, and local revenues and trust funds under public law and include capital outlays and administra
tive expenditures.
a Includes railroad and public employee retirement funds in addition to the listed programs.
b. Includes unemployment compensation under state programs, programs for federal employees, and railroad unemployment insurance, trade adjustment
assistance, payments under extended, emergency, disaster, and special unemployment insurance programs, and employment services,
c Includes cash payments and medical assistance under the Aid to Families with Dependent Children, Medicaid, emergency assistance, Supplemental
Security Income, Food Stamps, WIC, and General Assistance programs. Also includes social services, work relief, work-incentive and work experience
activities, surplus food, repatriate and refugee assistance, and low-income home energy assistance

510

Intersection of Unemployment Insurance with Other Programs and Policies

This overall growth in social insurance and public assistance expen
ditures has, however, not been uniform among programs or over time.
For example, programs that provide medical benefits grew the fastest,
while the growth in public assistance expenditures for nonmedical ben
efits leveled off in the last fifteen years. Most important for our pur
poses, expenditures for unemployment insurance and employment
services did not grow over this period as a percentage of GDP. The data
in table 12.1 suggest, in fact, that there has been a decline in expendi
tures relative to GDP in recent years, but comparisons among individ
ual years can be misleading since UI benefits fluctuate widely with the
unemployment rate. To address this analytic problem, UI benefits as a
percentage of GDP were regressed on the unemployment rate and a
time variable for the 1950-1993 period to control for the state of the
economy. The results of this regression suggest that there has been a
small but statistically significant long-run decline in UI benefits as a
percentage of GDP, of about .077 percent every ten years.
Workers who become unemployed or who are otherwise unable to
work may receive private as well as public support, with most private
assistance provided through employee benefit plans. Data on the preva
lence of these plans for medium and large private firms (table 12.2)
suggest that many workers in these firms participate in income continu
ation, retirement, or disability plans. 1 For example, in 1993, 42 percent
of workers had severance pay provisions, 78 percent participated in
retirement income plans, 87 percent had short-term disability protec
tion via sick pay or sickness and accident insurance, and 41 percent
had long-term disability insurance. Based on the data in table 12.2,
participation in these plans appears to have declined slightly in the past
ten years, although some of this measured decrease may have been due
to changes in the sample frame used for the survey.
Overall, these data suggest that workers who become unemployed
currently are likely to receive slightly less in terms of UI benefits than
they would have twenty or more years ago and that any gaps in UI cov
erage of unemployed workers are likely to have grown rather than to
have been closed. However, the growth in other social insurance and to
a lesser extent in public assistance programs could potentially fill these
gaps or overlap with UI if unemployed workers qualify for these bene
fits. Similarly, data on employee benefits show that substantial num
bers of workers in private employment participate in income
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continuation, retirement, and disability plans,. These plans could also
provide benefits to UI claimants or other unemployed workers.
Table 12.2 Selected Employee Benefits, Medium and Large Private
Firms, Percentage of Full-Time Employees Participating
198319881993
Income continuation plans
Severance pay
Supplemental unemployment benefits
Retirement income plans
Disability benefits
Short-term protection
Paid sick leave
Sickness and accident insurance
Long-term disability insurance
Medical insurance

50
NA
82

42
6
80

42
4
78

94
68
49
45
96

89
69
46
42
90

87
65
44
41
82

SOURCE U.S. Department of Labor, "Employee Benefits in Medium and Large Firms," Bulletin
2213 (August 1984); Bulletin 2336 (August 1989), Bulletin 2456 (November 1994)
NOTE: Comparisons between years may be misleading because of major changes in the sample
frame used for the survey
NA = not available.

Supplemental Unemployment Benefits and Termination Pay

Some workers who lose their jobs receive income support while
unemployed through Supplemental Unemployment Benefit (SUB)
plans. These plans provide a supplemental weekly payment to laid-off
workers that, in conjunction with the UI weekly benefit, equals a spec
ified percentage of the pre-layoff weekly wage. The plans are sup
ported through employer-financed trust funds that have been
established in some labor-management contracts, particularly in the
automobile, steel, and rubber industries. All states except New Mexico,
Puerto Rico, South Carolina, and South Dakota have ruled that these
payments do not affect UI benefit payments. 2
Workers who lose their jobs may also receive various kinds of sever
ance or termination payments from their employers. Generally, these
termination payments fall into two categories: (1) wages in lieu of
notice; and (2) severance payments, which are generally based on
years of service. As of 1994, thirty-three states counted wages in lieu
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of notice as disqualifying income for UI purposes. In twelve of these
states, claimants receiving wages in lieu of notice were disqualified
from UI for the weeks in which they received payments. In the remain
ing twenty-one states, the UI benefit was reduced by the amount of the
wage payment. Since weekly wages will in most cases exceed the UI
weekly benefit amount, few claimants would receive payments under
the latter provision. Twenty-two states had the same disqualifying
income provisions for all types of severance payments.
The availability of severance pay and SUB payments to some work
ers will not, however, fill gaps in UI coverage for the long-term unem
ployed or for low-wage workers. While a significant fraction of UI
claimants may receive severance pay (in 1993, 42 percent of full-time
employees in medium and large firms were eligible for severance pay),
these payments generally amount to a limited number of weeks of
wages, and they are primarily available to individuals with higher
wages, generally professional and technical workers. While SUB pay
ments are more available to production than to professional and techni
cal workers, they are primarily available to relatively high-wage
production workers (union workers in manufacturing). Moreover, only
a few UI claimants are likely to receive SUB payments (in 1993, only 4
percent of employees in medium and large firms were eligible for SUB
if they were laid off).3
Additionally, the treatment by some states of wages in lieu of notice
and severance payments as disqualifying income for UI seems incon
sistent. There does not appear to be a rationale to handle income from
these sources any differently than income from other private sources,
such as SUB or prior savings, which provide support to individuals
who have lost their jobs. Instead, just as in these other cases, the UI
work test could be used to determine if individuals who are receiving
wages in lieu of notice or severance payments are looking for work and
hence are eligible for UI.
Pensions and Social Security Retirement Income

Some workers who are laid off from a job may already be receiving
social security old age assistance or a private or government pension,
or they become eligible for and begin receiving retirement income
from these sources. If these workers are interested in finding a new job
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and they have sufficient prior earnings, they are also potentially eligi
ble for UI. The question then arises as to whether or not UI should be
paid. One could argue that receipt of social security or other retirement
income should be viewed as evidence that the individual is not in the
labor force and hence is not eligible for UI, even though he or she
expresses a desire to become reemployed. Under this argument, no UI
benefits would be paid to claimants who receive retirement income.
Alternatively, one could contend that social security old age assistance
and UI are part of a unified public social insurance system and that
individuals should not receive duplicate benefits from this system.
Under this argument, the UI benefit would be reduced by the amount of
the social security benefit (or vice versa), so that the individual would
receive only the maximum amount available from either system. A
similar rationale could apply to private or other government pensions.
In this case, one could argue that employer contributions to retirement
funds and the UI Trust Fund are part of a unified insurance system and
that the payment of duplicate benefits is inappropriate. Finally, one
could maintain that there is no connection between receipt of retire
ment income and UI. An individual who is looking for work and meets
UI work test requirements should be eligible for UI.
Currently, UI policy regarding retirement income is generally con
sistent with the second of these three approaches. Under a federal law
that went into effect in 1980, benefits from social security and Railroad
Retirement benefits are to be deducted dollar for dollar from the UI
benefit amount, as are private or other government pension payments if
they are made under plans contributed to by a base-period employer.
However, states can reduce UI benefits at less than a dollar-for-dollar
rate to account for employee contributions to social security, Railroad
Retirement, or a pension. States can also disregard pensions if base
period employment did not affect eligibility for or the amount of the
pension, but this provision does not apply to social security or Railroad
Retirement. As of 1994, fifty states deducted pension payments for
base-period employers only, while three states deducted all pension
payments. The majority of states (thirty-eight), however, adjust the
deduction for social security, Railroad Retirement, and pension income
for employee contributions; fewer states (twenty-four) exclude pen
sions not affected by base-period work.
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Before the passage of the federal requirement, states could treat pen
sion and social security income as they wished. During the 1960s and
1970s, many states deducted pension income for base-period employ
ers from the UI benefit, but many fewer deducted social security. For
example, in 1973, thirty-five states deducted pension income, and
twelve deducted social security. Early in the history of the UI program,
however, the majority of states denied UI to individuals receiving
social security. These changes over time in the treatment of pension
income, particularly social security, reflect some ambivalence about
whether individuals receiving social security can be considered to be
attached to the labor market and a concern that the UI work test cannot
be applied well enough to make this determination.
The federal requirement to deduct pension income has affected the
composition of the UI claimant population and the likelihood that indi
viduals are receiving both UI and social security, Railroad Retirement,
or pension income. In 1988, about 1.5 percent of the UI population was
age 65 or over (Corson and Dynarski 1990), while in 1978, before pas
sage of the requirement, 4.4 percent of claimants were age 65 or over
(U.S. Department of Labor 1979). The data for 1988 also show that 6.2
percent of UI recipients received payments from social security or
Railroad Retirement, and that 5.7 percent received other pension
income (9.4 percent received income from one or both of these
sources). Data for the general UI population are unavailable for the
1970s, but data for claimants who received extended UI benefits under
the Federal Supplemental Benefits (FSB) program in the mid-1970s
show that the rate of social security or pension benefit receipt was very
high among this population. Among FSB recipients, 18.2 percent
received funds from social security or Railroad Retirement and 10.8
percent received pensions (Corson et al. 1977). Since a higher propor
tion of FSB recipients were age 65 or older than was true for regular UI
recipients, these recipiency rates for social security and pensions
should be viewed as upper bounds for the rates for the general UI pop
ulation. Nevertheless, it appears that there has been a decline in the rate
of receipt of retirement income among UI claimants.
In summary, the availability of income from social security, Rail
road Retirement, or pensions provides a source of long-term support to
some UI recipients. Since relatively few UI recipients receive income
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from these sources, however, they do not, in general, fill any gaps in UI
coverage of the long-term unemployed.
Workers' Compensation and Disability Insurance

Workers in the United States are insured through workers' compen
sation and, in some cases, through disability insurance against the risk
of job loss resulting from injury or illness. Specifically, separate work
ers' compensation programs in each state and for federal employees
provide income maintenance payments and medical and hospital care
to workers with job-related disabilities. The income maintenance pay
ments, like UI, offer partial replacement of lost wages, but the replace
ment rate is generally higher than for UI benefits. Payments can also be
made to the dependents of deceased workers whose deaths result from
job-related accidents or occupational diseases. The majority of work
ers' compensation claims involve a temporary total disability—that is,
the claimant cannot work while recovering from an injury but is
expected to recover. A small number of claims (less than 1 percent)
become permanent total disabilities, but most of the rest are for partial
disabilities. In most cases, benefit payments continue for the duration
of the disability. As of 1991, about 87 percent of wage and salary
workers were covered by workers' compensation (Nelson 1993).
Workers' compensation payments, particularly medical payments,
have grown rapidly in the past ten to fifteen years.
Those who can no longer work because of an injury or illness that is
not job-related are often provided financial assistance, in the short run,
by temporary disability programs and, in the long run, by the Social
Security Disability Insurance program.4 Temporary disability pro
grams, which are the relevant ones for the UI system, are mandated in
five states—California, Hawaii, New Jersey, New York, and Rhode
Island—and in Puerto Rico. Most workers in these states are covered
by Temporary Disability Insurance (TDI) plans that are administered
directly by the state or by private insurance carriers. TDI eligibility
requirements and benefit payments are similar, although not always
identical, to UI eligibility requirements and benefit payments. In states
in which TDI programs are not mandated, many employers provide
temporary disability coverage through private programs or through
sick leave provisions. In 1993, most full-time workers (87 percent) in
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medium and large establishments were covered by TDI plans and/or
paid sick leave, although only about half of these workers had sickness
and accident insurance plans (see table 12.2). Coverage for state and
local employees is similar, although paid sick leave is relatively more
important as a benefit for this group.
Those who are out of work because of an injury or illness, whether
temporary or permanent, that results in total disability are not likely to
be eligible for UI because they will not be "able and available to work,"
as UI eligibility rules require in most instances. When the disability is
partial, however, the individual may be able to work in some type of
job and could qualify for both UI and workers' compensation.
Conceptually, one might argue that UI and workers' compensation,
and potentially TDI, should operate in concert to replace lost income
for a worker who loses a job involuntarily. If an individual qualifies for
both UI and workers' compensation or TDI, it makes sense to offset the
benefits from one program with the benefits from the other. An alterna
tive view is that an individual who receives disability benefits to com
pensate for the loss of one job, but qualifies for UI because he or she is
able and available to work at some other job, should be paid UI bene
fits. According to this view, anyone who is involuntarily unemployed
and seeking work is entitled to UI if he or she has had sufficient baseperiod earnings to qualify for benefits.
In practice, state UI programs reflect a mix of these views. Twentyeight states have no explicit offset requirements for workers' compen
sation and presumably permit payment of UI to a worker who meets
the able and available requirements. The remaining twenty-five states
have provisions to offset UI benefits if an individual is eligible for
workers' compensation. In seventeen of these states, UI benefits are
reduced by the amount of the Workers' Compensation benefit; in the
other seven, no UI is paid at all. This latter approach seems to carry the
concept of benefit coordination to an inappropriate extreme. The policy
may have no practical consequences, however, because the replace
ment rates for the weekly benefit and the maximum benefit under
workers' compensation exceed those under UI.
The six existing TDI programs appear to be well coordinated with
UI, since TDI benefits are paid when an individual is unable to work
and hence not eligible for UI.5 In these programs, TDI benefits are paid
when an individual becomes ill or injured, both while employed and
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while unemployed. Ten additional states have provisions that permit
continued payment of UI to claimants who become ill or injured while
collecting UI. These provisions appear to be a way of covering such
workers in states that do not have mandated TDI programs. This cover
age is unavailable in other states, however. In these states, a UI claim
ant who becomes ill or injured is not eligible for UI while he or she is
unable to work.
As the discussion here suggests, the number of UI claimants who
also receive workers' compensation or disability benefits is quite small.
Although no recent statistics are available, data from the mid-1970s
collected for a study of extended UI benefit recipients showed that only
about 1 percent of this population collected workers' compensation
(Corson et al. 1977). Given the growth in workers' compensation in
recent years, this number is likely to have grown, but it is probably still
the case that there is very little overlap between workers' compensa
tion, disability, and UI.
Health Insurance

The UI system provides income support to workers, but it does not
provide for the continuation of any fringe benefits, including health
insurance. Hence, coordination of UI benefits with health insurance
coverage is not an issue. Instead, the likelihood that UI recipients are
covered by health insurance and whether coverage should be made
available to this population become important.
Although direct evidence on the degree of health insurance coverage
for the UI population is not available, we can examine various ways in
which claimants could be covered. Specifically, workers who lose their
jobs could be covered by employer-provided health insurance that con
tinues for some period after layoff. They could also be covered through
insurance provided by another family member or by a public program
such as medicare or medicaid, and they could purchase coverage on
their own.
Health insurance coverage from a pre-UI job will probably continue
after layoff, but the duration is likely to be short. Information on group
health plans collected for the National Commission on Unemployment
Compensation and published in 1980 indicates that, at the time, about
80 percent of unemployed workers covered by these plans could retain
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coverage for a time, but the average period was only a month (Malhotra and Wills 1980). Very few health insurance plans extend cover
age for four or more months after a job loss. This pattern suggests that
few long-term UI recipients are likely to have this type of health insur
ance coverage.
UI recipients can also obtain health insurance coverage through
other family members or through public programs, such as medicare or
medicaid. Data on the characteristics of recipients, however, suggest
that these sources do not provide coverage for most claimants (Corson
and Dynarski 1990). About 40 percent of claimants have working
spouses, who might have health insurance coverage through their jobs,
but not all spouses have coverage nor would all spouses have elected
family coverage. In addition, few UI recipients are likely to be covered
by public programs. Medicare is not an option for most recipients: less
than 2 percent are age 65 or older, and 6 percent receive social security
or Railroad Retirement. Medicaid is probably also not an option for
most recipients because only 3 percent receive Aid to Families with
Dependent Children (AFDC), Supplemental Security Income (SSI), or
other welfare benefits.
The final way in which UI recipients can obtain health insurance is
by purchasing coverage on their own. Workers who leave a job with
health insurance coverage are allowed, through the Consolidated
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985 (COBRA), to pay for
extending their existing coverage for up to 18 months. However, many
UI recipients are not likely to have the financial resources needed to
purchase insurance when they are unemployed. Many had low-paying
jobs and low family incomes prior to receiving UI. Even for other
recipients, the cost, which equals 102 percent of the combined
employer-employee premium, may be prohibitive. For example, in
1992, the average annual cost of employer-provided health insurance
in mid-sized companies was $3,865 (Johnson & Higgins 1992); in
weekly terms this is equivalent to about 40 percent of the average
weekly UI benefit amount.
In summary, the evidence reported here suggests that substantial
numbers of UI recipients, particularly long-term ones, are likely to lack
health insurance coverage. Coverage under most employer-sponsored
health plans does not extend long enough to provide for the long-term
unemployed. Less than half of UI recipients have working spouses
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who might have health insurance. Few recipients are likely to be eligi
ble for medicare or medicaid. Many recipients do not have the financial
resources needed to purchase insurance under the COBRA provisions.
Providing health insurance to the UI population would probably best
be accomplished through general reforms in the health insurance sys
tem leading to more universal coverage. However, an alternative, more
targeted approach was proposed in the 1997 administration budget.
Under this plan, unemployed workers would receive premium subsi
dies to purchase private insurance for up to six months with funds pro
vided from general revenues. Individual states would design and
administer the programs, but the details of who would be eligible and
how the programs would work were unspecified.
Welfare Programs

Some UI recipients with low family incomes are eligible for benefits
from welfare programs—AFDC, SSI, General Assistance (GA), and
food stamps—or for assistance through the Earned Income Tax Credit
(EITC), a refundable tax credit. These benefits are coordinated with UI
by requiring applicants for welfare benefits to apply for and collect any
UI for which they are eligible. Income from UI is considered in the
welfare benefit calculation. UI income is also counted as part of tax
able income used in the EITC calculation.
UI recipients may be eligible to obtain benefits from welfare pro
grams, but relatively few do so. For example, data for 1988 indicate
that under 3 percent of UI recipients received cash welfare benefits
(AFDC, SSI, or other welfare), and only 4 percent received food
stamps (Corson and Dynarski 1990).6 Rates of welfare benefit receipt
rose following UI benefit exhaustion (to 4 percent for cash benefits and
7.5 percent for food stamps), but not by substantial amounts.
In contrast, a greater proportion of UI recipients receive income
from the EITC. For example, 1993 data from the Internal Revenue Ser
vice indicate that about 22 percent of the tax returns that had income
from unemployment compensation programs also had tax credits or
payments under the EITC. However, these same data show that the
average annual EITC benefit was relatively small ($1,024).7
The low rates of welfare benefit payments among UI recipients and
exhaustees occur for several reasons. First, some UI recipients have
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sources of family income other than UI—for example, their spouse's
earnings—that make them ineligible for welfare. Second, welfare pro
grams have asset as well as income eligibility requirements that may
disqualify UI recipients. For example, families with liquid assets that
exceed $2,000 are not eligible for food stamps. Third, AFDC and SSI
benefits are available only to specific categories of families or individu
als—families with children, in the case of AFDC, and individuals who
are age 65 or older, blind, or disabled, in the case of SSI. Finally, UI
recipients may be reluctant to apply for welfare benefits, because they
are likely to be newly eligible and unlikely to view themselves as longterm welfare recipients. They do, however, appear to apply for the
EITC.
Although few UI recipients or exhaustees actually collect welfare
program benefits, a number have family incomes that are below the
poverty line or likely to be below the poverty line if UI were not avail
able. For example, a Congressional Budget Office study found that 20
percent of long-term UI recipients had family incomes below the pov
erty line, and another 27 percent would have had family incomes below
the poverty line if they were not receiving UI benefits (Congressional
Budget Office 1990).8 This study found further that 16 percent of longterm UI recipients continued to have family incomes below the poverty
line three months after UI benefit exhaustion. Similar results were
found in a study of extended benefit recipients in the mid-1970s (Corson and Nicholson 1982).
While not the main objective of the UI program, the importance of
UI as an antipoverty mechanism has played a role in debates about
extended UI benefits. The current welfare system does not provide
much support to UI recipients or exhaustees, so some policy makers
have argued that UI should be extended because of its antipoverty
effects, particularly during recessionary times. Extending UI benefits,
however, is an inefficient way to meet an antipoverty objective,
because benefits are paid not only to poor but also to nonpoor families.
In fact, the same tabulations that illustrate the antipoverty effects of UI
show that a substantial share of benefits is paid to individuals with fam
ily incomes well above the poverty line. Targeting UI extensions better
to poor families could be achieved by means-testing extended UI bene
fits, but this process would imply a major departure from the funda
mental design of the UI program, which is based on an individual
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concept of eligibility. Means-testing extended UI would require that
eligibility be recomputed based on family income. An alternative
approach, which is used in several other countries (see chapter 14), is
to provide UI exhaustees with means-tested unemployment assistance
through a separate program. However, unless a separate assistance pro
gram is developed, the current welfare system is expanded, or the dura
tion of UI benefits is extended, the present gap in income support to the
long-term unemployed, including low-income individuals, is likely to
remain.

Unemployment Insurance and Programs
for Dislocated Workers
Since the 1980s, attention has focused on the reemployment prob
lems of workers who are laid off from their jobs permanently and who
must find a new job. The number of these workers, who have been
called "dislocated" or "displaced," has been sizable. For many, labor
market experiences following layoff have included long spells of
unemployment and a reduction in wages after reemployment.
Since 1984, the Bureau of Labor Statistics of the U.S. Department
of Labor has identified and tracked dislocated workers through bian
nual supplements to the Current Population Survey. In this survey,
workers who report "having lost or left a job because of a plant closing,
an employer going out of business, a layoff from which they were not
recalled, or other similar reason" are classified as dislocated. The 1994
survey found that about 5.5 million workers were dislocated in the
1991-1992 period. Nearly half of this group had been employed in
their jobs for three or more years (Gardner 1995).
An earlier analysis of data on these dislocated workers by the Con
gressional Budget Office (CBO) found that about two million individu
als were dislocated each year during the 1980s (Congressional Budget
Office 1993). Although the numbers were higher than average during
the early 1980s recession,9 substantial numbers were dislocated in all
years, including those in which the unemployment rate was relatively
low. The CBO study also found that workers in goods-producing
industries—agriculture, mining, construction, and manufacturing—
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and in blue-collar occupations were at greater risk of dislocation than
workers in service-producing industries and in white-collar occupa
tions. Substantial fractions of the dislocated worker population were
from service-producing industries and white-collar occupations, how
ever. Moreover, differences in the risk of dislocation for these groups
narrowed during the 1980s, a trend that continued in the early 1990s
(Gardner 1995).
The CBO study also showed that many dislocated workers have
long spells of unemployment and reductions in wages after reemployment. One to three years after losing their jobs, half of the individuals
were not working or had new jobs with weekly earnings of less than 80
percent of their prelayoff earnings. The workers with the largest losses
had the least education, were the oldest, and had the longest tenure
with the previous employer. Furthermore, dislocated workers who held
a job at the time of the survey had endured relatively long jobless
spells: the average duration was just under 20 weeks.
Additional studies of dislocated workers based on individual-level
data sets have also demonstrated that worker dislocation is costly.
Topel (1993) cites three studies that, depending on the point of obser
vation, estimated wage losses of 10 to 30 percent as a result of disloca
tion—that is, dislocated workers who became reemployed earned
about 10 to 30 percent less than they earned in their predislocation
job. 10 Even five years after their job loss, the wages of dislocated work
ers in these studies were still about 15 percent lower than their predis
location levels. The large loss in wages, together with the relatively
long jobless spells experienced by dislocated workers, implies that the
total cost of dislocation is high. This is confirmed by estimates based
on a sample of dislocated workers in Pennsylvania (Jacobson,
LaLonde, and Sullivan 1993). Total discounted earnings losses for
these workers over the six years after their job loss were equal to an
average of $41,000 per worker.
Many dislocated workers enter the UI system. Furthermore, many
UI recipients can be classified as dislocated workers. The CBO study
found that 70 percent of dislocated workers who were jobless for at
least five weeks reported receiving UI benefits. In addition, more than
half of the dislocated workers who received UI reported exhausting
their benefits. Data from a study of UI recipients in 1988 show that
more than half of the UI recipient population had no recall expecta-
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tions at the time they entered the UI system, and about 36 percent
could be characterized as dislocated, under a definition similar to that
used in the CBO survey (Corson and Dynarski 1990). Not surprisingly,
these figures were higher among UI exhaustees: 67 percent had no
recall expectations and 52 percent could be classified as dislocated.
Dislocated workers who enter the UI system, like dislocated work
ers in general, have longer-than-average spells of unemployment and a
greater likelihood of wage reductions than other claimants. Corson and
Dynarski (1990) used their sample of UI claimants from 1988 to com
pare employment and UI benefit outcomes of dislocated and nondislocated workers. 11 They found that dislocated workers, particularly those
with substantial job tenure, had lower reemployment rates, longer
spells of unemployment, higher UI exhaustion rates, and a lower ratio
of post-UI to pre-UI weekly wages than other claimants. For example,
only 81 percent of the dislocated workers with three or more years of
job tenure had become reemployed during the first twenty months after
their initial claim, compared with 92 percent of the nondislocated
workers.
Data from a demonstration program in New Jersey, in which claim
ants were followed for six years, showed that individuals targeted for
demonstration services—permanently separated claimants with three
or more years of job tenure—experienced large reductions in annual
earnings relative to their UI base-period earnings throughout the sixyear period (Corson and Haimson 1996). This drop in earnings was
considerably larger than that experienced by other claimants. Even
claimants who became reemployed had substantial earnings losses;
average earnings for employed individuals did not reach pre-UI levels
until the fourth year after the initial claim. By the sixth year, annual
average earnings for employed individuals exceeded the base-period
average by $1,889, but this 10.5 percent increase in nominal earnings
did not keep pace with inflation (the Consumer Price Index for the
Northeast rose approximately 34 percent in this period) or with the
average weekly earnings of manufacturing workers in New Jersey
(average weekly earnings rose by approximately 25 percent in this
period).
UI claimants who exhaust their benefits also have especially high
earnings losses. These losses, at least for manufacturing workers, are
illustrated by findings based on a sample of UI exhaustees from manu-
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facturing drawn from 10 states for an evaluation of the Trade Adjust
ment Assistance program (Corson et al. 1993). The findings show that
the costs of dislocation among UI exhaustees from manufacturing, as
measured by earnings losses, were about $35,000 (undiscounted) over
the first three years after the initial UI claim. Furthermore, since aver
age earnings were still relatively low among the sample three years
after the initial claim, we can conclude that the full earnings losses
would be significantly larger if we were able to expand the post-layoff
period of observation.
Trends in Unemployment and Dislocation

Trends in three unemployment measures suggest that an increasing
proportion of the unemployed population is made up of dislocated
workers. These measures include the proportion of unemployed work
ers on temporary layoff, the proportion of unemployed workers with
long unemployment spells, and the proportion of UI claimants who
exhaust their benefits. The trend in the proportion of job losers from
the Current Population Survey (CPS) who report that they are on tem
porary layoff is shown in figure 12.1. Although the series has been rel
atively volatile between 1967 and 1994, the long-run trend is clearly a
decrease in the proportion of job losers on temporary layoff and,
hence, a corresponding increase in the proportion on permanent layoff.
The trend line in figure 12.1 implies that the proportion of job losers on
temporary layoff declined by nearly three-tenths of a percentage point
per year over the observation period. This downward trend is statisti
cally significant at the 99 percent confidence level. Further evidence on
the relative decline in temporary layoffs is provided by comparing the
average proportion of temporary layoffs early in the observation period
with the proportion later in the observation period. The average annual
proportion over the first ten years of the series is 32 percent, compared
with about 27 percent over the last ten years of the series.
At the same time that the share of temporary layoffs has declined,
the proportion of unemployed workers who are jobless for 15 or more
weeks has increased. Figure 12.2 shows the data on unemployment,
which are drawn from the CPS, between 1950 and 1994 and the esti
mated trend in the unemployment data over this period. The trend line
indicates that an increasing percentage of unemployed workers have
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remained so for at least 15 weeks. The highest rate of long-term unem
ployment shown in figure 12.2 occurred not in recent years but during
the recession of the early 1980s, when the proportion of long-term to
total unemployed reached 39 percent in 1983. Nevertheless, the gen
eral trend since 1950 has been for long-term unemployment to become
more prevalent. The estimated trend suggests that the proportion of
unemployed workers who were unemployed for at least 15 weeks
increased annually by a quarter of a percentage point over the observa
tion period; this estimated trend is statistically significant at the 99 per
cent confidence level.
Figure 12.1 Percent of Job Losers on Temporary Layoff, 1967-1994
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NOTE Job losers on temporary layoffs are individuals who were laid off and are expecting to be
recalled.

The findings on UI benefit exhaustion parallel those on long-term
unemployment. The benefit exhaustion rate, which is shown in figure
12.3, applies only to unemployed workers who file for and begin to
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Figure 12.2 Percent of Unemployed Who Are Unemployed 15 Weeks or
More, 1950-1994
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Figure 12.3 UI Exhaustion Rate, 1950-1994
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collect UI benefits. Although the trend in benefit exhaustion may
respond to changes in the type of workers filing for UI, it is still a use
ful indicator of the reemployment difficulties of unemployed workers
who are receiving UI benefits. As expected, the pattern over time of the
exhaustion rate is similar to that of the long-term unemployed measure.
Estimates of the long-term trend in benefit exhaustion suggest that the
exhaustion rate increased annually by an average of three-tenths of a
percentage point between 1950 and 1994.
Trends in the three measures illustrated in the figures show that a
growing number of job losers do not expect to return to work with their
previous employer, that unemployed individuals are increasingly likely
to remain unemployed for at least 15 weeks, and that UI claimants are
increasingly likely to exhaust their benefits. These developments sug
gest that unemployed workers are more likely now than in the past to
face long unemployment spells with uncertain reemployment pros
pects, and, accordingly, that more of them could be characterized as
dislocated workers.
Programs to Aid Dislocated Workers

The federal/state system of unemployment compensation is the pri
mary source of cash benefits for dislocated workers. Most dislocated
workers who receive UI are also registered with the ES, but relatively
few receive substantive reemployment services. For example, a recent
study of long-term recipients found that just 6 percent were receiving
job search assistance that was more intensive than simple ES work reg
istration (Richardson et al. 1989). Rates of service receipt reported in a
1988 survey of UI recipients were considerably higher (64 percent said
they received some services), but a substantial number (36 percent)
still received no services, and few received intensive services, such as
assessment, counseling, or job search workshops (Corson and Dynarski 1990).
Dislocated workers may receive reemployment services and training
through several other programs explicitly targeted to them. The largest
of these, the Economic Dislocation and Worker Adjustment Assistance
(EDWAA) program, which operates as Title III of the Job Training
Partnership Act (JTPA), provides funding to states and through states
to substate grantees to provide training (occupational classroom and
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on-the-job training) to dislocated workers. 12 In addition, grantees may
provide related services—orientation and assessment, job search assis
tance (generally provided through group workshops), counseling, and
relocation assistance. As part of EDWAA, states also conduct rapid
response activities, to inform dislocated workers of available services
as soon as a plant closing or mass layoff is announced. Funding under
this program has grown in recent years, from under a half billion dol
lars in 1990 to more than one billion dollars in 1995. Nevertheless the
total number of dislocated workers served under EDWAA is a rela
tively small proportion of the total number of dislocated workers. For
example, approximately 300,000 individuals per year received assis
tance under EDWAA between 1990 and 1993 as compared to the over
2 million dislocated workers per year identified in the Bureau of Labor
Statistics dislocated worker survey.
Other programs provide services to specific groups of dislocated
workers. The Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA) program seeks to aid
individuals who lose their jobs because of trade liberalization. In the
1970s this program emphasized compensating workers for lost income
by adding a supplement to the weekly UI benefit and by extending
weekly benefits from the 26 provided by UI to 52 or to 78 weeks for
individuals in training or age 60 or older. In 1981, the supplement to
the UI weekly benefit amount was dropped, as was the extension for
individuals age 60 or older. Separate funds for training were also made
available in 1982. These funds were expanded substantially in 1988,
and training was made mandatory unless the requirement is waived. As
a result, the focus of the program has shifted toward providing adjust
ment services, and the likelihood that recipients receive reemployment
services, especially training, has increased (Corson et al. 1993). This
program is, however, quite small, with approximately 20,000-50,000
recipients per year. Various amendments to JTPA have also authorized
new programs for special categories of workers, including special
reemployment assistance for workers who lost their jobs after the
Clean Air Act was implemented and for workers dislocated because of
reductions in defense expenditures. Services under these special initia
tives are provided through the EDWAA program. A number of earlier
programs to aid workers dislocated by federal policy initiatives (such
as the enlargement of Redwoods National Park, railroad reorganiza-
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tions, and airline deregulation) were also targeted on specific groups of
workers.
Despite the large number of special programs, the overall number of
workers served by EDWAA and other dislocated worker programs is
relatively small. The 1988 UI study data suggest that under 5 percent
of UI recipients and under 10 percent of exhaustees receive any ser
vices from these programs (Corson and Dynarski 1990).
Evidence from Program Evaluations

Formal evaluations of four major demonstration projects during the
1980s assessed the extent to which reemployment services helped
enhance the reemployment prospects of dislocated workers. Three of
these demonstrations addressed layoffs at specific industrial plants in
Detroit (Kulik, Smith, and Stromsdorfer 1984), Buffalo (Corson, Long,
and Maynard 1985), and Houston and El Paso (Bloom and Kulik
1986). Although these demonstrations had relatively small samples and
used different research methodologies, 13 one general finding emerged:
the reemployment outcomes for workers who received special assis
tance in looking for work tended to be more favorable than those for
workers in the comparison/control groups, but additional benefits from
participating in a training program were either ambiguous or small, rel
ative to program costs. For example, the evaluation of the Buffalo
project found that job search assistance had significant effects on reem
ployment rates and on average weekly earnings, but classroom and onthe-job training had statistically insignificant effects (Corson, Long,
and Maynard 1985). Because the per-participant costs of training were
approximately four times the cost of job search assistance alone, the
report concluded that only the job search assistance treatment was
cost-effective.
A fourth major evaluation—the New Jersey UI Reemployment
Demonstration Project—had a somewhat broader focus than the plantbased projects described earlier. The goal of the New Jersey demon
stration was "to examine whether the Unemployment Insurance system
could be used to identify workers early in their unemployment spells
and to provide them with alternative, early intervention services to
accelerate their return to work" (Corson et al. 1989). Overall, 8,675 UI
claimants were assigned randomly to one of three treatments (job
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search assistance only, job search assistance combined with training or
relocation assistance, and job search assistance combined with a cash
bonus for early reemployment) and then compared with a randomly
selected control group of 2,385 claimants who received only regular
services. Demonstration services were targeted to dislocated workers
through a series of eligibility screens that excluded workers who (1)
did not receive a UI first payment within five weeks after their initial
claim, (2) were collecting partial UI benefits, (3) were younger than
twenty-five years of age, (4) had fewer than three years of employment
experience on their last job, (5) had a specific recall date from their
employer, or (6) were usually hired through union hiring-hall arrange
ments. As a whole, these screens excluded approximately 73 percent of
all workers who received a first payment from UI during the sample
period.
Each treatment in the New Jersey demonstration had a statistically
significant effect on reducing the collection of UI benefits and on rais
ing subsequent employment and earnings (Corson et al. 1989; Corson
and Haimson 1996). UI benefits were reduced in both the initial benefit
year and in subsequent years. The total benefits of the treatments also
exceeded their total costs from the perspectives of both society and the
individuals involved. From the viewpoint of government alone, how
ever, only the job search and reemployment bonus treatments were
unambiguously beneficial. No clear evidence emerged that providing
training or relocation help in addition to job search assistance led to
cost-effective gains. Evaluations of demonstration programs similar to
the New Jersey one in Minnesota, Nevada, South Carolina, and Wash
ington support the notion that stronger links between UI recipients and
the reemployment service system are a cost-effective way to promote
rapid reemployment among UI recipients (see Meyer 1995 and U.S.
Department of Labor 1995 for reviews).
Current Policy Initiatives: Profiling and Reemployment Services

The UI system is a logical avenue for identifying workers who
might be helped by reemployment services, because the majority of
dislocated workers collect UI benefits, and they usually begin to
receive these payments early in their unemployment spells. Other tar
geting mechanisms (such as the rapid response program outreach
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efforts under EDWAA) are important but more limited than a Ul-based
approach, because they tend to focus on specific groups of dislocated
workers (such as those from plant closings or mass layoffs, in the case
of EDWAA). Identifying workers early in their unemployment spells
has several advantages. By beginning the adjustment process more
quickly, claimants can use UI benefits as income support during train
ing, if training is necessary. For workers who do not need training, the
risk of exhausting UI benefits can be lessened, and income can be
increased through more rapid reemployment. Because many dislocated
workers collect UI benefits for a substantial period of time, potential
program savings from more rapid reemployment can also be achieved.
This reasoning, combined with evidence from the New Jersey dem
onstration that long-term UI recipients can be identified early in their
unemployment spells, resulted in the Unemployment Compensation
Amendments of 1993, which require state UI programs to profile
claimants as they enter the UI system so that dislocated workers can be
identified. Subsequent interpretations of this requirement by the U.S.
Department of Labor provide guidance on how states should imple
ment a profiling mechanism. 14 Specifically, states are encouraged to
adopt and adapt an approach developed by the Labor Department (U.S.
Department of Labor 1994). This method uses a two-step process to
identify dislocated workers. In the first step, non-job-attached claim
ants are identified; in the second, a probability of exhaustion is esti
mated for each claimant, on the basis of education, job tenure, industry,
occupation, and other variables. Those with the highest probabilities of
exhaustion are considered the target group. States that do not have suf
ficient data to estimate such models are expected to use a fixed set of
screens to identify dislocated workers (as was done in the New Jersey
demonstration), but they are encouraged and provided with technical
assistance to develop statistical profiling models as more data become
available.
Identifying dislocated workers is the first step in helping these indi
viduals become reemployed; strengthening linkages to reemployment
services is the second step. For this reason, the worker profiling legisla
tion requires state UI systems to refer profiled claimants to reemploy
ment services. Referred claimants are expected to participate in
reemployment services as a condition of eligibility for UI unless they

532

Intersection of Unemployment Insurance with Other Programs and Policies

have already done so or have a justifiable cause for failure to partici
pate.
To make these requirements operational, states are expected to
establish agreements between the UI system and service providers (the
ES or EDWAA programs), so that profiled claimants can be referred to
a provider and receive services. Service providers in each locality gen
erally hold initial orientation sessions with claimants, followed by
assessment sessions in which individual assistance plans are developed
for each claimant. Participation in reemployment services identified in
the plans is a condition for continued UI eligibility. In addition to ori
entation and assessment, reemployment services can include counsel
ing, job search assistance (such as workshops), referrals to jobs and job
placement, and other similar types of help, but they do not include
training or education. Claimants can be referred to training or educa
tional services; if they participate, they do not have to take part in other
reemployment services. However, engaging in training or education is
not a mandatory component of the service plans. So that UI can moni
tor and evaluate the reemployment services participation requirement
and continuing eligibility, states are expected to develop feedback
mechanisms to provide UI with information about whether referred
claimants participate in and complete mandated services.
All states have now put these Worker Profiling and Reemployment
Services (WPRS) systems into effect. In late 1994, Delaware, Florida,
Kentucky, Maryland, New Jersey, and Oregon began implementing
WPRS systems, while other states began implementation in 1995 and
early 1996. Each of the initial six states successfully developed part
nerships among the UI, ES, and EDWAA systems, a method to profile
and refer long-duration claimants to reemployment services, and a way
to provide feedback to the UI system from the service providers
(Hawkins et al. 1996). In most localities, the ES is the primary provider
for mandatory reemployment services, with short duration services
being emphasized on individual service plans. Lengthier, more exten
sive assistance is given less frequently and generally on a voluntary
basis. Such help is often provided through referrals to EDWAA.
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Unemployment Insurance Benefit Restructuring Initiatives
Two other relatively recent UI system initiatives are, like the WPRS
systems, designed to promote employment of claimants. 15 These initia
tives—short-time compensation and self-employment assistance—
restructure the UI benefit system to increase employment and, in the
second case, to provide additional services to claimants.
Short-Time Compensation

Short-time compensation (STC) allows firms to adjust their work
force in response to business fluctuations without resorting to layoffs. 16
Under STC, firms reduce use of their workforce simply by requiring a
group of employees—typically more than would otherwise be laid
off—to work shorter weeks. These workers are compensated for their
lost work time with partial UI benefits. STC may neutralize what some
have viewed as a pro-layoff bias in regular state UI programs, which
tend to be relatively restrictive in the payment of partial benefits (Feldstein 1976). 17 Under STC, UI benefits can be paid under a much
broader set of conditions than in the normal program. As implemented
in the United States, STC is viewed as a workforce stabilization plan,
used during periods of economic downturn that are expected to have
only short-term effects on the labor needs of employers.
STC programs were introduced in the United States in 1978, when
California implemented its Work Sharing Unemployment Insurance
program as an experimental effort to mitigate the public-sector
employment problems that were expected to accompany declines in
state revenue resulting from tax reductions. The California plan has
been the prototype for other STC initiatives in this country. The 19811982 recession acted as a catalyst for expansion of STC programs,
which were established by states throughout the 1980s. As of 1994,
STC programs had been implemented in seventeen states, although
many of these programs have modest activity.
Because state STC programs were grafted onto the existing UI sys
tem, and because many followed model legislation prepared by the
U.S. Department of Labor, the programs have many similarities. All
are implemented by a work-sharing plan for a given employer that,
once approved, remains in effect for a set period. These plans specify
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the hours reduction and the handling of fringe benefits during the
period. State laws limit the number of weeks STC can be collected and
indicate how benefits are to be calculated, usually as a proportion of
the weekly UI benefit for which the worker is eligible. State plans also
specify how STC benefits are charged to an employer. In many states,
they are charged in exactly the same way as regular UI benefits. Early
concern about the budgetary impact of STC on state trust funds, how
ever, caused some states to adopt special charging provisions and even
surtaxes for firms using the program. However, because of the modest
use of STC, only a few states retain these provisions.
Participation in STC is low in states with a program. Kerachsky,
Nicholson, and Hershey (1986) showed that firm participation in STC
was less than 0.5 percent of all employers in the three states (Arizona,
California, and Oregon) studied. Work by Vroman (1992) indicated
that STC use continued to be low, generally accounting for no more
than 0.3 percent of UI claimants.
Findings from the Kerachsky, Nicholson, and Hershey (1986) study
also suggest that STC has a clear but limited impact on layoffs. As
expected, participation in STC did reduce layoffs: approximately 13
percent fewer hours were spent on layoffs by workers in STC firms
than by workers in comparison firms. Even firms using STC continued
to use layoffs as their primary method of work force reduction, how
ever. Nearly 80 percent of all the compensated hours of unemployment
among workers in these firms were spent on layoff rather than on STCcompensated hours reduction. In addition, total compensated unem
ployment was nearly 11 percent higher among STC users than among
otherwise similar employers. These findings tend to refute the notion
that STC hours simply substitute for hours spent on regular UI.
Instead, the effect of STC on the trade-off between layoffs and hour
reductions appears to be more complex. An ongoing study is currently
evaluating this effect and related issues associated with STC.
Self-Employment Assistance

Another policy option that expands services to UI claimants and
encourages reemployment is self-employment assistance. Under the
traditional UI system, claimants must be able and available for work
and must conduct an active job search for wage and salary employ-
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ment, so those who work full-time on starting their own business are
generally ineligible for UI. Clearly, this policy creates a disincentive to
self-employment. However, recent legislation has offered states the
option of changing this situation. Title V of the North American Free
Trade Agreement (NAFTA) Implementation Act (Public Law [P.L.]
103-181) allows states to offer self-employment assistance as an addi
tional tool to help speed the transition of dislocated workers into new
employment. 18 Under this option, eligible claimants who want to estab
lish their own business are paid a self-employment allowance equiva
lent to their UI benefit. These claimants are expected to work full-time
on starting their own business and are exempted from UI work search
requirements. In addition, they are allowed to retain any earnings from
self-employment, without losing their self-employment allowance. The
effect of the new law is to remove the barrier that disallowed payment
of UI benefits to claimants pursuing full-time self-employment. States
are also required to provide self-employment assistance activities to
claimants receiving self-employment allowances. 19 Participation in
these services is mandatory for recipients of the allowance, and total
participation cannot exceed 5 percent of regular UI claimants. To date,
ten states have enacted self-employment programs for UI claimants,
and programs are operational in Maine, New York, Oregon, Delaware,
Maryland, New Jersey, and California.
The legislation allowing self-employment was a response to the rel
atively positive findings on impacts from two random assignment dem
onstrations conducted in Washington and Massachusetts. These results
indicated that self-employment is a viable reemployment option for a
small proportion of UI claimants. Both demonstrations provided selfemployment allowances and additional assistance activities to claim
ants who completed a set of initial intake activities. In Washington, the
self-employment allowance was offered as a lump-sum payment equal
to the amount of the claimant's remaining UI entitlement; in Massa
chusetts, claimants were offered weekly allowances equal to their UI
benefit amount.20 Four percent of targeted claimants in Washington and
2 percent in Massachusetts completed the initial intake activities and
were determined eligible for participation in the program. In terms of
impacts on economic outcomes, the availability of self-employment
assistance generated an increase in self-employment and an increase in
time employed among claimants in both demonstrations. Impacts on
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total earnings (from self-employment and wages and salaries) and on
total benefits paid (regular UI payments plus self-employment allow
ances) were mixed. In the Washington program, total earnings did not
rise—the increase in self-employment income was offset by a reduc
tion in wage and salary income—while in Massachusetts both selfemployment and wage and salary income rose. The Washington pro
gram, which paid lump-sum allowances, also increased total benefits
paid by about $1,000 per eligible claimant while the Massachusetts
self-employment program reduced total benefits paid during the benefit
year by about $900 per eligible claimant. Both programs were cost
effective from the participant and societal perspectives, but only the
Massachusetts program was cost effective from the governmental per
spective. The Massachusetts model of paying weekly allowances equal
to the UI weekly benefit amount has been adopted in the national legis
lation.

Conclusion
The UI system is intended to provide income support to experienced
workers who become unemployed involuntarily and, through referrals
to the ES, assistance in becoming reemployed; however, other public
and private programs also provide income support and reemployment
assistance to jobless workers. The presence of this wider set of social
insurance, public assistance, and reemployment programs must be con
sidered in an assessment of the adequacy of the income support and
reemployment assistance provided to unemployed workers. The exist
ence of these other programs also raises the question of whether they
are well coordinated with UI. These issues have been examined in this
chapter.
Income Support

The examination of social insurance, public assistance, and private
programs that may provide income support to unemployed workers
showed that, in general, overlaps in coverage are small. Few UI claim
ants appear to be eligible for or to receive income from social insur-
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ance, public assistance, or private programs designed to provide
income to older, disabled, or low-income individuals or families. How
ever, a substantial percentage of unemployed workers appear to be eli
gible for severance or termination pay (in 1993, 42 percent of full time
employees in medium and small firms were eligible for severance pay).
In addition, a significant share receives income from the EITC (in
1993, 22 percent of the tax returns reporting unemployment compensa
tion income also reported tax credits or payments under the EITC).
These findings indicate that the gaps in the income support provided
by the UI system to low-wage workers and the long-term unemployed
identified in earlier chapters, are not filled by other income support
programs. Severance pay is more often available to workers with
higher than with lower wages, and it tends to have a short duration; fur
ther, the amount of income provided by the EITC is modest (the annual
average payment or tax credit in 1993 was about $1,000). Other than
UI, sources of income support are generally not available to the UI
population.
The analysis in this chapter also suggests that another important gap
in support to the unemployed is for health insurance. Relatively few
unemployed individuals, particularly among the long-term unem
ployed, are likely to have health insurance coverage. While current leg
islation requires employers to permit laid-off workers to purchase
health insurance coverage for up to eighteen months at a cost equal to
102 percent of the employer-employee premium, few UI claimants are
likely to be able to afford this increasingly costly benefit.
Finally, rules providing for the coordination of benefits from UI and
other programs have been established for state UI programs. For public
programs, these regulations often offset the benefits from one program
by those from another so that an individual will not receive multiple
benefits, although certain states permit the payment of some multiple
benefits if the individual meets UI able and available requirements.
Rules for the coordination of private sources of income with UI have
also been established. These criteria vary by state as well and are simi
lar to the stipulations governing income from public programs. How
ever, in some states, the treatment of different kinds of private income
seems inconsistent. For example, certain states treat wages in lieu of
notice and severance payments as disqualifying income for UI while
income from SUB payments is ignored in the UI benefit calculation.
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Instead, it seems more reasonable to ignore all private sources of
income in the benefit calculation and to use the UI work test to ensure
that claimants are available and looking for work and are hence eligible
for UI.
Reemployment Assistance
Historically, the UI system has provided reemployment assistance to
UI claimants through the ES and through referrals from the ES to pro
grams like EDWAA for dislocated workers. However, in the past, few
claimants received intensive reemployment assistance from the ES or
from other sources, despite the fact that increasing numbers of claim
ants are permanently separated from their pre-UI employers and might
benefit from services. Growth over the years in other indicators of
worker dislocation, such as the proportion of the jobless who are longterm unemployed and the UI exhaustion rate, also points to a greater
need for reemployment assistance for UI claimants.
There has also been evidence from recent demonstrations that an
increased level of reemployment services coupled with a participation
requirement could lead to more rapid reemployment of UI claimants
and to lower UI benefit payments. The combination of factors that have
been described has led to legislation requiring states to implement
WPRS systems. Under these systems, states are expected to identify
permanently separated claimants who are likely to experience long
spells of unemployment and to refer them to reemployment services
from the ES or another service provider. Referred claimants are sup
posed to participate in reemployment services such as job search assis
tance as a condition of continued UI eligibility, unless they have
already done so or have a justifiable cause for failure to participate.
States are also expected to develop feedback mechanisms to provide
UI with information about whether referred claimants participate in
required services.
Early indications suggest that these WPRS systems can be imple
mented successfully. If sufficient resources are available to provide
reemployment services, these systems should lead to an increase in the
level of reemployment services provided to UI claimants and to
increased coordination between UI and reemployment service provid
ers. Other recent UI initiatives—short-time compensation and self-
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employment allowances—are also aimed at promoting the employ
ment of claimants. Short-time compensation is intended to strengthen
ties with existing employers by providing an alternative to temporary
layoffs, and self-employment assistance is designed to help claimants
develop an alternative to wage and salary work.
NOTES
I am grateful to Sheldon Danziger, Walter Nicholson, and the editors for their comments on
this paper and to Cmdy Castro for her help in producing the paper
1 These firms account for approximately one-quarter of all employment
2 For convenience, the fifty-three UI jurisdictions—the fifty states, the District of Columbia,
Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands, are called "states."
3 The decline in employment in automobile and other manufacturing industries has also led
to a decline in the number of workers covered under SUB plans. Haber and Murray (1966) report
that over 2.5 million workers were covered by SUB plans in 1962, while the 1993 survey of bene
fits in medium and large firms reports that 1 2 million workers are covered.
4. The Social Security Disability Insurance program provides monthly cash benefits to work
ers under age 65 who become disabled and can no longer work because of the disability Benefits
become available after a five-month waiting period.
5.In four states, the same agency administers TDI and UI
6. Conversely, few Food Stamp and AFDC program recipients receive UI. In 1988, 2.3 percent
of Food Stamp households (U S. Department of Agriculture 1990) and 4 3 percent of AFDC fam
ilies (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 1990) had income from UI.
7 These numbers were computed from data reported by the Internal Revenue Service (1995,
table 2) and from data reported in testimony on the earned income tax credit by the Commissioner
of Internal Revenue (Richardson 1995, table 1)
8. This latter estimate assumed that individuals would not respond to a loss of UI benefits by
increasing job search activities or by lowering the wage at which they would accept a job Thus,
this estimate provides an upper-bound poverty rate in the absence of UI
9 As indicated in the previous paragraph, the annual number of dislocated workers was also
higher during the recession of the early 1990s than in the 1980s.
10. The three studies are Topel (1990, 1991) and Ruhm (1991)
11. Corson and Dynarski use the BLS definition of dislocated workers, which includes work
ers who lose their jobs because their plants close, their employer went out of business, or they
were laid off and not recalled
12 EDWAA uses a relatively broad definition of dislocated workers Workers are eligible for
EDWAA if they have been laid off or have received a notice of termination, are UI eligible, and
are unlikely to return to their previous industry or occupation, they have been laid off or received
a notice of termination as a result of a plant closing or substantial layoff, or they are long-term
unemployed individuals with limited opportunities for reemployment in their occupation.
13. The Detroit evaluation used a comparison plant methodology, whereas the Buffalo and
Texas evaluations used random assignment methods that differed according to how nonparticipants were treated
14 Unemployment Insurance Program Letter No 45-93, Field Memorandum No 35-94, and
other documents in U.S Department of Labor 1994.
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15 A third initiative to promote reemployment—reemployment bonuses—has been tested
experimentally, but legislation permitting states to incorporate reemployment bonuses in their UI
programs has not been enacted For a discussion of reemployment bonuses, see chapter 7.
16 Short-time compensation is also referred to as work sharing or shared-work compensation
17. Most states have partial benefit schedules that specify a dollar-for-dollar reduction in ben
efits for wages in excess of a modest weekly earnings disregard. For a typical worker, these sched
ules usually mean that no benefits are paid if the employee works two or more days per week
18. This legislation has a five-year time limit, but pending legislation would make permanent
the provisions permitting states to provide self-employment allowances and assistance
19 Self-employment activities that must be offered include entrepreneurial training, business
counseling, and technical assistance This assistance is most often provided through state eco
nomic development agencies
20 For a description of the Washington and Massachusetts demonstrations and a discussion of
the results, see Benus et al (1995). See also Wilson (1995) for comparisons to programs in other
countries.
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Federal-State Relations
Thomas E. West
Michigan Employment Security Agency
Gerard Hildebrand
UI Service, U.S. Department of Labor

Almost sixty years after its inception, following over 340 million
first payments of unemployment insurance (UI) to individuals, signifi
cant problems with benefit fund solvency in many states,' and after
substantial growth in program complexity, the UI program continues to
be the initial point of contact for someone who becomes unemployed.
Although the program has experienced a number of pivotal problems,
some inherent in its basic structure and some beyond its control, it con
tinues to be a model of federal-state interaction and cooperation. The
purpose of this chapter is to examine the dynamics that established the
original federal-state UI system and to discuss how this unique rela
tionship has evolved over the last sixty years. Some of the issues that
will be discussed, notably administrative financing, are shared by the
employment service program that works to find jobs for UI claimants;
however, this chapter will be limited to UI.

Program Inception

The initial discussions involving the development of the UI program
in the United States focused on three primary issues: (1) whether an
exclusively national system was appropriate, (2) to what extent state
legislatures should have discretion about program requirements, and
(3) the degree to which states should be required to meet minimum
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federal standards. The federal-state UI program came about as a result
of the need for income protection in the political and economic climate
of the Great Depression of the 1930s. Attempts in 1916 and again in
1921 to pass federal UI legislation had failed. Between 1917 and 1933
thirteen unemployment benefit or guaranteed employment plans were
developed by individual companies. President Franklin D. Roosevelt
had hoped that either private insurance programs or individual states
would provide for temporary income coverage to help offset the unpre
dictability of unemployment. Although private insurance programs had
developed slowly in the early 1930s, many had failed and, prior to
1935, only Wisconsin had enacted a UI law. States were reluctant to
enact UI laws at their level since they would be at a competitive disad
vantage relative to states without UI programs. The Wagner-Lewis bill
of 1934 solved some of the state concerns by proposing a federal tax
with an offsetting credit for employers if the state met certain require
ments. Although President Roosevelt supported the proposal, he
requested that consideration be delayed until further study could be
completed.2
To examine the matter, President Roosevelt created the Committee
on Economic Security which eventually recommended a federal-state
system calling for a federal tax with provisions for credit against that
tax, similar to that put forward in the Wagner-Lewis proposal. With its
recommendation for a federal-state system, the committee also
expressed its apprehension about the compromise:
A federally administered system of unemployment compensation
is undoubtedly superior in some respects, particularly in relation
to employees who move from state to state .... We recognize also
that in other respects State administration may develop marked
inadequacies. Should these fears expressed by the champions of a
federally administered system prove true, it is always possible by
subsequent legislation to establish such a system .... Accord
ingly, the Congress can at any time increase the requirements
which state laws must fulfill and may, as it sees fit, at some future
time, substitute a federally administered system for a cooperative
Federal-state system we recommend (Report of the Committee on
Economic Security 1935).

The arguments used to support a totally federal system involved uni
formity of protection and coverage, consistency for employers who had
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multistate operations, the ability to pool trust fund resources and col
lect taxes centrally, and less administration. Those who favored a fed
eral-state system countered with the following: a national system
would be cumbersome to operate; the decision process would function
better if states could enact laws complying with broad federal require
ments; there would be more accountability of state and local officials
under a federal-state system to develop a program responsive to indi
vidual state needs and conditions; and, rather than proposing changes
to the federal laws which may not work throughout the country, a fed
eral-state system would mean that states could experiment with new
ideas, which could then be exported to other states.
The committee's unanimous recommendation for a federal-state
system was made primarily for three reasons: (1) it was known that
President Roosevelt preferred that approach, (2) there was a significant
question as to whether a wholly federal system was constitutional, and
finally (3) Congress was apparently unwilling to relinquish all state
authority over this issue to the U.S. government. Although the commit
tee's report did not detail federal or state duties, it did outline general
recommendations for incentives to states to enact laws adopting mini
mum state standards, providing for the control of trust fund reserves,
establishing substantive program provisions, and providing effective
administration. In most cases the responsibilities were to be shared and
collaborative.
The 1935 Social Security Act (SSA), which created the federal-state
system, did not end discussions about the basic structure of the pro
gram. By the end of 1937, concerns about the constitutionality of the
federal-state system were resolved by the U.S. Supreme Court. Even
by then, states had developed their own vested interest in the program
and were prepared to strongly resist any attempts to change it to an
exclusively federal system.3 With the possibility of an exclusively fed
eral system reduced, proponents for more uniformity switched their
attention to active support for federal benefit standards. Although bene
fit standards have been proposed by a number of different administra
tions, they have never been adopted.
The 1935 SSA addressed UI in two ways. First, Title III provided
for grants to states for the administration of their UI programs. The
receipt of these grants was conditioned on state law meeting the
requirements of Title III and Title IX of the SSA. Second, certain sec-
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tions of Title IX (since recodified as that part of the Internal Revenue
Code called the Federal Unemployment Tax Act [FUTA]) created the
cornerstone of the federal-state system: a federal tax with a significant
tax credit offset for employers in states with UI laws meeting federal
law requirements. Although the basic concept of a gross versus a net
FUTA rate has remained the fundamental incentive feature in the sys
tem, the amounts of the gross and net rates have changed. (When the
program began, the gross FUTA rate was 3 percent with a net FUTA
rate of 0.3 percent. In 1996, the gross FUTA rate was 6.2 percent,
including a temporary tax of 0.2 percent). Employers who have paid
their full state unemployment tax obligations can receive a 5.4 percent
offset credit on their FUTA rate if their state law meets federal require
ments, provided the state has had no outstanding loans from the federal
government for more than two years and provided the services are cov
ered under state law. Based on a taxable wage base of $7,000, most
employers pay no more than $56 (0.8 percent of $7,000) per employee.
However, if the state is ruled out of conformity or compliance with fed
eral law, then an employer's cost per employee would increase to $434
(6.2 percent of $7,000).4
The Federal-State Partnership

Rather than a simple federal-state partnership, the UI system
embodies a whole host of interested parties, with each affecting the
operation of the program at both the state and national level. Although
within the UI program the federal government is referred to as the
"federal partner," this federal partner is really comprised of the U.S.
Congress and the executive branch, including the U.S. Department of
Labor, at both the national and regional office levels, and the Office of
Management and Budget. Not surprisingly, the federal partner will not
always present a consistent view on issues relating to the UI system,
primarily because different interests in the program are represented.
Congress has several times rejected efforts by different administrations
to impose benefit standards on states. As federal UI law involves other
federal agencies, the U.S. Department of Labor may disagree with
those agencies and has sometimes participated in judicial action, as
friend of the court on behalf of the states in cases concerning whether
states have complied with federal requirements.
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The "state" partner is comprised of the fifty different states, the Dis
trict of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands. Each has its own
legislature, UI advisory councils, business and labor organizations that
protect the interests of their constituents, and state courts. Like the fed
eral partner, the state partner is comprised of different entities with
widely divergent interests and opinions.
As the UI program has evolved since the 1930s, the state UI agen
cies have served to explain both the mechanics and history of the pro
gram to state legislatures. State agency staff also commonly assist the
legislatures in explaining how proposals to change state law might con
flict with federal law, which could result in the loss of federal tax cred
its and the ability of the state UI agency to receive administrative
grants. Similarly, staff members at the U.S. Department of Labor are
called upon to provide the explanations of program administration to
Congress, to testify regarding economic shifts that necessitate program
modifications, and to estimate the impact of legislative changes. With
out this institutional knowledge, legislative changes could not be made
at either the state or federal level.
The federal-state partnership ranges from a system that functions as
a model of cooperation to a contentious program with widely divergent
problems and proposed remedies. An example of how the federal-state
partnership works cooperatively in accomplishing its basic mission can
be shown in the programs enacted by Congress to address prolonged
spells of unemployment during national recessions. A permanent
Extended Benefits (EB) program was required of the states by Con
gress in 1970 to provide for a "second tier" of income protection for
individuals exhausting entitlement to regular state unemployment ben
efits during a period of high state or national unemployment. Unlike
regular state UI, the federal government pays about one-half the cost of
EB payments. Congress has also authorized a number of "third tier"
programs (these programs are sometimes referred to as "emergency
benefit programs"), usually on short notice and usually 100 percent
federally funded, either in the midst of or towards the end of a national
economic downturn. These third tier programs may involve a variety of
triggering mechanisms, qualifying requirements and complex "reachback" provisions which provide additional income protection to indi
viduals who have exhausted both regular state benefits and all available
EB prior to the creation of the new program. Such initiatives are gener-
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ally implemented with very little time to develop the administrative
procedures necessary to pay benefits to millions of workers. Without
cooperation at the federal and state levels, these third tier benefits
might never come into existence, much less reach the unemployed.
The U.S. Department of Labor works with the states to formulate
program operation, to provide access to both the program dollars and
administrative grants for the states, and to provide guidance on pro
gram administration. States generally have the responsibility to
announce eligibility, to contact individuals who have exhausted entitle
ment, and to develop reporting and payment systems accommodating
these program requirements.
By contrast, as discussed later in this chapter, the problems associ
ated with administrative financing in the 1980s and 1990s have caused
many states to advocate more state control over funding and program
issues. These discussions result in disagreements among states and
between states and the federal partner; these controversies, while
sometimes divisive, highlight state problems and provide an opportu
nity for strengthening the system. However, since states represent thenindividual interests, the solutions proposed by some states could be
detrimental to others.

Conformity and Compliance
Two types of issues exist when the U.S. Department of Labor
believes a state UI program does not meet the requirements of federal
law: conformity and compliance. A conformity issue arises when the
state law does not agree with federal law. This may occur because the
state law contains a provision inconsistent with federal law or because
it does not contain a provision required by federal law. The conflict
may be created by the law itself, or by administrative or judicial inter
pretation. A compliance issue exists when actual state practice conflicts
with federal law. Whereas conformity is directed at the state law itself,
compliance is directed at the proper administration of state law. Put
another way, conformity relates to law while compliance relates to per
formance. Conformity and compliance issues arise under both the SSA
and the FUTA. If the state does not conform and comply with the pro-
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visions of the FUTA, employers in the state will lose tax credits, and
the state will not be eligible for administrative grants under the SSA.
Failure to meet the requirements of the SSA, however, results only in
the loss of administrative grants.
Federal Law Requirements

Originally, there were few federal requirements. 5 The President's
Committee on Economic Security (1935) in its report to the President,
recommended that federal standards apply only to matters on which
uniformity was absolutely essential and that states share in the devel
opment of those standards. Another recommendation was to require
that the federal government grant administrative funds to states "under
conditions designed to insure competence and probity" (President's
Committee on Economic Security 1935). This approach ensured some
uniformity among states while providing sufficient latitude for states to
enact provisions suitable for their area. The intent was to avoid inter
state competition by requiring, as a condition for the credit, that all
states have the same basic structure.
The Senate Finance Committee's 1935 report on the legislation that
eventually was enacted emphasized that the legislation "does not set up
a federal unemployment compensation system" and that "[e]xcept for a
few standards which are necessary to render certain that the state
unemployment compensation laws are genuine unemployment com
pensation acts and not merely relief measures, the states are left free to
set up any unemployment compensation system they wish, without
dictation from Washington." The 1935 SSA followed the pattern of the
Tenth Amendment to the Constitution by implicitly providing that all
UI responsibilities not expressly delegated or implied to the federal
government are reserved for the states (Rubin 1983, p. 64).
The original SSA created 12 requirements:
1. Methods of administration reasonably calculated to insure full
payment of UI when due. This provision has become perhaps the
most important in the federal-state relationship due to its broad
ness and its litigation in federal courts.
2. Payment of UI through public employment offices or other agen
cies that the Secretary of Labor may approve. This assures that UI
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claimants receive any employment services that may assist their
return to work.
3. A fair hearing for all claimants who have been denied UI. Since
this requirement was added prior to the explosion in administra
tive law, one might question whether this stipulation would be
included if the SSA were created today. The first requirement
listed would appear to mandate a fair hearing as a basic element
of determining whether payment of UI is made when due.
4. All receipts for the unemployment fund must be immediately
transferred to its account in the Unemployment Trust Fund in
Washington. This requirement assures that UI monies are imme
diately turned over to the federal government for investment in
federal, rather than in state securities. This system was given
impetus by fears that mass liquidation of state-held securities on a
falling market would further an economic downturn and cause the
value of a state fund to decline.
5. All amounts withdrawn from the state unemployment fund may
be used only for the payment of UI, i.e., cash payments to indi
viduals with respect to their unemployment. This requirement
assures that trust monies are used only for the purpose of the
trust, which is the payment of UI. Along with the stipulation that
payments be made through public employment offices, it is the
basis of the "able and available" requirement.6
6. States must make reports required by the U.S. Secretary of Labor.
7. States must provide information to any agency of the United
States charged with the administration of public works or assis
tance through public employment. This provision is obsolete.
8. States are prohibited from denying benefits to individuals entitled
to UI. In hindsight, this provision seems superfluous given that
states follow their laws, and, if they do not, the state courts would
become involved.
9. UI may not be paid until two years after the first day of the first
period with respect to which contributions are required. This

Unemployment Insurance in the United States

553

assured that states had adequate reserves on hand prior to com
mencing the payment of UI. Once a state commenced its UI pro
gram, it was no longer affected by this provision.
10. UI may not be denied due to a failure to accept a job if the posi
tion is vacant because of a strike or lockout; if the wages, hours,
or other conditions of work offered are substantially less favor
able than those prevailing in the locality; or if, as a condition of
employment, the individual is required to join or to refrain from
joining any bona fide labor organization. These provisions were
added to assure that UI would not be used to deflate wages as
well as to keep the UI program neutral in matters of labor-man
agement relations.
11. All the rights, privileges or immunities conferred by state law
shall exist subject to the power of the state legislature to repeal
the power of the law at any time. This provision was included as
the creation of an entirely federal UI system still appeared possi
ble in 1935. It provides protection to states in the event their laws
are repealed and replaced with a federal system.
12. To receive the additional credit against the federal unemployment
tax, any reduced rate of contribution assigned an employer must
be based on the employer's experience with unemployment.
Although states do not have to receive the additional credit, this
provision has the effect of a requirement, since early in the his
tory of the program, almost all states chose to adopt experience
rating. Currently, all states use experience rating.
The preceding requirements merely established a skeletal framework
for the system. They did not mention base periods, benefit years, or
waiting weeks. They did not mandate anything in terms of eligibility
except that the individual be able and available for work and that the
individual may not be denied benefits due to certain refusals of work.
They did not compel states to have provisions relating to voluntary
quits, discharges for misconduct, or the individual's suitability for
refused work. They did not address duration of benefits. A state need
not cover services if choosing to lose tax credit on those services. Con
versely, nothing prohibited states from having broader coverage.
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This lack of specificity may be surprising since current state UI pro
grams are similar in many ways. Such commonality results from a con
sensus concerning what constitutes an effective UI program. 7 For
example, in 1945, ten years after the enactment of the SSA, twentythree states did not have any provisions relating to quits, misconduct or
refusals of suitable work; today, all states have these provisions. As
another example, in 1940, most states had maximum durations of 16 or
fewer weeks. By 1955, most states had durations of around 20 weeks.
Today, fifty-one states have maximum durations of 26 weeks.
Following the enactment of the SSA, thirty-five years went by with
few changes in federal law. In 1939, those provisions of the SSA relat
ing to federal tax credits were moved to the FUTA, a part of the Inter
nal Revenue Code. In the early 1940s, two requirements were added
concerning the use of Ul-granted funds. In the 1950s coverage was
broadened. However, in 1970 and 1976, many new requirements were
created. Since 1980, new requirements have been added through the
budget reconciliation process rather than through legislation concerned
with the UI system itself. Although this approach has sped up legisla
tion, it also means that laws are enacted without hearings or much
deliberation and that UI program decisions are made due to budgetary
instead of program concerns.
Some of the requirements added since 1970 are matters of national
interest probably appropriate for the federal partner to address. Among
these requirements are the following:
1. States may not deny or reduce UI to individuals who live in or
filed from another state. This provision assures equal treatment
by prohibiting state law provisions discriminating against such
individuals.
2. States must participate in a combined-wage plan created with
their participation and approved by the Secretary of Labor. Prior
to this amendment, there were several combined-wage plans,
with the result that some individuals still could not establish eligi
bility.
3. States must cover services performed for state and local govern
ments and certain religious, charitable, and educational nonprofit
organizations. 8 Under this extension of coverage, UI must be paid
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on the same terms and conditions as other services covered under
state law. These provisions were added since the governmental
and nonprofit entities were not subject to the federal tax. There
fore, states did not have the incentive to cover these services, and
large numbers of unemployed individuals might never have
received UI. The amendment changed this. (Two other provisions
related to this coverage provision were not quite as clearly a mat
ter of national interest. First, states were required to give the gov
ernmental and nonprofit entities the option to reimburse the state
unemployment fund rather than to pay taxes. Second, certain
school services may not be used to establish UI eligibility
between and within academic periods.)
4. States must pay UI to claimants in training approved by the states.
The notion here was that UI should not act as an impediment to
training that may help the individual return to employment.
5. States must participate in the federal-state EB program. This
assured that no state would be discouraged from extending the
duration of UI during periods of high unemployment. Further, it
presumably would obviate the need for Congress to create special
benefit programs during recessions.
6. States were prohibited from using services performed by an alien
in establishing a claim unless the alien was in one of three speci
fied categories. Since the federal government oversees efforts
related to aliens such as admission and granting of work authori
zation, this interest was integrated into the UI program. The
notion behind the amendment was to deny UI to "illegal" aliens
who should not have been working and who were, in some cases,
replacing Americans.
Other requirements added since 1970 are more difficult to character
ize. For example, due to the way state eligibility criteria were struc
tured, it was possible for an individual with only one separation from
work to exhaust the first benefit year and to later establish a second
benefit period. Congress amended FUTA to require that UI could not
be paid in a second benefit year unless the claimant had worked since
the beginning of the first benefit year. Congress did not say how much
work was required. As a result, states could require as little as one hour
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of work. It is not clear why Congress felt this area had to be addressed
nor is it clear why the provision was left open to manipulation due to
the lack of a minimum standard. On the other hand, leaving the mini
mum standard to the states was entirely appropriate to the federal-state
system.
Purely political considerations seem to have been the rationale for
some requirements. As the result of a television show depicting indi
vidual abuses of the UI program, Congress amended federal law to
require states to deny benefits to certain athletes between sports sea
sons and to reduce UI due to receipt of pensions and other retirement
pay. Both of these provisions were, in effect, statutory assumptions of
unavailability. Since many retirees were in fact looking for work, the
original pension provision was later amended to apply only to pensions
100 percent financed by base-period employers. This creates a situa
tion where only a relatively few pension recipients are prohibited from
simultaneously collecting a pension and UI. Although the athlete pro
vision has been less controversial, it has served to deny UI to lowincome minor league athletes who are looking for work during the offseason. To the states, the pension and athlete provisions symbolize
inappropriate federal intervention since neither seems to address any
national concern.
Further requirements came about in an effort by Congress to save
money. For example, as part of the reconciliation process in 1980 and
1981, the EB program was amended. Whereas state eligibility condi
tions had previously applied to EB claims, federal requirements were
created concerning work search, suitable work, monetary qualifying
requirements, and requalifying following a disqualification. Federal
sharing was denied for any amount that was rounded up to the next
whole dollar and for the first week of EB unless the state had a noncompensable waiting week. Finally, the amendments changed the trig
ger levels in such a way that the program has not since served to pay
EB even during recessionary times. Under more recent amendments,
Congress attempted a legislative fix to this trigger problem by giving
the states the option of paying EB when the total unemployment rate in
a state reached a certain level.
The two most recent requirements are also attempts to help balance
the budget. Public Law (P.L.) 103-6 encourages the creation of a sys
tem of profiling all new claimants for regular UI to determine those
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claimants most likely to exhaust UI and to need reemployment ser
vices. In P.L. 103-152, Congress changed this to a mandate. The con
gressional history of this mandate indicates concern that individuals
were not fully utilizing available reemployment services. Full utiliza
tion would presumably reduce UI costs by accelerating reemployment.
However, from the perspective of the federal unified budget, the UI
costs savings attributable to profiling were actually used to pay some of
the costs of prolonging the Emergency Unemployment Compensation
program.
The second example of budgetary concerns resulting in a confor
mity requirement is found in P.L. 103-465. In this legislation, Congress
requires states to withhold federal income taxes from UI when the
claimant so elects. The purported reason was that taxpayers found it
burdensome to make quarterly estimated tax payments. While there
was merit to that argument, the immediate impetus was accelerated tax
collection, thereby helping to pay for costs of implementing the Gen
eral Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, which was generally unrelated to
the UI program.
This mixing of what is purportedly an expansive benefit program
with restrictive eligibility conditions, reduced federal sharing of benefit
costs, and high state triggers sends conflicting signals since the UI pro
gram works only when it pays benefits. States generally view federally
mandated restrictive eligibility provisions as being inappropriate to the
federal-state relationship and sometimes as being just plain wrong. For
example, some states waive work search requirements for regular ben
efits when there are no jobs during a recession. However, the EB work
search provision takes exactly the opposite approach by requiring
claimants to search for work that does not exist.
Another issue in the relationship is that, as the years have gone by,
Congress has grown more specific in legislating in most areas. This, of
course, has the result of limiting state discretion. One example of these
limitations is the self-employment program. As a rule, states may with
draw amounts from their unemployment funds only for payment to
unemployed individuals. This means that self-employed persons nor
mally will not collect UI. As a result, Congress amended federal law to
permit withdrawals to pay for self-employment assistance programs.
The authorizing provision in federal law lays down, by our count,
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eleven restrictions that states must follow. This is compared with only
twelve requirements for the entire original UI program!
In other cases, Congress has granted the U.S. Department of Labor
wide authority in implementing new requirements. For example, the
profiling legislation stipulates that states must "meet other require
ments" that the department determines to be appropriate. The Labor
Department issued extensive operational direction and required states
to submit detailed plans in order to obtain start-up funding. Similarly,
when Congress compelled states to give individuals the option of hav
ing federal income tax withheld, it required approval of a state plan by
the Labor Department. This time the department took a different
approach: any state following the department's broad draft legislative
language would automatically have its plan approved.
It should be noted that changes in federal law have not been limited
only to conformity and compliance matters (Right 1982, pp. 617-618).
Prior to 1970, there were sixteen changes to federal UI provisions.
Since then, there have been forty-four separate changes to UI provi
sions, including eighteen separate ones involving extending duration,
such as EB, Emergency Unemployment Compensation, Federal Sup
plemental Benefits, and Federal Supplemental Compensation.
Although these programs respond to the needs of the jobless during
periods of high national unemployment, they also add to the complex
ity of the system and often create confusion when they are extended or
expire. More important, the ability of states to deal with these changes
exemplifies the strength of the partnership in making frequent adjust
ments. This collaborative adaptability is essential to the operation of
the UI system in a dynamic economy.
We will now put aside the question of whether current federal
requirements are appropriate to the federal-state relationship or even
appropriate for the UI program itself. In this section, we will look at
these requirements to determine how provisions are administered and
which, in terms of the federal-state system, are more easily adminis
tered than others. For this purpose, we group federal law requirements
into three categories: "methods of administration," minimums, and
absolutes.
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Methods of Administration
The SSA requires state law to provide for "such methods of admin
istration ... as are found by the Secretary of Labor to be reasonably
calculated to insure full payment of unemployment compensation
when due" (42 U.S. Code § 503[a][l]). This provision is unique in that,
on its face, it requires nothing unless the U.S. Department of Labor
sees fit to create a requirement. Looking back on this 1935 provision in
1982, a longtime department employee concluded that it "is suffi
ciently broad to permit virtually any federal control over administra
tion that USDOL sees fit to impose" (Rubin 1983, p. 42). On the other
hand, if the Labor Department chooses not to determine a method of
administration, states need do nothing. It has been argued that the
department has exercised considerable restraint in applying this provi
sion, coming out with few major interpretations since about 1950. 9
The discretionary nature of this provision has made it the subject of
litigation for advocacy groups representing UI claimants. Indeed, it
seems that, notwithstanding the considerable federal legislation
enacted since 1970, this litigation has rechanneled the efforts of the
U.S. Department of Labor mainly into performance oversight. The
issues of litigation and performance oversight are sufficiently impor
tant that they will be treated in more detail later.
Minimum Requirements
Minimum requirements recognize the original spirit of the federalstate relationship: states are free to develop their own requirements
within a framework set by federal law. The degree of flexibility, of
course, varies with each minimum requirement. Examples are the pen
sion, alien, and approved training provisions. The U.S. Department of
Labor follows two general rules in interpreting and applying these minimums: (1) if the requirement impinges on areas otherwise left to the
states, it is construed as narrowly as possible while reasonably effectu
ating its purpose, and (2) any language that may be construed as leav
ing discretion to states is broadly construed, unless there are
compelling reasons for a narrow construction. 10 Of course, unless the
requirement is completely clear, there will be disagreement as to what
reasonably effectuates its purpose.
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Some minimum requirements create little or no tension in the fed
eral-state relationship. For example, the "double dip" provision gives
states such latitude that, once the provision is placed in state law, there
will likely be no conformity or compliance issues raised. Similarly, the
approved training provision allows the states to determine what train
ing will be approved. Again, once the state has an approved training
provision, few issues will be raised.
Other minimum federal requirements are not as easily administered.
To illustrate, the alien provision uses a very broad phrase—"perma
nently residing in the United States under color of law"—to describe
certain aliens. States are not required to have this phrase in their laws
and states that do have the provision can interpret it more restrictively
than does the U.S. Department of Labor. The problem with administer
ing the provision is that the phrase invites differing interpretations.
Based on federal court decisions in other programs such as Supple
mental Security Income, claimant advocacy groups have in many cases
successfully argued that aliens who have made themselves known to
the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) are permanently
residing in the United States under color of law. The Labor Department
and the INS, however, take the position that only aliens with written
acknowledgment from the INS meet this definition. Since state UI
agencies do not control state courts or advocacy groups, the Labor
Department almost always has an issue concerning the alien provision
pending with at least one state. 11
Absolute Requirements

The third and last category involves the absolute requirements.
These requirements are framed in such a way that they provide no lati
tude to the states or the U.S. Department of Labor in administering
them. Some absolute requirements are so clear that they create little
friction in the federal-state system. For example, if federal law sets a
numeric standard such as the 20 weeks of work requirement for EB,
then states simply incorporate that standard into their laws. Another
example involves the mandatory coverage and equal treatment require
ments for services performed for state and local governments and cer
tain nonprofit organizations. States either cover the services and
provide equal treatment, or they do not. Perhaps the most important
examples are the "immediate deposit" and "withdrawal" standards.
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The between and within terms denial of UI benefits for services per
formed for these governmental and nonprofit schools is, in part, an
absolute. UI may not be paid based on services performed by a teacher,
researcher, or administrator if the individual has a contract or reason
able assurance of performing services in the following period. States
must deny UI based on these services. Administration of this denial has
been a problem. The provision assumes that, given the same set of
facts, all states would reach the same conclusions. This, of course, sim
ply will not happen. Even two UI appeals referees from a given state
will not always reach the same conclusion given the identical set of
facts. As a result, differences between the U.S Department of Labor
and the states will inevitably arise. Although many times the issues are
significant, other times the problematic state interpretation concerns a
very minor point and affects very few individuals. The U.S. Depart
ment of Labor frequently does not know about situations that it should
address until states, due to timeliness considerations, have already
made a determination. In short, this ostensibly "absolute" requirement
is not entirely absolute. 12
Some absolute requirements are needed in the federal-state system.
For example, the deposit and withdrawal standards frame the nature of
the entire system and implement its trust fund aspect by assuring that
monies are used only for the payment of UI. The requirements relating
to interstate and combined-wage claims assure equal treatment of
claimants and cooperation between states. Others likely exist due to
political considerations. For example, without the between and within
terms denial, Congress might have been unable to extend coverage to
governmental entities and nonprofit organizations. Regardless of the
reason for its existence, when an absolute requirement assumes that
every state eligibility determination in a given area is consistent with
federal law, it places heavy burdens on both the U.S. Department of
Labor and the states. The Labor Department often cannot effectively
monitor such requirements; the monitoring that does occur is after the
fact, with the result that states must amend their laws or ignore their
own administrative decisions. Such requirements are better framed as
minimum requirements, which give states considerable latitude. For
example, the between and within terms denial could simply require
states to have a denial provision relating to school services. The
schools, the employees and the state agency could negotiate the appro-
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priate denial, perhaps using any draft legislative language provided by
the Labor Department. Similarly, the EB work search could mandate
that states require EB claimants to have a more stringent work search
than that stipulated for regular benefits; the details of this policy could
be left to the states.
This approach is not new. Haber and Murray (1966) discussed the
degree of strain new requirements might place on the federal-state rela
tionship:
If the standards are specific and conformity with them can be eas
ily verified, no difficulties in the federal-state relations should
arise. If the standards are subject to different interpretations or
compliance with them is difficult to verify, strained relations could
result (Haber and Murray 1966, p. 446).

The Federal Courts Move In
Timeliness
Starting with the U.S. Supreme Court's 1970 decision in the Java 13
case, the federal courts have played a major role in the federal-state
program. The Java decision addressed a provision of California law
that stopped payment of UI to otherwise eligible individuals when an
appeal was filed. In other words, the possibility of a reversal of an indi
vidual's eligibility was used as the basis for suspending payments. The
Court interpreted the "methods of administration" provision to require
payment at the time "when payments are first administratively allowed
as a result of a hearing of which both parties and are permitted to
present their respective positions." As a result of the Java case in effect
creating a new conformity requirement, forty-seven states had to
amend or reinterpret their laws. 14 Although Java had many implica
tions, the emphasis on timeliness is probably its primary legacy.
Although the U.S. Department of Labor had always stressed
promptness, it became an overwhelming concern following Java. Suits
concerning the timeliness of appeals and first payments were frequent
in the 1970s and suits regarding payment on continued claims continue
into the 1990s. The promptness of first level appeals was also an issue
in another case decided by the U.S. Supreme Court. While this case
was being litigated, the Labor Department issued regulations concern-
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ing the timeliness of appeals. Regulations concerning the timeliness of
first payments followed.
State Eligibility Criteria
Since the inception of the UI program, the U.S. Department of
Labor has, in the absence of a federal law requirement, left all eligibil
ity matters to the states. In the department's view, Java stands for the
limited proposition that a state law provision that does nothing but
delay payment of benefits is an administrative consideration inconsis
tent with federal law.
The U.S. Court of Appeals in the Seventh Circuit took a different
view in the Pennington case. 15 In Illinois, as in all states, employment
performed during the base period determines whether the individual
has sufficient attachment to the labor force to qualify for UI. As do
most states, Illinois uses a base period consisting of the first four of the
last five .completed calendar quarters. In most states, employment dur
ing the "lag" quarter between the end of the base period and the filing
of the claim is not used to establish a claim, even if its use would qual
ify the individual.
In the Pennington case, the court said that, since the base period was
founded on administrative considerations related to the method used by
the state of obtaining employment history, it was subject to the federal
"methods of administration" requirement. The court only-briefly
addressed the fact that the only reason the base period exists is for eli
gibility purposes and did not reconcile the tension between administra
tive and eligibility provisions. In any event, Pennington effectively
creates a new conformity requirement for the states in the Seventh Cir
cuit.
Court decisions such as Pennington cause sharp disruptions in state
UI programs when state laws, acceptable for sixty years, must be
amended. Since the U.S. Department of Labor is often in agreement
with state provisions, even to the extent of filing friend of the court
briefs, it should be no surprise when the department does not embrace
such decisions. As a result, sometimes federal law may be interpreted
and applied differently in different areas of the country. The Labor
Department is, however, required to treat all decisions handed down by
federal courts located in the District of Columbia, including the U.S.
Supreme Court, as conformity requirements.
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Oversight

The nature of federal oversight has changed considerably over the
years. In the early decades of the program, the federal partner approved
furniture acquisition, salary levels for administrators, and state organi
zational structure. Those days are long gone. States are free to spend
their UI grants as they see fit without direction from the U.S. Depart
ment of Labor. The only restriction is that the grant be necessary for
the proper and efficient administration of state UI law. The Department
of Labor now only very rarely advises a state that its grant may not be
spent for a specific UI activity.
To some extent, the changing nature of oversight is driven by shifts
in staffing patterns of the Labor Department. For fiscal year 1994, there
were only about 310 federal staff members nationwide compared to
over 40,000 state staff members. In the national office, there were
fewer than 100 individuals on staff whereas, about ten years earlier,
there were over 130. Despite this shrinkage, the U.S. Department of
Labor has had to pick up additional responsibilities whenever Congress
enacts new legislation. One might question whether staffing is suffi
ciently low to constrain the ability of the department to adequately per
form its activities.
In the 1970s, as a result of the action occurring in federal courts, the
main concern of the U.S. Department of Labor with the states shifted
to the performance of UI activities. Promotion of timeliness was insti
tutionalized in the late 1970s, when the department, in consultation
with the states, created a performance measurement system, called the
"Quality Appraisal," to the present day. 16 States not meeting designated
performance levels are required to submit corrective action plans as a
condition of receiving the following year's UI grant.
The Department of Labor believed that, if it did not establish an
oversight system emphasizing timeliness, the federal courts probably
would. Since there are many types of UI claims (intrastate, interstate,
UI for ex-military personnel, UI for ex-federal employees, and com
bined-wage), the department created performance levels for each. In
some cases, two different performance levels were created. For exam
ple, timeliness for first payments was measured 14 days following the
end of the first compensable week (21 days for states with no waiting
week) and then again after 35 days. The department also measured the
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timeliness of certain combined-wage functions, the handling of unem
ployment fund monies, and the determination of whether an employing
unit was an "employer" subject to state UI law.
The bulk of the performance levels emphasizes timeliness. Although
Java is one reason, the main factor is that timeliness is objective and
easy to assess, unlike quality and accuracy. Quality performance mea
sures exist for nonmonetary determinations and appeals and for some
tax functions.
The nature of the performance measures differs in another regard.
Numeric criteria for first payment promptness (for both intrastate and
interstate claims) and for the disposition of lower authority appeals are
found in regulations. 17 Meeting these criteria indicates that state pro
grams comply with federal law. Other measures do not have criteria in
regulations. They have "desired levels of achievement," (DLAs), which
by definition are merely "desired." Still other measures do not have any
numeric goal attached to them.
Has this measurement approach had an impact on the UI system? If
statistics alone are any indicator, the answer is yes. From the early to
mid-1970s first payments made within 14/21 days fluctuated around 80
percent of total first payments. When the timeliness criteria of the U.S.
Department of Labor became effective, there was a dramatic improve
ment in performance. There were, however, periods when timeliness
dropped below 70 percent. (See figure 13.1.) On April 1, 1979, the cur
rent criterion of 87 percent paid timely came into effect. Since then, the
national average has more often than not been above 87 percent. In
fact, the national average has not dipped below that level since early
1979. Only a small number of states have had chronic problems, as
shown in table 13.1.
Federal oversight is certainly one reason for this consistent perfor
mance. Another is that automation allows first payments to be made
more rapidly and allows the states to better handle the increases in UI
workloads occurring during recessions. (There is, however, a continued
need for more claimstakers when workload increases. This is generally
accommodated through overtime, moving workers from support to
frontline work, and hiring temporary employees.) Also, since the mid1980s, almost all states have converted to systems using employer
quarterly wage reports to determine eligibility. As a result, few claims
are delayed due to an employer's failure to respond.

Figure 13.1 Timeliness of First Payments, Impact of Standards Created by Secretary of Labor, 1971-1995
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Table 13.1 First Payment Timeliness, 1990-1994
______Number of states_________Number of years criterion met
All 5 years
34
4 of 5 years
7
3 of 5 years
8•
of 5 years
2
1
1 of 5 years
2
Never met criterion
1
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Labor, Unemployment Insurance Quality Appraisal
Results, published annually.

This level of sustained performance is not always matched in other
areas. For example, states are required to dispose of 60 percent of all
lower authority appeals within 30 days of the date of appeal. In the
early 1970s, the national average was only 20 percent. (See figure
13.2.) From calendar year 1977, two years after the 60 percent criterion
first took effect, through 1994, there was a decided and permanent rise
in the national average. Even so, this average has not consistently met
the 60 percent criterion. As shown in table 13.2, the failure to meet the
criterion is persistent for some states.
Table 13.2 Lower Authority Appeals Timeliness, 1990-1994
Number of states__________Number of years criterion met
All 5 years
18
4 of 5 years
7
3 of 5 years
9
2 of 5 years
6
1 of 5 years
4
____________9_________________Never met criterion.______
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Labor, Unemployment Insurance Quality Appraisal
Results, published annually.

On the other hand, for the 1994 performance year, thirty states
exceeded the 60 percent criterion by 10 percent or more. This suggests
that the criterion should be raised. Even for the 1992 performance year,

Figure 13.2 Promptness of Disposition of Lower Authority Appeals: Introduction of Standards Created by U.S.
Secretary of Labor, 1971-1995, U.S. Average, All States
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when recessionary effects resulted in most states not meeting the crite
rion, this number was seventeen.
Part of the problem in achieving the 60 percent criterion is that
appeals referees have very specialized skills. When vacancies exist or
increases in workload create the need for additional positions, most
new referees cannot immediately be shunted into hearings. Instead,
considerable training is necessary. Also, the appeals process itself is
not greatly amenable to automation. Even so, automation has assisted
in scheduling appeals, in easing research by making precedent deci
sions available, and by speeding the issuance of decisions once the
appeal is heard. While this performance measure results in a rapid con
clusion to the contested issue, it may mean that the parties are required
to participate in a hearing process even if they are not fully prepared. It
may also mean that the hearings are abbreviated in order to achieve a
prompt disposition of the next scheduled case.
Although there have been concerns in some states about the effect of
timeliness on accuracy of payment and on due process, others have
exceeded the federal performance levels without the perception that
accuracy and due process have been compromised. Some states seem
overwhelmed by workload changes; others seem better equipped to
handle such changes.
The preceding timeliness standards are almost without exception
viewed as being beneficial to the UI program. However, this is not the
case with all measures. According to a U.S. General Accounting Office
report (1989, p. 44), some of the performance levels "may be inappro
priate and provide misleading indications of service quality." The
report noted the "overemphasis on promptness of service" and said
"some DLAs measure inappropriate or misleading aspects of service
quality, wherein an improvement in the measure could actually be indi
cating a decline in service quality." The DLA specifically targeted in
the report was for field audit effectiveness. Meeting the DLA may
require states to divert staff that might otherwise be used to collect
delinquent tax payments. Another example is the DLA for recovery of
overpayments to claimants. Since the DLA measures the percentage of
overpayments recovered, states may meet the goal by concentrating on
collecting dollars instead of on detecting overpayments. As a result, the
state's performance will look good, even though relatively few over
payments are established.
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The Quality Appraisal never claimed to measure the entire system.
Consequently, it is not surprising that Burgess and Kingston found that
the approach did not constitute a comprehensive or valid way of mea
suring the total quality of the program (Burgess and Kingston 1987, p.
137). Not assessed are how long claimants must wait for service or
how far they must travel to file a claim. On the employer side, there are
no measurements involving the length of time needed to resolve a tax
dispute or to calculate new tax rates when the experience of a business
is transferred to a successor employer. Surveys are not widely used to
assure that both claimants and employers are being served in a profes
sional, consistent, efficient, and fair manner. Changes to the DLAs
have been relatively minor even though the U.S. Department of Labor
has always had the ability to unilaterally add or delete both perfor
mance measures and DLAs. Recently, however, work on updating the
benefit measurements found in the Quality Appraisal has been com
pleted. There is an ongoing effort to revise the measures related to the
handling of unemployment funds by the states, from the moment the
monies are received until they are used for the paying of UI.
In the 1980s, the U.S. Department of Labor developed a Quality
Control program, independent of its Quality Appraisal system. Origi
nally, Quality Control consisted of an exhaustive postaudit of payments
for purposes of determining accuracy. Every year, the Department of
Labor publishes the results, including an error rate for each state. Since
the procedures and laws differ in each state, it is difficult to draw any
comparisons between them, with the result that no performance level
has been established. Beginning in 1996, all states are also required to
operate a revenue Quality Control program to measure state UI func
tions related to collecting employer contributions. This program
replaces some of the revenue measures in the Quality Appraisal.
A workgroup made up of federal and state UI program managers has
developed a new approach to performance measurement. The goal of
this approach is to improve performance over the long run by empha
sizing program outcomes and customer service. All measures would
exist under a single measurement and oversight system called "UI Per
forms."
With the exception of the original benefit Quality Control program,
all of these measurement efforts have had heavy participation from the
states. State input helps the U.S. Department of Labor to determine
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whether a proposed measurement is necessary or useful as well as the
effort in implementing the measurement in each state. The UI Performs
workgroup operated on the assumption that its members would reach
consensus on each point. At the time of this writing, most of these
endeavors are in the implementation stage; we should soon be able to
look at the new oversight system and, a little later, to consider what
effect it has on state performance and federal-state relations.
Enforcing Federal Law Requirements

States often view the federal presence in the state legislative process
as a mixed blessing. Federal law requirements are often seen as intru
sive, and both state legislatures and state agencies resent having to
implement provisions without the opportunity to debate their merits.
The U.S. Department of Labor hears these objections each time Con
gress adds new federal requirements. However, the state agencies also
recognize that the federal presence has prevented many undesirable
state proposals from being enacted. As a result, the UI program is less
subject to passing state legislative whims than are other state programs,
such as workers' compensation.
Each year, the U.S. Department of Labor reviews hundreds of pro
posed state bills. Also reviewed are procedures, regulations and court
cases. In most instances, the bills do not create any problems with fed
eral law. In fact, many of the areas covered by the bills do not fall
under any federal requirement. The problems that do exist are gener
ally resolved prior to enactment. Certain such initiatives are enacted,
however, and the federal partner is required to take some steps to cor
rect the problem. Most issues that arise are resolved through negotia
tion rather than direct confrontation (Haber and Murray 1966, pp. 450451). At any given time, the Labor Department unit responsible for
conformity tracks between thirty and sixty issues.
Issues not resolved through negotiation result in conformity and
compliance hearings. An oral hearing before a U.S. Department of
Labor administrative law judge may be requested by the state(s). The
judge issues a recommended decision which the Secretary of Labor
may adopt, modify or reverse. If the Secretary determines that a state is
not in conformity/compliance, the state may appeal to the U.S. Court
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of Appeals in the circuit in which the state is located or with the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.
Since 1982, there have only been three conformity hearings involv
ing the regular UI program. 18 In the first proceeding, the Secretary
decided against the Department of Labor by finding that an appeals
practice used by the District of Columbia was consistent with federal
law. Specifically, the District of Columbia automatically ruled in favor
of the claimant when the employer failed to appear at an appellate
hearing involving a discharge for misconduct. In the second hearing,
the Secretary found that the use of hypothetical, rather than actual,
experience by the State of Washington for a certain group of employers
was inconsistent with federal law. In the third hearing, the Secretary
found that Minnesota law was inconsistent with federal law when it
allowed reduction of an individual's UI to offset amounts the individ
ual owed the unemployment fund in unpaid taxes due to his or her pre
vious status as an employer. The unfavorable decisions were not
appealed to the courts, and in neither case were administrative grants
or tax credits actually withheld.
In one instance, there was an actual withholding of administrative
grants where the state did not request a hearing. The Virgin Islands lost
several days worth of administrative grants due to a late payment of
interest on amounts borrowed from the federal government to pay UI.
The most recent experience in conformity/compliance hearings is
that clear issues, such as the late payment of interest by the Virgin
Islands, are resolved informally. Issues that go to hearing address areas
where states feel that the federal law does not clearly prohibit state
practice. In one of the preceding cases, the state was proven right. In
addition to giving states an opportunity to air their views, the hearing
process helps assure that the U.S. Department of Labor does not inter
pret federal law to create requirements not inherent in that law.
Concerning performance issues detected through its measurement
systems, such as timely payment of UI and timely disposition of
appeals, the U.S. Department of Labor has never initiated steps to
withhold certification. The reason most frequently offered is an unwill
ingness to hold back administrative grants since that would only
increase performance problems. (This seems somewhat at odds with
the department's regular reminders to states that withholding of grants/
tax credits will occur if a state law is inconsistent with federal law.)
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Another reason is that performance does not change overnight. The
Department of Labor, through its regional offices, tends to emphasize
incremental improvements in performance. Slightly enhanced perfor
mance or the taking of steps that should lead to better performance
indicates that eventually the problem may be resolved without initiat
ing withholding actions.
A mixed blessing for both the federal and state partners is created by
the potential loss of the FUTA tax credit or the total withholding of
administrative funds as an enforcement tools. On the one hand, even
when they feel their position is correct, states may yield due to their
own political situations, to avoid litigation, and to avoid any risk of los
ing credits or grants. On the other hand, for political, economic, and
programmatic reasons, the U.S. Department of Labor is reluctant to
initiate withholdings. As a result, tax credits have never been withheld,
and grants only rarely. Sometimes states believe that withholdings will
never occur and have become belligerent or have failed to respond to
the Labor Department's conformity efforts, even on obvious conflicts.
Although lesser enforcement measures have been suggested from time
to time, no such measures have been adopted. A lesser measure may
have no additional effect if it requires the same amount of Labor
Department time and effort to enforce as withholding grants/employer
tax credits. This is because providing notice for opportunity and hear
ing, documenting a case, and facing the prospect of appeals to the
courts require the department to undertake a major effort. However, if
lesser enforcement measures can be more easily carried out, states and
employers may resist their use.
The principal question in discussing the nature of conformity and
compliance is the following: Do they work for the betterment of the
system? In the main, the answer is "yes." Although one might question
the need for some of the federal requirements, or the lack of others, the
system has assured that UI monies are protected and that it fulfills its
fundamental purpose of providing income support for individuals
unemployed through no fault of their own. The hearing process assures
that the U.S. Department of Labor takes state concerns seriously. That
only three matters have gone to hearing since 1982 suggests that, more
often than not, the states and the Labor Department are in agreement
about how federal law should be applied to the states.
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Administrative Financing
The conformity and compliance requirements establish the frame
work for the UI system and, as a result, have perhaps been the primary
focus of the federal-state relationship during the first fifty years of the
program. However, state concerns about the adequacy of administra
tive funding have resulted in many skirmishes in the relationship and
now is perhaps the primary issue.
Since administrative funding affects both the quality and timeliness
of services, it is of great importance and has been an issue for states
since the inception of the program. The debate that occurred during the
1930s about the basic structure of the system also included questions
about how state programs should be funded. Since then, discussions
regarding funding problems have resulted in debates about whether the
UI program would operate better as a federalized system, whether it
should be "devolved" to state control, or whether the original structure
works best.
As noted in the first section, the FUTA tax pays for state administra
tive costs. The basic premise, shared by employers and states, is that
these revenues should pay the full costs of the UI program. The result
is that costs of administration are pooled and redistributed according to
state need. Some states receive more in administrative grants than their
employers paid in, while others receive less. Federal administrative
monies not appropriated by Congress are transferred to other federal
accounts in the Unemployment Trust Fund, primarily to the account
paying for the federal share of EB.
The first step in distributing money to the states is the appropriation
by Congress of monies from the Unemployment Trust Fund for admin
istrative purposes. The next step is the allocation of monies to the states
by the U.S. Department of Labor. We will discuss each separately and
then consider whether the system should be changed.
The Federal Appropriation

When the UI program was first created, the FUTA tax was deposited
into and UI administrative funds were paid from federal general reve
nues, apparently to address constitutional concerns. However, not all
FUTA revenues were appropriated, as Congress was using these
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receipts to help balance the federal budget. In 1952, a comparison of
the revenues generated from the FUTA tax with the administrative
appropriation showed a difference of between $500 million and $1.1
billion, depending upon which estimates were used. 19
In response, the Employment Security Administration Financing
Act (P.L. 83-567) of 1954 was passed. It provided for earmarking fed
eral unemployment taxes. Although the taxes continued to be deposited
into general revenues and appropriations were paid out of general reve
nues, any excess tax collections (the difference between revenues and
expenditures) would be credited to the Federal Unemployment Trust
Fund. The legislation established a loan fund of $200 million for states
and also provided that when that fund's ceiling was reached, the states
would share in the surplus collections. States could then use the funds
for the payment of UI, or a state legislature could under certain condi
tions appropriate them for administrative purposes. In 1960, Congress
required the deposit of the FUTA tax in a specific account in the Unem
ployment Trust Fund and provided for appropriations from this fund.
This ostensibly meant that UI appropriations would not be subject to
budget balancing or other fiscal policies.
This was in fact the case for several years. Then, in 1967, a Com
mission on Budget concepts, appointed by President Johnson, recom
mended a single unified budget that included the transactions of all
trust funds.20 As a result, in 1969 Congress enacted the Unified Budget
Act, which placed all federal trust funds, including the Unemployment
Trust Fund, within the federal budget process. UI appropriations
became subject to the budget-balancing preoccupation of Congress,
and state UI administrative appropriations suffered.
The Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985,
generally known as Gramm-Rudman-Hollings, established an auto
matic process to reduce federal deficits by "sequestering" funds from
all federal programs not specifically exempted. These actions resulted
in reductions in administrative funding for federal fiscal years 1986,
1987, 1989, and 1990. (Regular UI benefits were not affected because
they are state funds held in trust by the U.S. Treasury. The federal share
of EB was, however, reduced.) Even though the assets of the Unem
ployment Trust Fund are dedicated under federal law, these amounts
are classified as "discretionary" for federal budget purposes. This
means that UI grants can be used in reconciling the federal budget.
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Ironically, the administrative costs of other entitlement programs (e.g.,
medicaid and food stamps) are treated as "mandatory" even though
these costs are funded through general revenues. UI, with its dedicated
trust fund, would seem to be in a better position to claim mandatory
status.
Still another problem in the process was created when, in the 1980s,
Congress appropriated amounts based on inaccurate low estimates of
unemployment. As a result, insufficient funds were available to admin
ister the system, and Congress sometimes enacted a supplemental
appropriation. This approach has fortunately been eliminated by the
creation of an automatic funding provision (called "contingency
reserve" language) built into current appropriation bills.
In sum, the UI program has frequently received across-the-board
spending reductions without regard to program need. This has hap
pened even during periods of rising unemployment, when additional
administrative funds are normally provided to states to process the
increase in claims. Except for a brief period, the history of administra
tive financing has been a chapter in the history of balancing the federal
budget.
Allocation of the Appropriation to the States

Under the Social Security Act, the U.S. Department of Labor
(USDOL) provides, out of appropriated funds, amounts "necessary for
the proper and efficient administration" of state UI law. 21 The state
allocations are to be based on an estimate of the cost of proper and effi
cient administration using: (1) the state population, (2) an estimate of
the number of persons covered by the state law, and (3) other factors
that the Secretary of Labor considers relevant.
Initially, state UI programs were funded using a "line item" budget
justification for each staff person and piece of equipment needed. By
1941, budgeting was accomplished by estimating the workload and
functions necessary to support that workload (Haber and Murray 1966,
p. 402). The state allocations were made on the basis of a "work load
time factor" system that required work measurement studies for rou
tine activities such as processing tax returns, and national averaging for
nonstandard activities such as benefit appeals. By 1963, the allocation
process had evolved into "position allocations based on functional
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areas." In the first twenty-five years of the program, the determination
of administrative resources involved an inexact method that used his
toric funding experience to establish the annual administrative grant
for each state (Haber and Murray 1966, pp. 402-403).
A new system developed in the 1970s, called the Cost Model, mea
sured the amount of time required to complete various units of work.
The Cost Model used 700 different activity codes and seventeen sepa
rate workload measurements. Each state was allocated a specific
amount of time to complete a certain activity. For example, a given
state might be alloted five minutes to process each continued claim.
These "minutes per unit" (MPUs) would be multiplied by the antici
pated workload and ultimately converted to a certain number of staffyear positions based on the annual number of hours worked in each
state. Each state would be assigned a different time factor based on the
actual time necessary to complete the workload item. The Cost Model
program was designed to be updated every three years so that state effi
ciencies and changes in the law could be factored into the time alloca
tions. However, in 1984, the restudies were discontinued because of
their cost and because of questions as to whether the MPUs derived
from the studies were being used to inflate costs.
Perhaps the most basic criticism of the Cost Model was the lack of
incentives for states to improve operations. That is, if a state were to
implement new procedures that resulted in increased administrative
efficiencies and, consequently, lower program costs, the state grant
would be reduced by the amount of savings. In the late 1980s, changes
were made by the U.S. Department of Labor, giving states more bot
tom line authority over determinations of spending of administrative
resources. These actions shifted more responsibility for controlling
costs to the states and also signaled that future state allocations would
focus more on workload changes rather than on the actual costs of pro
cessing the workload.
Even so, more than twenty years after the initial application of the
model, states continue to be primarily compensated for their adminis
trative costs on the basis of Cost Model MPUs. These MPUs may,
however, be prorated downward by the U.S. Department of Labor to
balance the workload with the congressional appropriation. The MPUs
in use in the mid-1990s are based on the studies completed more than
ten years earlier, with the result that the MPUs do not bear a strong
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relationship to current state administrative costs. However, states now
have "bottom-line authority" to use their administrative grants. For
example, where once amounts received for initial claims had to be used
for initial claims, they can now be used for any UI task, including
appeals and tax functions. This method of allocation, therefore, bears
less relationship to actual program costs but gives states more flexibil
ity to initiate their own costs savings.
State Treatment of Federal Administrative Grants

Employers pay the FUTA tax primarily to support the administrative
costs of UI and the employment service and to obtain labor market
information at the national, regional, and state levels. Congress appro
priates administrative funds annually, and those resources are allocated
to states by the U.S. Department of Labor. However, there are two
additional steps in the process before the administrative grants are
actually spent on direct employer and claimant services. These activi
ties bring a variety of "state partners" into the process of deciding state
priorities and methods of determining service delivery.
In most states, the legislatures must also appropriate the federal
administrative grants before the state agency can spend the funds on
services. Although the legislatures generally approve the grants with
minimal review as part of legislative oversight activities, state agencies
are required to justify their expenditures in terms of service delivery
and performance. In theory, the federal grant can only be expended for
"proper and efficient administration"; however, in practice state agen
cies are subject to some political pressures involving the use of federal
grants.
When a state has satisfied all the federal and state requirements, it
can address the budgetary allocation to the local level. Employers may
want to know why the FUTA taxes that support administrative costs are
unavailable to provide more local services. Claimants (who often erro
neously believe that their taxes pay for both benefit and administrative
costs) want to know why local staff is unavailable to respond to con
cerns about the complexity of the UI system or to provide assistance
with problems. Finally, local agency personnel want to know why they
are impacted by decisions made at the federal level, which affect their
ability to provide the service that they believe is justified locally.
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The state allocation of administrative resources results in many diffi
cult choices between direct service delivery, central support and over
head expenditures. Sometimes states must manage declining
administrative resources by implementing new technologies. Although
these strategies make sense in the long run, there are initial capital
investment choices and resistance to changes in service delivery which
must be factored into the short-term decisions.
Should the Administrative Funding System be Changed?

Since states are unhappy with both the appropriation process and the
allocation methodology of the U.S. Department of Labor, some are
questioning, at least with regard to administrative financing, whether
the federal-state partnership is the best approach. Proposals to revise
the 100 percent federal funding concept were made as early as the
1940s, and today the original concept has been modified without any
federal law change, as many states rely on state resources to supple
ment their federal UI grants. Even more have been relying on state
resources to fund their employment service programs. For example, in
1980, eight states received supplemental state funds amounting to $1.1
million for administrative purposes (U.S. General Accounting Office
1989). Although some states obtained funds from general revenues or
new taxes, the most frequent source was state "penalty and interest"
funds consisting of amounts employers pay when they are delinquent
in making tax payments and reports. By 1987, thirty-three states were
using $54 million in state funds for UI or the employment service. A
survey of states showed that although the number of states receiving
state funds for administration was about the same in 1993 as it was in
1987, the aggregate funding exceeded $162 million. 22 At that level (and
there are some indications that the reported use of state funds is under
stated), states were providing approximately 5 percent of their admin
istrative resources. Since the distribution of funds bore little
resemblance to the taxes that employers in a given state paid or to the
actual costs of operating the program in that state, employers felt that
they were paying for administrative costs twice.
All of these factors indicated that the system was ripe for a change
in funding methods. A number of bills introduced in 1982, known as
the Bliley-Warner bills, would have allowed a state, subject to agree-
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ments with the Secretaries of Labor and Treasury, to collect FUTA
taxes and to retain a portion to fund the administrative costs of its UI
program. Although the bills never received a hearing, they were indica
tive of growing state discontent with the federal appropriation and allo
cation system.
In the 1986 Budget of the United States Government, the devolution
of administrative financing was discussed:
Working with the states, the Administration will develop and pro
pose legislation to devolve to the states the responsibility for
managing and financing their employment services and unem
ployment insurance services. The federal unemployment tax will
be reduced accordingly, freeing tax resources for the states . . .
This proposal would encourage efficiency in state administration
by increasing the flexibility with which states carry out their pro
grams (Executive Office of the President 1986, section 5, pp. 5-98
to 5-99).

This proposal was based on the theory that, although under the current
UI program states can legislate their own policy, federal appropriations
for administration may not meet state needs.
The discussions that developed, which involved the federal govern
ment and many states, brought out complaints that the existing appro
priation mechanism had two major deficiencies: underfunding
(insufficient resources) and cross-subsidies (inadequate return of
FUTA taxes to some states). Proponents argued that devolving the sys
tem would create self-insurance for purposes of administrative costs,
requiring states to do everything possible to reduce program costs. The
opponents of devolution argued that the national system would not sur
vive. Their concerns were that (1) states would effectively compete by
offering lower cost services, which would result in wide variations in
service delivery from state to state, and (2) states would be unable to
fund their programs through the full economic cycle, which was very
unpredictable in many states and which occurred more frequently in
some states than in others. In other words, the pooling of risk was
desirable.
In 1986, a proposal known as the Equity Act was developed by a
group of thirteen states, but was never introduced. This plan would
have resulted in the collection of federal UI tax by states and their
retention of 0.5 percent of their taxable payrolls to operate their pro-
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grams. Each state would be required to abide by a "maintenance of
effort" provision to ensure that state programs would conform to mini
mum federal requirements. The National Governors' Association also
developed a proposal that increased the overall federal appropriation
and guaranteed that a state would receive a minimum return of the
taxes that employers in that state pay to the federal government to
operate UI, the Employment Service and Labor Market Information
programs (Committee on Ways and Means 1988, pp. 324-328).
The theory behind allowing states to receive a guaranteed percent
age of state revenues is that FUTA revenues are really taxes paid by
employers in that state for administration of UI within the state. This
assumption divides the states into two groups: the "winner" states,
which currently receive more in administrative funds than employers in
that state pay in FUTA taxes for administrative costs, and the "loser"
states, which receive less. In theory, if the "loser" states were able to
retain a larger share of the FUTA taxes paid by employers in their state,
their administrative funding problems would be resolved.
This theory is not new and will likely never completely vanish. We
share the view of Haber and Murray, who addressed the issue of
administrative funds not being returned to the states where the employ
ers paid the FUTA taxes:
We are not impressed with the argument that federal unemploy
ment taxes are state money that should be returned to the state.
The federal unemployment tax, like all federal taxes, is a national
tax, to be used for national purposes. ...The pooling of the tax on a
national basis and allocation of funds on the basis of needs for
proper and efficient administration meets the state needs better
than if each state were given what their employers contributed.
Actually, most of the complaints as to allocation of state grants are
due to inadequacy in the total federal appropriations (Haber and
Murray 1966, p. 417).

Administrative funds are pooled and allocated to states on the basis
of need, using workload as the primary factor. If the congressional
appropriation were greater and if the Unemployment Trust Fund were
not part of the unified federal budget, the problems of states would per
haps be resolved.
Although the appropriation is the main problem, the method of allo
cating resources is also significant. Recognizing this, in 1991, Con-
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gress required the Secretary of Labor to undertake an "Administrative
Financing Initiative" (P.L. 102-164, Section 304). As a result, the U.S.
Department of Labor began discussing with states a proposal that
attempted to equalize state funding by using more objective criteria to
increase predictability and facilitate budget planning. By using its own
experience, combined with the application of national cost factors, a
state could be in a better position to develop multi-year budget plans.
On the negative side, the total funds appropriated would be approxi
mately the same, so about half the states would be worse off, while half
the states would be better off.
When discussing allocation, several issues arise. One is the lack of a
consistent relationship between the actual cost of administering state
programs and the amounts received. On the one hand, the SSA pro
vides that the Secretary of Labor allocate funds to states for "proper
and efficient administration" of state UI law. What is "proper and effi
cient" is debatable. While most states desire more administrative fund
ing, even they do not agree among themselves on what is proper and
efficient. If state A argues that its law is more expensive to administer,
then state B, looking out for its own appropriation, will respond that
state A is inefficient and should, therefore, receive a smaller allocation.
UI programs are far from homogeneous. Some are large, some small,
some are susceptible to high unemployment, and some are more insu
lated from economic downturns.
Because administrative funds are obtained from federal grants, state
legislatures and interest groups often do not focus on the costs of
administering new state provisions, but on the provisions themselves.
Employers and state legislators share the view that to the extent that
employers pay FUTA taxes to support the costs of program administra
tion, they should be able to structure state provisions as they wish, as
long as there is no conflict with federal law.
However, does this mean that a state should expect federal grants for
administration of its law regardless of complexity or cost? For exam
ple, if a state chooses to enact a very complex approach involving ben
efit disqualifications, is it reasonable to anticipate that the costs of
processing will be paid by federal grants regardless of the cost as com
pared with other states? Alternatively, should the U.S. Department of
Labor pay only "normal processing costs" for basic provisions, with
the states paying for more complex or cumbersome provisions? With
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state legislatures passing benefit and tax provisions that do not neces
sarily reflect administrative efficiency and static or declining federal
appropriations, state UI agencies are caught in the middle. Also caught
in the middle is the Department of Labor, which must still make deter
minations on how an appropriation is allocated. That a state chooses to
enact a costly new provision does not mean Congress will increase the
appropriation, nor does it mean that another state's allocation should
be reduced.
The administrative funding issue has an obvious and significant
impact on the federal-state relationship. States have noted that without
adequate administrative resources, they must struggle in their ability to
deliver services. To the extent that Congress does not appropriate suffi
cient funds for the system to operate, states have less discretionary
authority. As a result, states view the administrative funding issue as
increasing the power of the federal partner to influence program deliv
ery. Alternatively, if states are able to argue that adequate administra
tive resources must be granted to support provisions enacted at the
state level, irrespective of their cost-effectiveness, then the balance
shifts towards the states. Until the Unemployment Trust Fund is
removed from the federal Unified Budget, Congress will continue to
limit expenditures, even though employers will continue to pay taxes
dedicated to a specific use and even though the program suffers in
states with inadequate funding.

Federal-State Interaction: Fund Solvency
Conformity issues define the basic structure of the federal-state UI
program, and the administrative financing provisions make the
resources available to deliver the services. This section will review the
involvement and interaction of the federal-state partnership in address
ing and settling the problems of state Unemployment Trust Fund insol
vency. The U.S. Department of Labor provides oversight, and financial
and program support. States have the responsibility and authority
through their legislatures to decide benefit and tax levels and to provide
direct services to both employers and claimants consistent with the
basic objectives of the program.
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Before the 1970s, insolvency was not a recurring problem, and fund
reserves were generally adequate, with only a handful of states borrow
ing. However, the severe recession in the mid-1970s required twentyfive states to secure loans from the federal partner in order to continue
to pay state unemployment benefits. (Although some of this loan
money came from a loan account in the Unemployment Trust Fund, the
federal partner was also required to borrow from general revenues.) At
the end of 1982, twenty-three states still had outstanding loans
amounting to $10.6 billion. During that eight-year period, state insol
vency became a significant problem that influenced the direction of the
program (Rubin 1983, pp. 240-241). This problem also exemplifies
how Congress, the U.S. Department of Labor, state legislatures, and
state UI agencies address and resolve new challenges on a collabora
tive basis as the issues arise.
In the early 1980s, the magnitude of the loans, which in a few states
exceeded $1 billion, and the condition of the national economy neces
sitated congressional action. At first, Congress responded with the
elimination of most interest-free loans by imposing interest charges on
new borrowing. However, Congress later adopted less restrictive terms
for loan repayment if certain states made changes to improve their sol
vency. These incentives to reduce federal loans influenced state legisla
tive changes to lower benefit costs and to increase state taxes, as a
condition of getting the relief on debt repayment and interest charges.
Efforts to eliminate insolvency sometimes resulted in more stringent
state qualifying requirements for benefits, lower wage replacement
percentages, and freezes in benefit increases. These efforts to restore
solvency also contributed to the declining percentage of persons
receiving benefits as compared to the total number of unemployed
(U.S. General Accounting Office 1993, p. 4). 23 Clearly, the magnitude
of the insolvency problem mandated that states initiate major changes
in the benefit financing schemes in order to repay prior loans, pay cur
rent benefit obligations, and begin accumulating some cash reserves as
a buffer against future downturns.
A report by the House Ways and Means Committee (1989, p. 296)
noted that funding for state benefits had significantly improved since
the recession in 1981-1982. This was partly due to long periods of eco
nomic growth and partly due to federal incentives for states to improve
their fund balances. However, the report indicated that there will be
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trouble maintaining solvency for state funds in the future. One example
of the basis for that concern is the way states respond to wage growth,
that is, by increasing benefits without correspondingly raising the tax
able wage base. Another sign, the comparatively low reserve levels that
states are maintaining in their funds, shows the increased probability of
future borrowing. See chapter 9 for a more complete discussion of this
phenomenon.
One central issue in the federal-state partnership is the degree of
responsibility of the federal partner in maintaining state solvency. Con
gress could regulate state balances in one of three ways. First, states
could be compelled to maintain certain reserves. However, there would
be considerable difficulty in establishing a single standard that would
minimize borrowing and reflect efficient measurements for all state sit
uations. For example, the ability of a state to maintain a solvent fund
cannot be defined in terms of reserve levels only. Consideration must
also be given to the responsiveness of the tax system to increased bene
fit payments, the potential to recover the benefits paid, the nature of the
economy, and the ability to build reserves before the next recession
causes a new drain on the fund. Even if it were possible to develop rea
sonable reserve standards, some would advocate that the standards
themselves would compromise the ability of states to control their own
system.
Secondly, Congress can change the taxable wage base to encourage
all states to adjust a powerful component of the state experience-rating
systems. The problem with increasing the taxable wage base is that it
also forces uniformity among states, which runs contrary to the origi
nal intent to make states accountable for their own tax provisions and
schedules. Efforts to increase the federal taxable wage base can impact
the balance within the state experience-rating systems by changing the
share of UI costs borne by low-wage-paying employers (who have
most of their payrolls taxed) relative to that of high-wage employers.
As a third possibility, Congress could adopt a method of benefit
financing that addresses economic situations that are clearly beyond
the ability of a state to fund. For example, when national recessions
have a prolonged impact on certain regions of the country, it is reason
able to support a catastrophic insurance program. These national insur
ance proposals have been considered in the past under the names of
"reinsurance" or "cost-equalization." The difference in those philoso-
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phies involves whether the individual experience of the state is the trig
gering mechanism or whether some absolute level of unemployment
determines eligibility. One problem with these proposals is that they
result in a redistribution of federal taxes that would cause some states
to qualify, while others would not. As a result, discussions break down
for the same reasons that certain states object to the administrative
funding idea of devolution.
Since states have the responsibility to decide on both tax and benefit
provisions for their citizens, it is logical that the primary responsibility
for benefit financing should rest with the states. The problem of state
benefit financing raises three issues in the federal-state relationship:
• First, states must insure their own unemployment risks. However,
to a large extent, unemployment is beyond the ability of the state to
control.
• Second, states can determine their own tax and benefit levels based
on local needs. On the other hand, confrontations will develop
between local business and labor groups as businesses try to lower
UI tax costs while organized labor struggles to maintain benefit
levels that adequately replace wages.
• Third, if state funds become insolvent, monies can be borrowed
from the Federal Unemployment Account which in turn is funded
through FUTA revenues. However, if states rely too heavily on the
federal loans, the interest on the loans becomes a general obliga
tion of the state. Although the prospect of finance charges on out
standing loans gives states the option to either maintain solvency
or to face the consequences by paying interest, requiring such pay
ments in the midst of an economic downturn can be viewed as an
additional tax due to high levels of unemployment.
Who then bears the primary burden for fund solvency? The answer
is that, as with other provisions, there must be a shared responsibility.
State decision making must balance benefit levels and eligibility crite
ria for the regular UI program with the degree of taxation and experi
ence rating that a state accepts and with its overall solvency
philosophy. Meanwhile, the federal partner needs to continue to bear a
portion of the burden for extended benefits or other continuations of
benefits. The responsibility of the U.S. Department of Labor would
include guidance, training of state staff, and the development of sol-
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vency measurements that are more comprehensive than those currently
available. With the establishment of interest on federal loans to states,
Congress has required states to be more responsible in maintaining sol
vency. Although the incentive approach used in the early 1980s to
encourage states to repay their loans and to accumulate necessary
reserves worked in restoring state solvency, Congress, the Labor
Department, and the states must exercise care to ensure that the basic
program objectives are not compromised for the sake of solvency con
cerns.

Summary
The UI program has the advantage of being self-financing and of
being based on a workload-driven formula. As a result, it has survived
during periods when the lack of program funding in other areas has
resulted in extreme reduction or outright elimination of services. It has
a proven record of responding to social and economic need by provid
ing temporary wage replacement for those who have lost their jobs
through no fault of their own. By means of mutual cooperation at the
federal and state levels, the system has survived many challenges: a
series of regional recessions, which tested the ability of states to
finance benefit costs; recurring budget reductions unrelated to either
program needs or to the dedicated revenues paid; criticisms of benefit
payments to some groups of workers (such as those receiving retire
ment pay); and state delivery systems that are sluggish or that pay ben
efits to ineligible claimants. In 1995, debates raged in Congress over
whether programs such as Aid to Families with Dependent Children or
food stamps should be substantially modified or entirely replaced.
Meanwhile, congressional discussions of UI were close to nonexistent.
(Although it should be noted that, in 1996, the governor of Virginia
presented a devolution plan to the National Governors' Association,
and a congressional hearing on devolution and a variety of other issues
occurred in mid-1997.) Even if it has not been an outright success in
every regard, neither can the UI program and the federal-state system
be considered as having failed.
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Some of the disagreements that existed when the program was
established in the 1930s continue to be discussed. The degree of fed
eral control, the extent of state flexibility, and issues concerning admin
istrative funding are still debated. Almost every state cites shortages of
administrative dollars as a reason for closing local offices. The lack of
benefit standards raises questions about the national equity of the pro
gram. It has been criticized for inaccurate and delayed benefit pay
ments and for failure to collect taxes from delinquent employers. There
is a considerable duplication of effort. For example, UI computer sys
tems differ between states; sometimes this results in inefficient pro
gramming and in systems that have been frequently modified but never
redesigned to function well. 24
The system is administratively complex and difficult to explain to
claimants, employers, and the general public. It is also debatable
whether the federal partner has exerted too much or too little influence
over states or whether the federal partner has abdicated its responsibil
ity to ensure that states are administering their laws consistent with
federal requirements.
Most of the original architects of the program, both in Washington,
D.C., and in the states, are now gone. Millions of individual recipients
of unemployment benefits do not know about the nature of the federalstate system. Although UI is a major concern to employers, labor
unions, and legal aid groups, there is no specific "UI lobby" for all
individuals who might become unemployed. As a result, the UI pro
gram does not always seem focused nor does it receive the political or
moral support that it once did. Compared to other programs, such as
social security, medicare, and medicaid, it is infrequently in the public
eye.
State UI and employment service agencies have responded to this
situation by continuing to support an organization that, since 1937, has
acted as an institutional memory, serves as a historical bridge, and
strives to maintain the balance between the state and federal partners.
The Interstate Conference of Employment Security Agencies (ICESA)
acts as the advocate for states to Congress and the U.S. Department of
Labor and has performed an essential role in preserving the federalstate partnership. On an ongoing basis, ICESA facilitates networking
and the exchange of information between all fifty states, the District of
Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands. ICESA provides an
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essential link between the federal and state partners in assisting the
development of UI policy and in acting as a liaison between the states,
the Labor Department, and Congress. Although ICESA is a positive
force, it should be noted that ICESA is not a lobbyist organization.
ICESA is not chartered to advocate the interests of either employers or
claimants.
The federal partner's response has been less apparent. Into the
1950s, it was not unusual to find the Secretary of Labor actively
involved in UI program decisions. Today, this is uncommon. The fed
eral UI service resides in the Employment and Training Administration
(and previously in the Manpower Development Administration), which
mainly focuses on job training programs. (This aspect is mirrored at
the state level, as UI agencies are combined with other agencies having
distinctly different missions.) Decisions by the U.S. Department of
Labor concerning the UI program are often made by individuals rela
tively inexperienced with UI and with greater interest in other pro
grams. Meanwhile, congressional UI determinations are frequently
made on the basis of budget balancing and politics, and not on what
makes program sense.
In spite of those concerns, the system continues to pay benefits each
year while maintaining generally solvent funds for the state. There are
differing philosophies that result in varying laws and procedures, and
there are points of contention with the U.S. Department of Labor, but
the existing infrastructure is well-positioned to provide service to
employers and claimants in the future. The system will function best if
there is a continuing dialogue between the federal and state partners
that fully acknowledges the fundamental mission of the UI system.
Both partners will be better able to develop innovative approaches to
service delivery by incorporating the efficiencies of data processing
systems and other developing technologies and by taking human ecol
ogy into account. It is vitally important that states focus on eliminating
all barriers to getting UI payments to those who are qualified.
No doubt the system will meet a variety of new challenges in the
future. Its strength and its ability to respond to such challenges, are in
the dialogue and interaction that occur between the federal and state
partners. We hope the federal-state partnership will find ways to
resolve its current problems. An individual in need of income support
depends on the program and on its fulfillment of the vision established
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by its original architects—that there be a system that provides tempo
rary income support to those who lose their jobs through no fault of
their own.
NOTES
The authors would like to acknowledge and thank Dr. Joseph Might of the U.S. Department of
Labor for his contribution to this chapter
1. For purposes of this chapter, the terms "state" or "states" refer to the fifty states, the District
of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands.
2. Haber and Murray (1966) provide a complete description of the discussions in their chap
ters 6, 7, and 20
3. See Might (1982, p. 616)
4. Failure by a state to cover FUTA-taxable services means that employers in that state could
not claim the FUTA credit on those services. As a result, most states currently have "recapture"
provisions, which extend coverage to services defined in federal law, to avoid employers having to
pay additional FUTA taxes.
5 A complete list of federal law requirements and the year in which they were first added may
be found in the appendix.
6 The legislative history indicates that UI is only to be paid to individuals "who cannot find
other work (Senate Reports No. 628, 74th Congress, 1st Sess., 1935, 11 )
7. The U.S. Department of Labor has, however, encouraged states to change their laws in par
ticular ways. For example, in 1962, it issued a book entitled Unemployment Insurance Legislative
Policy Recommendations for State Legislation \
8 This requirement did not take its final form until 1976.
9. Hildebrand (1995, 1996) discusses this and other aspects of how the U S Department of
labor applies federal law
10. Hildebrand (1995 and 1996) states this thesis and provides a more thorough explanation of
how the U.S. Department of Labor applies federal laws
11. A more basic issue is whether the "permanently residing in the United States under color
of law test" is appropriate for the UI program Congress established this test for several programs,
including Supplemental Secunty Income, Aid to Families with Dependent Children, and medicaid That the UI program is uniquely employment based is lost in this definition.
12 As it has learned about factual situations not covered by the original between and within
terms denial, Congress has often amended the denial with the consequence that the statute is
clumsily written and sometimes leads to unexpected results In the case of "nonprofessional" ser
vices—that is, those services not performed by a teacher, researcher, or administrator—Congress
seems completely at sea At first, denials for those services were optional on the part of the states,
than they became mandatory; currently, they are again optional Now that the provisions are once
more optional, states have considerable latitude in implementing them, as the U.S. Department of
Labor views them as the outer limit of what is permissible. States did not have this latitude when
the provisions were mandatory.

13. Java v California Department of Human Resources Development, 402 U.S 121 (1971).
14. Java also stood for the proposition that, even though federal UI law does not purport to
require anything of the states since it is an incentive-based system, the federal courts will still find
jurisdiction.
15. Pennmgton v. Didnckson, 22F3d 1376 (1994), cert denied, 115 U.S. 613 (1994).
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16. The Advisory Council on Unemployment Compensation (1996) discusses these oversight
programs in chapter 6 of its January 6, 1996 report
17. 20 C FR , parts 640 and 650
18. Rubin (1983, pp. 171-214) discusses the major conformity hearings held prior to 1982.
19. Haber and Murray (1966, p. 404)
20. See Blaustem (1993, p. 216).
21 Section 302(a), SSA, 42 U S.C 502(a).
22. Interstate Conference of Employment Security Agencies (ICESA) Employment Security
Funding Survey 1991-1993. Prepared by the ICESA Board of Directors.
23 The General Accounting Office analysis concluded that state concerns about declining or
insolvent trust funds resulted in state changes making it more difficult for claimants to qualify for
benefits.
24 This problem is not unique to the UI system According to the U S. General Accounting
Office (1995, p. 17), federal administrative funding to a variety of means-tested programs encour
ages state automation, but no innovation.

Appendix to Chapter 13
Federal Law Requirements
Approval for Tax Credits
Sections 3303 and 3304 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (also know
as FUTA) contain the minimum federal requirements that states must meet for
employers to obtain the normal and additional tax credits. The year the require
ment was first added to federal law is in parentheses.
• Compensation is paid through public employment offices or other
approved agencies (1935).
• No compensation is paid until two years after the first period with respect
to which state contributions are payable (1935).
• All of the funds collected under the state program are deposited in the
federal Unemployment Trust Fund (UTF). Title IX of the Social Security
Act prescribes the distribution of the tax among the various accounts of
the UTF (1935).
• All of the money withdrawn from the UTF is used to pay unemployment
compensation, to refund amounts erroneously paid into the fund, or for
other specified activities (1935).
• Compensation is not denied to anyone who refuses to accept work
because the job is vacant as the direct result of a labor dispute, or because
the wages, hours, or conditions of work are substandard, or if, as a condi
tion of employment, the individual would have to join a company union
or resign from or refrain from joining any bona fide labor organization
(1935).
• Compensation is paid to employees of state and local governments; there
are required limitations on benefit entitlement during vacation periods for
certain employees in education (1935).
• Compensation is paid to employees of FUTA tax exempt nonprofit orga
nizations, including schools and colleges that employ four or more work
ers in each of 20 weeks in the calendar year (1970).
• State and local governments and nonprofit organizations may elect to pay
regular employer contributions or to finance benefit costs by the reim
bursement method (1970).
• Compensation is not payable m two successive benefit years to an indi
vidual who has not worked after the beginning of the first benefit year
(1970).
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Compensation is not denied to anyone solely because the individual is
taking part in an approved training program (1970).
Compensation is not denied or reduced because an individual's claim for
benefits was filed in another state or Canada (1970).
The state participates in arrangements for combining wages earned in
more than one state for eligibility and benefit purposes (1970).
Compensation is not denied by reason of cancellation of wage credits or
total benefit rights for any cause other than discharge for work-connected
misconduct, fraud, or receipt of disqualifying income (1970).
Extended compensation is payable under the provisions of the Extended
Unemployment Compensation Act of 1970 (extended benefit program).
No individual is denied compensation solely on the basis of pregnancy or
termination of pregnancy (1976).
Compensation is not payable to a professional athlete between seasons
who is under contract to resume employment when the new season begins
(1976).
Compensation is not payable based on services performed by an alien
unless the alien was (1) lawfully admitted for permanent residence, (2)
legally available to work in the United States, or (3) permanently residing
under color of law (1976).
The benefit amount of an individual is reduced by that portion of a pen
sion or other retirement income (including income from social security
and Railroad Retirement) funded by a base-period employer (1976).
Wage information in the agency files is made available, upon request and
on a reimbursable basis, to the agency administering transitional assis
tance to needy families (1977).
Wage and claim information is disclosed to the Secretary of Health and
Human Services for the National Directory of New Hires and for child
support and other purposes (1996).
Any interest required to be paid on advances is paid in a timely manner
and is not paid, directly or indirectly (by an equivalent tax reduction in
such state) from amounts in the trust fund of the state (1983).
Federal individual income tax is withheld if a claimant so requests
(1995);.
All the rights, privileges, or immunities conferred by state UI law exist
subject to the power of the state legislature to amend or repeal such law at
any time (1935).
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• Reduced tax rates for employers are permitted only on the basis of their
experience with respect to unemployment (1935).
Approval for Grants for Costs of Administration
Title III of the SSA provides for payments from the federal UTF to the states
to meet the necessary costs of administering the unemployment compensation
programs in the states and the major proportion of the cost (97 percent) of op
erating their public employment offices. Under this title, the grants are restrict
ed to those states that have a UI law approved under the FUTA and that have
been certified by the Secretary of Labor as providing the following provisions
(some are also included in the FUTA):
• methods of administration (including a state merit system) that will insure
full payment of unemployment compensation when due (1935);
• unemployment compensation payment through public employment
offices or through other approved agencies (1935);
• fair hearings for individuals whose claims for unemployment compensa
tion have been denied (1935);
• payment of all funds collected to the federal UTF (1935);
• that all of the money withdrawn from the state trust fund account will be
used either to pay unemployment compensation benefits, exclusive of
administrative expenses, to refund amounts erroneously paid into the
fund, or for other specified activities (1935);
• reports required by the Secretary of Labor (1935);
• information to federal agencies administering public works programs or
assistance through public employment (1935);
• limitation of expenditures to the purpose and amounts found necessary by
the Secretary of Labor for proper and efficient administration of the state
law (1939);
• repayment of any funds the Secretary of Labor determines were not spent
for unemployment compensation purposes or have exceeded the amounts
necessary for proper administration of the state unemployment compen
sation law (1939);
• that, as a condition of eligibility, any claimant referred to reemployment
services pursuant to the profiling system participate in such services
(1993);
• information to the Railroad Retirement Board as the board deems neces
sary (1938);
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reasonable cooperation with every agency of the U.S. charged with the
administration of any unemployment insurance law (1938);
the stipulation that any interest on advances be paid by the date on which
it is required to be paid and is not paid directly or indirectly (by an equiv
alent reduction in state unemployment taxes or otherwise) by such state
from amounts in its trust fund account (1983);
information to the Department of Agriculture and state food stamp agen
cies with respect to employee wages, UI benefits, home address, and job
offers (1980);
employee wage information to any state or local child support agency
(1980);
the requirement that a claimant disclose whether or not he/she owes child
support obligations; deductions from benefits shall be made for any such
child support obligations, and the amount of such deduction shall be paid
by the state UI agency to the appropriate child support agency (1981);
information for purposes of income and eligibility verification be
requested and exchanged in accordance with a state system meeting the
requirements of Title XI of the SSA; the UI wage record system may, but
need not, be the required state system (1984);
wage and claim information is disclosed to the Department of Health and
Human Services and the National Directory of New Hires for child sup
port enforcement and other purposes (1996);
for establishment and use of a system of profiling new claimants of regu
lar compensation to identify those likely to exhaust such compensation
and to need job search assistance (1993).
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Unemployment Compensation
in the Group of Seven Nations
An International Comparison
James R. Storey
Congressional Research Service
Jennifer A. Neisner
Congressional Research Service

In considering U.S. unemployment compensation (UC) policy
issues, it is useful to examine how other nations aid their jobless, since
UC systems vary greatly. This chapter compares UC among the Group
of Seven (G-7) nations: Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the
United Kingdom, and the United States. These seven nations are the
industrialized countries with the largest economies. They meet annu
ally to review their economic policies and to consider policy changes
that might be mutually beneficial.
The main body of this chapter describes major events in the devel
opment of each of the seven systems, analyzes how they differ along
several dimensions, and provides examples of how other national sys
tems differ from the G-7 programs. Appendixes to this chapter provide
a description of the UC system in each of the G-7 countries and a chro
nological chart of how each system developed. Program rules and ben
efit amounts discussed in this report are those that applied in 1993
unless otherwise indicated.
The term unemployment compensation is used in this chapter to
refer to a nation's overall system of unemployment benefits. Unem
ployment insurance (UI) is used in connection with the components of
these systems that base benefits on insured work histories. Unemploy
ment assistance (UA) is used in relation to programs that do not tie
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benefits explicitly to work history or that extend UI benefits to the
unemployed who meet a test of financial need.
The reader should be aware of three limitations of this chapter. First,
need-related aid for the unemployed is included in the discussion only
where it is offered as an integral part of a UC system. All seven nations
have need-related assistance programs outside their UC systems, but
they are not covered here. Second, employment services are discussed
only to the extent that they are explicitly a part of a UC system. Third,
special arrangements that may exist for unemployed public sector
workers are not discussed except to the degree that such arrangements
are integrated with provisions for compensation of jobless private sec
tor workers.
In comparing program rules across,nations, this chapter cannot
describe the full historical, economic, and political contexts that deter
mine international variations. However, the reader should keep in mind
that such factors as unionization, government relationships to indus
tries, labor force diversity and mobility, and economic trends are
important in understanding the significance of the program differences
that are highlighted.
Monetary figures used in the chapter usually are stated in the
national currency, with the U.S. dollar equivalent shown in parenthe
ses. 1 Dollar equivalents were calculated using the currency exchange
rates in effect for July 1993.2

Major Events in the Development
of Unemployment Compensation
By the end of the 19th century, unemployment protection schemes
were organized in several countries through trade unions, mutual bene
fit societies, and other worker associations. Under these plans, mem
bers contributed to funds from which benefits were provided. 3
Organizations in France, Germany, and the United Kingdom provided
unemployment benefits, which in some cases (notably France) were
subsidized by government contributions. The inadequacies of such
funds led to a recognition that broader measures would be needed to
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protect more of the populace and that national governments would
have to be involved.
In 1911, the United Kingdom became the first country to legislate a
national compulsory UI program with the passage of the National
Insurance Act. In 1919, Italy instituted a UI program covering most
manual workers. Although these programs were limited in coverage
and benefits, they were soon expanded. In the period following World
War I, several countries instituted unemployment programs, the major
ity of which were compulsory insurance schemes, notably the German
UI system in 1927. In addition, six countries employed subsidized vol
untary schemes.
The economic depression of the 1930s and the risk of high unem
ployment following World War II led several countries to develop com
prehensive social insurance programs for the unemployed. This
development included the improvement of existing schemes, as in Italy
and the United Kingdom, and the establishment of new programs, in
the United States with passage of the Social Security Act of 1935,
which contained a UI program, in Canada with enactment of the
Unemployment Insurance Act of 1940, and in Japan with enactment of
the Unemployment Insurance Law of 1947.
During the postwar period until the recessions of the early 1970s,
most countries modified their systems by extending coverage and
increasing benefit durations and rates. In the late 1960s and early
1970s, UC programs were overhauled in several countries in response
to changes in the objectives held for UC. An emphasis was placed on
integrating the income maintenance aspects of UC with a wider human
resources policy, one that emphasized job training and related provi
sions. In Germany, UI was integrated into the Employment Promotion
Act of 1969. Japan adopted the Employment Insurance Act in 1974.
This act, which replaced the Unemployment Insurance Act, empha
sized the concept of lifetime employment as opposed to temporary aid.
Canada passed a new Unemployment Insurance Act in 1971 that
included job training provisions as well as benefits in case of sickness,
maternity, and retirement. Likewise, the United Kingdom restructured
UI under the Social Security Act of 1975. The United States enacted a
trade adjustment assistance (TAA) program in 1962 and expanded it in
1974 to provide workers displaced by import competition with com
pensation and employment services. A 1970 law established a perma-
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nent extended benefits (EB) program to provide federal support for UI
benefit extensions in states with high unemployment rates.
The 1980s saw several countries revoke or cut back on program
reforms of the 1970s. The United Kingdom eliminated its earningsrelated benefit in 1982, returning to a flat-rate UI benefit. France
restored its dual UI-UA system in 1984 following disappointment with
a unified system. The United States tightened eligibility for EB and
TAA in 1981 and made all UI benefits taxable in 1986. In 1988, TAA
claimants were required to accept retraining unless specifically waived
by the government.
In the past few years, UC systems have not changed dramatically,
but there were substantial modifications in several G-7 countries. Ger
many, faced with large-scale unemployment since reunification,
offered special extended UI benefits in the former German Democratic
Republic (GDR) in 1990 for a temporary period. Canada passed Bill
C-21 in 1990, the most important provision of which ended govern
ment contributions to UI. The United States, confronted with increas
ing unemployment due to the 1990-1991 recession, enacted
Emergency Unemployment Compensation (EUC) in November 1991
and extended its life several times until it expired in April 1994. (This
marked the third time that Congress enacted temporary extended bene
fits since creation of the permanent EB program in 1970.) The U.S.
system was also changed to place more emphasis on early intervention
for claimants likely to experience long-term jobless spells, and states
were authorized to use an optional unemployment measure for activa
tion of EB to make it more available during downturns. TAA was
expanded to deal with potential dislocations from the North American
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Italy tightened the rules for use of its
special UI benefits by firms experiencing downsizing. France made
major changes to its UI benefit structure and tightened UA eligibility.

Comparison of Unemployment Programs in the G-7 Nations
The UC systems of the G-7 nations are detailed in appendix 14.A.
This section compares these seven systems using the same structure as
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the appendix: objectives, administration, financing, coverage, eligibil
ity, benefits, and employment services.
Objectives

The formally stated objectives of the seven systems are similar. All
are intended to provide income support to the jobless and to promote
stability of employment. However, the relative emphasis given to dif
ferent objectives varies substantially. The systems of Canada and Japan
specify reentry into employment as a main objective of UC. Italy and
Japan attempt to prevent unemployment through temporary wage sub
sidies of workers in depressed industries. France, Germany, and the
United Kingdom have designed their systems to aid workers experi
encing long-term unemployment. The U.S. system, through decentrali
zation, bases policy more on subnational decisions about labor market
issues.
The following sections describe variations among the seven sys
tems, including the
• degree of national control over the system;
• division of program funding among employees, employers, and
government;
• work history required for eligibility;
• relationship between benefit amounts and past wages;
• adjustment of benefit duration according to economic conditions;
• extension of benefit duration for hard-to-employ workers;
• coverage of new labor force entrants and reentrants;
• availability of means-tested benefits for the long-term jobless; and
• inclusion of job training activities in the UC system.
Administration

Each of the seven systems is supervised nationally by an executive
department or ministry of the national government. However, delega
tion of authority by the supervising organization varies substantially
across nations. Collection of program revenue is handled differently
from administration of benefit claims in six of the seven nations. Only
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Japan collects revenue through the same local agencies that administer
benefit payments.
The revenue earmarked for UI is collected by the national revenue
agency in Canada, Italy, and the United States, although most U.S. rev
enue is collected by state agencies and then deposited with the U.S.
Treasury. The United Kingdom relies on its Department of Social
Security for tax collection, and Japan on its Labor Ministry. In France,
financial management is the responsibility of employer associations
known by the acronym of ASSEDICs. The payroll tax in Germany is
collected through the Social Security tax collection system by sickness
funds serving specific localities, enterprises, or occupational groups.
Five of the G-7 countries administer claims through a local office
network under the direct management of the national agency responsi
ble for employment matters. The two exceptions are France and the
United States. Administration in France is the responsibility of
UNEDIC, an acronym for an employee organization. Municipalities
perform payment functions where there is no UNEDIC office. Local
administration in the United States is handled by the local office net
works of fifty-three distinct state employment security agencies, 4
which operate under the general guidance of the U.S. Department of
Labor.
Financing

Program financing methods vary among the G-7 nations in regard to
who pays, how much each party pays, and for what they pay. Funding
arrangements are summarized in table 14.1. All seven nations use a
payroll tax to fund UI benefits. While Japan pays one-fourth of UI ben
efits with general government funds, the other six countries rely on the
payroll tax exclusively (figure 14.1). Five of the seven apply the tax to
both employee and employer; Italy and the United States (except for
three states) do not tax employees. 5 Japan taxes all covered wages,
France and the United Kingdom apply their employer taxes to all
wages, and Italy taxes all wages above an exempt amount. The other
three nations have ceilings on taxable wages. The United States taxes
wages less than do the other six nations (figure 14.2A).
Four of the seven nations have fixed payroll tax rates, with the
employee rates ranging from 0.55 percent (Japan) to 3.25 percent (Ger-

Table 14.1 Funding Sources for UC Benefits in the G-7 Nations, 1993
Proportion of benefit cost paid from
Payroll tax on
Government
Employer
subsidy
Employee
Nation/program
Canada UI
France
UI
UA
Germany
UI
UA
Italy
Basic benefit
Special benefit
Wage supplement
Japan UI
United Kingdom
UI
UA
United States
UI
TAA

Level of tax on
Employer
Employee
Wage base3
Tax rate
Wage base3
Tax rate
($)
($)
(%)
30,178
4.2
30,178
3.0

42

58

0

42
0

58
0

0
100

2.97b
-

50
0

50
0

0
100

3.25
-

0
0
0
37.5

100
100
NA
37.5

0
0
NA
25

..
-_.
0 55h

NA
0

NA
0

0
100

2.0-9.0^
..

32,345k

0
100

0.0-0. 125m
-

0-23,200m

2'

98'

0

0

111,102

49,680C

All wages

4.18
-

All wages
-

3.25
-

49,680C
-

1.61-1.91 d
0.3-0.8f

e

1.92-2.28
0.551

e

All wages

4.6-10.4)-k
-

All wagesk
-

0.6-4.2"
-

e

7,000
23,900"
(continued)

8

Table 14.1 (continued)____________________________________________________
NOTE. NA indicates not available
a. Wage base figures were annualized and converted to U S dollars using July 1993 exchange rates
b Tax rate is 2.42 percent on first $25,270 of earnings,
c. The taxable wage ceiling is $36,570 in the former GDR.
d Lower rate applies to industrial managers and higher rate to other jobs,
e. Taxable wage base is wage in excess of $34 a day. No upper limit
f. Lower tax rate applies to industrial firms and higher rate to construction firms,
g. Tax rate is 1.9 percent for firms with fewer than 50 employees,
h Construction workers and seasonal workers pay 0.65 percent of wages.
i. Employers of seasonal and construction workers pay 0.65 percent Employers pay an additional 0.35 percent (0 45 percent for construction firms) to
fund employment services.
j. The first employee tax rate applies to the first $4,313 of annual earnings, and the second rate to additional earnings A range of rates is shown for employ
ers because ther ate is higher at higher wage levels
k. The United Kingdom payroll tax funds other social secunty programs in addition to UI. In 1992, UI benefits accounted for 4.1 percent of all benefit
costs financed by this tax
1 Employee share was estimated by the Congressional Research Service. It represents an upper bound on the actual employee share of UI financing
m Only three states tax employees. Rates range from 0 1 percent in Pennsylvania to 1.125 percent in New Jersey Taxable wages range from $8,000 in
Pennsylvania to $23,200 in Alaska.
n. Tax rates and taxable wages vary by state, and tax rates vary by firm in each state The rates shown are the lowest and highest average state rates. The
national average tax rate applied to taxable wages in covered employment was 2.3 percent state and 0.8 percent federal. If all covered wages had been tax
able, the national average rate would have been 0 9 percent. The taxable wage base for the median state was $8,500.
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many) and the employer rates from 0.55 percent (Japan) to 4.2 percent
(Canada). Of the systems with variable tax rates, the United Kingdom
rates vary with wage level. Tax rates in Italy are differentiated by
industry, job type, and firm size. The U.S. rates vary by state and by
firm within state. The latter variation reflects the efforts of states to
"experience-rate" program financing so that employers creating larger
unemployment costs pay more taxes. The other six nations do not vary
rates for experience. Japan applies a higher tax rate to seasonal and
construction jobs. The average state tax rate in the United States in
1993 was 2.3 percent, and the federal tax rate was 0.8 percent. Measur
ing state taxes as a percentage of all U.S. wages, the effective state tax
rate was 0.9 percent. Figure 14.2B compares nominal payroll tax rates.
Figure 14.1 Shares of UI Benefits Financed by Employer Taxes,
Employee Taxes, and General Government Funds, 1993
100%
80%-

60% -

40% -

20% -
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d Government Subsidy
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NOTE United Kingdom not shown because employee share could not be determined
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Figure 14.2A Taxable Wage Base for UI, 1993
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Figure 14.2B Nominal UI Payroll Tax Rates, 1993
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plement (19-2 2%) components of the Italian UI system
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Germany relies most heavily on employee taxes (covering 50 per
cent of UI benefit costs), with Canada and France (42 percent) next.
The least reliant on employee taxes are the United States (less than 2
percent) and Italy (0 percent).6
The non-UI parts of these seven UC systems are supported by gen
eral government revenue. The three nations with UA programs
(France, Germany, the United Kingdom) pay for UA entirely with gov
ernment funds, as does the United States for the TAA program that
extends benefits to workers dislocated by import competition. 7 Italy
has a wage supplement that is supported partly by government funds
and partly by the employer payroll tax. Canada stands alone among the
G-7 in its lack of any general government financing for its UC system.
The level of expenditure supported by these financial arrangements
is shown in figure 14.3 for each G-7 nation as a percentage of gross
domestic product (GDP) for selected fiscal years 1985 through 1993.
Three systems (those of Canada, France, and Germany) have consis
tently cost more than 1 percent of GDP, and the system of the United
Kingdom has returned to that level after a decline during the late
1980s. The other three systems are much smaller relative to the respec
tive national economies. The Japanese system is the smallest at 0.26
percent of GDP, which is only about three-fifths of the size of the U.S.
program (0.45 percent). The U.S. program has not exceeded 1 percent
since the recession year of 1975 (not shown).
Figure 14.4 shows this expenditure data adjusted for the level of
unemployment by dividing each GDP percentage by the corresponding
unemployment rate. The resultant statistic indicates that relative pro
gram cost has diverged since 1990. The German program is by far the
most expensive; the U.S. and Italian programs are the least expensive.
By this adjusted measure, the U.S. program is only one-fifth the size of
the German one. The U.S. program ranked either sixth or seventh
among the G-7 throughout the period shown.
Coverage

All seven systems provide broad coverage to wage and salary work
ers. Three UC systems (in France, Germany, and Japan) coordinate
coverage with national pension systems by excluding workers over
pensionable age. The U.S. program usually reduces UC benefits for
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Figure 14.3 Public Expenditures for UC as a Percentage of GDP
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Figure 14.4 Public Expenditures for UC as a Percentage of GDP per
Percentage Point of Unemployment
Percentage of GDP
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pension recipients. Three systems (in Canada, Germany, and Japan)
specifically exclude certain part-time workers based on a weekly
threshold for hours worked. Italy excludes managerial personnel from
basic UI eligibility.
Some systems have special arrangements for seasonal workers. Canada has particular rules for self-employed fishermen. France has certain rules for construction workers, the merchant marine, longshore
workers, and aviators. Germany excludes seasonal workers employed
less than 180 days in the past three years. Italy excludes seasonal workers. Japan excludes those working six months or less in a year and covers small firms in selected industries only on a voluntary basis. In the
United States, seasonal workers whose work spells fall below thresholds set by each state are excluded.
France and the United Kingdom provide coverage through UA programs for virtually all unemployed persons who do not qualify for UI.
Self-employed persons are generally not eligible foi UI, although the
State of California covers them on a voluntary basis. Workers on
reduced schedules may receive partial UI benefits in all seven countries. In the United States, this "short-time" compensation is only available in seventeen states, however.
Eligibility

Eligibility for UI depends on a person's having worked in covered
employment for some minimum time during a base period. The extent
of employment required varies widely, however. These requirements
are summarized for the G-7 programs in table 14.2.
The requirement in Italy is the strictest, amounting to half of the past
two years, 13 weeks of which must be continuous to receive full benefits. Japan requires work for half of the past year, but the base period
can be extended to up to four years for those out of the -workforce
because of illness, injury, or pregnancy. Germany has the longest base
period (three years) and requires covered work for at least 360 days
during that time. The Canadian requirement calls for work for at least
40 percent of a one-year base period, although this criterion is more
lenient in regions with high unemployment. The requirement in France
calls for covered work for one-fourth of the prior year.
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Table 14.2 Minimum Employment Needed in Covered Job for VI
Eligibility in the G-7 Nations, 1993

Nation
Canada
Low-unemployment regIOn
High-unemployment region
New entrant/reentrant
France
Germany
Seasonal workers
Other workers
Italy
BasIc benefits
SpeCial benefits

Minimum amount of covered
employment required
Reference period
Duration
Earning~
for required work
20 weeks
10 weeks
20 weeks
91 days or 520
hours

$116/week
$116/week

Pnor 52 weeks
Pnor 52 weeks

$116/week
None

Prior 52 weeks
Pnor 12 months

180 days
360 days

None
None

Prior 3 years
Prior 3 years

(1) 52 weeks,
and (2) 2 years
Same as above,
but 13 weeks
must be
continuous

None
None

(I) Pnor 2 years, and
(2) Any penod
Same as above

None

Past 48 months

None

Past 12 months

$4,147/ year
$2,073/ year

Pnor tax year
Prior tax year

$1,390/year

First 4 of last 5
quarters C

$30/weekd

Prior 52 weeks

Japan
Workers out of labor force
6 months
because of illness, inJury, or
pregnancy
Other workers
6 months
United Kingdom
None
Full benefits
None
Reduced benefits
UnIted States
b
UI
TAA

26 weeksd

a. Currency figures were converted to U S. dollars usmg July 1993 rates
b Nme states reqUIred covered employment for 15-20 weeks. Other states had no explicIt work
duratIOn reqUIrement The mmlmum earnmgs reqUIrement shown ($1,390) was the medIan for the
fifty-three state programs. The reqUIred mmImums ranged from $130 (HawaII) to $4,280 (Oklahoma).
c. In forty-eIght of the fifty-three state programs.
d. To be elIgIble for TAA, claImant must also meet state VI eligibIlIty reqUIrements
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Minimum work requirements in the United Kingdom and United
States are primarily earnings based and are relatively low. The United
Kingdom requires a year's earnings to exceed $4,147 for full benefits.
The rule in the United States varies by state, but the median state
requires only $1,390 in covered wages (equivalent to 41 days of fulltime work at the minimum wage) over four quarters to qualify for a
minimum benefit. However, nine states do have requirements for work
duration, ranging from 15 to 20 weeks in four quarters, and the majority of states require a minimum earnings amount in the worker's highest-paid quarter. Of the states with this latter stipulation, the median
state high-quarter earnings requirement is 61 percent of the earnings
required over four quarters.
Each of the G-7 nations has rules that disqualify claimants whose
unemployment results from voluntary quitting, misconduct, refusal of
a suitable job, involvement in a labor dispute, or failure to accept training. Those jobless because of labor disputes are generally disqualified
for the duration of the dispute. However, the length of disqualification
for other causes of unemployment varies among the seven programs.
Italy has a thirty-day disqualification for job quitters, those fired for
misconduct, and those who refuse jobs. Canada disqualifies individuals
for up to 12 weeks, as does Germany, but Canada disqualifies job quitters and those fired for misconduct indefinitely until they requalify
through subsequent jobs. In Japan, disqualifications last as long as
three months. France disqualifies job quitters for 3 months and denies
eligibility for misconduct or job offer refusals, although job quitters
may become eligible after 121 days of job search. Disqualifications for
voluntary quits and misconduct last for 26 weeks in the United Kingdom. The United States has the strictest rules on disqualification,
which are set by each state. For example, the disqualification for voluntary quitting is for the duration of the unemployment spell in fortyseven of the fifty-three state programs (figure 14.5).
Eligibility rules for UA in the three G-7 nations that have these programs are also tied to work history. France requires employment in at
least five of the past ten years but reduces this requirement by up to
three years for periods spent rearing children. the German program
requires at least 150 days of insured employment during the past year.
The United Kingdom has no specific work history stipulation. UA
claimants have to comply with work registration rules similar to those
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for UI claimants. UI exhaustees are eligible for UA in all three countries. A means test is used to limit UA eligibility to those in financial
need.
Figure 14.5 Maximum Disqualification Period for Voluntary Quits, 1993

ITA

GER

JPN
a

FRA

26

CAN

26

GBR

26 b

USA
(47 States)

26
0

5

10

15

20

25

30

weeks
NOTE· Chart shows disqualIficatIOn penods for an unemployment spell of 26
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a. ClaImant can become elIgIble after 121 days If work search reqUirement IS met.
b ClaImant can become elIgIble if Jobless spell lasts more than 26 weeks.

The proportion of unemployed workers assisted by the U.S. program in the mid-1980s was low relative to the proportions helped in
Canada, France, and Italy. The U.S. figure was similar to those for VI
in Germany and the United Kingdom, but the figures in those countries
were much higher with UA recipients counted. In 1985,34 percent of
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u.s. jobless workers received UI. Comparable statistics for five of the
other nations were as follows: Canada, 80 percent; France, 55 percent
(72 percent including UA recipients); Germany, 39 percent (68 percent
with UA recipients included); Italy, 60 percent (for 1981-1983); and
the United Kingdom, 32 percent (as of 1984), (90 percent with UA
recipients included).8 It should be noted that unemployment rates in
Canada, France, and the United Kingdom were 1.5 times the U.S. rate
in the mid-1980s. Higher unemployment usually means that a greater
proportion of the jobless qualify for UI since there are relatively more
job losers than job quitters during downturns.
Benefits

The method of calculating UI benefits is unique to each program.
The main factors taken into account by the benefit formulas are displayed in table 14.3. Of the seven programs, only the U.S. program
lacks a national benefit formula.
All of the G-7 programs except that of the United Kingdom relate
benefits to past wages. Germany replaces 63 percent of after-tax
wages; the other systems base benefits on gross pay. The formula in
Japan is the only one that provides a more generous rate of wage
replacement, the lower the wage leve1. 9 Canada, France, Japan, and the
United States limit benefits with monetary maximums, the maximums
in the United States being the lowest except for a few states. The wage
replacement rate in Japan of 80 percent at low wage levels is the highest rate, but the wage figure used in Japan excludes overtime pay and
bonuses, which account for nearly one- third of cash compensation in
Japan. UI benefits are subject to income taxes in all of the G-7 nations
except Germany and Japan.
Age is generally not used as a factor in computing UI benefits, but
Japan does pay lump-sum benefits to persons over 65, and the United
Kingdom has higher benefit levels for unemployed workers who are
over pensionable age. Benefits are more generous for workers with
dependents in Germany, the United Kingdom, and fourteen U.S. states.
The United Kingdom awards lump-sum "redundancy" benefits to longterm employees who have been dismissed. Italy uses a higher wage
replacement level for those dismissed by firms that are undergoing
planned workforce reductions or reorganizations. The U.S. system is

Table 14.3 Major Determinants of VI ~enefit Amounts in the G-7 Nations, 1993
Nation

Relationship of VI benefit formula
Agea
Work history8

Past wages

Regiona

Dependents

Canada

57% of average gross wage, None
max. of $313/week

None

None

None

France

57.4% of average gross
wage, min. of $22.34/day,
max. of $52 54/dayb

None

None

None

None

Germany

63% of average net wage

None

None

None

68% of average net
wage for claimant
with children

Italy
BaSIC benefit

20% of average wage

None

None

None

None

80% of average wage

None

None

None

Japan

80% of average gross wage
at low wage levels, 60% at
high wage levels, max. of
$85/day

Lump-sum benefit
for workers over 65

None

None
None

United Kmgdom

None: benefit IS $66/week

$83/week If over
pensIOn age, plus $50
for spouse and $16/
child

Lump-sum benefit None
for workers
dismissed after 104
weeks of continuous
employment

Special benefit

None

Additional $41/week
with dependents

(contmued)

Table 14.3 (continued)
Nation
Umted States

Relationship of VI benefit formula
Past wages
Agea
Work history3
Regiona
Dependents
50% of average gross wage None
None
Different
14 states had
in most states, max. of $133
formula in each dependents'
to $335/weekc
state
allowances, which
added up to $156/
week

NOTE' Currency figures were converted to U.S. dollars USing July 1993 exchange rates.
a. Benefit amounts naturally vary with age, work history, and reglOn Since these factors are often related to wage levels and, therefore, benefit amounts.
However, thIs table displays only the relationship of each factor to a program's benefitjormulas.
b Benefits In France are reduced 8 to 17 percent after the initial benefit penod and every four months thereafter
c The maXimum in the median state was $223 a week
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the only one without a national benefit formula, its UI benefits being
determined by fifty-three different state formulas that produce widely
varying benefit amounts.
Figure 14.6 compares weekly UI benefit amounts across the seven
nations for three hypothetical cases. For the United States, amounts are
shown for the states with the highest (Massachusetts) and lowest (Mississippi) benefit maximums. 10 Case 1 is a single worker age 25 who has
worked six months at an annual salary rate of $10,000. Case 2 is a 31year-old married worker with one child who has worked three years
and was earning $28,000 a year at the time of job loss. Case 3 is a married worker age 55 with two children who has worked twenty-five
years and was earning $50,000 a year.
Case 1 would be ineligible in Germany and Italy. In the other countries, the weekly benefit ranges from $48 (25 percent of the weekly
wage) in Massachusetts to $156 (81 percent of wages) in France. For
case 2, benefits vary more, exceeding $500 a week in Italy (100 percent
wage replacement) and $300 in Canada (57 percent wage replacement), France (57 percent), Germany (68 percent), Japan (65 percent),
and Massachusetts (59 percent), while amounting to only $165 (31
percent) in Mississippi and $107 (20 percent) in the United Kingdom.
The weekly benefit for case 3 is over $900 in Italy (100 percent wage
replacement), ranges around $600 in Japan (60 percent) and Germany
(68 percent), and falls between $300 and $500 in Canada (33 percent),
France (38 percent), and Massachusetts (49 percent). However, the
benefit is the same as for case 2 in Mississippi (17 percent) and the
United Kingdom (11 percent).
Maximum benefit durations also vary widely across the G-7 nations,
as shown in table 14.4. The first column shows the maximum duration
for full-time workers with substantial work histories. For such workers,
UI benefits generally last about half a year in Japan and the United
States, two-thirds of a year in Canada, a full year in Germany, Italy,
and the United Kingdom, and two-and-a-half years in France. However, maximum durations can vary considerably from these benchmark
figures in every country except the United Kingdom. Table 14.4 illustrates how four key factors (work history, age, unemployment rate, and
region) affect maximum benefit durations.
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Figure 14.6 VI Benefit Amounts for Three Hypothetical Cases, 1993
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Table 14.4 Determinants of Maximum VI Benefit Durations in the G-7 Nations, 1993

Nation

Maximum benefit duration
for full-time workers

Variation in maximum duration in relation to
Unemployment
Age
rate
Work history

Canada

35 weeks (worked all year)

17 weeks with 20
weeks of work in 1 yea

None

France
First penod

275 days

122 days if less than
426 days of work in last
2 years (214 days if 50
or older)

214 days if under 25;
457 days if 50 or
older; 610 days if 50
to 54 and worked at
least 821 days in last
3 years~ 822 days if
55 or older

637 days

334 days if worked less
than 426 days 10 last 2
years (425 days if 50 or
older); 91 days if
worked less than 243
days in last year; 0 days
if worked less than 192
days in last year

699 days if under 25; None
913 days if 50 or
older; 759 days if 50
to 54 and worked at
least 821 days in last
3 years; 1,003 days if
55 or older

Second penod

Region

Up to 50 weeks in Vanes for
regions with high regions with
unemployment
unemployment
over 6%
None

None

Extensions
granted by
employer
groups

(contInued)
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Table 14.4 (continued)
Variation in maximum duration in relation to
Nation

Germany

Italy
Basic benefit

Special benefit

Maximum benefit duration
for full-time workers

Age

Work history

Unemployment
rate

Region

52 weeks (worked at least
24 of last 36 months)

35 weeks with 16
months of work,
longer durations for
combinatIOn of age
and service (see next
column)

78 weeks for workers None
42 or older wIth 36
months of work; 95
weeks for workers
44 or older with 44
months of work; 113
weeks if 49 or older
wIthin 52 months of
work; 139 weeks if
54 or older WIth 64
months of work

None

180 days

90 days for
constructIOn workers,
less than 180 days for
some farm workers

None

None

None

12 months

None

24 months for
None
workers 40 to 49; 36
months if 50 or older

None

Japan

180 days (age 30-44 and
worked 5-9 years; under 30
and worked over 9 years;
45-54 and worked 1-4
years)

90 days for less than 1
year of work; 210-300
days for certain age and
service combinations;
90-day extension for
claimants awaiting
traimng

90 days if under 30
unless worked over
9 years; 210-300 days
for certam age and
servIce combmatIOns

90-day extension
if uinsured
unemployment
over 4%

90-day
extension m
remote areas
and for
industries in
recession

United Kingdom

52 weeks

None

None

None

None

UI

26 weeks (30 in 2 states)
(must have worked certain
amount m 42 states)

4-30 weeks for
mmimum work
required by state m 42
states a

None

39-46 weeks
when extended
benefits triggered
by high
unemployment in
a state

Noneb

TAA

52 weeks (mcludmg UI
duration)

78 weeks if in trainmg
(including UI duration

None

None

None

United States

a. Median mimmum duratIOn for these forty-two states
b. DuratIOns may vary by state as indicated elsewhere.

IS

13 weeks.
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France, Germany, and Japan vary maximum durations by age and
length of service in combination. Basic benefit periods can be extended
for these factors as follows:
• In France, the benefit duration can be as long as five years for
workers age 55 and older who have worked at least two-and-aquarter of the last three years;
• In Germany, the regular 52-week period can be increased to 139
weeks for workers 54 and older who have worked at least 64
months;
• In Japan, the regular 180-day period can be increased to as much
as 300 days for workers 55 and older who have worked more than
nine years.
In Canada and the United States, age is not a factor in determining
duration, nor is service occurring before the base period. However, the
level of unemployment is a determinant of duration in Canada, Japan,
and the United States. Benefit extension periods in France result in a
claimant's original UI benefit amount being reduced by 8 percent to 17
percent when such extensions occur. These reductions are repeated
every four months.
Canada and the United States provide longer benefit periods based
on unemployment rates in labor market regions and states, respectively.
Canada also takes weeks of insured employment into account; its normal 35-week benefit period can be as long as 50 weeks for full-year
workers in regions with unemployment above 10 percent. The usual
U.S. maximum benefit duration of 26 weeks is extended to 39 weeks in
states where the insured unemployment rate for a 13-week period
exceeds 5 percent and is at least 120 percent of the corresponding rates
in the two preceding years. I I In forty-one states, an insured rate of 6
percent or higher will trigger the extension without regard to the rates
in the preceding two years. States have authority to trigger 13 weeks of
extended benefits when their total unemployment rate exceeds 6.5 percent and is at least 110 percent of the corresponding rate in one of the
two preceding years. 12 Total unemployment of 8 percent can trigger 20
weeks of extended benefits. However, only seven states had authorized
this more liberal trigger mechanism as of July 1995.
A temporary benefit extension had effectively supplanted the permanent EB program with benefits that totaled as much as 52 or 59 weeks
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depending on the total unemployment rate in a state, but the program
expired in April 1994. The United States has enacted temporary benefit
extensions during each major recession since 1958. The other six
nations have changed permanent law in reaction to economic change,
but they have not relied on temporary programs for benefit extensions.
Figure 14.7 compares maximum UI benefit durations for the same
three cases for whom benefit amounts were shown in figure 14.6. The
typical 26-week initial U.S. benefit period (30 weeks in Massachusetts)
is relatively generous for the youngest worker (case 1), representing a
longer duration than would be available from UI in France or Japan, or
in Germany and Italy, where this case would be ineligible. For case 2,
however, the initial benefit duration in the United States would be
shorter than in all the other nations but Japan. Eligibility for EB could
make the U.S. duration longer than the duration in Canada for its
regions of low unemployment. For case 3, all six nations would provide benefits for a longer time than would the United States, but EB
would make the U.S. duration similar to that in a low-unemployment
Canadian region. However, the relatively few U.S. claimants eligible
for TAA have a maximum duration longer than that shown in figure
14.7 for Canada, Japan, and the United Kingdom. The benefit periods
could be well in excess of 100 weeks for case 3 in France, Germany,
and Italy.
Figure 14.7 does not show UA durations, which can extend benefits
at a lower rate indefinitely in France, Germany, and the United Kingdom. While eligibility for UA is indefinite, it is subject to a means test.
France pays a flat-rate benefit of F72.92 ($12.18) a day, with larger
benefits for eligibles who meet criteria for old age and length of service. The German UA benefit is 56 percent of net wages (58 percent for
claimants with children). The UA benefit in the United Kingdom for
claimants with no other income is £44.00 ($65.16) a week, £69.00
($102.19) for couples.
Employment Services

All seven nations have public programs to provide job training and
other employment services to those with employability problems. This
discussion is limited to those services that are integral to each national
UC system.

Figure 14.7 VI Maximum Benefit Durations for Three Hypothetical Cases, 1993
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The G-7 countries all require UC claimants to register with employment offices where information is provided on available jobs. Service
provision to UC claimants beyond this basic help varies a great deal.
Italy and Japan use wage supplements and subsidies to firms to permit
them to retain employees during downturns. Canada, France, Germany,
and Japan provide skills development training as part of their UC systems. In the United States, states are required to identify claimants who
are likely to experience long-term unemployment so that these individuals can receive employment services early in their jobless spells. Job
training is not available within the U.S. program, but TAA claimants
must enroll in approved training unless this requirement is waived.
Claimants in approved training usually continue to receive weekly benefits and may be eligible for special allowances for job search and relocation.
Unemployment benefits can be used to help claimants start new
businesses in Canada, France, Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom. The United States has tested this idea in two state demonstration
projects, and 1993 legislation authorized all states to allow UI claimants to start businesses while receiving benefits.
Public expenditures in 1993 for employment services and training,
including programs outside the UC systems, are shown in table 14.5.
Table 14.5 Public Spending for Employment Services and Training by
the G-7 Nations, 1993
Nation
Canada
France (1992)
Germany
Italy (1992)
Japan
Umted Kingdom
Umted States

Spending as a percentage of
GDP
VI benefits
0.60
30
0.48
30
0.78
39
0.10
16
0.06
23
0.33
27
0.14

31

SOURCE OECD (1994, table 1 B 2).
NOTE' The pubhc spendmg figures shown here include employment servIces and admmistratlOn,
trammg for unemployed adults, and support of unemployed persons startmg enterprIses.
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Spending as a percent of GDP was highest in Canada, France, and Germany. The lowest expenditures relative to size of economy were registered by Italy, Japan, and the United States (ranked fifth). German
spending was more than five times that of the United States relative to
GDP.
When spending for employment services and training is viewed in
relationship to UC spending (table 14.5, right column), there is less
variation across the G-7. The German ratio of 0.39 is highest, and the
Italian of 0.16 is lowest. Thus, these nations represent the most and
least aggressive in applying active labor market measures in relation to
the size of their income support for the jobless. The ratios of the other
five countries fall in the range of 0.23 (Japan) to 0.31 (United States).
Recent Trends

Several trends since 1990 can be identified across the G-7 UC programs. Some programs have lengthened the periods during which
claimants are disqualified for voluntary unemployment. Eligibility has
been tightened in two countries (for UA in France, for special UI benefits in Italy). On the other hand, none of the G-7 has liberalized eligibility rules. Benefit amounts have been lowered relative to wages in
Canada; no G-7 country has raised them. Benefit periods have been
lengthened in some cases. Prolonged benefits were tied to age and
work history in France and Italy. The U.S. program has adopted a more
liberal measure of unemployment for the activation of EB but has left
its implementation up to the states. Several of the G-7 programs have
attempted better integration of UI with employment services.
Conclusions

While all of the G-7 nations have UC systems that mandate coverage of most workers and that finance most of the costs with payroll
taxes, the seven systems differ widely in their details. The variations
are particularly striking when the U.S. system is compared with the
other six. The U.S. system is the only one that
• has most of its rules set by subnational governments;
• uses experience rating to set tax rates on employers;
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• bases extended benefit periods on unemployment levels in its political subdivisions;
• relies on temporary programs to augment UI in coping with recession-related unemployment increases; and
• provides additional unemployment benefits for dislocated workers
whose joblessness can be linked to national trade policy.
The UC systems of the other six G-7 nations also vary widely
among themselves, but there are some common trends. National spending on UC as a percentage of GDP has tended to converge since 1990
except for Germany, which had to absorb the unemployment costs of
the former GDR after reunification. All of the G-7 countries are placing
greater emphasis on reemploying the jobless in one way or another.
Finally, recent program changes have generally been in the direction of
retrenchment as unemployment and the associated costs have risen in
Canada and western Europe.

Other Types of Unemployment Compensation Systems
Overview

This section presents an overview of the types of UC systems found
worldwide and describes three systems that contrast sharply with the
programs of the G-7 nations. The 1993 edition of Social Security Programs Throughout the World (U.S. Department of Health and Human
Service 1994) describes the programs of 163 countries. Of these, 75
countries had a formal public law authorizing compensation for jobless
workers. These 75 laws can be classified as follows:
• compulsory social insurance-fifty countries;
• voluntary social insurance-three countries;
• means-tested assistance-nine countries (plus seven countries that
also operate social insurance programs);
• severance pay-twelve countries; and
• compulsory self-insurance-one country.
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Unemployment Compensation in the Group of Seven Nations

All of the G-7 nations and forty-three others operated compulsory
social insurance programs in 1993. These programs are characterized
generally by broad coverage and by some linkage of funding and/or
benefit amounts to covered wages. However, the program in Chile is
funded entirely from general government revenue and pays flat-rate
benefits. In Estonia, the program is government-funded and ties benefits to the minimum wage. Latvia also ties benefits to the minimum
wage. Malta pays flat-rate benefits. The forty-three countries in additi9n to the G-7 nations that operated compulsory social insurance
schemes as of 1993 were as follows:
Albania
Argentma
Armenia
Austria
Azerbaijan
Bangladesh
Barbados
Belarus
Belgmm
Chile

Cyprus
Czech RepublIc
Egypt
Estoma
GeorgIa
Greece
Hungary
Iceland
Iran
Ireland

Chma

Israel

Kyrgyzstan
Latvia
Lithuama
Luxembourg
Malta
Moldova
Netherlands
Norway
Poland
Portugal
Romania

RussIa
SlovakIa
South AfricaI3
Spam
Switzerland
Turkmenistan
Ukraine
Uruguay
Uzbekistan
Venezuela

Three Scandinavian countries (Denmark, Finland, and Sweden) had
voluntary social insurance systems operated through labor unions.
Union participation in UC is not compulsory.
Means-tested assistance programs apply means tests to unemployed
workers to determine their eligibility. Benefit amounts may be related
to need as well. Some of these programs stand alone, while others are
components of larger UC systems. Nine countries had only a meanstested program. They were the following:
Australia
BrazIl
Bulgana

Hong Kong
Mauritms

New Zealand
Serbia

Slovenia
Tunisia
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Seven countries used means-tested assistance to augment a social
insurance program, either for selected unemployed workers with little
or no recent work experience, or for those exhausting their VI benefits,
or both. Three of the G-7 nations (France, Germany, and the Vnited
Kingdom) had such arrangements. The other four countries with dual
VI and VA programs were Austria, Finland, Ireland, and Portugal.
Twelve countries offered only severance pay to unemployed workers. Vsually this benefit is paid by the employer under a labor law that
specifies the employer and employee types to which it applies and the
amount of the severance pay. The countries with severance pay only
were as follows:
BolIVia

Ecuador

LIbya

Solomon Islands

Botswana
Colombia

Honduras

Mexico

Tanzania

IndIa

Pakistan

Turkey

Finally, Guatemala required workers to self-insure against unemployment under a law mandating individual saving for that purpose.
A major development during the 1990s has been the adoption of VC
systems by countries that had state-controlled economies in the 1980s.
Compulsory social insurance VC systems has been established in these
former communist states, except for Bulgaria, Serbia, and Slovenia,
which have means-tested programs.
The remainder of this section describes three VC systems that differ
from those of the G-7 nations. These include a voluntary social insurance program (Sweden), a solely means-tested program (Australia),
and a severance pay law (Mexico).
Voluntary Social Insurance: Sweden

Sweden is the largest of the three Scandinavian countries that had
voluntary VI systems in 1993. There are two aspects of voluntarism in
this system. First, unemployment funds for VI are established voluntarily by trade unions. Second, although union members generally must
participate in their union's fund, nonunion workers in the industry may
voluntarily accept coverage by the union fund. Workers over age 64 are
excluded. About two-thirds of all employees are covered by this system. Workers ineligible for VI and new labor force entrants if over age
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20 are covered by a means-tested VA plan called the "labor market
support program." VI is administered by the National Labor Market
Board, and VA is administered by county labor boards and local
employment offices.
The VI system is funded by employee, employer, and government.
Employees pay from K32 ($3.87) to K100 ($12.10) a month, the exact
amount varying by fund. These employee contributions cover 5 percent
of VI costs. Employers are taxed at a rate of 2.14 percent of payroll,
which covers about 60 percent of VI costs and two-thirds of VA costs.
Government funds pay for the balance of VI and VA costs.
Eligibility for VI requires twelve months of membership in a union
fund, including at least four of the last twelve months before unemployment. Eligibles must be registered at an employment office and be
capable of work. Individuals whose unemployment is a result of voluntary quitting, misconduct, or refusal of suitable work are usually disqualified for four weeks. Eligibility rules for VA are basically the
same, except for the work history requirement. A person can meet the
requirement either by working for at least four of the past twelve
months or by meeting an education or training criterion.
The VI benefit amount varies by fund and wage level, ranging from
K210 ($25.41) to K598 ($72.36) a day. It is pegged to 80 percent of the
average wage in each covered trade. Benefits are payable for up to 300
days and are considered taxable income.
The VA benefit amount is K210 ($25.41) a day and is payable for up
to 150 days. For those ages 55 to 59, the maximum benefit duration is
300 days. For those ages 60 to 64, or for dislocated workers ages 55 to
59, the maximum benefit duration is 450 days.
Unemployment Assistance: Australia

Australia was the most industrialized nation offering unemployment
benefits solely on the basis of a means test in 1993. First enacted in
1944, this VA program covers all employed persons and is funded
from general government revenue. Benefits are administered by the
Department of Social Security. Local offices of the Department of
Employment, Education, and Training receive claims and apply a work
test.

Unemployment Insurance
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the United States
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To be eligible, an unemployed worker must be at least 16 years old
and be under pensionable age (65 for men, 60 for women). Eligibles
must be capable of and available for work and actively looking for
jobs. Jobless individuals whose unemployment is a result of voluntary
quitting, misconduct, or refusal of suitable work are subject to disqualification for up to 12 weeks. Those unemployed because of a labor dispute are disqualified for the duration of the dispute.
Benefits are paid after a one-week waiting period for as long as an
individual is qualified. Benefit amounts depend on income, marital status, age, number of children, amount of rent, and location of residence.
The means test has been liberalized numerous times to allow the disregarding of more income in computing the benefit.

Severance Pay: Mexico
In Mexico, the only form of unemployment benefit is a government
requirement that employers pay departing employees a severance benefit under prescribed circumstances. Mexico has two forms of severance pay: the cesantia, payable when separation occurs without just
cause, and the antiquedad, payable based on tenure without regard to
the reason for termination.
The cesantia equals three months of pay plus 20 days of pay per
year of service. Pay is defined to include bonuses, commissions, and
benefit payments except profit sharing. A worker must have been
employed for at least a year to be entitled to this benefit upon job loss
without just cause. Examples of just cause are a worker's engaging in
dishonest, negligent, immoral, or violent acts, or coming to work in an
intoxicated state. The reason for dismissal of an employee must be
communicated in writing to be considered justified.
The antiquedad, adopted in 1970, equals 12 days of pay per year of
service but cannot exceed twice the minimum-wage salary. It is payable upon retirement, death, disability, or termination of employment.
To qualify for this benefit upon voluntary termination, the individual
must have worked for at least fifteen years with the firm. No minimum
service period is required for involuntary termination, death, or disability, but service is counted only back to 1970 for involuntary termination. For jobless workers near retirement ages 60 to 64, the Mexican
Social Security system also pays reduced pension benefits. The reduction is 5 percentage points per year for each year under age 65.

Appendix 14.A
Program Descriptions for the G-7 Nations
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Canada
Objectives

When the VI system was established in 1940, the central objective was to
provide workers with economic security during short-term unemployment by
paying benefits related to past contributions but not to exceed wages. Emphasis
was given to adherence to insurance principles in the system design. A major
reform of the system in 1971 added a second objective: aiding the reentry of
jobless workers into the labor market.
Administration

A national agency, the Canada Employment and Immigration Commission,
administers VC through regional and local offices. The nation is divided into
sixty-two regions for the purpose of administering VC. Most of these regions
represent urban labor markets, with rural areas of provinces making up the balance. Payroll taxes that fund the system are collected by the national revenue
agency.
Financing

Revenue is raised from a payroll tax on both employer and employee. In
1993, the employer paid 4.2 percent and the employee 3.0 percent on the first
$C745 ($580) of each covered worker's weekly wage. No general government
revenue is used to support the program.
Coverage

All wage and salary jobs are covered except those providing less than 15
hours of work per week and paying less than $C 149 ($116) a week. Self-employed fishermen are covered under special rules. Provincial government jobs
are covered at the option of those governments.
Eligibility

To qualify for VI benefits, an unemployed person must have worked for a
minimum number of weeks during the prior 52-week period. The qualifying
period can be longer than 52 weeks for those who were ill, injured, pregnant,
or in training. An insurable week is one in which the person worked at least 15
hours or earned at least $C149 ($116). The minimum number of weeks required varies by unemployment in the region, from 10 weeks where the unemployment rate is over 15 percent to 20 weeks where the rate is 6 percent or less.
A new entrant or reentrant to the labor force needs 20 weeks to qualify.
Persons who refuse suitable jobs or refuse required training are disqualified
for periods ranging from 7 to 12 weeks. Individuals jobless because of labor
disputes are disqualified for the duration of the dispute. Those who quit jobs or
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were fired for misconduct are disqualified until they requalify from subsequent
employment.
Benefits
Benefits are equal to 57 percent of average insured gross earnings over the
prior 52 weeks, subject to a weekly maximum of $C425 ($331). For those who
refuse jobs or training, the benefit is only 50 percent of average earnings, however. Benefits are fully taxable as income. Benefit payments begin after a twoweek waiting period.
The duration of benefits varies with the number of insurable weeks of work
and the regional unemployment rate. The maximum duration is at least 17
weeks for persons with 20 weeks of work in regions with unemployment of 6
percent or less. The maximum duration for those who worked every week of
the qualifying period is at least 35 weeks. Durations reach as long as 50 weeks
for some combinations of work history and regional unemployment, as shown
in appendix table 14A.l.
Appendix Table 14A.1 Maximum Duration of VI Benefits, Canada, 1993
Regional
Weeks worked in past year
unemployment
rate
13
26
39
52
6.1 % or less
NE
22
29
35
6 1% - 7.0%
NE
25
32
38
7 1% - 8.0%
NE
28
35
41
8.1 % - 9.0%
NE
32
39
45
9.1% - 10.0%
NE
36
43
49
10.1 % - 11.0%
NE
40
47
50
11.1 % - 12.0%
NE
44
50
50
12.1 % - 13 0%
34
46
50
50
13 1% - 14.0%
36
48
50
50
14.1% - 150%
38
50
50
50
151%-16.0%
40
50
50
50
42
50
50
50
Over 160%
NOTE NE means not eligible.

Benefits are limited to 15 weeks if unemployment is because of sickness or
maternity and to 10 weeks if because of parental care.
Employment Services
The Employment Commission maintains lists of available jobs and provides
counseling on job search and retraining programs. The agency offers job train-
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ing and work experience programs for the long-term unemployed. The use of
UI funds for training has expanded rapidly since 1990.
France
Objectives

Since 1984 legislation, the UC system has consisted of two distinct parts.
For workers who have lost their jobs involuntarily, UI provides benefits that
are mainly wage-related but that decline as the period of unemployment lengthens. The "solidarity" UA program provides a need-based benefit to UI exhaustees and to certain categories of new labor force entrants and reentrants.
Administration

The system is supervised by a national agency, the Ministry of Health and
Social Security. Funds are managed by ASSEDICs, an acronym for associations of employers. Payments are administered by UNEDIC, an employee organization. Municipalities distribute payments in places where these
organizations have no offices.
Financing

Employers and employees are required to contribute to the ASSEDICs. Employers pay 4.18 percent of all wages. Employees pay 2.42 percent of earnings
up to F12,610 ($2,106) a month, plus an extra 0.55 percent on monthly earnings between F12,610 ($2,106) and F55,440 ($9,258). The government pays
for the solidarity program that benefits certain persons ineligible for UI.
Coverage

Workers under age 60 (or under 65 and not covered for a social security oldage pension) are covered by UI, except for domestic employees and seasonal
workers. There are special rules covering construction and longshore workers,
the merchant marine, and aviators. Certain new entrants are covered by the solidarity program, including new labor force entrants ages 18-25, apprentices,
freed prisoners, recently discharged military veterans, newly widowed or divorced women, single women with children, and unemployed workers who
have exhausted their UI benefits.
Eligibility

To be immediately eligible for UI, the jobless worker must be involuntarily
unemployed and have worked for at least 91 days or 520 hours during the
twelve months preceding job loss. Unemployment cannot be due to misconduct
or to refusal of suitable job offers. Those who leave jobs voluntarily are disqualified from benefits, but they may gain eligibility after 121 days if they meet

639

a job search requirement. A claimant must be able to work and be registered at
a job exchange.
Eligibility for a solidarity benefit for those who have exhausted their VI
benefits necessitates employment in at least five of the past ten years, but this
requirement can be reduced by one year per child for childrearing for as many
as three children. Eligibility is also income-tested, with the limits set at
F5,104.40 ($852) a month for a single person, FI0,208.80 ($1,705) for a couple.
Benefits

The VI benefit is 57.4 percent of wages over the prior twelve months. Benefits range from a minimum of F133.76 ($22.34) per day to a maximum of
F314.63 ($52.54). Benefits are paid after an eight-day waiting period and are
taxed the same as earnings.
Extension periods are granted beyond the original benefit period at the discretion of the ASSEDICs. The lengths of these periods depend on employment
history and age. Benefits in an extension period are reduced by 8 percent to 17
percent of the original amount. Maximum benefit durations and reduction rates
for benefit extensions are shown in appendix table 14A.2.
The solidarity benefit is F72.92 ($12.18) a day. A higher rate of FI04.73
($17.49) is paid to those ages 55 to 58 1/2and employed at least twenty years
and those age 58 1/2 and older and employed at least ten years. Benefits are
payable for periods of six months but may be renewed. Eligibility terminates at
age 60 for those with old-age pension coverage.
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Table 14A.2 Maximum VI Benefit Durations and Reduction Rates for
Benefit Extensions, France, 1994
Maximum
Maximum
Benefit cut
duration
duration
2nd period
(percent)
Work history and age
1st period (days) 2nd period (days)
122
N/A
122 days in last 8 months
o
15
122
91
182 days in last year
243 days In last year and
122
334
17
under age 50
15
214
425
age 50 or older
426 days in last 2 years and
17

457

699
637
913

15

610
822

759

15

1,003

8

under age 25

214

age 25 to 49

275

age 50 or older

17

821 days in last 3 years and
age 50 to 54
age 55 or older
NOTE: N/A means not applIcable

Employment Services

UI beneficiaries are required to register with an employment exchange
where information on available jobs is maintamed. The government can use UI
funds for skills development activities and to pay allowances to persons in
training. The long- term unemployed have access to subsidized public or private jobs. UI benefits may be continued for claimants who are starting businesses.

Germany
Objectives

The Employment Promotion Act of 1969, which established the present
German UC system, states the intention that the program contribute to the prevention of unemployment and underemployment as well as assist unemployed
workers with income replacement.
Administration

The UC system is supervised nationally by the Federal Ministry of Labor
and Social Affairs. Contributions for this system and for other parts of the social security system are collected by sickness funds operated by various localities, enterprises, and occupational groups. Unemployment benefit payments
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are administered by the Federal Institute for Labor through its regional and local offices.
Financmg

Funds for VI are raised from the compulsory social security tax on employers and employees. The VI share of these contributions comes from a payroll
tax of 6.5 percent on the first DM86,400 ($49,680) of annual earnings, split
equally between employee and employer. 14
Coverage

All employees with earnings subject to the social security tax are covered
by VC. Individuals exempted are those working less than 15 hours a week.
Those employed less than two months or fifty working days in a year are also
exempt.
Eligibility

To be eligible for VI benefits, unemployed workers must be under age 65,
capable of and available for work, and registered with a local employment office. Eligibility also requires the person to have worked in insured employment
for at least 360 days during the past three years (180 days for seasonal workers). Otherwise qualified individuals are disqualified for up to 12 weeks for
voluntary leaving, misconduct, participation in a strike, participation in training, or refusal of a suitable job offer.
A means-tested V A program covers those who fail to qualify for VI benefits
if they had insured employment for at least 150 days during the past year. Persons exhausting their VI benefits may also be eligible. In addition, assistance
is available for jobless workers in retraining programs.
Benefits

The VI benefit amount is 68 percent of after-tax income for persons with
children and 63 percent for others. It is payable without a waiting period. Benefits are not subject to the income tax.
The maximum duration of VI benefit payments differs according to length
of work history and age. For those under age 42, maximum benefit durations
vary proportionately from 35 weeks with sixteen months of covered work up
to 52 weeks with two years of covered work. For those 42 or older, benefits can
be paid for up to 78 weeks with thirty-six months of covered work. For those
44 or older, benefits can be paid for up to 95 weeks with forty-four months of
covered work. For those 49 or older, benefits can last up to 113 weeks with fifty-two months of covered work. For those 54 or older, benefits can continue up
to 139 weeks with sixty-four months of covered work.
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The means-tested UA benefit is 58 percent of after-tax income for persons
with children and 56 percent for others. Benefits are available for one year but
may be extended for one-year periods indefinitely.
Employment Services
Beneficiaries must register with an employment office. The administering
agency can use payroll tax funds to provide job counseling and training. Income maintenance grants are available for persons in training. Claimants starting businesses can receive benefits for up to six months.
Italy

Objectives
The UI system provides a small basic benefit. This amount may be augmented with supplementary benefits to replace wages more adequately and to provide job continuity in firms experiencing downturns or operational disruptions.
Administration
Benefit payments are administered by the Ministry of Labor and Social
Welfare through the National Social Insurance Institute. Payroll taxes that support the program are collected by the Treasury.
Financing
Employer payroll taxes fund UI benefit costs. The tax is assessed on wages
in excess of L54,886 ($34) a day. The tax rate is 1.61 percent for industrial
managers and 1.91 percent for others. Industrial employers pay an additional
0.3 percent (0.8 percent in the construction industry) for special benefits and
2.2 percent for the wage supplement fund (1.9 percent for firms with fewer than
fifty workers). General government revenue pays for administration and for
part of the cost of wage supplements.
Coverage
All workers in private employment are covered except occasional and seasonal workers and part-time employees.
Eligibility
To be eligible for basic UI benefits, a jobless worker must have at least two
years of insured employment, at least 52 weeks (43 weeks in the construction
industry) of which occurred in the past two years. Special UI benefits, available
to industrial and construction workers, require at least 13 weeks of continuous
covered employment as well.
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Eligibility further requires that the jobless worker be registered at an employment office and be capable of and available for work. Claimants may be
disqualified for thirty days if unemployment results from voluntary leaving or
misconduct or if a suitable job or prescribed training is refused.
Benefits

The basic UI benefit is 20 percent of wages and is payable for up to 180 days
after a I-week waiting period. This benefit is not available to business executives. Construction workers are limited to 90 days of benefits. Agricultural
workers are limited to 270 days minus the number of days actually worked, not
to exceed 180 days. All benefits are subject to the income tax
Special benefits are available to employees in industrial firms with more
than fifteen employees and commercial firms with more than two hundred employees. This benefit fully replaces past wages for up to one year. Any subsequent benefits are reduced to 80 percent of wages. Again, executive-level
personnel are not eligible. Special benefits, which do not include any dependents' allowances, are reduced for any basic benefits received.
The special VI benefit is available for up to twelve months. This duration is
longer for older workers (24 months for those ages 40-49, thirty-six months for
those age 50 or older). Durationallimits also apply to the use of these benefits
by a particular company for its workers. The normal term is twelve months, but
a company undergoing reorganization can use this program for up to twentyfour months, with two twelve-month extensions allowed. An operational unit
within an eligible firm can use these benefits for no longer than thirty-six
months in a five-year period.
Employees of firms covered by special benefits who are partially unemployed may be eligible for wage supplementation. However, wage supplementation cannot be paid to persons receiving special VI benefits. The supplements
are in amounts sufficient to replace 80 percent of lost wages and are paid for
three-month periods. Wage supplements cannot be received for more than
twelve months in a two-year period.
Employment Services

Claimants must register with a local placement office where information on
available jobs is maintained.
Japan

Objectives

The VC system was revised in 1992 to emphasize its role as "employment
insurance," which reflects its multiple objectIves: to help maintain the incomes
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of workers during unemployment, to stabilize employment, and to strengthen
the employment security of workers through skills development.
Administration

The system is administered by a national agency, the Employment Security
Bureau under the Ministry of Labor.
Financing

Most of the cost of the system is borne by employer and employee payroll
taxes. Both employees and employers pay 0.55 percent of wages for a total of
1.10 percent. (Employees who are seasonal or construction workers pay 0.65
percent, as do employers.) In addition, employers pay 0.35 percent of wages to
support employment services (0.45 percent for construction employers). These
payroll taxes apply to total wages. General government revenue is used to pay
one- fourth of benefit costs.
Coverage

All workers are covered except those age 65 or older, certain day laborers
and seasonal workers, part-time workers employed less than 22 hours a week,
and government pensioners. Jobs with small firms (fewer than five employees)
in the agriculture, forestry, and fishing industries are covered on a voluntary
basis.
Eligibility

To be eligible, a worker must have been in insured employment for at least
six ofthe last twelve months. The reference period can be extended to up to forty-eight months for those out of the labor force because of illness, injury, pregnancy, or for hard-to-employ cases.
Eligibility requires registration with an employment security office. An eligible must be capable of and available for work and report to the local office
every four weeks. A claimant may be disqualified for up to three months if unemployment resulted from voluntary leaving, misconduct, refusal of a suitable
job offer, or failure to attend recommended training.
Benefits

The basic benefit applicable for most workers varies by wage level. The
benefit is 80 percent of past wages at lower wage levels and 60 percent at higher levels. 15 The minimum basic benefit is ¥2,390 ($22.56) a day; the maxImum
is ¥9,040 ($85.34). A separate benefit schedule for insured day laborers ranges
from ¥1,770 ($16.71) a day for laborers with the lowest wages to ¥6,200
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($58.53) for those with the highest wages. Benefits are paid after a one-week
waiting period and are not subject to taxation.
Unemployed workers age 65 or older receive a lump-sum benefit that ranges
in value from 50 days of the basic benefit for those in insured employment less
than one year to 150 days for those in insured employment ten years or more.
Unemployed insured seasonal workers receive a lump-sum benefit worth 50
days of basic benefits.
The maximum duration of UI benefit eligibility depends on age and work
history as shown in appendix A table 14A.3
Table 14A.3 Maximum Duration of UI Benefits, Japan, 1993
Period of insured employment
Age
Under 1 year
1-4 years
5-9 years
Over 9 years
Under 30
90 days
90 days
90 days
180 days
30-44
90 days
90 days
180 days
210 days
45-54
90 days
180 days
210 days
240 days
55-64
90 days
210 days
240 days
300 days
Dlfficult-to-employand
90 days
240 days
240 days
240 days
under 55
55-64
90 days
300 days
300 days
300 days

If a worker obtains a steady job before half of the applicable maximum benefit period has expired, a reemployment allowance is paid that is worth from 30
to 120 days of the basic benefit amount.
Benefit durations are briefer for "short-time" workers (those employed between 22 and 33 hours a week) age 30 and older. Those ages 30 to 54 must have
worked at least five years to receive benefits for 180 days. Those over 54 have
a maximum duration of 210 days with ten or more years of service. Difficultto-employ individuals are also limited to 210 days (180 days if under age 55).
The benefit amount for short-time workers is 60 percent of lost wages.
Benefit durations can be extended for up to ninety days for workers forced
into retirement by the bankruptcy of a firm or by an industrial recession, for
workers awaiting placement in a training program, and for those seeking job
placement in "remote areas." A national ninety-day extension is triggered
when the number of insured unemployed exceeds 4 percent of the workforce
covered by UI.

Employment Services
Employment services aimed at combating structural unemployment and labor market problems associated with factors such as age and region are an integral part of the Japanese UI system. These services include skills
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development training and support activities such as job vacancy listings, relocation assistance, and job search assistance. Firms can receive employment stabilization subsidies to allow them to retain employees during short-term
downturns. These funds can be used to support production activities or on- thejob training. Employers who hire dislocated workers age 45 and older may also
receive subsidies.
United Kingdom
Objectives
Under 1992 legislation, the UC system provides a fixed amount of income
support for those with substantial work histories who lose their jobs involuntarily. However, brief disqualification periods and a broad program of need-related aid result in significant income support for the unemployed generally.
Administration
The UC system is administered by two national agencies. The Department
of Social Security is responsible for tax collection and the awarding of incometested UA benefits. The Department of Employment administers UI benefits
through 9 regIOnal and 1,759 local offices.
Financing
UI benefits are funded by part of the payroll tax that finances the overall Social Security system. For the year ending March 31, 1992, UI benefits comprised 4.1 percent of all benefits financed by the payroll tax. Income-tested UA
is funded from general government revenue.
The social security system employer tax applies to total earnings, while the
employee share of the tax applies only to the first £420 ($622) of weekly wages. Revenue is allocated among all the insurance programs (pension, sickness,
maternity, unemployment, and work injury benefits), the National Health Service, which is mostly government funded, and redundancy payments (severance benefits).
Social security tax rates are graduated according to wage level. The employee pays 2 percent on the first £56 ($83) per week and 9 percent on addItional
wages up to the overall ceiling. Employees over pension age (65 for men, 60
for women) do not pay the employee tax. Employers pay from 4.6 percent to
lOA percent of wages, the rate rising with the wage level.
Coverage
All workers who earn at least £56 ($83) a week are covered. The self-employed are excluded.

647

Eligibility

All jobless workers who had earnings in the prior tax year of at least 50
times the minimum threshold of taxable earnings, i.e., £56 ($83) a week, are
eligible for full VI benefits. Reduced benefits can be paid to those with earnings of at least twenty-five times the earnings threshold. To remain eligible,
beneficiaries must register with a job exchange and be physically capable of
and available for work.
Those workers who left jobs voluntarily or engaged in misconduct can be
disqualified for 26 weeks. This disqualification period also applies to those
who refuse a suitable job or fail to accept job training. Those who are jobless
because of a labor dispute are disqualified for the duration of the dispute. After
VI benefits are exhausted, a person can regain eligibility only after returning to
work for at least 8 weeks. There is no work history requirement for VA eligibility.
Benefits

A flat-rate benefit of £44.65 ($66.13) is paid weekly to the jobless worker,
plus another £27.55 ($40.80) for a spouse or dependent adult. Those over pension age receive higher benefits: £56.10 ($83.08) for the worker, £33.70
($49.91) for the spouse/dependent adult, £9.80 ($14.51) for the first dependent
child, and £10.95 ($16.22) for each additional dependent child. Benefits are
payable, after a three-day waiting period, for up to 52 weeks. VI benefits are
taxed the same as earned income.
Redundancy benefits are paid by an employer in a lump sum to employees
under pension age who are dismissed after at least 104 weeks of contmuous
employment by the employer. The benefit equals years of service times £205
($304) times a factor for weeks of pay per year of service. This factor is 0.5 for
those ages 18 to 21, 1.0 for those 22 to 40, and 1.5 for those 41 to 64.
The social security system includes need-based VA, for which the unemployed who meet a needs test are eligible indefinitely. This benefit for those
age 18 or over with no other income is £44.00 ($65.16) a week, £69.00
($102.19) for couples. 16 Additional benefits are available for children.
Employment Services

Beneficiaries must register with a labor exchange operated by the Department of Employment. This agency maintains information on available jobs. Intensive job counseling and job search assistance are provided. Training
allowances are available to persons in job training, and some travel expenses
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for job search may be reimbursed. VI benefits may be continued for claimants
who are starting new businesses.
United States
Objectives
Before establishment of the VI system In the Social Security Act of 1935,
principles were set forth by the Committee on Economic Security that have
since guided the program without major change. The system was intended to
compensate jobless workers for short periods of unemployment with payments
proportionate to wages and not subject to any means test. Establishment of VI
was left to the states, but state action was induced through a federal tax on employers that is reduced substantially if a state has a VI program in compliance
with federal law. Specific provisions of eligibility and benefits were left to the
states, and the states administer benefit payments and revenue collection; however, financial control over program administration was placed with the federal
government to assure an adequate quality of state administration. Financing
was to rely on employer taxes, and possibly on employee taxes as well, but no
subsidy from general government revenue was included. Finally, it was intended that the system be designed to promote stabilization of employment. Problems of long-term unemployment were to be met by creation of public jobs
rather than by long-term VI benefits, an objective that has not been pursued.
Administration
Fifty-three state employment security agencies administer VI through local
offices in each of the fifty states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the
Virgin Islands. The V.S. Department of Labor oversees state compliance with
federal law, provides grants to state agencies for administrative expenses, and
provides research and statistical services. The V.S. Treasury Department receives state and federal unemployment tax revenue, maintains a set of trust
fund accounts for the system, and reimburses state agencies for their benefit expenditures.
Financing
Benefits are financed through the Vnemployment Trust Fund by payroll taxes levied by the states. These taxes are applied solely to employers in all but
three states, where employees are also taxed. In 1993, state taxes averaged 2.3
percent of taxable wages and 0.9 percent of total wages in covered jobs. Tax
rates are experience rated by individual firm to some degree in all states. The
1993 ceilings on taxable yearly wages ranged from $7,000 in thirteen states up
to $23,200 in Alaska. Each state program has a federal trust fund account that
is credited with its tax receipts.
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A federal payroll tax of 0.8 percent on the first $7,000 of each covered worker's annual wages is levied on employers as authorized by the Federal Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA). The FUTA tax pays for the federal share of the
permanent extended benefits (EB) program, federal and state administration of
UI, and loans to states that experience insolvency in their trust fund accounts.
Coverage

Federal law indirectly compels state UI programs to cover most jobs. Nonfarm jobs are covered for employers with at least one worker in 20 or more
weeks or with a quarterly payroll of at least $1,500. Farm jobs are covered for
agricultural employers that have at least ten employees in 20 weeks or pay at
least $20,000 in quarterly cash wages. Domestic employment is covered for
employers that pay cash wages of at least $1,000 quarterly. Federal law directly
requires coverage for jobs in state and local governments and most nonprofIt
organizations. The largest uncovered worker category is the self-employed. UI
covers 98 percent of all wage and salary workers.
Eligibility

States determine UI eligibility requirements. Most states require that a
worker have covered wages above a minimum level during the first four of the
past five calendar quarters to be eligible. The median minimum earnings required in 1993 was $1,390. Nine states require employment by the worker for
at least a minimum number of weeks (15 to 20) during the base period. In addition, thirty-four states stipulate that a substantial part of the required minimum earnings fall within one quarter as a criterion of serious attachment to the
labor force.
States disqualify workers who leave jobs voluntarily, with all but six states
extending the disqualification for the duration of the unemployment spell. Jobless workers are also disqualified for willful misconduct on a job (for the entire
spell in fifty jurisdictions), refusal of suitable employment (for the entIre spell
in forty jurisdictions), a labor dispute (for its duration in fifty-two jurisdictions), fraud, or receipt of disqualifying income. This last disqualification usually results in an offset of UI benefits by some or all of the disqualifying
income. Federal law requires that states reduce UI benefits for pension benefits
receIved from a base-period employer and for social security benefits received.
Benefits

UI benefit levels and durations are set in state law. Most states peg benefits
to 50 percent of the prior gross wage level, but all states set benefit caps that
result in lower wage replacement for those who earn more than the average
wage. Benefit maximums in 1993 ranged from $133 a week in Puerto Rico to
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$468 a week in Massachusetts (for a worker with dependents). Fourteen states
provide supplemental benefits for workers with dependents. All VI benefits are
fully taxable as income. A waiting period of one week is applicable in fortytwo states; there is no wait in the others.
The UI system was designed to compensate for job loss because of normal
business cycles. Thus, regular benefit durations are limited to no more than 26
weeks in all but Massachusetts and Washington, where benefits can last for 30
weeks.
The federal-state EB program, funded 50-50 from federal and state payroll
taxes, is automatically triggered in an individual state when its insured unemployment rate over 13 weeks exceeds 5% percent and is at least 120 percent of
the rate during the same 13-week period of each of the past two years. At state
option, a rate above 6 percent will trigger EB regardless of the relationship to
the rates of preceding years. EB provides an additional 13 weeks of benefits.
Since March 1993, states can elect to trigger EB when their total unemployment rate exceeds 6.5 percent and is at least 110 percent of the rate in either of
the past two years; 20 weeks of benefits are available if the total rate exceeds
8.0 percent. As of July 1995, only seven states had this provision in force as an
option. Only Alaska, Puerto Rico, and Rhode Island were paying EB that
month.
Since UI was not designed to help displaced workers faced with long-term
unemployment and with the need to make career transitions, Congress acted in
1962 to provide special help to workers dislocated by U.S. trade policies. Under the TAA program, workers who are certified as eligible may receive cash
benefits and training, and firms may receive technical or financial assistance to
cope with import competition. TAA cash benefits are at the same dollar level
as UI benefits in the state where the recipient is paid. TAA benefits are paid
only after UI benefits expire and are, thus, an extension of the regular UI program. The combined duration of TAA and UI benefits, including any EB or
emergency benefits, is limited to 52 weeks (78 weeks in the case of workers
engaged in approved training that lasts beyond 52 weeks). To be eligible, a
worker must have been employed with a single trade-affected firm during at
least 26 of the 52 weeks preceding layoff, must have received wages of at least
$30 per week, and must meet the state requirements for UI eligibility.
There is no need-tested benefit integrated with UI. U.S. assistance programs
apply differently to different categories of needy people, and benefits in some
programs vary widely by state. The assistance program most closely related to
UC is the unemployed parent component of the federal-state Aid to Families
with Dependent Children (AFDC-U).17 To qualify for AFDC-U, the unemployed parent must have a minimum work history, meet a test of unemploy-
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ment in addition to a need test, and accept work or training as required by the
state. Time spent in school can substitute for part of the required work history.

Employment Services
VI beneficiaries are eligible for assistance from the V.S. Employment Service, which maintains listings of available jobs. States are required to identify
VI claimants most likely to have long spells of unemployment and to refer
them to job search assistance services. Federally funded job training is available from a separate program for dIslocated workers under the Job Training
Partnership Act. VI can be received while in training only if the state approves
the training course for the individual. States can allow VI claimants to start new
businesses in lieu of job search.
Workers who receive TAA cash benefits must participate injob training unless exempted by the Secretary of Labor. (Those eligible under special provisions enacted with NAFTA cannot be exempted.) Cash benefits are extended
for up to 26 additional weeks when training lasts beyond the normal TAA eligibility period. Special allowances of up to $800 are available to TAA beneficiaries for job search expenses and for relocation expenses.

Appendix 14.B
Major Events in the Development
of Unemployment Compensation
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Appendix Table 14B.l Major Events in the Development of Unemployment Compensation
Decade

Canada

France

Early 1900s

Pnvate
contnbutory
unemployment
benefit funds
organized by
trade unions or
mutual benefit
socIetIes and
subSIdIzed by
government
contnbutIons

1910-1919

natIonal VA
scheme
establIshed
Benefits provIded
through funds
created and
operated locally.
subsidIzed by
government
revenue

1920-1929

Germany

Italy

Decree Issued In
1919 makIng VI
compulsory for
most manual
workers

Compulsory
natIonal VI
program
establIshed In
1927 for all wage
earners and
lower-paId
salaned
employees

Japan

United Kingdom

United States

Cash benefit plans
for unemployed
organized by
trade unions and
workmen's
assocIatIons

Help for members
who became
unemployed
provIded by trade
unions and
voluntary
communal
Insurance funds

FIrSt country to
legIslate a
natIonal
compulsory VI
program wIth
passage of the
National
Insurance Act of
1911
VI extended to
most workers In
Industry and
commerce In
1920

(contInued)

Appendix Table 148.1 (continued)
Decade

Canada

1930-1939

Employment and
Social Insurance
Act passed m
1935. ill program
funded by tax
revenue from
employers,
employees, and
government. Law
found
unconstltutlOnal
and never
lmplemented

1940-1949

Unemployment
Insurance Act of
1940 estabhshed
compulsory UI
program and
NatlOnal
Employment
Servlce to operate
in conJunctlOn.
Program
administered by
Unemployment
Insurance
COffiffilsslOn

France

Germany

Italy

Japan

Decree lssued m
1939 extendmg
ill, financed
through employer
taxes and general
government
revenue,
admtmstered by
the National
Social Insurance
Institute (INPS)

Soclal secunty
estabhshed
Unemployment
not regarded as
msurable nsk

The Fund for
Supplemental
Earnmgs (CIG)
mstttuted m 1941
to guarantee part
of the pay of
workers and
salaned staff
whose pay was
threatened by
reduced work
under certam
Circumstances
Fund financed
through employer
taxes to the INPS

Unemployment
Insurance Law
enacted m 1947
estabhshed first
compulsory ill
scheme m country

United Kingdom

United States

UI benefits
hmlted followmg
financial stram on
government m the
mld-1930s.
Means-tested UA
program lmtlated

ill estabhshed by
the Soclal
Secunty Act of
1935 as a federalstate program to
provlde
temporary
financial ald and
mamtam
consumer
spendmg m
receSSlOns

Enactment of
umfied system of
social msurance
contamed m the
comprehenslve
NatlOnal
Insurance and
Industnal Injunes
Scheme of 1946

1950-1959

1940 VI Act
repealed and
replaced by
Unemployment
Insurance Act of
1955 Designed to
make VI more
effective,
expanded
coverage, eased
qualIfymg
conditIOns,
mcreased benefit
rates, lengthened
duration, and
Increased
allowable
earnIngs

Private
contributory plans
nearly extmct
Legislation
enacted m 1951 to
Improve existmg
programs and
provide work
projects for the
unemployed
Followmg a
national labormanagement
agreement In
1958, VI scheme
establIshed to
prOVide coverage
to all firms
belongIng to trade
associations or
interoccupatlOnal
organizations
affilIated With the
NatIOnal Council
of French
Employers
(CNPF)

Federal InstitutIOn
for Placement and
Unemployment
Insurance
established in
1952 to
admimster VI

Temporary
Unemployment
Compensation
program enacted
m 1958 provldmg
one-half of
regular benefit
entitlement up to
13 weeks,
financed through
federal loans to
states

(contmued)

Appendix Table 14B.l (continued)
Decade
1960-1969

Canada

France

Germany

Italy

VI made
compulsory In
1967, extendIng
to all workers in
IndustrIal and
commercial
sectors.
AdminIstered by
JOInt labormanagement
bodies at the
natIOnal and
regIOnal levels
(the UNEDIC and
the ASSEDIC),
scheme was
prIvate
contrIbutory
Insurance
program receivIng
no government
funds Public
means-tested VA
extended to cover
unemployed In all
regions

1927 Act replaced
by Employment
PromotIon Act
(AFG) In 1969,
providIng VI
benefits fInanced
by earnIngs-based
payroll taxes and
means-tested UA
for those
Ineligible for VI
or who have
exhausted VI,
financed by
government
funds. Act
proVides Job
traInIng and other
benefits
Complemented by
the Federal SOCial
ASSistance Act to
aid those not
entitled to VI or
UA

Special UI
establIshed In
1968 to aId those
made redundant
by sectoral or
local econonuc
clrses. Addltl ve to
baSIC UI, financed
With government
funds, and
admInistered by
INPS

Japan

Vnited Kingdom

Vnited States

UA merged Into a
general
supplementary
benefit system In
1966 EarnIngs
Related
Supplement
(ERS) also
Introduced, based
on prIor-year
earnIngs,
supplemented
flat-rate UI
benefits for up to
6 months

Temporary
Extended
Unemployment
CompensatIOn
passed In 1961,
providIng onehalf of regular
benefit up to 13
weeks, financed
by a temporary
Increase In FUTA
tax
TAA authOrIzed
to compensate
workers displaced
by Import
competitIOn

1970-1979

Unemployment
Insurance Act of
1971 enacted
Intended to make
VI compatible
with other social
security
programs,
Included umversal
coverage, eased
eligibility, and
offered new
benefits in case of
Sickness,
maternity, and
retirement
Distinguished
between
claimants with
major labor force
attachment
eligible for
regular benefits
and those with
minor attachment
eligible for
speCial benefits
(Sickness,
maternity, job
training)

Government
established
unified VI system
In 1979, financed
by earmngs-based
taxes and
government funds

As of 1977, an
unemployed
person who
cannot find a job
comparable to the
one from which
terminated must
accept another job
after 4 months If
pay IS at least 80%
of former wage

New rules
established for
basIc benefits
paid by the
Earnings
Supplemental
Fund

Old law replaced
by employment
Insurance system
In 1975 Program
designed to
provide Income
security for
unemployed
persons and
contribute to a
national
workforce policy.
Emphasizes
continuous skill
development for
all workers

DC restructured
In 1975 New
scheme based on
earnings-related
payroll tax paid
by both
employers and
employees, but
benefit still a flatrate award

Permanent
extended benefits
program
established In
1970, proViding
up to 13 weeks of
benefits, financed
equally by FUTA
tax and state taxes
Emergency
Unemployment
Compensation
Act In 1971
temporarily
extended benefits
for up to an
additIOnal 13
weeks, financed
byFUTA tax
Temporary
supplemental
benefits passed In
1974 proVided up
to 26 weeks of
benefits, financed
through FUTA
tax and federal
general funds
TAA eligibility
rules eased and
benefits
liberalized In
1974
(continued)

0\

Appendix Table 14B.l (continued)
Decade
1980-1989

Canada

France
Dual ill-UA
system restored m
1984 followmg
failure of umfied
scheme, consists
of ill, financed by
payroll taxes on
employees and
employers and
adrrunistered
Jomtly by
UNEDICASSEDIC, and a
revampted VA
"solidanty"
scheme, financed
by general
government funds

VI
00

Germany

Italy

Japan

United Kingdom

United States

ERS abolIshed in
1982,leavmg
only basic flatrate benefit and
supplementary
benefit system

ElIgibility for EB
and TAA
tightened m 1981
Federal
Supplemental
CompensatIOn
passed in 1982,
extended benefits
temporarily,
durations varymg
by state
unemployment.
Benefits financed
by federal general
funds
VI benefits made
fully subject to
mcome tax m
1986.
TAA claimants
reqUired by 1988
act to undergo Job
retraming unless
waived

1990-1993

Bill C-21 passed
m 1990. Intended
to mcrease
pnvate-sector
traming and make
VI more
responsive to
needs of Jobless,
reduced the
maximum benefit
penod in most
regiOns, extended
coverage to
workers over 65,
provided for a
multi-tier special
benefit structure,
and encouraged
greater use of
program funds for
expenments.
Government no
longer contnbutes
general funds to
UI

Benefits and
financmg
restructured;
disquahficatiOn
penod for
voluntary qUltS
lengthened

UC system
estabhshed
temporarily for
formerGDR,
consisted of flatrate benefit plus
redundancy
allowance
VI payroll tax rate
raised, benefit
duration mcreased

1991 law imposed
new restrictions
on special VI
benefits to aVOid
overuse by
employers with
surplus workers

VI payroll tax rate
increased for
employers,
reduced for
employees

DisquahficatiOn
penod
lengthened for
those jobless
voluntanly or due
to misconduct

Temporary
Emergency
Unemployment
CompensatiOn
(EUe) passed m
1991 to provide
additional
benefits to those
who exhausted VI
and EB, financed
by FUTA taxes
More hberal
tngger for EB
permitted at state
optiOn m 1992
law
Job search
assistance
required by 1992
law forUC
claimants likely to
be long-term
unemployed

Appendix 14.C
Backup Tables for Charts
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Table 14C.l Public Expenditures for UC Programs in the G-7 Nations, Fiscal Years Beginning in 1970-1993
Fiscal year beginning in
1990
1991
1975
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
Nation
1970
1980
Public expenditures for UC as percent of GDP
1.64
1.57
1.91
2.28
2.76
2.32
1.87
1.86
1.57
Canada
1.67
1.31
1.47
1.46
1.20
1.24
1.31
1.31
1.27
France
0.32
0.78
Germanya
1.34
1.20
1.51
1.12
1.41
1.31
1.34
1.09
0.40
1.49
Italy
Japan
United Kingdom
Umted States

0.18
0.27
0.47
0.42

Canada

0.29

1992

1993

2.25

2.00

1.61
1.51
0.64
0.26
1.28
0.61

NA
2.02
NA
NA
1.23

0.57
0.49
0.40
NA
0.55
0.60
0.45
0.47
0.75
0.23
0.43
0.34
0.22
0.48
0.40
NA
NA
0.40
1.10
0.84
0.95
1.38
0.70
0.94
2.01
1.93
1.56
0.51
0.44
0.47
0.49
0.68
1.18
0.62
0.61
0.56
Public expenditures for UC as percentage of GDP per percentage point of unemployment
0.17
0.20
0.19
0.20
0.21
0.24
0.22
0.20
0.40
0 31

0.45
0.18

France
0.13
0.19
0.23
0.12
0.12
0.12
0.13
0.13
0.14
0.15
0.15
NA
Germanya
0.80
0.44
0.40
0.20
0.20
0.21
0.21
0.21
0.22
034
0.32
0.35
009
0.09
NA
Italy
0.06
0.13
0.11
0.12
0.08
0.06
0.05
NA
0.08
012
NA
Japan
0.22
0.25
0.20
NA
NA
0.14
0.17
0.15
0.10
0.11
013
0.18
0.17
0.15
0.13
0.12
0.14
0.16
0.13
0.12
UnitedKingdom 0.15
0.15
United States
0.09
0.14
0.09
0.08
0.08
0.08
0.08
0.09
0.09
0.10
0.08
0.07
SOURCE: OECD (1994). The unemployment rates used to adjust the OECD data are from theEconomlc Report ofthe President, February
1994.
NOTE: NA means not available.
a. Data before 1991 for Germany exclude the eastern states. For 1991 and later, data are for the unified Germany.
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Table 14C.2 Unemployment Rates Used to Adjust Statistics
in Appendix Table 14C.l
Unemployment rates for
Year
Canada France Germany
Italy
Japan
1970
5.7
2.5
0.5
3.2
1.2
1971
6.2
2.8
0.6
3.3
1.3
1972
6.2
2.9
0.7
3.8
1.4
1973
5.5
2.8
0.7
3.7
1.3
1974
5.3
2.9
1.6
3.1
1.4
1975
6.9
4.2
3.4
3.4
1.9
7.1
4.6
3.4
3.9
1976
2.0
8.1
4.1
1977
3.4
5.2
2.0
4.1
3.3
2.3
1978
8.3
5.4
74
2.9
4.4
6.1
2.1
1979
1980
7.5
2.8
4.4
6.5
2.0
7.5
4.0
7.6
4.9
1981
2.2
1982
11.0
5.6
5.4
2.4
8.3
11.8
1983
8.6
6.9
5.9
2.7
7.1
11.2
5.9
2.8
1984
10.0
7.2
1985
10.5
10.5
6.0
2.6
9.5
1986
10.6
6.6
7.5
2.8
1987
8.8
7.9
10.8
6.3
2.9
1988
7.8
6.3
7.9
10.3
2.5
1989
7.5
5.7
7.8
9.6
2.3
8.1
5.0
1990
7.0
9.1
2.1
1991
44
10.3
9.6
6.9
2.1
4.7
11.3
7.3
2.2
104
1992
58a
1993
11.2
11.2a
lO.3 a
2.4a
SOURCE: Economic Report of the President, February 1994
a Based on data for first three quarters.

U.K.
3.1
3.9
4.2
3.2
3.1
4.6
5.9
6.4
6.3
5.4
7.0
10.5
11.3
11.8
11.8
11.2
11.2
10.3
8.6
7.3
6.9
8.8
10.0
10.4

U.S.
4.9
5.9
5.6
4.9
5.6
8.5
7.7
7.1
6.1
5.8
7.1
7.6
9.7
9.6
7.5
7.2
7.0
6.2
5.5
5.3
5.5
6.7
7.4
6.8
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NOTES
This IS an update of an earlier report (CRS Report for Congress No. 92-622-EPW) ongmally
prepared at the request of the Senate Committee on Fmance and the House Committee on Ways
and Means It was first published as a Jomt CommIttee Print (S. Prt 102-88, WMCP 102-41) in
Apnl 1992 With the permissIOn of the Committees, the report was made available for general
congressIOnal use.
1. Abbreviations of currency names used m this chapter are as follows: £-Bntlsh pounds, $CCanadIan dollars F-French francs; OM-German marks, L-Italian lira, Y-Japanese yen, K-Swedlsh
kronor, $-U S. dollars
2. These exchange rates were as follows: I BntIsh pound =$1481; 1 Canada dollar =$-.779;
1 French franc - $0.167; 1 German mark = $0575; 1 Italian lira = $0000619; 1 Japanese yen =
$000944, 1 Swedish kronor =$0.121. In some charts, the followmg abbreviations are used. Canada = CAN; France-FRA, Germany-GER, Italy-ITA, Japan-JPN; Umted Kmgdom-GBR; Umted
States-USA; Massachusetts-MA, Mlssissippi-MS
3. See appendix 14.B for a chronological listing of major developments m each G-7 country
4. The U.S. system operates m each of the fifty states plus the Dlstnct of Columbia, Puerto
RICO, and the VIrgm Islands.
5 This dIscussIOn refers to the nOmInal tax rates applied to employee paychecks. The actual
mCldence of employer and employee taxes IS not addressed. Many econOmIsts believe that payroll
taxes on employers ultimately are borne by employees In the form of lower wages
6 The share of the U.K. program paid from employee taxes could not be determmed.
7 The mtematlOnal literature classIfies the Umted States as a natIOn Without a UA program.
However, m 1990 federal legislatIOn mandated that all state welfare systems provide Aid to Families With Dependent Children (AFDC) to families With an unemployed parent. In the states
affected by thiS mandate, such aid may be demed for families that have received benefits m at least
6 of the precedmg 12 months. The program IS admmlstered by welfare agencies and is financed by
state funds and federal formula matchmg grants
8. No comparable figures were obtained for Japan.
9 A few state programs in the Umted States use higher wage replacement rates at lower wage
levels in computIng benefits
10 The program in Puerto RICO has a lower UI benefit maximum than does any state program
11 The Insured unemployment rate IS the proportIOn of workers claimIng UI benefits of total
workers covered by UI.
12 The total unemployment rate IS the proportIOn of the total CIVIlian labor force that IS unemployed and seekIng work
13 In 1993, South Afnca was still under ItS apartheid system, which excluded lower-paid
black workers from ill coverage
14 The taxable wage ceilIng is DM63,600 ($36,570) In the former GDR.
15. It should be noted that wage figures used by the Japanese program for benefit computatIOn
exclude overtime pay and bonuses, which together constitute nearly one-third of total cash compensatIOn In Japan.
16 The benefit for IndlVlduals ages 18-24 With no children IS £34.80 ($51.54)
17 In March 1995, the House of Representatives passed legislatIOn to repeal AFDC and proVide grants to states for welfare programs of theIr own deSign Similar legislatIOn was under consideratIOn by the Senate for actIOn dunng the 104th Congress.
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Christopher J. O'Leary
W:E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research
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The unemployment insurance (UI) program began modestly. Initial
coverage and eligibility provisions reflected a depression-era concern
about the ability to finance new unemployment benefits. Based on federal law, coverage was originally restricted to firms having eight or
more employees, each working at least 20 weeks in a year. No agricultural, household, nonprofit, or government employees were covered.
The benefit replacement rate most state laws set-50 percent up to a
maximum weekly benefit amount of $15-was quite generous. However, benefits were usually not payable until after a 3-or-4-week waiting period had elapsed, and maximum benefit durations ranged
between 12 and 20 weeks, being 16 weeks in most states. Payment was
only made to involuntarily unemployed persons who were able and
available for work. Eligibility and disqualification rules were tight.
Unemployed workers who quit their previous job, refused suitable
work, or were discharged for misconduct were generally disqualified
for the duration of their unemployment (Blaustein 1993, pp. 159-169).
As World War II began, unemployment plummeted and the outlook
for the UI program became more optimistic. The program entered a
period of expansion, which continued into the 1960s and 1970s. It was
felt that more benefits via higher benefit maximums, longer benefit
durations, and decreased waiting periods could be financed. States also
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expanded coverage, while at the same time reducing taxes and increasing the use of experience rating.
Today, there is powerful pressure to reduce the size of government
and to decrease or eliminate some government programs, especially
domestic ones. Despite this situation, the UI program today is
respected as a fundamental part of the foundation for a competitive
labor market. There are political pressures to transfer at least some of
the federal responsibilities under the program to the states. The main
target of devolution advocates is the administrative funding of the program. Nonetheless, it appears likely that UI will survive as a model
federal-state program, even if there is a tilt toward more state control.
Benefit liberality reached its high point in the 1970s; since then, the
generosity of both the regular and extended benefit programs has been
in decline. Both state and federal UI policy has become increasingly
restrictive. The permanent Extended Benefit program has been especiallyaffected.
Federal UI policy is highly cyclical. In periods of prosperity, the
program has largely been ignored; during recessions, pressures build to
extend benefit durations. Because of the prior weakening of the permanent Extended Benefit program, during the past two recessions temporary emergency programs have been the primary vehicle for extending
durations. These issues are examined in the following section of this
chapter.
The chapter then presents summary comments on UI taxation. The
discussion of benefit financing reviews trends in financing, proposals
to increase the taxable wage base, and experience rating in relation to
temporary and permanent layoffs. Administrative funding is considered in terms of distributional issues between states and the adequacy
of annual federal budget appropriations.
Although ideas for reforms have come from many sources, there has
been no comprehensive revision of the UI program since the enactment
of the Unemployment Compensation Amendments of 1976. Two advisory bodies have been established by Congress to review the UI program and to make policy recommendations: the National Commission
on Unemployment Compensation in 1976 and the Advisory Council on
Unemployment Compensation in 1991. The fourth section of this concluding chapter reviews the recommendations of these two bodies, fol-
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lowed by a discussion of the important concept of preserving the
insurance principle in section five.
During the past decade, various innovative ideas to change the VI
system have been proposed and investigated. The integration of the VI
system into a broader reemployment system has also begun as part of
the response to the growth in permanent job loss and worker dislocation. Ideas for new approaches to the VI program, particularly for
reemploying VI recipients, have emerged from a series of state and
federal field experiments in VI conducted over the past ten years. Some
of the findings from these experiments have resulted in federallegislation that improves the reemployment incentives in VI. This experience
is discussed, along with the response of the VI system to new technologies for administration of benefits and the system's potential to adjust
to fundamental changes in the labor force behavior of American workers. The concluding section considers the likely future of the VI program.

Benefit Trends in the Unemployment Insurance System

The total benefits paid by the VI system can be expressed as the
product of the number of benefit recipients, the average benefit level,
and the average duration of benefits. The information needed to compute the total can be gathered as the answers to three simple questions:
who, how much, and how long? More specifically:
Who?

Persons with recent labor market experience
unemployed through no fault of their own

How much?

Partial wage replacement

How long?

Temporary wage replacement

Trends in benefit payments from the system depend on answers to one
or more of these and related questions. This is the approach of our brief
review of coverage and eligibility in this section.
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Who Receives Benefits? Coverage, Eligibility, and Disqualifications
Coverage under VI is generally defined by the industry or other
characteristics of the employer. VI coverage has gradually expanded
over the past sixty years as it became clear that covering all experienced wage and salary workers was feasible. The 1976 amendments
left experienced wage and salary workers uncovered in only a very few
industries and types of firms.
Given the nature of VI as an insurance system, the reason for job
separation is crucial to determining eligibility, and thus how many of
the VI-covered ultimately receive benefits. The VI program generally
only compensates experienced wage and salary workers who have lost
their jobs through no fault of their own.
In the Current Population Survey (CPS), the household survey from
which total employment and unemployment are estimated, one may
enter unemployment for anyone of four reasons. One may have lost a
job, left a job, be a new entrant to the labor force, or be a reentrant
returning to the labor force after some hiatus. Vnder the various current
state laws, as shown in table 15.1, VI only has the potential to compensate 40 to 60 percent of all the unemployed who are job losers. Since
VI typically provides only 26 weeks of benefits, its true potential is the
even smaller fraction of job losers who are unemployed up to 26
weeks. A sizable proportion of this population actually receives VI
benefits.
The relationship between the number of job losers and the number
of workers claiming VI-the average weekly insured unemployment
(AWIV)-in the regular VI program has fluctuated over time.
Throughout the 1970s, the number of regular program VI claimants
approximated the number of job losers. Since the early 1980s that fraction has been at a much lower level, although there are signs of
rebound since 1984. Actual benefit receipt reflects demographic and
economic factors as well as state VI laws. Chapters 2, 3 and 4 of this
book reviewed the issues of coverage and of initial and continuing eligibility that influence who collects VI benefits.
Coverage
As noted, since the 1976 amendments, most wage and salary workers are in jobs covered by VI. Agricultural and household workers are

Table 15.1 Job Losers and Other Unemployed Workers, by Reason for Unemployment, 1967-1994
Job losers
Job leavers
Reentrants
New entrants
Calendar
Level
Percent
Level
Percent
Level
Percent
Level
Percent
year
(thousands) of total (thousands) of total (thousands) of total (thousands) of total
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985

1,229
1.070
1,017
1,811
2,323
2,108
1,694
2,242
4,386
3,679
3,166
2,585
2,635
3,947
4,267
6,268
6,258
4,421
4,139

41.3
38.0
35.9
44.2
46.3
43.2
38.8
43.5
55.3
49.7
45.3
41.7
42.9
51.7
51.6
58.7
58.4
51.8
49.8

438
431
436
550
590
641
683
768
827
903
909
874
880
891
923
840
830
823
877

14.7

945

15.3
15.4
13.4
11.8
13.1
15.6
14.9

909
965
1,228
1,472
1,456
1,340
1,463

10.4
12.2

1,892
1,928
1,963
1,857
1,806
1,927
2,102
2,384
2,412
2,184
2,256

13.0
14.1
14.3
11.7
11.2
7.9
7.7
9.6
10.6

Total
unemployment
(thousands)

31.8
32.3
34.1

396
407
413

13.3
14.4
14.6

2,975
2,817
2,832

30.0
29.3
29.8
30.7
28.4
23.9
26.0
28.1
29.9
29.4
25.2
25.4

5.4
630
677
649
681

12.3
12.6
13.9
14.9
13.2
10.4
12.1
13.6
14.3
13.3
11.4
11.9
11.1
11.3

4,093
5,016

10,678
10,717

13.0
12.5

8,539
8,312

22.3
225
25.6
27.1

623
895
953
885
817
872
981
1,185
1,216
1,110
1,039

4,882
4,365
5,156
7,929
7,406
6,991
6,202
6,137
7,637
8,273

(contmued)

0'1

-l
UJ

0\

Table 15.1 (continued)
Calendar
year
1986

-....l

+::-

Job losers
Level
Percent
(thousands) of total
4,033
49.0

Job leavers
Level
Percent
(thousands) of total
1,015
12.3

1987

3,566

48.0

965

13.0

1988

3,092

46.1

14.7

Reentrants
Level
Percent
(thousands) of total
2,160
26.2
1,974
26.6
1,809

Level
(thousands)
1,029

Percent

of total

Total
unemployment
(thousands)

12.5

8,237

920

12.4

7,425

816

12.2

6,701

1989

2,983

45.7

983
1,024

15.7

1,843

28.2
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6,528

1990

3,322

48.3

1,014

14.8

1,883

27.4

654

9.5

6,874

1991

4,608

54.7

979

11.6

2,087

24.8

753

8.9

8,426

1992

5,291

56.4

975

10.4

2,228

23.7

890

9.5

9,384

1993

4,769

54.6

946

10.8

2,145

24.6

874

10.0

8,734

3,815
1994
1967-1994 average

47.7

791

9.9

2,786

34.8

604

7.6

7,996

49.5

11.9

27.0

New entrants

26.9

11.7
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the main groups outside UI coverage. A much larger group that could
be covered consists of the self-employed. Reducing or eliminating
requirements for substantial work experience to embrace new labor
force entrants and reentrants could also greatly increase the number of
workers covered by UI, although coverage of these last two groups is
hard to justify on insurance grounds.
Self-employment has grown rapidly in the United States. According
to the U.S. Small Business Administration, the number of selfemployed workers in the United States rose from 5.99 million individuals in 1981 to 6.46 million in 1985. In 1985,9.1 percent of all nonagricultural workers were engaged in self-employment (U.S. Small
Business Administration 1989). This sharp growth has removed an
increasing portion of the U.S. labor force from potential UI coverage.
There are considerable conceptual and practical barriers to covering
the self-employed within the current UI framework. These include difficulties in distinguishing periods of employment from periods of
unemployment, determining the level of wages and salaries during
periods of employment, and ascertaining reasons for separation.
Making coverage available to workers without recent labor market
experience would allow some new entrants and reentrants to be beneficiaries under the UI program. Such coverage opens up another series of
problems. First, UI in the United States is an insurance program that
provides protection against the risk of involuntary unemployment.
Covering those with no recent labor market experience would violate
the insurance principle by allowing benefits to be paid to those who
choose to leave the status of n~nemploymentfor that of unemployment. This would make the UI program a form of unemployment compensation or unemployment assistance that exists in some other
industrial countries. Second, there is the issue of setting the level and
duration of benefits. Clearly there would be no wage or employment
history on which to base benefits; they would have to be uniform or be
based on need.
Covering new entrants and reentrants to the labor force would result
in UI becoming a dual system. Benefits for experienced workers would
be based on labor market experience-an insurance principle-while
benefits for everyone else would be based on need-a welfare principle. Both parts would have to be administered, simultaneously and
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side-by-side. Other developed industrial nations have shown little
enthusiasm for such coverage.
Eligibility and Disqualification

Over the past five decades, states have gradually tightened UI eligibility criteria. This tightening has involved both initial eligibility and
continuing eligibility for UI benefits. To retain the insurance character
of UI, states have tended to exclude most claimants who voluntarily
leave a job from initial UI eligibility. Over the years, the states have
wrestled with whether to make these unemployed workers eligible
after some fixed, limited period of time or to disqualify them for the
entire period of their unemployment. The logic of a limited disqualification is that, while an unemployed worker may have originally left a
job voluntarily, after a certain period of time the unemployment effectively becomes involuntary, as a result of labor market conditions and
not because of the personal choice to quit the prior job. At first, most
states disqualified claimants for the whole benefit year. As can be seen
in table 15.2, by 1952, most states had adopted limited-duration disqualifications. The pendulum has swung back sharply since 1970.

Table 15.2 Number of States with Disqualifications for the Duration of
Unemployment, by Reason for Disqualification

1952
1960
1970
1980
1990
1995

Voluntary
leaving
12
18
27
43
50
50

Discharge for
misconduct
6
11
25
33
42
41

Refusal of
suitable work
13
15
23
30
41
41

SOURCE' U.S. Department of Labor (vanous years, 1952-1995)

A trend toward tightening eligibility was completed by 1990. While
from the 1940s through much of the 1960s the UI program served both
job losers and, with a delay, job leavers, the tide then turned. Today,
nearly all states serve job losers only. As can be seen from table 15.1,
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the result has been a cut in the portion of unemployed workers who
could potentially receive VI from about three-fifths to about one-half.
It does not seem likely that the current state restrictions on eligibility
for voluntarily leaving a job-or for other reasons, such as discharge
for misconduct or refusal of suitable work-will change substantially
in the near future.
How Long Are Benefits Provided?

The duration of benefits is related to two different policy considerations: the maximum potential duration of benefits under the regular
program and the availability and potential duration of extended benefits. For the first two decades of the VI program, there were no
extended benefit programs. The question to be answered was the following: How long a period of temporary unemployment should be
compensated?
In 1958, Congress began a lengthy, fitful debate over the issue of
long-term unemployment compensation. The discussion concerned
whether there was a federal responsibility to deal with unemployment
that states decided endured beyond the "temporary" period they could
afford to insure, and whether this should be addressed from the standpoint of the affected individual or of whole geographic areas.
Regular Unemployment Insurance Duration

The appropriate maximum potential duration of benefits under the
regular VI program seems to have been settled by consensus. A maximum potential duration of 26 weeks of regular benefits is now the
norm. Only two states, Washington and Massachusetts, offer a different
maximum duration of 30 weeks.
At the inception of the federal-state VI program, there was a lack of
uniformity among states on the maximum potential duration of benefits. Because of early actuarial studies that expected far greater
demands on the VI system than in fact occurred, six months of benefits
seemed financially out of reach. In 1940, with all state VI programs
operational, the most popular maximum potential duration of benefits
was 16 weeks. As seen in table 15.3, twenty-seven states offered up to
16 weeks, fourteen had shorter potential durations, and nine had longer
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potential durations: only two states ventured to the current norm of 26
weeks.
Table 15.3 Maximum Duration of the Regular Unemployment Insurance
Program (in weeks)

1940
1945
1950
1955
1960
1965
1970
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995

12-15
14
2
7
0
0
1
1
0
0
0
0
0

16
27
12
4
3
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

17-19
4
4
2
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

20
3
20
22
10
2
0
0
1
0
1
1
0

21-25
0
7
9
9
7
2
2
0
0
0
0
0

26
2
5
13
27
33
40
41
42
42
48
50
51

27-39
0
0
0
1
9
9
10
9
9
3
2
2

SOURCE U.S Department of Labor, Slgmficant PrOVlswns of Unemployment Laws, varIOus
Issues, 1940-1995.

State attitudes about the maximum potential duration of VI changed
rapidly after World War II. The war years had been a period of low
unemployment, and an expected postwar recession never materialized.
As a result, maximum durations expanded rapidly. In the late 1940s, a
large plurality of states selected 20 weeks as their maximum. In the
1950s, however, a consensus began to emerge that 26 weeks was the
right figure for the VI program. By 1960, thirty-three states had legislated 26-week maximums, and by 1980, forty-two. Interestingly,
between 1960 and 1980 about nine states flirted with longer (27- to-39week) durations. Since 1990, seven of them have dropped back to the
consensus 26-week limit.
Today, a maximum of six months of regular VI benefits is viewed as
standard. It is the base from which extended benefits have been considered and implemented. The 26-week maximum duration is likely to
continue to be a fixed feature for the near future of the regular VI program. The determination of states not to pay more than 26 weeks of
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benefits pointed to the need for extended support during a period of
high unemployment. When the permanent Extended Benefit program
was created in 1970, it took for granted the emerging norm of 26 weeks
of regular VI benefits and built an extension upon that base.
Extended Duration of Unemployment Insurance Benefits

Debate on extended VI benefits centers on two main issues. The first
has been a concern since the 1950s: How to deal with long-term cyclical unemployment? The other issue dates mainly from the early 1980s
and concerns long-term unemployment due to structural change rather
than to fluctuations in the business cycle.
Despite concerns about the importance of long-term cyclical unemployment and the problem of workers who are permanently separated
from their previous employment, most unemployed persons are only
temporarily disconnected from their jobs. As a result, the VI program
mainly provides short-term income support to workers who return to
the same or similar jobs. In fact, since 1971, the average duration for
an insured spell of unemployment has varied between a low of 5.4
weeks in 1974 and a high of 8.1 weeks in 1993. The duration per spell
of unemployment remained at a high level of 7.9 weeks in 1994,
despite the improved economy. Nonetheless, only 27- 40 percent of
regular program beneficiaries exhausted their entitlement to VI benefits
in each of the past twenty-five years.
The policy history of extended VI benefits reflects the view of the
federal government that most recessions are national in scope and
require a federal policy response. The programs also reflect the political reaction of Congress to the needs of constituents when recessions
increase both the numbers of job losers and their durations of unemployment. High rates of regular benefit exhaustion have frequently
prompted a congressional response.
As discussed in chapter 6, long-term unemployment during recessionary periods has generated a congressional response in the form of
both the permanent Extended Benefit (EB) program and a series of
temporary (generally third-tier) emergency programs. The first temporary emergency program was enacted during the 1958 recession. The
permanent EB program, enacted in 1970, was designed to eliminate the
need for such ad hoc congressional responses to each recession. That
intent has not been realized. Regardless of the strength of the perma-
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nent EB program, since its enactment, Congress has felt a need to
intervene with additional programs in each recession.

Table 15.4 Extended Benefits and Emergency Program Benefits as a
Percentage of Regular Program Benefits
Payment period

Extended benefits Emergency benefits as
as a percentage
a percentage
of regular benefits
of regular benefits

Recession

Examined

1974-1975

1974-1977

17.7

14.9

1980-1982

1980-1985

7.4

9.9

1990-1991

1990-1994

0.5

24.9

SOURCE US. Department of Labor, VI Database.

Table 15.4 summarizes the relative importance of the permanent and
temporary extended benefit programs over the past two-and-a-half
decades by listing the percentage of regular benefits paid by each during recession periods. The table shows that the permanent EB program
as originally enacted was a true second-tier program. During the 19741975 recession, EB payments exceeded the temporary Federal Supplemental Benefits despite the high level of payments by this third-tier
program. EB payments declined in the early 1980s after the legislative
tightening of the program in 1981. Finally, in the most recent recession, EB payments became negligible, and Emergency Unemployment
Compensation bore the full weight of providing benefits for regular
program exhaustees.
How Much Is Paid in Weekly Benefits?

A central standard of UI since program inception has been replacement of 50 percent of lost wages and salaries for the great majority of
claimants. Most state UI formulas do replace about half of lost wages
and salaries up to a maximum benefit. However, despite fifty years of
exhortation and unsuccessful federal legislative efforts, the goal of
replacing half of prior wages for the great majority of UI recipients has
not been approached. The main impediment is usually the fixed state
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maximum benefit level, which constrains the replacement rate for
high-wage individuals (see Haber and Murray 1966, pp. 441-444;
O'Leary 1996).
In general, during the past half century, the rule advocated to
achieve the goal of 50 percent wage replacement for most workers has
been to set the maximum benefit amount at two-thirds of the average
weekly wage in the state. While nine states had provisions in 1996 to
set the maximum weekly benefit amount at or above two-thirds of the
state average weekly wage (see table 5.2 in chapter 5), as table 15.5
shows, in 1993, on the basis of aggregate average data, only one state
had a maximum weekly benefit that high. In most states, in fact, the
maximum was less than 50 percent of their average weekly wage.
Table 15.5 Maximum Weekly Benefit Amount as a Percentage of the
Average Weekly Wage, Calendar Year 1993
Less than 40%
40 - 49%
50 - 59%
60 - 65%
66 2/3% or more

Number of states
8
23
15
6
1

SOURCE U.S Department of Labor, VI Database

As a result, the U.S. gross replacement rate-the average weekly
benefit amount divided by the average weekly wage- has been considerably below the targeted 50 percent. Throughout the post-World
War II period, UI benefits have generally replaced about one third of
lost income. As shown in table 5.1, since 1947 the gross replacement
rate has only varied between 0.32 and 0.37.
Individual state replacement rates reflect specific legislative provisions, and the national replacement rate masks big differences between
states. At the high end, Hawaii replaces 51 percent, and Kansas and
Rhode Island replace 44 percent. At the low end, California and Alaska
replace 28 percent.
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The Gap Between Insured and Total Unemployment

Since the early 1980s, there has been growing interest in the proportion of unemployed workers who receive UI benefits. The U.S. Department of Labor has funded four studies to better understand this issue
(see Burtless and Saks 1984; Corson and Nicholson 1988; Vroman
1991). This research has provided insight into the reasons for the gap
between total unemployment, as measured by the CPS, and insured
unemployment. Another formulation of this concept is the recipiency
rate, which is the proportion of all unemployed who receive UI benefits.
As discussed in chapter 2, the gap has also become an important
policy issue because of the belief that closing much of it is within the
control of state and federal governments. However, research funded by
the Department of Labor has shown that much of the gap is due to fac~ors not directly influenced by policy action. The causal factors identified by research include the changing industrial mix of employment in
the United States and the way that unemployment is measured.
The gap has been a target of critics who argue that the UI system is
inadequate, both with respect to the regular UI program at all times and
to extended benefit programs during recessionary periods. The size of
the gap is related to nearly all of the benefit payment provisions of the
program. Eligibility and disqualification provisions directly determine
who receives benefits, and duration provisions determine how long
benefits are paid. Furthermore, the level of UI benefits may affect
whether unemployed workers apply for benefits and how long they
draw benefits.
Another major concern about the gap, measured as the ratio of
insured unemployment to total unemployment, is the fact that UI benefit provisions keep the ratio low for the regular UI program as compared to that of other developed industrial nations. The gap also varies
with the business cycle and falls during periods of economic expansion. As a result, advocates for wider availability of regular benefits
frequently criticize the program because of the low percentage of the
total unemployed drawing UI benefits during peaks in the business
cycle (see Baldwin and McHugh 1992).
As shown in table 15.6, the annual average recipiency rate for the
regular program has varied between 29 and 50 percent since 1967. The
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Table 15.6 Percentage of Unemployed Receiving UI, National Averages,
1967-1994
Year
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994

Regular state UI
(percent)
41
39
39
44
43
38
37
44
50
40
38
38
40
44
37
38
32
29
31
32
31
31
33
36
40
34
.32
34

All programs
(percent)
43
42
41
48
52
45
41
50
75
67
56
43
42
50
41
45
44

34
34
33
32
32
33
37
42
52
48
37

NOTE: The category "all programs". mcludes regular state VI, and VI benefits for former cIvIlIan
federal employees (VCEF), former armed services personnel (VCX), railroad employees (RR),
extended benefits (EB), federal supplemental benefits (FSB), special unemployment assistance
(SVA), federal supplemental compensatIOn (FSC), and extended unemployment compensatIOn
(EVC).
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size of the gap reflects the nature of the VI program as a system to partially compensate for job loss. While job losers make up about half of
all unemployed persons, as can be seen in table 15.1, their share of the
total grows during periods of recession. Policy actions that could
reduce the gap include broadening coverage, extending program duration, and easing initial and continuing eligibility provisions.
While small potential increases in coverage among agricultural
employees, domestic workers, and nonprofit employees can be made,
expanding coverage can reduce the gap for the regular VI program
only by expanding beyond the traditional areas and diminishing its
insurance character. Examining the situation for all VI programs,
including extended benefit programs, reveals another possible way to
close the gap. During recessions, extended benefit programs have
greatly raised the ratio of the insured to total unemployed. The ratio
reached as high as 75 percent in 1975. Thus, although generous
extended benefit programs would do little to reduce the large gap in
times of low unemployment, extended benefits could cut the gap considerably during recessionary periods when job losers become a much
larger share of all unemployed.
Finally, table 2.1 shows the wide differences in the gap among
states. In 1993, the proportion of the unemployed claiming VI ranged
from 64 percent in Alaska to 15 percent in South Dakota. The gap also
varies systematically by region of the country. It tends to be smallest in
New England and on the West Coast, and largest in the South, the
Southwest and in the Rocky Mountain states. The wide disparity in the
gap by state is evidence that differences in state policy and state administration with regard to regular VI program parameters are the principal
policy determinant. Thus, to a considerable extent, closing the gap is
an issue of the tightness or looseness of state VI law and policy.
Although one may speak of closing the gap, in reality, eliminating it
is an illusion-if we compare VI claimants to the total population of
total unemployed persons. The gap exists partly because of the exclusion of new entrants and reentrants, whose coverage is beyond the
scope of an insurance program.
By the 1980s, the VI program had evolved into a system that pays
benefits to job losers only for a period of up to 26 weeks, except in
times of recession. As a result, a reasonable baseline for analyzing VI
recipiency can be directed at unemployed workers who have lost their

Unemployment Insurance in the United States

685

job and who are unemployed for under 27 weeks. This approach would
suggest comparing actual recipiency to the level of recipiency if all job
losers unemployed less than 27 weeks claimed VI benefits. For this
group, it can be seen in figure 15.1 that the VI program serves the great
majority of short-term job losers. While the proportion has declined
somewhat in recent years, since the early 1980s the VI program has
still served about four-fifths of this segment of the unemployed population. State and federal policy changes could have opened up benefit
receipt to a wider number of unemployed workers which would have
raised the recipiency rate further. For example, eligibility could be
extended to a small portion of unemployed workers who had low baseperiod earnings or had worked part-time.

Trends in Unemployment Insurance Financing
Benefit Financing

Overly pessimistic economic assumptions used during the design of
the federal-state VI system in the 1930s resulted in lower-thanexpected benefit charges and higher-than-needed revenues. There was
a substantial buildup of reserves prior to initial benefit payments in the
late 1930s. On top of this, the virtual full employment during the years
of World War II resulted in the excessive accumulation of reserves. As
a result, as shown in figure 8.2, VI taxes were reduced sharply at the
end of the war, largely through the state-by-state spread of experience
rating.
Despite initial overfunding, the VI system began moving toward
long-term financial problems. The process started with the imposition
of a maximum VI taxable wage base, set at $3,000 in 1939. It continued with the failure of state and federal legislators to follow the example set by the social security system of gradually increasing the taxable
wage base to more or less keep up with inflation. The result of the
diverging taxable wage bases for the two programs is summarized in
figure 8.4.
While the taxable wage base has remained relatively constant in
nominal terms, it has steadily declined both in real terms and relative to

Figure 15.1 Regular Program Insured Unemployed as a Percenage of Job Losers Unemployed Less Than 27 Weeks
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average wages. The small increases in the taxable wage base have
proved to be only modest and temporary exceptions to the trend.
Although the UI average tax rate on taxable wages has been on an
upward trend since World War II, as shown in figure 8.3, the UI system
has not achieved a sound financial footing in large part because of the
shrinking taxable wage base. Benefit levels, on the other hand, have
increased with wages and prices and have remained relatively constant
in real terms.
Chapter 9 points out that, although the period from 1979 to the
present has seen some rebuilding of the UI trust fund, reserves have not
reached the level attained just before the 1974-1975 recession. The
rebuilding was spurred in part by the decision of the federal government to begin charging interest on state trust fund borrowing in 1982.
Although this provided a strong incentive for states to maintain a solvent trust fund, the recovery of adequate state trust fund reserves has
been modest. As chapter 9 discusses, part of the explanation for this
limited growth in reserves may be the increased reliance by states on a
responsive financing system rather than on a system that makes extensive and substantial use of forward funding. State legislatures have felt
political pressure to reduce UI tax rates, even when state trust fund
accounts have been below the level considered sufficient on an actuarial basis to weather the next recession.
One policy conclusion from this analysis that economists widely
accept is a need to increase the UI taxable wage base and then to index
the wage base to keep up with inflation. This is a conclusion of Levine
in chapter 8. It has also been a recommendation of the National Commission on Unemployment Compensation in 1980 and of the Advisory
Council on Unemployment Compensation in 1995. Despite this widespread policy consensus, strong opposition in the business community
has meant little movement in the UI taxable wage base throughout six
decades of the program, and no increase in the base in well over a
decade. The result is an enormous difference between the taxable wage
bases of the two programs which started at the same time. While the
indexed wage base for social security stands at $65,400 in 1997, the UI
program continues with a federal taxable wage base of $7,000 and little
prospect for change.
Another concern of economists in their study of the UI system since
at least the 1970s has been the impact of imperfect experience rating.
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Analysis has demonstrated how less-than-perfect experience rating
offers incentives to employers to initiate temporary layoffs. For example, Levine concludes in chapter 8 that layoffs would be 20 to 50 percent lower in a perfectly experience-rated system.
While perfect experience rating has never been a goal of the state or
federal policy makers, the degree of experience rating differs widely
among states. Analysts have tried to draw attention to this variation by
developing empirical measures of experience rating. These indexes
have been analyzed and measured over the past decade and a half (see
Wandner and Crosslin 1980; Topel 1984; Hunt and O'Leary 1989;
Vroman 1989). The Department of Labor has published an experiencerating index for each state since 1988. There is not yet any indication
that its publication has resulted in any measurable change in overall
experience rating or even in a narrowing of variation among states in
their degree of experience rating.
Although most economists believe that the degree of experience rating should be increased, policy makers cannot necessarily agree on
whether or how this should be done. For example, in its final report
released in January 1996, the Advisory Council on Unemployment
Compensation did not offer a majority recommendation on this matter.
Most analysis of the experience rating of UI taxes has been directed
at its role in financing temporary periods of unemployment. Brechling
and Laurence (1995) have investigated how experience rating might
operate in response to permanent layoffs. As mentioned throughout
this book, permanent job separations resulting from business restructuring and plant closings have increased tremendously since the 1980s.
New UI financing strategies must address this issue.
Brechling and Laurence (1995) conclude in their book that increasing the extent of experience rating is as appropriate in the case of permanent layoffs as in the case of temporary layoffs, but caution that it is
more difficult to accomplish. They argue that, just as for temporary
layoffs, experience rating for permanent layoffs can be improved by
raising maximum tax rates and lowering minimum tax rates. However,
Brechling and Laurence assert that these actions alone are not sufficient. They advocate additional steps to require that firms with declining employment internalize a greater share of the costs that result from
their layoffs.
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Brechling and Laurence (1995) recommend two additional changes:
(1) shortening the time lag when determining the VI tax rate for an
employer; and (2) uniform adoption of the reserve ratio method of
experience rating, with several modifications. To minimize the time lag
in setting employer tax rates, they propose that the VI tax rate for the
current year be determined by the employer's reserve ratio at the end of
the prior year.
They favor the reserve ratio system of experience rating for two
main reasons. First, a positive trust fund balance could easily be incorporated as an asset on the firm's balance sheet, while a negative balance could be entered as a liability. Requiring these entries on the
balance sheet may induce firms to more fully consider the VI tax consequences of layoff actions. Second, if a firm goes into bankruptcy, its
positive balance would be refunded, while any negative balance would
make the state VI trust fund a creditor in legal proceedings. These recommendations directly address the problem the VI program faces in
financing benefit payments for inactive employers. Finally, Brechling
and Laurence recommend that firms be paid interest on their positive
trust fund balances and be charged interest on their negative balances.
Interest owed by negative balance employers would be collected in
cash, while interest payable would be added to the firm's positive balance. By penalizing negative balances and rewarding positive balances,
these policy recommendations are intended to encourage firms to build
up VI trust funds.
The analysis of the financing of both temporary and permanent layoffs assumes that raising experience-rated charges to employers will
result in greater internalizing of VI costs by employers imposing layoffs. Employers, however, are not charged for layoffs until determinations are made by the state VI agency that they are responsible for the
given layoffs. As a result, firms have an incentive to challenge the attribution of layoffs to them. The growth of challenges related to benefits
and separation issues and the growth of private service bureaus, which
manage VI accounts for both private and public employers, are indications that employers are choosing to dispute potential charges to their
VI account, either themselves or through their agents. To date, there
has been no study of the effect of VI service bureaus on the personnel
policies of employers or on the operation of VI. Such a study would
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enlighten policy on experience rating and benefit eligibility; however,
proper data to investigate this issue would be very difficult to obtain.
Administrative Financing

Administrative financing is discussed at length in chapter 13 as a
federal-state relations issue. In one sense, UI administrative financing
should be very simple and straightforward. The UI program is very
efficiently administered, it is highly automated, and its costs are low.
Administration costs about six cents per dollar of benefits paid and
about three cents per dollar of tax collections. Nonetheless, there are a
number of controversial questions in UI administrative financing. Who
should collect FUTA tax money that is used for administrative financing and other purposes? How should the administrative funds be distributed among the states? Also, how much money should be
distributed each year?
In chapter 13, West and Hildebrand discuss the issue in the context
of the search for balance between the federal and state partners in the
system. Contention between the partners is probably greatest over the
question of how big the total administrative financing level should be,
as opposed to the question of how money should be allocated among
states.
Just as subsidies flow from employers with low layoffs to employers
with high layoffs due to imperfectly experience-rated financing of benefit charges, cross subsidies between the states have long existed in
administrative financing. These cross-subsidies have been measured by
the U.S. Department of Labor for nearly two decades, and the results
have been published and made available to the states and other interested parties (see Van Erden and Wandner 1979). Unlike the undesirable subsidies in benefit financing, the subsidies in administrative
financing are intentional and closely managed. The principal reason for
administrative cross-subsidies is to accommodate the differences in UI
workloads, which result mainly during recessionary periods that do not
impact all regions of the country equally. These cross-subsidies accommodate regional downturns such as the "Oil Patch" recession of the
mid-1980s. Persistent cross-subsidies also result from the higher cost
of administering UI programs in low-density, low-population regions.
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While many cross-subsidies tend to be intermittent and to move
from one portion of the country to the other, historically there have
been some persistent "winners" and "losers" among the states. Not surprisingly, the persistent losers have tended to spearhead the demand for
devolution of UI administrative funding. The call for an end to crosssubsidies in UI administrative financing and more limited calls for the
end of federal extended benefits seem to represent a retreat from the
national public policy focus of UI.
Of great public policy concern is the developing problem of inadequate total resources for UI administrative financing. UI is an entitlement program and, as such, it is treated as a "mandatory" item in the
federal budget. The funds needed to pay UI benefits are thus automatically appropriated. Administrative financing, however, is treated as
"discretionary" under the federal budget. This means that UI administrative financing must compete with other items for funding within the
single, limited federal budget appropriation for the U.S. Departments
of Labor, Education, and Health and Human Services. As a result, there
is no guarantee that the funding needed to administer UI workloads
and to cover state salary increases will be made available. There is a
basic contradiction in recognizing that UI benefits payments are driven
by state unemployment, while ignoring the fact that claims loads affect
administrative costs as well. Concern over administrative financing is
heightened by the unique nature of the UI program: no other federally
funded program expands and contracts so much over the business
cycle.
If UI administrative financing remains a discretionary item in the
federal budget, the long-term survival of the UI system as a national
unemployment program will be in jeopardy. Unfortunately, efforts by
the states and the executive branch to work with Congress toward making UI administrative financing "mandatory" under the federal budget,
or to adopt some other similar rule, have not been successful.
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Ideas for Reform and Change: Recommendations from Two
National Commissions

There has been no comprehensive reform of the UI system since
1976. The Congress that enacted the Unemployment Compensation
Amendments of 1976 did not expect that a two-decade hiatus in reform
legislation would follow. Indeed, the 1976 legislation established the
National Commission on Unemployment Compensation (NCUC). The
final report'of the NCUC was issued in 1980 and has languished since
then. In 1991, Congress established the Advisory Council on Unemployment Compensation (ACUC) to take a fresh look at UI policy
issues.
The reports and recommendations of these two commissions reflect
their mandates to make major policy recommendations about the future
direction of the UI program. Both were given the task of conducting a
thorough review of the entire program. They each provided a different
view of the potential scope and nature of major UI reform. This section
briefly reviews both sets of recommendations to identify the similarities and differences in their findings.
The scope and nature of the recommendations from these two panels
differ greatly. The recommendations reflect the many changes that
have occurred over the past two decades. The relevant changes affected
the structure of the U.S. economy, the political environment at the state
and federal levels, and state and federal government budgetary situations.
Nonetheless, there are some similarities between the two sets of recommendations. First, a shared principle is the ideal of insulating the UI
program from federal budget considerations and from the influence of
federal agencies other than the U.S. Department of Labor. This is
reflected in the common recommendations to remove the UI trust fund
from the federal unified budget, exempt UI benefits from federal
income taxation, and let the states-instead of the Internal Revenue
Service-collect the FUTA tax. The ACUC goes a step further in this
regard and offers a recommendation to remove federal impediments to
the collection of UI taxes for independent contractors. Second, there is
agreement on a number of minor issues, such as
• extending agricultural coverage
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• making nonprofit organizations pay the FUTA tax
• strengthening the appeals process
However, the particulars of the NCUC and the ACUC recommendations on these and other matters differ significantly.
Increasing Federal Controls: National Commission
on Unemployment Compensation

The Unemployment Compensation Amendments of 1976 included
the reforms upon which there was agreement. Congress left an agenda
of further issues to be considered and created the NCUC to investigate
the alternatives (see NCUC 1980).
The NCUC saw its role as completing the work begun by the Social
Security Act of 1935: building a comprehensive, soundly financed
income maintenance program for unemployed workers. Its members
also wanted to insulate the program from federal budgetary disputes
that might interfere with the operation of the UI system.
On the benefit side, the NCUC approved an ambitious set of recommendations. For the regular UI program, it proposed a wide variety of
federal standards that would raise benefit payments by increasing the
maximum benefit level, raise replacement rates for benefit paid below
the maximum level, and reduce the earnings required to qualify for the
maximum duration of benefits. It also recommended federal requirements increasing coverage, easing eligibility requirements, and limiting the reasons for disqualifications.
The NCUC further proposed a greatly enhanced extended benefits
program, recommending lower thresholds for states to "trigger on" the
existing permanent EB program during periods of high unemployment.
In addition, it recommended a permanent emergency third-tier program, over and above EB, which would also be triggered on by severe
unemployment.
Moreover, the NCUC saw its role as the creator of a number of new
federal programs. These included significant new UI plans such as
reinsurance, which would buffer the states from unusually heavy benefit costs, allowing them to maintain state solvency by pooling their
independent state UI trust fund accounts. It also included major initiatives that went beyond the scope of the UI program, such as means-
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tested unemployment assistance for UI program exhaustees, an income
maintenance program for displaced homemakers, and a lifetime
reserve benefit program for workers 60 years of age and over.
At the same time, the NCUC recommended that the funding capacity of the program be raised. It suggested that this be accomplished by
expanding federal requirements for the states. The primary emphasis,
however, was on federal legislative initiatives. The NCUC proposed
that the federal taxable wage base be increased substantially and
indexed for future adjustments. States were also asked to expand the
tax capacity of their UI systems, largely by improving their state experience-rating provisions.
If enacted, the NCUC recommendations would have greatly
increased UI system costs. A substantial portion of the additional program cost would have been accommodated by a rise in state and federal UI payroll taxes. The NCUC also recommended more federal
control of the system and more uniformity among individual state UI
programs.
The composition and views of the NCUC membership reflected the
Democratic Congress and President of the late 1970s. The final report
of the Commission was completed on Labor Day, 1980. Shortly afterward, Ronald Reagan was elected president. As a result, the final report
was put aside. Today, as in the 1980s, it seems that the economic, political, and social environment gives little chance for adoption of most of
the NCUC recommendations.
Exhorting States to Reform: Advisory Council
on Unemployment Compensation
The Emergency Unemployment Compensation Amendments of
1991 (Public Law [P.L.] 102-164), which initiated Emergency Unemployment Compensation as a temporary third-tier extended benefit program during the 1990-1991 recession, also established the ACUC. The
legislation gave the Council a broad mandate to review the UI program, instructing the council "to evaluate the unemployment compensation program, including the purpose, goals, countercyclical
effectiveness, coverage, benefit adequacy, trust fund solvency, funding
of State administrative cost, administrative efficiency, and other
aspects of the program and make recommendations for improvement."
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The final report of the Council was submitted in February 1996. The
Council also released two annual reports, in February 1994 and February 1995.
The Council found "a pressing need to reform the Extended Benefit
program," and its 1994 report concentrated on the permanent EB program (ACUC February 1994). It proposed that extended benefits trigger on in all states when the seasonally adjusted total unemployment
rate (TUR) in the state exceeds 6.5 percent. 1 The ACUC recommended
that the EB trigger continue to be based on statewide data and not on
local or regional measures. To finance the increase in the cost of EB,
the Council advocated that the federal UI taxable wage base be
increased from $7,000 to $8,500.
The Council also recommended eliminating the federal requirement
that individuals receiving EB must accept any job offered that pays at
least the minimum wage or forfeit eligibility for EB. The Council
advocated a policy of allowing states to set their own work tests for
EB, just as they do for the regular UI program.
By congressional mandate, the Council also considered the UI system's treatment of alien agricultural workers. Until January 1, 1995,
wages paid to legal, temporary alien agricultural workers were exempt
from the Federal Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA). The Council found
that earnings of alien agricultural workers should be subject to the
FUTA tax for two reasons. First, this levy would eliminate the cost
advantage these workers offer to employers over domestic workers on
whose earnings the tax must be paid. Second, the UI trust fund already
bears the cost of certifying alien workers before their admittance to the
United States, by funding the operation of the certifying agency, the
U.S. Employment Service.
In its February 1995 report, the Council made recommendations on
a broad range of issues, mostly dealing with the regular UI program
and its financing. On the benefit side, the ACUC did not call for any
federal standards. Instead, it urged the states to adopt a series of new
approaches to UI eligibility, with the principal goal of improving benefit eligibility and adequacy for low-wage, part-time, intermittent, and
seasonal workers. Because the changes would be targeted to a small
portion of the potentially eligible population of unemployed workers,
there would be only a limited impact on the overall UI program. A
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small number of additional workers-mostly, but not exclusively, lowwage workers-would be able to collect UI benefits.
With respect to financing, the ACUC placed its emphasis on increasing the "forward funding" of the UI program, to ensure sufficient balances in the individual state trust funds to finance benefits in future
recessions. The ACUC offered only recommendations to states regarding financing. It proposed that the program develop a new measure of
adequacy of funding: the average of benefits paid by a state in its three
highest-cost years during the previous twenty years. States were urged
to maintain sufficient reserves to pay at least one year of benefits at that
level. To encourage states to maintain adequate funding, the ACUC
proposed giving them an additional percentage point of interest on all
their UI reserve balances in excess of one "high-cost" year of reserves.
To assure no additional cost to the federal budget, the interest rate premium would be funded by reducing-by two-tenths of a percentage
point or whatever the balancing percentage is-the rate paid on a portion of the reserves of a state, the amount by which such reserves fall
short of the new target trust fund balance.
Proposals for federal legislative requirements were limited to providing incentives to states to forward-fund their programs. The incentives recommended would be conditional interest-free loans or loan
premiums and discounts for states that strive for forward funding of UI
benefits.
With few exceptions, the final report of the ACUC (1996) concentrated on issues dealing with benefit payment and benefit financing
provisions. In a vote divided along business and organized-labor lines,
the ACUC recommended raising the taxable wage base to $9,000 and
then indexing it to the annual increases in national average total wages
in covered employment. As part of the same recommendations, the 0.2
percent FUTA surcharge would be removed.
Proposed changes on the benefit side of the program dealt with the
repeal of selected federal standards regarding denial of benefits to professional athletes, reduction of benefits by the amount of pension payment, denial of benefits between school terms, and certain restrictions
on EB receipt. The ACUC also recommended that federal guarantees
strengthen the right to representation during appeals.
The main thrust of the final report, however, dealt with four other
issues: federal-state relations, certain administrative matters, data and
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reporting, and administrative financing. With respect to the federalstate relationship, the ACVC proposed a new, narrow concept of federal responsibilities. The federal government should concentrate on
two national objectives: assuring that states provide benefits without
interstate competition and assuring forward funding of the VI tax system.
The ACVC also developed a novel approach to federal administration and oversight. It asserted that the federal partner should no longer
mandate a broad and comprehensive scheme of performance measures
and should only require measures affecting those national interests that
conflicted with the interests of the states. Such conflicts were not found
to exist with day-to-day operations of the program, for example, in the
traditional areas of program administration dealing with the timeliness,
quality, and accuracy of the benefit payment and tax collection processes. Thus, designing those measures should be left to the states. In
particular, the ACVC recommended eliminating federal indicators of
tax revenue and benefit payment accuracy, quality, and timeliness. It
proposed that states be encouraged to develop their own wage replacement measures. As a result, these indicators would not necessarily be
subject to interstate comparison or to national aggregation.
According to the ACVC, existing federal performance measures
should be replaced with "measures of access to the VI system." These
indicators would deal with issues such as access to information about
VI, ease of applying for benefits, and access to the system by seasonal,
low-wage, and part-time workers. Thus, the existing federally mandated measures of day-to-day program performance would be replaced
with indexes assessing how state policy and administration affect
access to VI benefits.
The ACVC placed considerable emphasis on the data needs and
reporting requirements of the VI system. Its recommendations
included creating state-by-state VI data bases of comparable program
data, implementing a new biennial supplement to the CPS dealing with
VI issues, improving the state employment and wage (ES-202) reports,
and developing a national longitudinal wage record data base.
Finally, the ACVC recommended improvements to VI administrative financing. Congress was urged to provide adequate administrative
funding on a regular basis. Grants to support innovation for cost effective administration were also advocated.
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Summary

Recommendations of the ACVC made in the mid-1990s were far
more modest than those offered by the NCVC in 1980. The ACVC recommendations also appear to be more sensitive to the contemporary
policy context in the states and Congress than were the recommendations of the NCVC. The current mood is dominated by a political aversion to raising taxes and increasing expenditures. Despite the focused
and measured advice of the ACVC, in this environment, federal VI legislative reform is likely to be limited and incremental.

Retaining the Insurance Concept
As an insurance program, VI has to deal with the moral hazard of
paying benefits to workers who may be purposely avoiding employment. This risk is addressed by the VI work test, which checks labor
force attachment through Employment Service (ES) registration and
provision of employment exchange and reemployment services. Many
states also impose a weekly work search requirement.
The stringency of work search requirements varies considerably
among states. Some states stipulate that unemployed workers who are
not job attached make and document three job contacts per week.
Other states have no specific requirements about job contacts or documentation. In all states, verification of reported work search contacts is
limited or nonexistent.
There has been a strong tendency for states to reduce their work
search requirements over time. By 1990, only 33 states required that
individuals report their work search contacts. This trend is partly the
result of the widely held belief that the work search requirement is not
necessary or effective in promoting return to work. These changes also
appear to be related to the introduction of the Benefits Quality Control
program, which measures benefit payment accuracy and finds a high
level of errors with regard to the work search process. Elimination of
the work search requirement reduces the potential for erroneous payments based on its improper application.
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It is important for the states to have accurate information about the
impact of the work test on the cost of the VI program and on the ability
to assist individuals in returning to work. There has been little research
on evaluating alternative approaches to the work search requirement.
One demonstration project has been conducted, the Washington Alternative Work Search Experiment. The project tested four different work
search approaches, ranging from a streamlined one that did not require
claimants to report employer contacts, to a customized version that tailored claimants' work search to their labor market characteristics and
included intensive reemployment services early in the spell of unemployment. The demonstration showed that, relative to the usual Washington work search requirement of three employer contacts per week,
the streamlined approach significantly increased VI duration and VI
payments, while the customized version with mandatory reemployment services significantly reduced VI payments (Johnson and Klepinger 1991, 1994).
Responding to concerns relevant to the findings of the Washington
Alternative Work Search Experiment that work search requirements
can affect VI durations and VI payments, the Department of Labor initiated the Maryland Work Search Demonstration in 1991. Its primary
objective was to determine whether the stringency of the work search
requirement affects VI durations, VI payments, and wages in subsequent employment. The demonstration was designed to provide data
for policy initiatives for the states and the Labor Department to
increase the effectiveness of the VI work search process. It both tested
the benefits of the work search requirement and attempted to measure
the effectiveness of the enforcement aspect compared to the reemployment services aspect.
The Maryland demonstration involved four treatment groups, each
with a work search requirement differing with respect to stringency,
verification of claimant contacts, and the provision of reemployment
assistance. In the experimental design, claimants were randomly
assigned to one of the four treatment groups or to a control group.
Claimants in the control were given the current search requirements
and services. Enrollment into the experiment began in 1993 and concluded in early 1995.
The evaluation of the demonstration found that each of the four
treatments had their expected effects. Additional work search contacts
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and verifications were each effective in reducing the duration of VI
spells. Participation in a job search workshop-which was not targeted
to those most in need as in worker profiling-was somewhat less effective in reducing VI spells. Finally, removing the requirement to report
job search contacts was found to increase the VI spell, but the increase
was relatively small, expecially compared to the similar Washington
Alternative Work Search Experiment treatment, given the requirement
to maintain regular contact with the VI local office (Klepinger et al.
1997).

Adapting to a Changing World
Dislocation and the Need for Reemployment Services

In response to the growing importance of dislocated workers among
the insured unemployed, the VI program has become more involved in
promoting reemployment. Although dislocated workers represent only
10 to 20 percent of VI claimants, they are the group of unemployed
individuals in greatest need of reemployment assistance. The VI system has a natural role in helping them because nearly all dislocated
workers who remain jobless for long periods claim VI benefits. Since
most dislocated workers apply for VI benefits when they first become
unemployed, the VI program has the potential to direct claimants to
reemployment services early in their spell of unemployment.
The Problem of Worker Dislocation
Worker dislocation as a policy issue in the Vnited States can be
traced back at least to the early 1960s. In 1961, unemployment climbed
to 6.7 percent, a figure considered very high at the time. There were
widespread fears that an acceleration in technological change-termed
"automation"-would displace large numbers of workers in autos,
steel, textiles, and other basic industries (Davidson 1972). In response,
the Kennedy administration proposed and enacted the Manpower
Development and Training Act (MDTA), the first national program
designed to retrain experienced workers for new jobs.
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However, by 1964, unemployment had dropped back below 5 percent, and the nation entered a long period of economic expansion.
Most experienced workers were again employed in their former jobs,
and it had become clear that the threat of widespread technological
unemployment had been greatly exaggerated. In this environment, the
focus of MDTA and other government-sponsored programs shifted to
the needs of the economically disadvantaged in response to the newlydeclared "War on Poverty."
After a twenty-year hiatus, worker dislocation reemerged as a major
national issue in the early 1980s. During the 1981-1982 recession, the
national unemployment rate climbed to a post-World War II record
high of 10.7 percent. Plant closings and permanent mass layoffs in
steel, autos, footwear, textiles, and other industries dislocated millions
of experienced workers, and the worst fears of the early sixties became
a reality in the eighties. Unlike the 1960s, many of the laid-off workers
continued to be unemployed despite a strong economic recovery, as
manufacturing employment declined sharply. By the end of 1984, with
the economy nearly two years into recovery, unemployment remained
well above 7 percent. The new economic reality of structural unemployment had become painfully clear.
In 1984, the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) at the U.S. Department of Labor began conducting surveys to determine the size and
characteristics of the dislocated worker population. While there are no
universally accepted definitions of who is or is not a "dislocated
worker," the BLS definition is a commonly used one. BLS defines dislocated workers as individuals who had at least three years of tenure
with their last employer and lost their job for reasons other than temporary layoff, for example, a plant closing or relocation, or the elimination of the job or shift.
These BLS dislocated worker surveys are special supplements to the
CPS, a monthly survey of about 60,000 households carried out by the
Bureau of the Census for BLS. They are conducted every two years
and solicit retrospective information about the previous five years. For
example, the 1984 survey asked about experience from January 1979
to January 1984. The BLS survey covering the period from January
1989 to January 1994 indicated that the problem of worker dislocation
is substantial and growing. Based on this survey, there were 2.8 million
workers in 1991 and 1992 who had at least three years of tenure with
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their employer and who were permanently displaced from their jobs,
up from 2.2 million such workers in 1989 and 1990. The 1991 and
1992 figures represent a rate of displacement of 3.8 percent for longtenured workers, up from 3.1 percent in the prior two years. If all
workers (regardless of tenure) who were displaced from their jobs are
included in the count, the total number of dislocated workers in the
BLS count rises to 5.4 million individuals for the years 1991 and 1992
(Gardner 1995).
A recent study by the Congressional Budget Office looked at trends
in worker dislocation throughout the decade of the 1980s. It used data
from the BLS displaced worker surveys conducted in 1984, 1986,
1988, 1990, and 1992. The study points out that the number of dislocated workers during the 1980s varied substantially with the business
cycle, ranging from a high of 2.7 million during the recession in 1982
to a low of 1.5 million in 1988, five years into the economic recovery
(Ross and Smith 1993, p. 7). However, during most of those years, the
total number of dislocations ranged between 1.5 and 2 million workers
annually.
While not all of these dislocated workers would have difficulty
becoming reemployed, a large proportion of them, especially those
with long job tenure, could benefit from some type of reemployment
assistance. For example, workers with three or more years of tenure
with their previous employer had longer spells of unemployment and
were more likely to experience a reduction in earnings of 20 percent or
more than were workers with less than three years of tenure (Ross and
Smith 1993, pp. 20-25).
Reemploying Dislocated Workers: The Role of Unemployment
Insurance

The traditional role of the UI program is to provide temporary partial wage replacement to unemployed workers. In the process, the UI
program tests whether unemployed workers are able, available, and
actively seeking work. In most states, emphasis has been more on
checking continuing attachment to the labor force than on attempting
to promote reemployment.
In the 1980s and early 1990s, the problem of worker dislocation had
become a prominent concern for insured unemployed workers. One
indication of this recognition is that when the Unemployment Insur-
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ance Service developed its first "Mission, Vision, Values, Goals" statement in 1992, it adopted the following: "The program's mission is to
provide unemployed workers with temporary income support and to
facilitate re-employment" (Wandner 1992). This statement made clear
the emphasis placed on reemployment by the federal partner in the VI
system.
Recently the VI program has been serving between 8 and 10 million
unemployed workers each year. About one to two million of these individuals are dislocated workers, or about 10 to 20 percent of all workers
served. These people, however, have needs beyond income support,
and they frequently will have great difficulty in returning to work without the assistance of reemployment service providers, generally either
the ES or the Economic Dislocation and Worker Adjustment Assistance (EDWAA) program.
Even though dislocated workers represent a reasonably small portion of all beneficiaries of the VI system, they have received increasing
attention in recent years. As seen in figure 15.2 for 1993, overall the VI
program serves about half of all dislocated workers. Many dislocated
workers return to work quickly, even though they have been permanently separated, and apparently never file for VI benefits. In a recent
dislocated worker study summarized in figure 15.3, VI was found to
serve less than one-third of the dislocated workers unemployed less
than five weeks, but 80 to 90 percent of those unemployed 15 weeks or
longer. This is the great majority of all long-term unemployed dislocated workers who are likely to need reemployment services.
Encouraging New Ideas and Experimentation
Finding Out What Works

For many years, the V.S. Department of Labor has used demonstrations and evaluations to determine the effectiveness of existing programs. Its willingness to evaluate current programs and to test the
potential of new initiatives using field experiments represents a desire
to learn what works and what does not work. These efforts have generally been an attempt to develop the most effective and efficient programs possible to help employ and reemploy America's labor force.
The Department has also periodically reviewed the research it has con-
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Figure 15.2 Total Unemployment, UI Beneficiaries, and Dislocated
Workers, Calendar Year 1993

Figure 15.3 Displaced Workers Who Receive UI, by Duration of Unemployment
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ducted to help determine what works and to develop and select from
policy options (U.S. Department of Labor 1995).
Most of the initial Labor Department experiments were not related
to the UI program. Beginning in the early 1980s, however, a demonstration dealing with the UI work search requirement was done in
Charleston, South Carolina (Corson, Long, and Nicholson 1985). In
the mid-1980s, the Unemployment Insurance Service became active in
operating a series of experiments that tested and evaluated new
approaches to return claimants to work, particularly if they were permanently separated from their previous employer and appeared to be in
need of reemployment assistance.
The impetus for the UI demonstrations and their reliance on the field
experiment approach came from a number of different places. First, the
dislocated worker problem was becoming more important in the U.S.
economy, and recognition of it as a public policy concern was increasing. In 1985, awareness of this issue within the Department of Labor
became greater when William Brock became Secretary of Labor, having worked on international aspects of worker dislocation as the Special Trade Representative. Second, in a period of extreme federal
budget stringency, it was difficult to expect adoption of new policy initiatives that recommended extra or expanded programs. The exception
to this situation would rest on an analysis of cost effectiveness that
demonstrated that the new program would be beneficial to society as a
whole and, if possible, to the government sector, such that the program
might actually save money for the federal government. Third, with frequent political divisions between Congress and the executive branch of
the federal government, agreement about which economic policies
work and which do not work is promoted by an evaluation method that
is simple and direct.
Field experiments involve random assignment of large numbers of
claimants to treatment and control groups, with the response to a new
program change estimated as the difference in the average behavior of
the two groups. With field experiments, there is no need to make questionable modeling assumptions or to use sophisticated statistical analysis to yield meaningful results. Evidence from classically designed
field experiments involving random assignment makes forging policy
agreements easier.
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Just as the V.S. Department of Labor has done, some states have
undertaken their own tests of what works to promote reemployment.
Several states have committed resources to undertake studies and have
initiated programs based on the results. Some of the state studies have
involved experimental designs. In the 1970s and 1980s, Nevada tested
two Claimant Employment Projects that were found successful in
reducing VI durations by having a VI and ES team provide more intensive reemployment services to VI claimants. The Reemploy Minnesota
project duplicated the treatment of intensive job search assistance from
the New Jersey experiment. The Washington Alternative Work Search
Experiment evaluated alternative VI work search requirements and the
provision of job search assistance (see V.S. Department of Labor 1990;
Johnson and Klepinger 1991, 1994). In addition, in 1984, Illinois independently initiated the nation's first experimental test of the reemployment bonus (Woodbury and Spiegelman 1987).
The Unemployment Insurance Experiments

Since the reemergence of worker dislocation as a national policy
issue in the early 1980s, the Department of Labor has conducted eight
experiments designed to test different reemployment service strategies
to assist dislocated workers in making the transition to new employment. The following is a chronological list of the field experiments
undertaken.
Experiment

States involved

Multitreatment: job search
assistance, training grants,
relocation grants, and
reemployment bonuses

New Jersey

Reemployment bonus

Washington and Pennsylvania

Self-employment assistance

Massachusetts and Washington

Work search

Maryland

Job search assistance

District of Columbia and Florida
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The goal of these studies has been to determine what works for dislocated workers, what doesn't work, and why. More specifically, these
field experiments were designed to determine the impacts of various
reemployment services, or combinations of services, on the subsequent
labor market experience of dislocated workers. They examined outcomes such as employment, earnings, and receipt of VI benefits and
other income transfer payments. These studies have also attempted to
estimate the cost-effectiveness of various services and to measure the
return on investment of each service from the perspectives of participants, the government, and society as a whole (see Corson et al. 1992;
Decker and O'Leary 1995; O'Leary, Spiegelman, and Kline 1995;
Benus et al. 1995).
Conclusions about the Experiments
To date, analysis of the VI demonstrations has yielded three strong
conclusions:
• Worker profiling and reemployment services: It is possible to
develop a service delivery system such that the state VI and reemployment service providers can identify dislocated workers early in
their unemployment spell, determine the unique needs of individuals, and then promptly match each worker with appropriate and
effective reemployment assistance.

• Job search assistance: Comprehensive job search assistance is a
highly cost-effective strategy for accelerating the reemployment of
dislocated workers. The experiments suggest that more suitable
jobs are available than are yielded by casual, undirected job search.
This reemployment service provided net benefits to participants,
the government, and society as a whole. Job search assistance is an
option that can be effective and efficient when made widely available for dislocated workers.
• Self-employment assistance: Self employment is of interest to only
a small portion of dislocated workers, but half of those who participated in experimental trials succeeded at starting their own
microenterprises. The final evaluation of the Massachusetts demonstration provides impact and benefit-cost analyses indicating
that self-employment has promise as a labor market intervention
for a small share of unemployed workers.
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The conclusions about the effectiveness of job search assistance are
widely held, based on a number of state and federal experiments. For
example, Meyer (1995) finds that
The job search experiments... try several different combinations of
services to improve job search and increase the enforcement of
work search rules. Nearly all combinations reduce VI receipt
and... increase earnings.... The main treatments have benefits to
the VI system that exceed cost in all cases, and societal-level costbenefit analyses are favorable ... (p. 128).

He recommends that "On the services side we should consider making
job search assistance universal. The exact combination of services we
should include is not completely clear, but jobs search workshops and
individual attention by the same personnel seem promising" (p. 125.
See also Ross and Smith 1993; The Economist 1996).
Implementation of Unemployment Insurance Reemployment
Promotion Options
In March and October 1993, Congress enacted worker profiling legislation as sections of two extensions of the Emergency Unemployment Compensation Act. The October legislation required states to
implement worker profiling provisions and to have their UI programs
refer likely dislocated workers to reemployment services provided by
existing state and federal programs. Under the Worker Profiling and
Reemployment Services (WPRS) system, the UI role ends with the
identification and referral of likely dislocated workers to reemployment services. The UI system cannot provide reemployment services
and federal law does not allow UI trust fund money to pay for services.
Traditional reemployment service providers must make the services
available. With dislocated workers representing one to two million UI
beneficiaries per year, the UI program is dependent on the ES and the
EDWAA programs to devote substantial resources to providing these
services.
To help with the implementation of this legislation, the Department
of Labor provided states with technical assistance and over $20 million
in funding to establish worker profiling mechanisms. The EDWAA
program also provided states with nearly $20 million to build the
capacity to provide reemployment services. By mid-1996, the WPRS
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initiative was operational in all states. Nearly 400,000 unemployed
workers had been profiled and referred to reemployment services during the early six-month operational period from October 1995 through
March 1996.
As a result, implementation of the WPRS initiative generally has
resulted in a cooperative and interdependent relationship between UI,
the ES and the dislocated worker (EDWAA) portion of Job Training
Partnership Act (JTPA) programs at the state level. This relationship
has helped to create a kind of one-stop shopping for reemployment servIces that has been gradually introduced by the states and promoted by
the federal government. The UI system has become a "gateway"
through which dislocated workers pass to receive reemployment services from ES and EDWAA.
The primary emphasis of WPRS has been on the early identification
of dislocated workers and referring them to reemployment servicesprimarily job search assistance. However, as both the New Jersey
experiment and the early implementation of WPRS have shown, a
small but significant portion of the dislocated workers cannot find
employment through basic reemployment services alone. Many of
these hard-to-place clients are referred to retraining, even though participation in training is voluntary under WPRS. About one-fifth of the
unemployed workers referred to reemployment services under the
WPRS initiative were referred to retraining during the early phase of
implementation (Wandner 1996, 1997).
In another reemployment promotion option, the early evaluations of
the self-employment demonstration projects had shown both substantial positive economic impacts and net savings to the federal budget by
1992. These findings were widely disseminated, and they made possible and encouraged two policy initiatives to enact enabling federal legislation. The first was inclusion of a budget-neutral, self-employment
initiative in the comprehensive workforce development plan of the
Clinton administration, which was first made public in August 1993
and later was introduced as the proposed Reemployment Act of 1994
(see Wandner 1992; U.S. Department of Labor 1994a, 1994b).
For the UI program the proposed Reemployment Act placed equal
emphasis on income replacement and reemployment. This initiative
was named "Unemployment Insurance Flexibility," and it had three
components. The first was a self-employment allowance, to be given in
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the form of periodic payments, which states would be authorized to
adopt permanently. Secondly, states were authorized to adopt reemployment bonuses to be paid to permanently separated workers who
speed their return to employment. Finally, the short-time compensation
program to promote work sharing, which already existed in eighteen
states, was encouraged and reauthorized.
A separate legislative effort was developed in mid-1993 by a group
of legislators including Representative Ronald Wyden and Senators
Edward Kennedy and Harris Wofford. They proposed a freestanding
bill that would also authorize state self-employment programs involving periodic payments. The sponsors requested and received support
from the Clinton administration for this bill which became an amendment to the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) implementation legislation (P.L. 103-182). As passed, the provisions expire
five years after enactment, in December 1998.
Title V of the NAFTA Implementation Act provides that states may
establish self-employment assistance (SEA) programs for unemployed
workers as part of their VI programs. To establish such plans, participating states must enact legislation conforming to the federallegislation. The states of California, Connecticut, Delaware, Maine,
Maryland, Minnesota, New Jersey, New York, Oregon, and Rhode
Island have enacted legislation. Other states are considering similar
legislative proposals. Self-employment programs can be initiated only
after a state implementation plan is approved by the Department of
Labor. On April 17, 1995, New York became the first state to implement a self-employment program. As of 1~97, programs were operational in California, Delaware, Maine, Maryland, New Jersey, New
York, and Oregon.
In states that operate SEA programs, VI claimants identified through
worker profiling are eligible to participate. State SEA programs provide participants with periodic (weekly or biweekly) self-employment
allowances during start-up of the self-employment activity. These support payments are the same weekly amounts that the VI claimant
would otherwise receive in benefits, but participants can work full-time
on starting their business enterprise instead of searching for wage and
salary jobs. They can also fully retain any after-tax earnings from selfemployment without any impact on their weekly self-employment sti-
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pend. The traditional UI work search provisions are waived and do not
act as a barrier to self-employment for UI recipients.
Technology and the Decline of Unemployment Insurance Local Offices
Background

State UI program staff serve a large population of beneficiaries
whose number varies inversely with the business cycle. In recent years,
between 8 and 10 million claimants annually have received benefits.
Funding for administration of the UI program, including staff salaries,
also varies with the business cycle. The total of personnel staffing UI
offices has fluctuated in recent years between 38,200 in 1990 (before
the last recession) and 48,200 in 1993. This variation has been largely
handled through the use of temporary employees. Among these workers, about two-thirds are front-line staff who deal directly with benefit
payments, while the others work in the UI tax revenue function.
Since UI administrative costs are paid for with funds held in the
U.S. Treasury, they must be appropriated by Congress. Of late, administrative funding of UI has come under increasing scrutiny. As the
information economy expands, Congress expects more administrative
efficiency. At the same time, there has been increased concern that the
UI system serve its customers-beneficiaries and employers-with
close personal attention that improves over time.
The result is a UI program under pressure to enhance administrative
performance while constrained by ever-dwindling financial resources.
Additionally, the UI program and all other federal programs have
begun to operate in accordance with the Government Performance and
Results Act of 1993, which requires the management of programs to
achieve measurable and objective performance outcomes. The centerpiece of improved UI operational efficiency has been a steady process
of automation. Simultaneously, there has been an effort to bring all
states up to an acceptable level of overall performance, while supporting continuous improvement in all states.
The Decline ofIn-Person Claims Taking

The local UI office still has the public image of a place with long
lines and lengthy waits to file for UI benefits. This image is perpetuated
by the repeated use of television news library film clips from the 1982
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recession showing long lines in large, urban UI offices. Such clips are
frequently shown when the latest UI initial claims figures are
announced. The present reality is much different. States have actively
pursued alternatives to in-person claims filing, which can improve customer service and reduce administrative costs. Swarms of claimants
rarely clog local UI offices today. Instead of coming to the local VI
office, individuals increasingly file claims by mail or telephone, or
employers file the claims for laid-off workers; alternatively, mass
applications for benefits are taken by local UI office staff at the site of
large layoffs. Claimants still filing in person find lines reduced by having their in-take interview scheduled in advance to reduce peak-load
problems, and by redesigned local offices and operational procedures.
As telephone initial claims spread, local office lines will disappear
altogether, and in many states there will be no physical local UI offices,
only "virtual" offices accessed by telephones and computers.
Originally, UI program operations were largely manual. Both initial
and continued claims were filed in person. The move away from inperson claims began in the 1960s and 1970s, with the acceptance of
continued claims by mail. Unemployed workers still initially filed for
benefits in local UI offices, but states began giving them continued
claims forms, which they could then mail in on a weekly or biweekly
basis. In the 1990s, interactive voice response units combined the
power of telephones and computers to allow individuals to call in their
continued UI claims. With touch-tone phones, claimants could now
dial up the UI system and enter the data requested.
Today, in all but two states, fewer than 25 percent of continued
claims are filed in person. All states allow at least some of their claimants to file continued claims by mail, and, as a result, nearly four-fifths
of claimants nationwide file continued claims that way. In addition, filing by telephone has rapidly begun to replace both claims by mail and
in person. Continued claims filed by telephone went from zero in 1991
to 11 percent by 1994. Meanwhile, in-person claims filing has steadily
declined, reaching 9 percent in 1994.
While in-person continued claims taking has gradually declined
over the past three decades with the spread of mail and telephone procedures, the taking of initial claims remained almost exclusively in person until the 1990s. States began to take some initial claims over the
telephone in the 1980s, but this was largely a low-volume, manual pro-
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cess, introduced in rural areas where geographically fixed local offices
could not cost-effectively serve the small number of widely dispersed
claimants. The taking of initial claims by telephone has recently gained
in popularity because of new communication technologies, budget
constraints on VI administrative funding, and new approaches to customer service. Colorado led the way by eliminating all of its local VI
offices in 1992, leaving ES offices open, but without any VI counterpart. Since then, other states -are following suit. California, Massachusetts, and Wisconsin are operating or implementing telephone initial
claim systems. Many other states are now actively involved in planning
or implementing remote initial claims taking.
The Changing Labor Force and Unemployment Insurance

For some time, permanent, full-time attachment to the labor force
among V.S. workers has been declining. There has been a corresponding increase in looser and more intermittent attachment. This has
meant a rise in the number of workers categorized as part-time, seasonal, intermittent, and low wage.
The VI program, at both the federal and state levels, has maintained
its traditional focus on providing strict insurance benefits for strongly
attached workers and has not adapted to these changes. This fact has
been discussed for decades. It was raised by the NCVC. More recently
it has been raised by the ACVC. The following are some potential policy options for adapting the VI system to the current labor market environment. Taken together, these proposals might help to adapt the VI
program to the changing nature of the labor force in the Vnited States.
1. Low-wage worker eligibility for VI: At present, all states, except
Washington State, determine VI eligibility using quarterly wages
during a one-year base period. This means that workers with
higher hourly earnings are eligible for VI with fewer hours
worked than are low-wage workers. A remedy for this situation
could be to base eligibility on quarterly or annual hours worked
instead of on quarterly earnings. The ACVC has recommended
that the annual amount worked be set at 800 hours-the equivalent of about two full days of work a week throughout a year.
To put this idea in perspective, one should note that the Canadian government has adopted a similar proposal involving hours
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worked. The Canadian plan ties the hours-of-work requirement to
the unemployment rate in the area. A claimant could be eligible
with as few as 420 hours of work in the base year if the regional
unemployment rate were 13.5 percent or more, or need at least
700 hours if the unemployment rate were below 5.5 percent. 2
2. Part-time worker eligibility: In most states, part-time workers
who are unemployed and seeking part-time work cannot receive
VI unless they are searching for full-time work. Thus, individuals
who chose to work part time are not eligible for VI. The ongoing
and continued part-time status of these workers could be recognized and encouraged by allowing previously part-time workers
to collect VI while they are again seeking part-time work.
3. Seasonal worker eligibility: In many states, the ability of seasonal
workers to receive VI benefits is limited. Fifteen states permit
workers in seasonal industries to collect VI only during the season in which the industry work is normally conducted. In addition, thirteen of these states do not allow earnings in seasonal
employment to count toward the monetary eligibility requirement, even if the worker subsequently works in a nonseasonal
job. The purpose of these provisions is to prevent workers with
only seasonal labor force attachment from collecting VI benefits
during the off-seasons.
Eligibility could be broadened by allowing the use of seasonal
wages for establishing eligibility, as long as workers also have
nonseasonal employment. The Wisconsin approach might be followed. Wisconsin allows workers to use seasonal wages if they
earned at least $200 in nonseasonal employment during the year
preceding the date of filing a VI claim.
4. Relatively recent labor force entrants: The standard base period,
geared to the cycle of wage record systems, is the first four of the
last five completed calendar quarters. With frequent movement
into and out of the labor force, labor force attachment may be too
recent to establish monetary eligibility using the standard base
period. Six states-Maine, Massachusetts, Ohio, Rhode Island,
Vermont and Washington-have responded to this situation by
allowing workers who are not able to qualify for benefits using
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the normal base period to use an alternate, and more recent, one.
It could be the last four completed calendar quarters or the most
recent 52 weeks. Vse of these more recent base periods generally
requires requesting recent wage and employment data from the
prior employer(s), rather than relying on previously reported
quarterly wage records.
The ACVC has recommended that such an alternative base
period be adopted nationwide. Recent estimates indicate that this
approach would increase VI beneficiaries by 6 to 8 percent and
raise total costs by 4 to 6 percent (Vroman 1995).
Another method for incorporating more recent wages would be
to accelerate the use of the lag quarter as part of the base period.
This approach would require employers to report employment
and wage data more rapidly. The state would process and use
these data for benefit eligibility determinations as soon as they
became available. This technique would have two advantages. It
would allow states to use the most recent four quarters of data
within one to two months after the end of a quarter. It would also
obviate the need for states to return to any wage request reporting
by employers. Employer wage requests result in added employer
and state agency administrative costs and in decreased data accuracy.
5. Expanding agricultural coverage: The VI system covers almost all
wage and salary workers except agricultural workers on small
farms. Eight states, including the major farm states of California,
Florida, and Texas, provide broader VI coverage of agricultural
work. While a percentage of American agricultural workers are
covered because they work on large farms or in states that already
provide small-farm coverage, the remaining workers on small
farms in other states are still left without the protection of VI benefits. The steps taken in the eight states might be used as models
for all states.
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Looking Ahead
Looking ahead to the future of the VI program, there seem to be at
least four major themes. First, given the national political environment,
the prospect for and likely scope of VI reform appear to be only modest in the near term. While the program is not likely to disappear or
shrink precipitously, it is also not likely to expand greatly.
Arguing for its continued existence is the widespread belief that the
VI program, like social security, is a social insurance critical to the
well-being of the American workforce and the V.S. economy. The VI
program is also likely to benefit from its highly decentralized form of
administration. Its cooperative federal-state partnership has frequently
been cited as a model working relationship between the states and the
federal government.
Yet, the program that survives is not likely to have much in the way
of enhancements in its benefit structure or increased revenues to fund
these benefits or program administration. The VI program grew for the
first three decades of its existence, but, in the 1970s to early 1980s, it
reached a peak from which little further development can be expected
in the near term.
The most uncertain area is extended benefits. It is not likely that
there will be reform of the permanent EB program prior to a recession,
if at all. It generally takes an economic downturn to draw congressional attention to the needs of constituents back home who experience
prolonged periods of unemployment. As noted, Congress has shown its
preference for creating temporary emergency unemployment benefit
programs in times of recession, and that may be its response to future
downturns. Nonetheless, the permanent EB program is moribund and
needs to be revived. It is good public policy to have an automatically
triggered, second-tier VI program available, such that Congress only
needs to add emergency extended programs during particularly severe
recessions.
Second, public policies regarding the tax system and administrative
financing are deficient and need repair. The taxable wage base has been
inadequate for many years and puts an undue burden on tax rates for
the system to remain solvent. Experience rating is limited and calls out
for improvements. Administrative financing is proving inadequate to
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process the benefit and tax function of the program. The federal budget
process needs to be modified to recognize that both the benefit and
administrative portions of the VI program should be treated as "mandatory" under federal budget law. Instead of being treated as a discretionary part of the VI program, administration should be treated as an
entitlement.
Third, the public and its elected officials are intent on getting "value
for money" in all government programs, including VI. The pressure of
budget deficits has heightened the emphasis for a solid return on
investment. For VI, this has meant increased concern about customer
service, meeting a set of outcome goals, and continuous improvements
in effectiveness and efficiency. As we have seen, the VI program has
been working to enhance efficiency for many years. It has been automating its processes for decades and is increasingly making use of
remote claims taking. Always relatively goal-oriented, it is becoming
more so. This trend is likely to continue.
At the same time, the VI system is likely to retain its emphasis on
program performance and on continuous improvement of that performance. Whereas, in the past, VI has tended to rely largely on objective
measures of customer service, in the future, it will also incorporate
measures of customer satisfaction, which will be used for program
assessment and policy development.
Finally, the issue of worker dislocation is likely to remain a major
concern to the VI program, as well as to the rest of the employment and
training system. The fact that the VI program sees most dislocated
workers when they first become unemployed is likely to keep the program at the focal point of the reemployment system. It is not anticipated that the VI program itself will provide or fund reemployment
services, but VI will probably continue to be a referral agency, identifying and sending dislocated workers to reemployment service providers.

NOTES
I A redesIgned CPS was Implemented m January 1994 and appears to have increased the
measured TUR somewhat; the ACUC recommendatIOn was based on the old CPS methodology
2. See Government of Canada 1995. ThIS provlSlon was implemented on January 5, 1997 It
also mcludes a higher hours reqUIrement of 900 hours for reentrants and new entrants to the labor
force
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Appendix A
Significant Benefit Provisions
of State Unemployment Insurance Laws
January 1, 1996
Unemployment insurance programs, which operate in the fifty states, Washington, D.C., Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands, encompass tremendous variety in benefit provisions. ThIS appendix offers a summary of the differences in
a way that is limited but suggestive of the wide range of benefit provisions in
effect across the country.
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Table A.l State Minimum and Maximum Weekly Benefit Amount (WBA)
and State Minimum and Maximum Potential Duration of
Benefits for Total Unemployment on January 1, 1996
State

Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
CalifornIa
Colorado
ConnectIcut
Delaware
DC
Honda
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
IllinOIs
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
LOUIsiana
Mame
Maryland
Massachusetts
MichIgan
Minnesota
MissisSIPPI
Missoun
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New MexIco
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota
OhIO

Minimum
WBA 3

Maximum
WBA b

Minimum
DurationC

Maximum
Duration

$22
44-68
40
47
40
25
15-25
20
50

180
212-284
185
264
230
272
350-400
300
359
250
205
347
248
251-322
217
224-274
260
238
181
202-303
250
347-521
293
303
180
175
228
184
237
216
362
212
300
297
243
253-339

15
16
12
9
14

26
26
26
26
26
26
26
26
26
26
26
26
26
26
26
26
26
26
26
26
26
30
26
26
26
26
26
26
26
26
26
26
26
26
26
26

10

37
5
44

51
87
33-40
65
22
10

35-52
25-33
14-21
42
38
30
45
57
20
16
32
60
42
40
25
43
66

13

26
24
20
10

9
26
10

26
8
11
10

15
26
21
26
10

15
10
13
11

8
20
12
26
15
19
26
13

12
20
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State
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Puerto Rico
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virgmia
Virgin Islands
Washington
West VIrginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming

Minimum
WBAa
16
70
35-40
7
41-51
20
28
30
42
17
25
65
32
75
24
52
16

Maximum
WBA b
247
301
352-360
133
324-404
213
180
200
252
263
212
208
214
350
290
274
233

Minimum
DurationC
20
4
16
26
15
15
15
12
9
10
26
12
13
16
26
12
12

Maximum
Duration
26
26
26
26
26
26
26
26
26
26
26
26
26
30
26
26
26

SOURCE. US Department of Labor, "ComparIson of State Unemployment Insurance Laws,"
Employment and TraInIng AdministratIOn, Unemployment Insurance Service, 1995
a. When two amounts are given, the higher figure Includes dependents' allowances Augmented
amount for the mInimUm weekly benefit amount (WBA) mcludes allowances for one dependent
chIld
b. Augmented amount for the maximum WBA includes allowances for maximum number of
dependents. In the DistrIct of Columbia, Maryland, and New Jersey the maximum IS not affected
by dependents.
c Potential duratIOn of benefits for claImants who qualIfy for mInimum WBA with IUlnimum
qualIfyIng wages.

Appendix B
Selected Unemployment Insurance Financial Data
The tables below are intended to summarize state unemployment insurance
transactions. Table B.1lists data for each state in 1995, the most recent year for
which data are available, and table B.2 lists similar data for the nation as a
whole in each year dating back to the beginning of the federal-state unemployment insurance (UI) system. The tables show the total amount collected in tax
contributions, the amount distributed in benefits, the reserves at year end, and
the percentages of total covered payrolls represented by each.
Beginning in 1972, some employers, mainly nonprofit firms, could opt to
provide UI on a reimbursable basis, rather than facing the regular state UI tax
schedule. Reimbursing employers are essentially fully experience rated and
have no net effect on trust funds. Therefore, figures in the summary tables of
this appendix include only taxable employers and exclude reimbursable employers.
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Table B.l Selected Unemployment Insurance Financial Data by State, Calendar Year 1995
Contributions
Benefits paid
Estimated
collected a
average employer
amount
Amount
tax rate
(thousands
(percent of
(thousands
Percent of
of dollars)
total wages)
of dollars)
total wages
State
$21,972,163
.86
$20,119,898
Umted States
.80

-J
tv

Reserves as of January 31
Amount
(thousands
of dollars)
$35,403,296

Percent of
total wages
lAO

129,795

.37

177,607

.53

534,470

1.61

Alaska

91,354

1.71

114,124

2.02

201,017

3.56

Anzona

216,013

.61

149,997

042

534,640

1.48

Arkansas

163,094

.88

155,585

.87

200,866

1.12
0.68

Alabama

2,825,654

.96

2,963,739

.96

2,104,220

Colorado

185,487

47

179,307

480,582

1.22

Connecticut

544,012

1.26

435,310

116,692

0.27

70,336

86

60,232

046
1.00
.72

271,807

3.24

DIstrict of
Columbia

123,936

.92

94,750

.78

68,636

0.57

634,534

.54

1,806,432

1.53

270,382

.38

1,453,118

2.03

180,435

1.75

213,496

2.07

1.09

243,090

2.88

Cahfornia

Delaware

Flonda

694,134

GeorgIa

352,260

Hawall

150,249

Illinois

1,367,931

.58
048
1.60
.92
1.01

1,075,674

.80

1,629,210

1.22

IndIana

232,239

Al

223,869

.39

1,228,070

2.16

Iowa

122,109

.51

152,972

.65

725,149

3.10

54,852

.16

.56

704,008

2.88

Idaho

Kansas

74,621

91,741

137,144

00

.72

470,826

1.61

138,302

043

1,003,378

3.15

101,506

1.13

95,289

1.06

331,332

.75

605,415

1.36

1.43

731,615

.97

527,273

0.70

Kentucky

222,643

.75

Louisiana

205,428

.64

Maine

116,393

1.27

Maryland

493,048

1.08

Massachusetts

1,074,938

MichIgan

211,389

1,389,706

1.34

843,181

.82

1,497,688

1045

Minnesota

398,020

.79

328,442

.67

459,621

0.94

MissiSSIPPI
Missouri

135,159

.77

111,931

.65

551,318

3.19

362,615

.70

271,915

.55

196,933

0040

Montana

56,651

.95

53,472

.91

122,242

2.08

Nebraska

37,881

.27

44,288

.33

194,283

1.45

153,172

.89

143,123

.81

297,866

1.69

58,232

048

34,984

.31

250,884

2.25

1,115,631

.87

1,253,780

1.30

1,987,790

2.06

81,067

.73

65,176

.60

354,874

3.25

2,045,217

1.02

1,988,026

.99

248,978

0.12

North Carolina

196,848

.28

315,503

047

1,531,117

2.27

North Dakota

25,174

.61

30,35~

.75

57,415

1.41

Nevada
New HampshIre
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York

Ohio

982,877

.91

647,673

.59

1,600,533

1.46

Oklahoma

112,889

049

100,069

044

521,683

2.32

Oregon

188,726

.85

339,991

1.20

905,985

3.21

1,747,964

1.57

1,475,508

1.37

1,914,777

1.78

146,470

1.52

220,954

2.34

634,291

6.71

Pennsylvama
Puerto

RiCO

(contmued)

-...J
IV
\0

-.....I

Table B.1 (continued)

State

w

0

Contributions
collected8
amount
(thousands
of dollars)

Estimated
average employer
tax rate
(percent of
total wages)

Benefits paid

Reserves as of January 31

Amount
(thousands
of dollars)

Percent of
total wages

Amount
(thousands
of dollars)

Percent of
total wages

Rhode Island

170,562

2.07

182,083

2.20

110,086

1.33

South Carolina

189,268

.63

170,827

.57

556,650

1.84

9,873

.21

13,029

.27

51,622

1.09

Tennessee

275,087

.55

256,409

.52

822,821

1.66

Texas

930,927

.54

584,866

0.34

South Dakota

997,812

.60

Utah

86,228

.55

58,684

.37

468,030

2.93

Vermont

44,037

.95

46,725

1.02

206,720

4.51

Virginia

281,661

.45

201,491

.32

788,787

1.27

6,558

1.44

7,821

1.34

40,064

6.86

Washmgton

600,024

1.16

793,643

1.64

1,417,701

2.93

West Virginia

122,117

1.08

133,056

1.16

164,036

1.44

Wisconsin

419,376

.84

416,647

.85

1,503,641

3.06

Wyoming

24,735

.73

28,640

.85

142,310

4.22

Virgm Islands

SOURCE U S. Department of Labor, Employment and Trammg AdmImstration, Unemployment Insurance Service.
a. ContnbutIOns collected mclude contnbutIOns and penalties from employers and employee contnbutIOns m states that tax workers In 1996, employee
contnbutions were only collected m Alaska, New Jersey, and Pennsylvama. In years pnor to 1996, employee contnbutIOns were collected at times in Alabama, CalIfornia, Indiana, Kentucky, LOUiSiana, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Rhode Island.

Table D.2 Selected Unemployment Insurance Financial Data lbr the United States, 1938-95
Contributions
Estimated
Benefits paid
collected 3
average employer
amount
tax rate
Amount
(thousands
(percent of
(thousands
Percent of
Year
of dollars)
of dollars)
total wages)
total wages
1938
818,501
2.69
393,783
1.50
1939

824,876

2.66

429,298

1.47

Reserves as of January 31
Amount
(thousands
of dollars)

Percent of
total wages

1,110,625

4.22

1,537,797

5.28

1940

853,780

2.50

518,700

1.60

1,817,110

5.60

1941

1,006,328

2.37

344,324

.82

2,524,463

5.99

1942

1,139,333

1.98

344,083

.63

3,387,888

6.19

1943

1,325,423

1.86

79,644

.12

4,715,510

7.13

1944

1,317,049

1.67

62,384

.09

6,071,925

8.78

1945

1,161,883

1.50

445,867

.67

6,914,010

10.38

1946

911,836

1.24

1,094,845

1.49

6,860,044

9.35

1947

1,095,522

1.19

755,142

.90

7,303,287

8.44

1948

999,635

1.01

789,931

.82

7,602,964

7.91

1949

986,906

1.07

1,735,991

1.85

7,009,585

7.47

1950

1,191,435

1.18

1,373,113

1.33

6,972,181

6.76

lY51

1,492,506

1.20

840,411

.71

7,781,930

6.56
6.52

1952

1,367,676

1.08

998,238

.78

8,327,427

1953

1,347,632

.93

962,219

.69

8,912,680

6.41

1954

1,136,151

.79

2,026,868

1.48

8,218,954

6.00

1955

1,208,788

.81

1,350,264

.91

8,260,724

5.56
(contmued)

......:J

w

Table 8.2 (continued)
Contributions
collected 3
amount
(thousands
of dollars)
Year

-..I

w

tv

Reserves as of January 31

Estimated
average employer
tax rate
(percent of
total wages)

Benefits paid
Amount
(thousands
of dollars)

Percent of
total wages

Amount
(thousands
of dollars)

Percent of
total wages

1956

1,463,261

.88

1,380,728

.84

8,573,431

5.21

1957

1,544,233

.85

1,733,876

1.00

8,659,312

4.99

1958

1,470,841

.84

3,512,732

2.05

6,831,292

3.99

1959

1,955,664

10.60

2,279,018

1.22

6,674,297

3.57

1960

2,288,440

1.15

2,726,849

1.40

6,418,822

3.29
2.80
2.84

1961

2,449,942

1.24

3,422,558

1.72

5,567,780

1962

2,951,841

1.39

2,675,565

1.26

6,038,626

1963

3,018,817

1.34

2,775,222

1.24

6,421,119

2.88

1964

3,047,288

1.26

2,521,575

1.05

7,090,270

2.96

1965

3,053,646

1.18

2,166,011

.84

8,172,316

3.17

1966

3,030,126

1.05

1,771,292

.62

9,664,712

3.40

1967

2,678,119

.86

2,092,364

.69

10,705,198

3.54

1968

2,551,573

.76

2,029,957

.61

11,715,954

3.54
346

1969

2,545,161

.69

2,125,809

.58

12,636,017

1970

2,505,814

.64

3,847,312

1.01

11,902,575

3.11

1971

2,636,599

.64

4,951,507

1.23

9,725,314

2.41

1972

3,896,620

.88

4,481,854

.98

9,402,983

2.06

1973

4,995,166

.99

4,005,191

.79

10,882,144

2.13

1974

5,218,967

.92

5,977,411

1.06

10,520,181

1.87

3,070,231

1975

5,210,855

.88

11,753,643

2.01

1976

7,532,078

1.20

8,972,637

1977

9,170,529

1.28

8,345,948

1.38
1.16

1978

11,193,446

1.41

7,722,347

.93

8,556,908
13,768,135

.91

8,582,608

0.91

1.34

6,591,827

0.64
0.50
(0.23)

1979

12,095,041

1.26

1980

11,414,649

1.06

0.52

871,380

0.13

950,381

0.13

4,554,185

1981

11,624,545

1.02

13,221,592

1.17

5,644,584

1982

12,206,070

1.03

20,649,840

1.76

(2,644,584)

1983

14,548,669

0.20

17,755,392

1.44

(5,803,331)

1984

18,111,266

12,598,229

.92

2,204,797

0.55

(0.47)
0.16

1985

19,296,983

1.39
1.30

14,124,342

.96

10,069,416

0.68

1986

18,111,266

1.14

15,402,735

.99

15,402,260

0.99

1987

17,576,976

1.04

13,617,007

.81

23,174,690

1.38

1988

17,720,628

.96

12,579,703

.69

31,103,671

1.71

1989

16,451,876

.84

13,641,569

.71

36,870,882

1.92

1990

15,221,274

.73

1.88

14,510,670

.71

.86
1.20

37,937,017

1991

17,320,777
24,582,501

30,488,785

1.49

1992

16,972,655

.79

23,956,510

25,846,579

1.19

1993

19,831,045

20,687,678

28,001,956

1.25

1994

21,802,096

.90
.92

1.10
92

20,438,509

.86

31,343,551

1995

21,972,163

.86

20,119,898

.80

35,403,296

1.32
1.40

SOURCE U.S. Department of Labor, Employment and Traimng AdministratiOn, Unemployment Insurance SerVice.
a Contributions collected include contnbutlOns and penalties from employers and employee contributions in states that tax workers In 1996, employee
contnbutlOns were only collected in Alaska, New Jersey, and Pennsylvama. In years pnor to 1996, employee contributlOns were collected at times in Alabarna, California, Indiana, Kentucky, LOUiSiana, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Rhode Island
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